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UNIVERSAL HISTORY
AMERICANISED;

OR,

AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE WORLD,

FROM THE EARLIEST RECORDS TO THE YEAR 1808.

WITH A PARTICULAR REFERENCE

TO THE

STATE OF SOCIETY, LITERATURE, RELIGION, AND FORM OF GOVERNMENT,

IN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

BY DAVID RAMSAY, M. D.

TO WHICH IS ANNEXED,

A SUPPLEMENT,

CONTAINING

A BRIEF VIEW OF HISTORY,

FROM THE YEAR 1808 TO THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.

"Life is so short, and time so valuable, that it were happy for us if all "great works were reduced to their quintessence." *Sir William Jones.*

"Primaque ab origine mundi
"Ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen." *Ovid.*

IN TWELVE VOLUMES.

VOL. IV.

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RAMSAY'S

UNIVERSAL HISTORY.

GREECE—*Continued.*

FROM this scene of bloodshed and desolation, we proceed to another still more shocking. In the island of Corcyra, since its connection with Athens, the democratical had been the prevailing interest. In the sea fight with the Corinthians off Sybota, a number of Corcyræans of rank had been made prisoners; when it became the policy of the Corinthian government to conciliate, in the hope, through them, to bring over Corcyra to the Peloponnesian confederacy. The Corcyræan nobles were set at liberty. Every Corcyræan was solicited, separately, for his support in the general assembly, to a question, for renouncing the Athenian alliance, and renewing the ancient connection of Corcyra with Corinth, its mother city. Success in this intrigue was various; but party soon became warm, and the whole island was in commotion. The democratical leaders, in alarm, sent information to Athens; and the Athenian government dispatched ministers to watch over the interests of the commonwealth in Corcyra. It happened that ministers from Corinth arrived nearly at the same time. An assembly of the Corcyræan people was held in presence of both; the question concerning the alliance was discussed; and the Corinthians so far prevailed, that though it was resolved to maintain the alliance with Athens, it was nevertheless resolved to maintain peace with Peloponnessus.

How far it might have been possible for the aristocratical party to stop there, and preserve quiet, we have not means to judge; but that no discreet zeal directed their following measures, amply appears. A prosecution was commenced against Peithias, chief of the democratical party, and a public guest of the Athenian commonwealth. The vague accusation urged against him was, "that he had subjected, or endeavoured to subject his country to Athens." He was acquitted. It was then, perhaps, necessary for him to ruin those, who would have ruined him; and the interest which had enabled him to repel the attack, would be likely to give him means of revenge. He accused five of the wealthiest of the aristocratical party of cutting stakes in the sacred groves of Jupiter and Alcinous. Superstition furnished the crime, and party spirit decided upon the fact. The five were all condemned in fines to an amount that would reduce them to indigence. Immediate payment or imprisonment was the alternative, to be avoided only by flight, or by taking refuge at the altars. They chose the latter expedient. Peithias, more master in the supreme council in consequence of the absence of the five, procured a resolution for proposing to the people an alliance offensive as well as defensive with Athens. The suppliants, looking upon their ruin, and that of their party as complete, if it should be carried; in the rage of despair quitted the altars; collected some of their adherents; armed themselves with daggers; and rushing into the council hall, killed Peithias, with others, some counsellors, some private persons, to the number of sixty. Those counsellors of the democratical party, who avoided the massacre, fled for refuge to the Athenian trireme which lay in the harbour.

The five were no sooner thus masters of the council, than they summoned an assembly of the people; acknowledged what they had done; and claimed merit from it, as that alone could save the commonwealth from subjection to Athens; and then immediately proposed a decree for maintaining a strict neutrality; for refusing to admit more than one ship of war at a time, belonging to either of the belligerent powers; and for declaring any attempt to introduce more into any port of Corcyra, an act of hostility. Their own influence was exten-

sive; their opponents were intimidated, and without a head; the decree, moderate in its purposes, was carried. Ministers were then dispatched to Athens, to apologize, as far as might be, to the Athenian government for what had passed. Instead of being received at Athens, they were apprehended as rebels and sent in custody to Ægina.

Meanwhile, the aristocratical party in Corcyra, encouraged by the arrival of a Corinthian ship, attacked, and in a moment overpowered their opponents, who maintained themselves in some of the higher parts of the town. Collecting then their strength, they took possession of one of the ports of the city called the Hyllaic. The aristocratical party held the agora, and the principal post. Next day, both sent detachments into the country to invite the peasant slaves to their assistance, with promises of freedom. In this the democratical party had the greater success. The nobles, on the other hand, obtained eight hundred Epirot auxiliaries from the continent. In the course of the day, light skirmishes passed with missile weapons.

On the next day but one, matters were brought to a crisis. System was now in some degree restored, in the conduct of the affairs of the democratical party; and leaders were become settled in command and influence, in the room of those, who had been assassinated; they were superior in numbers, and within the city, they possessed the more commanding situations. With these advantages they attacked their opponents; and such was the effect of party spirit, that even the women took a zealous part in the action, throwing bricks and tiles from the house tops, and supporting the tumult of battle, with a resolution beyond their nature. Late in the evening the aristocratical party were compelled to yield: and fearing that their opponents might become masters of the naval arsenal and the port, they set fire to all the buildings about the agora, sparing neither their own houses, nor those of others; so that besides dwellings, many warehouses full of valuable merchandize, were consumed; and had any wind blown toward the city, the whole would have been destroyed. The conflagration effectually checked pursuit, and prevented that immediate destruction which the aristocratical party had

apprehended; but their affairs, nevertheless, suffered from the defection of their friends.

On the next day, Nicostratus, commander of the Athenian squadron, arrived in the harbour of Corcyra with twelve triremes, and five hundred heavy-armed Messenians. His purpose, of course, was to support the democratical, which was the Athenian party; but, in the present circumstances, his arrival gave greater joy to the defeated nobles, who dreaded nothing so much as the unrestrained revenge of their fellow-citizens. Nor did he deceive their expectation: proposing a treaty, he succeeded in mediating an agreement, by which it was determined, that ten only, who were named as the most guilty of the nobles, should be brought to trial, and that the rest should retain all their rights as citizens, under a democratical government. He provided then, that even the selected ten should have opportunity to escape; and thus, a sedition begun with the most outrageous violence, was composed in a manner little heard of in Grecian annals, totally without bloodshed. The proposal for a league offensive and defensive with Athens, was carried without opposition.

Nicostratus would then have returned with his whole squadron to Naupactus; but to ensure the continuance of quiet, the democratical leaders requested, that he would leave five of his ships, undertaking to supply him with as many of their own, completely manned. The magistrates, whose office it was to appoint citizens for this service, thought to gain farther security against fresh commotion, by selecting many of the aristocratical party. Unfortunately, a suspicion arose among these, that the pretence of service was only a feint; that the purpose was to send them to Athens; where, under the sovereign people, they expected no favourable treatment. Under this persuasion, they betook themselves as suppliants to the temple of Castor and Pollux, which no assurances from Nicostratus could persuade them to quit. This extreme mistrust excited suspicion among the democratical party. Arming themselves, they broke into the houses of the nobles to seize their arms; and they would have proceeded to bloodshed, if Nicostratus had not prevented them. The alarm of the aristocratical party then became universal, and four hun-

dred took sanctuary in the temple of Juno. All the labours of Nicostratus to restore peace and harmony were thus frustrated: for mutual jealousy prevented the possibility of accommodation. While the suppliants of Juno feared assassination should they quit their sanctuary, and starving if they remained, their opponents were apprehensive of some sudden blow meditated by them. To prevent this, therefore, they proposed to remove them to a small island, not far from the shore, near which the temple stood; promising not only safety, but regular supplies of provisions. The utter inability of the suppliants in any way to help themselves induced them to consent.

In this state affairs had rested four or five days, when a Peloponnessian fleet, of fifty-three ships of war, commanded by Alcidas, arrived in sight. After some partial skirmishes, Alcidas received intelligence, by fire signals, that a fleet of sixty Athenian ships of war was approaching. Immediately he got under way, and passed undiscovered to Peloponnessus.

No sooner were the Corcyræan people assured of the approach of the Athenian fleet, and the flight of the Peloponnessian, than measures were deliberately taken for perpetrating one of the most horrid massacres recorded in history. The Messenians were now introduced within the walls. The fleet was then directed to pass from the town port to the Hyllaic port. In the way, all of the aristocratical party among the crews, were thrown overboard, and in the same instant, massacre began in the city. The suppliants only, in the temple of Juno, remained protected by that superstitious dread, which so generally possessed the Greeks, of temporal evil from the vengeance of the gods, for affronts to themselves; while no apprehension was entertained for the grossest violation of any moral duty. The fear of starving, nevertheless, induced about fifty of them, on the persuasion of their opponents, to quit their situation, and submit to a trial. They were all summarily condemned, and instantly executed. Their miserable friends in the sanctuary, informed of their fate, yielded to extreme despair: some killed each other within the temple; some hanged themselves on the trees of

the adjoining sacred grove; all, in some way, put a hasty end to their wretchedness. In the city and through the island, the scene of murder was not so quickly closed. For seven days the democratical party continued hunting out and massacring their opponents.

The Athenian admiral, Eurymedon, lay in the harbour with his powerful fleet, the quiet and apparently approving spectator of these disgraceful transactions; and not till the democratical Corcyræans had carried revenge to the utmost, sailed away. The impolicy of his conduct seems to have been equal to its inhumanity. Nicostratus, interfering as a generous mediator, had put Corcyra into a situation to be a valuable ally to Athens. The licence which Eurymedon gave to massacre all, who were supposed adverse to the Athenian interest, had a very different effect. About five hundred escaped. They took possession of some forts and lands, which had belonged to the Corcyræan people, on the continent opposite to their island; and thence, with all the activity that the spirit of revenge, the thirst of plunder, and the desire of recovering their ancient possessions could excite, they carried on hostilities against Corcyra; seizing ships,—making descents on the coast,—living by depredation—and destroying whatever they could not carry off. After this experience of the weakness of their adversaries, they determined to attempt the recovery of the island; and with a few auxiliaries, who made their whole number only six hundred, debarked on Corcyra. Immediately on landing in Corcyra, they determined to maintain themselves, or die; and to prevent all hopes of return, they burnt the vessels, in which they had transported themselves, and which had hitherto rendered them both powerful and successful. They then occupied and fortified Mount Istone, and from that advantageous post, issuing as opportunity offered, they compelled their adversaries to confinement within their walls, and themselves commanded the country. Thus, the warmth of temper, which perpetually engaged, not only these islanders, but the Grecians generally, in party disputes and petty quarrels, unfitted them for great objects: insomuch, that they were continually employing for mutual destruction, abilities and courage, which,

with more political union, might have enabled them to defend their independency for ever against the world.

In every republic, and almost in every city, the intriguing and ambitious found the ready protection of Athens, or of Sparta, according as their selfish and guilty designs were screened, under the pretence of maintaining the prerogatives of the nobles, or asserting the privileges of the people. A virtuous and moderate aristocracy, an equal, impartial freedom were the colourings which served to justify violence, and varnish guilt. Sheltered by the specious coverings of fair names, the prodigal assassin delivered himself from the importunity of his creditor. The father, with unnatural cruelty, punished the licentious extravagance of his son; the son, avenged by parricide, the stern severity of his father. The debates of the public assembly were decided by the sword. Not satisfied with victory, men thirsted for blood. This general disorder overwhelmed laws, human and divine. The ordinary course of events was reversed: sentiments lost their natural force, and words their usual meaning. Dulness and stupidity triumphed over abilities and refinement, for while the crafty and ingenious were laying fine spun snares for enemies, men of blunter minds had immediate recourse to the sword and poignard.

In the beginning of the ensuing winter, the pestilence again broke out in Athens. It had never yet entirely ceased, though, after the two first years, there had been a remission; but in the renewal of its fury, it seems to have worn itself out, and we hear of it no more. In its whole course, it carried off not less than four thousand four hundred of those Athenians in the prime of life, who were enrolled among the heavy armed; and three hundred men of the higher rank, who served in the cavalry. Of the multitude of other persons, who perished by it, no means existed for ascertaining the number.

Notwithstanding that pestilence, which had so reduced the strength of the commonwealth; notwithstanding the loss of those talents, which had prepared its resources during peace, and directed them, during the two first years of hostility: Athens was advancing towards a superiority, which promised, under able conduct in the administration, to be decisive.

Indeed such had been the energy of the Athenian government, directed for near a century by a succession of men of uncommon abilities, that, notwithstanding the inferiority of the present leaders, it was scarcely perceived to slacken. Democracy, though a bad regulator, is a powerful spring. The highest offices in Athens were now open to the lowest people. Great competition of course arose, and one consequence was, that men of rank and education, however unambitious, were forced to put themselves forward in public business, that they might avoid being trodden upon by their inferiors. Thus, Nicias seems to have been rather compelled by circumstances, than induced by his own inclination, to accept the situation in which he was placed. He had succeeded Pericles in the office of commander in chief. His cautious temper led him always to chuse commands where success might be certain, though the glory would be small: not from any defect of personal, but of political courage; he was less afraid of the swords of enemies, than of the voices of his fellow citizens. After the reduction of Lesbos, he had conducted the Athenian forces against a fortified islet, called Minoa, at the mouth of the harbour of Nisæa, the sea port of Megara. It was, without much difficulty, taken; and a garrison was left in it. The purpose was, to curb more effectually the Megarian privateers which annoyed the Athenian trade.

In the present summer it was determined to send out two expeditions. Having a navy that commanded the seas, the Athenians had leisure and means to prosecute offensive operations. Nicias with a fleet of sixty triremes went to the island of Melos, whose people rejected the Athenian alliance, and refused to pay tribute. It was expected that the waste of their lands would have brought them to submission; but the Melians shutting themselves within their walls with a a declared determination not to treat, the tedious business of a siege was postponed for another enterprise. Passing to Oropus, on the confines of Bœotia, Nicias landed his forces by night, and marched immediately to Tanagra. The next day was spent in ravaging the Tanagræan lands. On the following days, the Tanagræans, reinforced by a small body of Thebans, ventured an action, but were defeated. Nicias

proceeded with the fleet to the Locrian coast, plundered and destroyed what was readily within reach, and then returned home. The expedition, indeed, seems to have had no valuable object. Apparently, the principal purpose was to acquire a little popularity to the leaders, and obviate clamour against them, by retaliating the evils of invasion on those of their enemies, who were most within reach, and by holding out the recompense of pillage, to gratify the vulgar mind.

The purpose of the other expedition was to support the allies and extend the influence of Athens in the western parts of Greece. In pursuance of this design, Demosthenes undertook to subdue Etolia. Always numbered among the members of the Greek nation, yet, even in that age, when science and art were approaching meridian splendor in Attica, scarcely sixty miles from their borders, the Etolians were a most rude people. Since the Trojan war, barbarism, rather than civilization, seemed to have gained among them. They lived scattered in unfortified villages; they spoke a dialect scarcely intelligible to the other Greeks; and one clan of them, at least, was said to feed on raw flesh; they used only light arms; yet their warlike character stood high.

Demosthenes entered Etolia, took and plundered the towns, and drove the inhabitants before him. During several days he marched unresisted; but the Etolians, living in a country abounding in defiles, and involved in woods, though irregular and desultory in their warfare, yet employing a species of bush fighting, not unlike to that, which, two and twenty centuries afterwards, has been used by the American Indians, defeated the regularly disciplined heroes of Athens; and Demosthenes was obliged to take refuge in Naupactus. The Athenian general, however, soon found means to irritate those barbarians to venture a contest in the plains, and with great ease obtained a signal victory.

By the activity and able conduct of Demosthenes in prosecuting his western conquests, the face of things was soon completely changed in that region. The Athenian affairs were restored, as if the disaster in Etolia had never happened, and the Peloponnesian cause was in a far worse situation,

than before any force from Peloponnesus was sent into the country.

The Athenians were now so familiarised to the invasion and waste of Attica, and to the inconvenience of confinement within their fortifications, that the eloquence and authority of Pericles had ceased to be necessary for persuading them to bear them. The want of his wisdom, and the want of his authority, were, however, felt in the general conduct of affairs.

Nothing, during the whole war, happened so contrary to the general opinion and expectation of the Greeks as the surrender of the Lacedæmonians at the siege of Pylus; for it was supposed, that neither hunger, nor the pressure of any other the severest necessity would induce them to surrender their arms.

The prisoners, being many of them connected with the first families of Sparta, were considered by the Athenians as most valuable pledges. It was determined, by a decree of the people, that they should be kept in chains till the two republics should come to some accommodation, unless any invasion of Attica should be attempted by the Peloponnesians. In that case the decree declared, in terror to the Lacedæmonians, that they should be put to death. Such were at that time the maxims of warfare among those, who boasted to be the most civilized, and indeed the only civilized people upon earth; and such the motives for preferring death in the field, to the condition, so mild in modern times, of a prisoner of war.

By the issue of the affair of Pylus, the Lacedæmonians were in a state of distress totally new to them. From the first establishment of their ancestors in Peloponnesus, it was not known, by tradition, that such a number of their citizens had fallen into the hands of an enemy; and it was as little remembered, that an enemy had ever possessed a post within their country. Pylus was now so fortified, that as long as it was open to supplies by sea, no mode of attack by land with which the Lacedæmonians were acquainted, would be effectual against it. In this situation of things the Lace-

dæmonian government, anxiously desirous of peace, expected only insult from the haughty temper of their enemy, should they send ministers publicly to propose terms. They made, however, repeated trials by secret negotiation. The wiser and more moderate Athenians, and those of higher rank in general, would gladly have profited by present prosperity to make an advantageous accommodation. But the arrogance of the people, fed by success and inflamed by the boisterous eloquence of Cleon, now the popular favourite, made all endeavours for the salutary purpose fruitless.

About this time the tragedy of the Corcyræan sedition was brought to a conclusion. Eurymedon and Sophocles, making Corcyra in their way from Pylus, debarked their forces, and, with the Corcyræans of the city, stormed the fort on mount Istone held by the aristocratical Corcyræans, most of whom, nevertheless, escaped to a neighbouring eminence so difficult of approach, that it was inexpugnable. Being, however, without means to subsist there, they were soon obliged to surrender their auxiliaries to the discretion of the besieging army, and themselves to that of the Athenian people. Eurymedon and Sophocles placed them in the adjacent little island of Plychiæ, as on their parole, with the condition, that if any one should attempt escape, the benefit of the capitulation should be forfeited for all. The chiefs of the democratical Corcyræans feared, that their fellow citizens of superior rank (were the Athenian people to decree their doom) might, yet, escape death. They devised therefore a fraud, to seduce them to their own destruction. Persons were employed to infuse apprehension, that the Athenian generals intended to deliver them to the Corcyræan people, offering at the same time to provide a vessel in which they might escape from what, they beyond all things, abhorred. The prisoners gave into the snare, and were taken in the ship. The capitulation was thus undeniably broken, and the Athenian generals surrendered the wretched remains of the Corcyræan aristocrats, to the pleasure of their people. These, then, resolved that their revenge should be completed, and that as far as might be consistent with public order, the utmost indulgence for that passion should be allowed to every indivi-

dual, among the sovereign multitude. The prisoners were placed all in one large building. The people, in arms, formed a lane at the door. Twenty of their unfortunate adversaries, bound together, were brought out at a time. Men with scourges drove on any that hesitated, while the armed citizens selected for revenge, those to whom they bore any ill will, cutting and stabbing as the passion of the moment excited. Sixty had been thus killed, when the rest received intimation of what had been passing. Calling then aloud to the Athenians to put them to death, if such was their pleasure, they declared, they would neeither go out of the building, nor permit any to come in. The people, not to encounter their despair, got upon the roof, and taking off the covering, thence in safety discharged missile weapons. The prisoners endeavoured at first to defend themselves; but when night came on, no symptom appearing of any relaxation in the animosity of their enemies, they determined to put the finishing stroke to their own misery: some strangled themselves with the cords of some beds, which were in the place, some with strips of their own clothes, some used the weapons which had been discharged at them. When day broke, all were found dead. The corpses, heaped upon wagons, were carried out of the city; and disposed of without any of those funeral ceremonies, which among the Greeks were held of such sacred importance.

The taking of Anactorium finished the successes of the Athenian arms, and the operations of the war for the summer. Being attacked by the Athenian force from Naupactus in conjunction with the Acarnanians, it was betrayed into their hands. The inhabitants, a Corinthian colony, underwent no severer fate than expulsion from their settlement, and the loss of all their property. Their houses and lands were occupied by a new colony, drawn from the several towns of Acarnania.

Spring advancing, the Lacedæmonians, depressed by their misfortunes, remained inactive; but, in Athens, while many were still desirous of peace, the more restless and ardent spirits prevailed; and it was determined to push success, and press the Peloponnesians on all sides. The island of Cythera

was a very important appendage of the Lacedæmonian dominion. The lands were all possessed by Lacedæmonians; the government was administered by a magistracy sent, annually, from Sparta; and a Spartan garrison was constantly kept there. Against this island, an armament sailed under the command of Nicias, and Autocles. The garrison and inhabitants were quickly compelled to surrender without any condition, but for their lives only.

The Athenians, sailing from Cythera, proceeded to take their last revenge of the unfortunate Æginetans, now established at Thyrea, without the territory, and under the immediate protection of Lacedæmon. Nicias, landing his whole force, quickly overpowered them, and all who did not fall in the assault, became prisoners at discretion; together with their Lacedæmonian governor, Tantalus, who had been wounded. Thyrea, being stripped of every thing valuable, was burnt, and the armament returned with the booty and prisoners to Athens. A despotic multitude was then to decide the fate of that miserable remnant of a Grecian people, once declared by an oracle, and confessed by all Greece the most meritorious of the Greek nation, for their actions in its common defence against the Persians, the most formidable enemy that ever assailed it. What few individual tyrants could have thought of without horror, the Athenian people directed by a deliberate decree. The law, indeed, established by the Lacedemonians, and sealed with the blood of the unfortunate Platæans, was but too closely followed, and the Æginetans all executed. Tantalus was added to the number of living pledges obtained at Sphacteria, for the security of Attica.

Another decision then waited the pleasure of the Athenian people; the fate of their new conquest of Cythera, and particularly that of some of the principal inhabitants, whom the generals had thought it unsafe to leave there. These were distributed among the islands of the Athenian dominion. The rest of the Cytherians, to whom the capitulation only assured their lives, were, however, left unmolested in their possessions, with a reserve only from the whole island of four talents in yearly tribute to Athens.

The superiority now acquired by the Athenians in the war, began to appear decisive. Their fleets commanded the seas, and the islands, without a prospect of successful opposition from any quarter: their land force was growing daily more formidable, while the Lacedemonians, in a manner imprisoned within Peloponnesus, and unable to defend even their own territory there, were yet more unable to extend protection to their still numerous allies beyond the peninsula. The extravagant views, and wild presumptions, prevalent among the Athenian people, which the flattery of interested orators contributed not a little to inflame, are marked by their own favourite poet Aristophanes, the admirable satirist of the age. "A thousand cities," says he, in his comedy of the Wasps, "pay tribute to Athens." "Now, were each ordered to furnish subsistence for only twenty Athenians, twenty thousand of us might live in all ease and luxury in a manner worthy of the dignity of the republic." In another comedy of the Birds, the extravagance of their petulant and presumptuous haughtiness is jeered: "It is intolerable," says one of them, "that we, an imperial people commanding many cities, should be treated with an air of superiority by the gods, who ought to know how to respect us their betters." And in the same piece, the inordinate craving of their restless ambition is ludicrously noted: report being spread of a new city founded in the air by the birds, the Athenians are represented, as immediately earnest to send thither, their superintendants and their decrees. Indignation, hatred, animated and obstinate enmity to the Athenians, became, of course, mixed with the fear, which the prevalence of their arms infused through a large portion of the Greek nation.

All this time a general dejection prevailed in Sparta. A series of misfortune and defeat the Lacedæmonians had not for ages experienced. In the regular course of their singular government, they were accustomed to overbear opposition, insomuch, that it seemed as if great abilities in a leader were superfluous: wisdom communicated by education and practice to every individual of the state, appeared as sufficient, as it was always ready for public purposes upon

all occasions. But, a new system was now introduced, for which their great legislator not only had not provided, but which his institutions strongly forbade. They had engaged in a naval war, a complicated war, and a protracted war. To conduct this, other abilities, and other management were necessary than had sufficed for the simple warfare of former ages. But in seven campaigns, Brasidas was the only man among them, who had yet distinguished himself: he was still a young man, and the Spartan institutions were singularly unfavourable to eminence in youth. His first good fortune did not follow him in his succeeding attempts. But Brasidas could learn from misfortune, without being dejected by it. Of a temper as persevering, and a genius as fruitful as his understanding was strong, and his courage clear, he alone, among the Lacedæmonians, was looking around for opportunities of new enterprize which might relieve his country from the evils which pressed it.

Some circumstances appeared favourable to his views, and particularly the alarm, arising on all sides at the progress of the Athenian power. The terror of it had induced the Sicilian Greeks to repress the animosities, and accommodate the differences which had long prevailed between the several cities of their island. Those who had been friends to Athens, would no farther promote its power; those, who had been enemies, would no farther irritate its vengeance: the determination was general to maintain peace within the island, and a neutrality, with regard to the differences of the mother country. But the revolted cities in Thrace had not equally the means of chusing their party. Expecting, that the vengeance, which had cut off the people of Ægina from the face of the earth, would next fall upon them, there was nothing which they were not ready to und rtake in opposition to the power, which gave them such apprehensions. Nor could the king of Macedonia place any confidence in the present alliance with the Athenian commonwealth, with which he had been so often at enmity: and while he was not without apprehension for the safety of what he already possessed, he was incited by views of ambition,

to which his connection with Athens was adverse; for he coveted the province of Lyncus or Lyncestis, which the Athenian alliance in some degree guaranteed to its prince Arrhibæus.

These circumstances, bringing the Macedonian monarch and the chief of the Chalcidion towns to a communication of counsels, they had carried on in common a secret negociation at Lacedæmon. They desired a body of Peloponnesian troops, for which they offered to provide all supplies; and with such assistance, they engaged, not only to maintain the Peloponnesian interest in the revolted towns, but to extend the revolt. The Lacedæmonian government gladly received a proposal to draw the war from their doors where it now pressed them, and employ the Athenians in the defence of their distant possessions. But means to send the desired succours were not obvious; for by sea, they could neither oppose, nor easily evade the Athenian fleets; and by land, the march was long and difficult through the territory in part of uncertain friends, if not of declared enemies. Brasidas offered himself for the conduct of an undertaking, which to timidity and inertness appeared impossible, and would really have been so to injudicious boldness.

But the Lacedæmonian administration was composed of men far different from Brasidas. Though they anxiously desired to carry the war to a distance, they feared to diminish their force at home, where their own slaves, objects of jealousy, now more than ever, caused them greater apprehensions, than their foreign enemies. A more nefarious measure, than that to which they resorted for obviating the danger, is not easily to be imagined. Proclamation was made, that any Helots, who thought themselves capable of meriting freedom and the dignity of Lacedæmonian citizens by their actions in arms, might present themselves to the magistracy, and a number should be selected to be put upon the honorable trial. This was supposed a ready and safe method for discovering which among them would be most forward to revolt: for the same high spirit would incite to seek freedom, and the rank of citizens, by deeds of danger, if opportunity offered, equally against Lacedæmon, as against the enemies of Lace-

dæmon. About two thousand were accordingly chosen, and being crowned with chaplets, were marched in solemn procession around the temples. Thus, they were given to expect that they were to receive freedom, by being admitted to communicate in religious rites with the free. Soon after, they disappeared, and the massacre was managed with such careful secrecy, that in what manner they perished was never known.

After this shocking and dastardly precaution, the Spartan ministry less scrupled to send a part of their force on a foreign expedition. Still, however, they would allow no more than seven hundred Lacedæmonians for the hazardous attempt to march by land as far as Thrace. But the reputation of Brasidas, for prudent and engaging conduct among the allies of Lacedæmon, as well as for ability and activity in military command, had reached Chalcidice, and the leading men, in the revolted towns, had solicited his appointment to the command of the armament intended for their support. Their solicitation met the wishes of Brasidas; and the Lacedæmonian ministry did not refuse him an honour, for which there seems to have been no competitor. He was to increase the scanty force assigned him as he could, by interest, or by hire, among the Peloponnesian states.

After a short, but unavoidable delay, he set forward on his difficult and hazardous march towards Thrace. He had collected a thousand heavy armed Peloponnesians, in addition to his seven hundred Lacedæmonians. He passed first through friendly territories, but soon arrived on the border of a country, not indeed at declared enmity with Sparta, but allied to Athens. With his small band, which would scarcely exceed four thousand men, he could not attempt to force his way across the Thessalian plains in defiance of the Thessalian cavalry. The greatest part of Thessaly was, nominally, under democratical government, and the democratical party was zealous in the Athenian alliance; yet, in most of the towns, the interest of a few powerful men principally decided public measures. This facilitated negociation, and Brasidas was not less able in negociation, than in arms. Employing, sometimes, the interest of the king of Macedonia; sometimes,

that of other allies, and never neglecting the moment of opportunity for gaining a step, he obtained free passage as far as the river Enipeus. There he found a body in arms, whose leaders declared their resolution to oppose his farther progress, and expressed in reproaches to his Thessalian guides, their resentment at the permission and assistance so far given to an army of strangers, passing through the country, unauthorised by the general consent of the Thessalian people. Fair words, discreetly used, nevertheless softened them, and after a short treaty, Brasidas obtained unmolested passage. Through the remainder of Thessaly, dubiously disposed to him, but unprepared for immediate opposition, he made his way by forced marches, till he reached Perrhœbia, among whose people, subjects of the Thessalians, he had provided by previous negociation for a favorable reception. The difficult passage over mount Olympus, which was next to be undertaken, made the friendship of the Perrhœbians particularly important. Under their guidance, he arrived with his force entire at Dium, on the northern side of Olympus, where he was within the dominions of his ally the king of Macedonia.

Here, the difficulties of his march ended, but difficulties of another kind arose. A common interest, in opposing Athens, had united the king of Macedonia with Lacedæmon; but their interests were otherwise different, and their views in some points opposite. The principal object of Perdiccas was, to subdue the province, called Lyncus or Lyncestis, among the mountains on the western frontier of Macedonia, and far from the Grecian colonies. This was a measure by no means calculated to promote the interest of Lacedæmon. Perdiccas, joining his forces with those of Brasidas, directed the march of the combined army towards Lyncestis.

The prince of Lyncestis, Arrhibæus, little able to withstand the united forces of Macedonia and Lacedæmon, had sent to Brasidas to request his mediation with Perdiccas. A negociation was opened, and shortly a treaty was concluded, by which Arrhibæus became numbered among the allies of Sparta. Perdiccas, unable to prevent this measure, was however highly dissatisfied.

The accommodation, nevertheless, was satisfactory to Brasidas and his Grecian allies: and the arms of the confederacy were now of course directed to the object, which the confederate Greeks desired, the reduction of the power of Athens. Their first attempt was against Acanthus. Some of the principal men there had been always disposed to join with the Chalcidians in renouncing the Athenian dominion. The democratical party was zealous in the Athenian interest, but being unable to oppose the approaching enemy in the field, they were in alarm for their property, and especially for their vintage, now ready to be gathered. Upon a knowledge of these circumstances, measures were taken. They were summoned, not as enemies, but as those, who ought to be friends, to join the confederacy. After some conciliatory negotiation, the Acanthians conceded so far, as to agree that Brasidas should be admitted into the town alone, and allowed to declare his proposals before the general assembly.

Brasidas, for a Lacedæmonian, was eloquent: he was besides politic and highly liberal in his policy. He began with assuring the Acanthians "that the great object of the Lacedæmonians, in the war, was to give liberty to Greece." He proceeded then to tell his audience "that he had received assurances from the principal magistrates of Lacedæmon, that whatever cities, through negotiation with him, might accede to the Peloponnesian confederacy, should be subject to no claims of authority from the Lacedæmonians, but should be perfectly independent." From himself he assured them "that none need fear for person, property, or civil rights, on account of any political principles they had held, or any political conduct they had followed; for he was determined to support no faction, but to establish that equal liberty for all ranks, which formed the boast and the happiness of his own country. If then, refusing conditions, not only perfectly equitable, but highly advantageous, they would persist in their connection with Athens, and by the tribute, which they paid, promote the subjection of other Grecian states, he should think himself not only justified, but bound to consider them as enemies, and to begin immediately the waste of their lands.

He trusted, however, they would save him the necessity of a measure so opposite to his inclinations."

The eloquence of Brasidas, powerfully seconded by his army at their gates, had its full effect upon the Acanthians, and the suffrages of the assembly being taken, a majority was found for revolting from Athens. The city of Acanthus thus became a member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; and before the end of the summer, the example was followed by the neighbouring city of Stagyrus.

Of the ten generals of the regular establishment of Athens, it should seem, that two were usually appointed to the Thracian command. Eucles and Thucydides, the historian, now held that station. Eucles commanded in Amphipolis: Thucydides was at the island of Thasus, with the squadron of the station, consisting of only seven triremes. It was to be expected, that in spring the Athenians would send powerful reinforcements. It behoved Brasidas, therefore, to make every use of opportunities yet open to him.

Amphipolis was the most important place held by the Athenians in Thrace. It lay upon a noble river which it commanded, and whose banks, with the neighbouring hills, bore a growth of excellent ship timber. The country around was a rich plain, and the environing mountains had mines of silver and gold. The port of Eion, at the mouth of the river, was but an appendage, yet a valuable appendage of Amphipolis. The place was already populous and flourishing, but the inhabitants were a mixt multitude from various Grecian cities; some, connected by blood, or by habit and intercourse, with the revolted Chalcidians; some, by interest, with the king of Macedonia.

On these circumstances Brasidas founded a project for gaining Amphipolis to the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Communication was managed with some of the inhabitants, and a plan concerted with them. Collecting then all the force he could obtain from his allies, on a dark stormy evening, with sleet falling, he arrived at Aulon and Bromiscus, where the waters of the lake of Bolbe discharge themselves into the sea, and halting there, only while his army took refreshment, he proceeded in the night to Argillus. The people of that lit-

tle town, always disaffected to Athens, were prepared to receive him. Its territory was divided from the Amphipoliton, only by the river Strymon. Near Argilus, was a bridge which as an important pass was protected by a constant guard, but no attempt being at present apprehended, the guard was small. Under the guidance of the Argilians, and favoured by the storm, Brasidas surprised the guard. Becoming, thus, master of the bridge, the Amphipolitan territory was open to him. Extreme alarm and confusion immediately ensued among the Amphipolitans, who, as a heterogenous people collected from various parts, were almost wholly without confidence, each man in his neighbour. After gratifying his troops, therefore, with the spoil of the country, he waited in expectation that from so populous a place, something would be attempted against him, and in any action, in open field, he promised himself success, which would promote his measures.

The inactivity of Eucles disappointed Brasidas. No movement was made from the town, and it was to be apprehended, that the arrival of Thucydides, with the squadron from Thasus, would utterly defeat the enterprize; for, beside the force he would bring, Thucydides had great influence among both Greeks and Thracians; and his presence would not only confirm the Amphipolitans in the Athenian interest, but assist much toward the collection of a powerful land force, for opposing the Peloponnesians. Measures, that might be quickly decisive, were therefore necessary to Brasidas. He found means to send assurance into Amphipolis, "that it was not his purpose to deprive any person in the city of either property or civil rights: that all the inhabitants might chuse, whether they would remain upon the footing of free citizens or depart with their effects." This proposal had immediate efficacy: the Athenians, a small proportion only of the inhabitants, little confident in their general, and highly diffident of their fellow colonists, had supposed their persons, their properties, and their families in imminent danger of the worst that could befal them: the terms were more favourable than from the common practice and policy of Grecian commanders was to be expected; and in their present circumstances, they

could hardly wish for more. Such being the sentiments of the Athenians, the other multitude were still readier to rejoice in the offer of the Spartan general. The promoters of the revolt, therefore, boldly stepped forward, the people in assembly decreed, that the terms should be accepted; and Brasidas, with his forces, was immediately admitted into the city. That active officer, without a moment's loss of time, proceeded to take measures for possessing himself of Eion, distant about three miles, and so excluding the Athenian fleet from the river. But late in the evening of the same day on which Amphipolis surrendered, Thucydides entered the harbour with his squadron. Eion was thus secured; but it was beyond the power of Thucydides to recover Amphipolis.

To the loss of that city from the Athenian dominion, we owe our best information concerning the history of the times with which we are now under consideration, and almost our only means for acquiring any accurate acquaintance with the Grecian republics in that period, in which their history is most interesting. The news of the successes of Brasidas in Thrace, but particularly of the surrender of Amphipolis, made great impression at Athens.

About the same time, the Athenians, having advanced into Bæotia under the command of Demosthenes and Hippocrates, were defeated near Delium by the Thebans; who, after that victory, besieged and took the town of Delium. Those distant dependencies, from whose wealth the republic principally derived its power, had been esteemed, hitherto, secure under the guard of the Athenian navy; but now, through the adventurous and able conduct of Brasidas, they were laid open to the superior land force of the Peloponnessians.—Dwelling upon these considerations, and irritated by misfortune, the Athenian people vented against their best friends that revenge, which they knew not how to vent against their enemies. Thucydides, whose peculiar interest and influence in Thrace gave him singular means to serve them there, was deprived of his command, and banished from Attica for twenty years. Precluded thus from active life in the service of his country, it was the gratification of his leisure to compose

that history, which has been the delight and admiration of all succeeding ages.

Thus Brasidas, with a very small force, rendered important services to his country. His sedulity to prosecute them was unremitting, and he had now greatly increased his means. The reputation of his unassuming and conciliating behaviour toward the allies, whom he had gained, was communicated through the other Grecian cities in Thrace. His character passed for a specimen of the character of his countrymen; and his constant declaration, that the great purpose of his commission was to give perfect freedom and independency to all Grecian cities, received such support from the wise liberality of his conduct, that it found general credit. Perdiccas, a prince of much policy and little honour, forgetting his resentment, was desirous of profiting by his connection with such an ally as Brasidas; and condescended to visit him, for the purpose of concerting measures for prosecuting the common interest of the confederacy. Meanwhile, the news of the late defeat of the Athenians in Bœotia assisted to promote the disposition to revolt. The naval power of Athens became less an object of fear, when it was known, that protection, against it, might be obtained by land. Shortly, Myrcinus, Gapselus and Œsyme revolted to the confederates, while several other towns, fearful yet to declare themselves, intimated, privately, their desire to be freed from subjection to Athens.

Such success, and such prospects encouraged Brasidas in sending to Sparta an account of them, to request a reinforcement which might enable him to pursue his advantages, and attempt still greater things. A man, who so united talents for military and civil command—who could conquer as occasion required, either by force or by persuasion—and who had knowledge and temper to maintain his acquisitions, Lacedæmon had not yet presented to the notice of history. But talents, so superior in a man not of royal race, not qualified by age for superiority, and distinguished only by his spirit of enterprize—his daring courage—his indefatigable activity, and those engaging manners, which conciliated the affection of all with whom he conversed, excited envy and apprehen-

sion among the cautious heads of long established families, who were jealous of the rising merit of new men. The reinforcement was totally denied.

No disappointment, nor any rigour of season could abate the activity of Brasidas. With the progress of his successes, he enlarged his views; and being now possessed of a country favourably situated, and producing materials in singular abundance, he formed the bold project of creating a fleet at Amphipolis. Meanwhile, with his small force of Peloponnesians, and what allies he could collect, he marched into Acte, part of the peninsula of Athos. It contained the little towns of Sane, Thyssus, Cleone, Acrothous, Olophyxus and Dium, which were so many separate republics. The first named, was a pure Grecian colony from Andrus. The inhabitants of the others were a mixed people, a few Chalcidian Greeks, but the greater part Thracians. All were under the dominion of the Athenian commonwealth, but all presently acceded to the terms offered by Brasidas, except Sane and Dium, whose territories he wasted.

Intelligence of the rapid success of Brasidas, was of powerful effect to lower the unruly haughtiness of the Athenian people. His success excited, at the same time, some apprehension among the Lacedæmonian leaders, that their own allies might be excited to desire the continuance of the war, to which they were anxious to put a conclusion. The great object of the principal families was, to recover their kinsmen and friends prisoners in Athens; and while they dreaded a reverse of fortune, that might renew the arrogance of their enemies, they also feared such success, as might too much elate their allies. Such being the sentiments on both sides, negotiations for peace were opened; and, in the beginning of spring, a truce for a year was concluded. Each party retained what it possessed. It was the professed purpose of the truce to give opportunity for negociating a general and permanent peace.

While these measures were taken in Greece for putting an end to the ravages of war, circumstances arose in Thrace to give new fuel to animosity. The people of Scione, the principal town of the fruitful peninsula of Pallene, regarded themselves as a Peloponnesian colony, and had a general partiality

for the Peloponnesian connection. A party among them communicated to Brasidas their desire to reject the dominion of Athens, and be received under his protection. To correspond, concerning the proposal, was not easy; not only the Athenians commanded the sea, but they completely commanded also the communication by land. Brasidas, therefore, who refused no danger in the prosecution of great objects, resolved to go himself to Scione, and in a small swift boat, escorted by one trireme, he arrived safe in the harbour. He was so well assured of the strength of his party in the town, that he ventured immediately to assemble the people, and exert that eloquence which he had already found so useful. He began with his usual declaration, which experience had proved no less politic than liberal, "that no man should suffer in person, property or privileges for past political conduct, or existing political connections;" and concluded with assurances "of his readiness to give all protection, and his wish to do all honour to a people, who, he was confident, would prove themselves among the most meritorious allies of Lacedæmon."

The rhetoric, and the liberality of Brasidas had their desired effect. Many even of those, who before were adverse to the revolt, became now satisfied with it; and the whole people vied in paying honours public and private to the Spartan general.

Scione being thus gained, Brasidas was extending his views to Potidæa and Mende, in both which places he held correspondence, when commissioners arrived, Aristonymus from Athens, and Athenæus from Lacedæmon, to announce the cessation of arms. The intelligence was joyful to the new allies of Lacedæmon in Thrace; as the terms of the treaty removed, at once, all the peril of the situation in which they had placed themselves. With regard to the Scionæans alone, a dispute arose. Aristonymus, finding, upon inquiry, that the vote in assembly had not passed till two days after the signing of the articles, gave it as his opinion, that they were excluded from the benefit of the treaty. Brasidas, on the contrary, (no way pleased with a truce that checked him in the full career of success, and conceiving himself strongly pledged

to preserve the Scionæans from Athenian vengeance,) insisted, that the revolt, truly considered, had taken place before the signing of the articles, and he refused to surrender the town. Aristonymus sent information of this to Athens, where preparation was immediately made to vindicate the claim of the commonwealth by arms. The Lacedæmonian government, disposed to support Brasidas, remonstrated; but the Athenian people, indignant that not only their continental subjects, but now even those who were in the situation of islanders, should so presume on the protection of the land force of Peloponnesus, passed a decree, declaring that Scione should be taken, and the people put to death. This was actually done, as will appear hereafter.

For some time past, the Athenian affairs had been going backwards. They did not attribute this reverse of fortune to the constitution of their government, now so altered from that which Solon had established, nor to the folly which making them dupes to the boisterous eloquence of the ignorant Cleon, led them to commit the administration of public affairs principally to his direction. Nor did they conceive themselves obnoxious to divine anger, for all their unjust violence to their allies, and all their shocking cruelties to those, whom they called rebellious subjects; yet, they did attribute their misfortunes to the indignation of the Deity. They fancied that the purification of the sacred island of Delos had been deficiently performed, and that this was the prominent cause of their misfortunes. To remove it, and to secure the favour of the gods, they deliberately, and from mistaken piety, committed a new act of cruel injustice. The whole Delian people, subjects, who had every right to protection from the Athenian government, were expelled from their island, without having any other settlement provided for them. These miserable Greeks, thus inhumanly treated by the most polished of their countrymen, found, however, charity from those, whom they called barbarians: the Persian satrap, Pharnaces, gave them the territory of Atramyttium, on the Æolian coast, to cultivate for their subsistence.

After the death of Pericles there seems to have remained no man of rank in Athens whose powers of elocution were of

that superior kind, which, together with extraordinary talent for public business, is necessary in a democracy, for the guidance of public affairs. When all graver men were now tired of ineffectual opposition to the arrogance of the petulant Cleon in the general assembly, a poet undertook their cause, and attacked him on the public stage. The practice of the old comedy still subsisted in Athens: public characters were exhibited with the utmost freedom in the theatre: masks representing their countenances being worn by the actors, who, in thus mimicking their persons, assumed without any disguise their names. This license was of great political consequence, giving opportunity for those, who could write, but who could not speak, to declare their sentiments, or to vent their spleen on political topics: in the want of that art, which now furnishes such ready means to multiply copies, a composition was thus at once communicated to a whole community; and stage exhibitions supplied the place of the political pamphlets of modern times. The interest of a party might thus as well be promoted on the stage as in the agora; and those opinions might be propagated, and those passions excited on one day by theatrical exhibitions, which, on the morrow, might decide the measures of the general assembly.

It was when Cleon was in the height of his popularity, that Aristophanes brought upon the stage of Athens, that extraordinary comedy which remains to us with the title of The Knights. Cleon is there represented in the most ludicrous and ignominious light; satire being at the same time not spared against the Athenian people, personated in their collective character by a single actor, under the name of Demus, as Swift has characterized the people of England, under the appellation of John Bull. Such was the known influence of Cleon among the Athenian people, that no actor could be found bold enough to represent him on the stage, nor any artist to make a mask in his likeness. But Aristophanes would not be so disappointed: himself, a man of rank; personally an enemy to Cleon; certain of support from all the first families of the republic; and trusting in his own powers to engage the favour of the lower people, he under-

took, himself, to act the part, and for want of a proper mask, he disguised his face with lees of wine.

The immediate effect of this extraordinary exhibition was great. The performance was relished and applauded. Cleon was ridiculed and reviled: in this temper of the people, an accusation was preferred against him for embezzling public money: and not finding his wonted support, he was condemned in a fine of five talents, or nearly $ 5000.

In such a government, however, as that of Athens, nothing was lasting, but the capriciousness of the people. The reproach of a condemnation, against which the greatest and purest characters were scarcely more secure than the vilest, was not likely, long, to affect Cleon. Pericles, himself, had been condemned, and within a few days the people anxiously invited him to take again the lead in public affairs. Cleon wanted no such invitation; he did not, with his reputation, lose his impudence. Continuing to cabal in the portiçoes, and vociferate in the assemblies, he loaded with vague accusation all the principal men of the commonwealth. The people gave him credit for abuse of their superiors, as they had given Aristophanes credit for abusing him. In the general assembly the field thus became his own. Demosthenes, an able officer, and apparently an able statesman, but unknown as a public speaker, seems to have yielded before him. The mild and timid Nicias feared to exert his abilities in the contest, and Cleon, by degrees, so reingratiated himself with the people, as to become again the first man of the commonwealth, and to have its forces at his disposal.

His success at Pylus, deluded, not only the people, but himself, with the imagination that he possessed military talents; he thought he could now command armies, without the assistance of Demosthenes. He therefore opposed to his utmost, all proposals of a pacific tendency. His arguments were calculated to make impression on the passions of the multitude; and the truce was no sooner expired, than a decree passed for sending a force into Thrace, to the command of which he was appointed. On his arrival there, he, by surprize, recovered for his country Torone in Sithonia.

Elated with this easy success, Cleon determined to proceed against Amphipolis, the most important of all the places of which the valour and ability of Brasidas had deprived the Athenian republic. In an unsuccessful attempt, he was killed. In the same engagement Brasidas received a mortal wound, but lived long enough to know, that his army was completely victorious.

Scarcely any Spartan known in history; and, indeed, few men of any nation have shown themselves so endowed with talents to command armies,—to persuade citizens,—to make and to maintain conquests,—as Brasidas. The estimation in which he was held, was remarkably testified by the honours paid to his memory. His funeral was performed with the greatest solemnity at the public expence. A spot; in front of the agora of Amphipolis, was chosen to receive his ashes; and, as sacred ground, was enclosed with a fence to prevent profane intrusion; a monument was erected there to perpetuate his memory: every testimony to the foundation of the colony by the Athenian, Agnon, whether public building, or whatever else, was carefully destroyed, and it was ordained by public decree, that in future, Brasidas, the founder of the liberty of Amphipolis, should be venerated as the true founder of the city: and worship was decreed to him as a hero or demigod, and public games with sacrifices were instituted to be annually performed to his honour.

The envy of the leading men in the Spartan administration, when too late, had yielded to the pressing calls of Brasidas, and a body of nine hundred heavy armed men had been ordered to his assistance. Toward the end of summer they arrived at Heraclea, and while they were settling the deranged affairs of that colony, the action near Amphipolis took place. They had already entered Thessaly, when intelligence of it reached them; and, about the same time, a declaration was communicated to them from the Thessalians, that their march through Thessaly would be opposed. The consciousness of their insufficiency for the prosecution of those designs which had originated with Brasidas; the consideration, that the necessity for reinforcing the Peloponnesian troops in Thrace, was alleviated by the advantages already

gained there; and the knowledge, that the leading men of their administration, were more anxious for peace than willing to risk farther the events of war, all together determined them, immediately, to lead their little army home.

A concurrence of circumstances now contributed to induce the two leading powers equally to desire peace. The Lacedæmonians, had originally engaged in the war in confidence of decisive superiority, and in full hope, that the waste of Attica, with a battle, which they expected would ensue, and in which they had no doubt of being victorious, would bring the Athenians to their terms. The event had hitherto deceived their expectation. The ravage of Attica had produced no disposition to submit, nor even to risk a battle. Their loss, in killed and prisoners at Pylus, was such, as never within memory had happened to their state: the enemy possessed a fortress within their country, and an island was taken from them which commanded their coast; and from Pylus, and from Cythera, their lands were infested, and depredation was spread in a manner before unknown. Their slaves at the same time deserted in numbers, and the apprehension was continual, that confidence in foreign assistance would excite insurrection among the numerous remainder of those oppressed men.

So many, and so weighty, were the causes which urged Lacedæmon, notwithstanding the late turn of fortune in her favour, to be solicitous for peace. At the same time, that turn of fortune had considerably lowered the haughty tone of Athens. The defeats at Delium and Amphipolis—the revolt of so many of their dependencies—and the fear that others would follow a successful example, had checked the idea, before prevailing, that they could command the fortune of war, and might dictate the terms of peace.

With the inclination of the people, on both sides, it fortunately happened, that the temper and interests of the leading men concurred. By the death of the turbulent Cleon, the mild Nicias was left undisputedly first minister of the Athenian commonwealth. His natural temper disposed him to peace. At the same time, among the Lacedæmonians, the

interest of Plistoanax, the reigning prince of the house of Eurysthenes, led him to be urgent for peace.

Matters being now brought into this happy train, a peace was concluded, in the tenth year of the war, between the two states and their confederates, for fifty years. The chief articles of it were, that the forts should be evacuated, and the towns and prisoners restored on both sides.

Of the Peloponnesian War, during the peace between Lacedæmon and Athens.

The treaty of peace concluded, was ill calculated to give general and permanent quiet to the nation. A narrow policy appeared in the treaty itself: the exclusive interest of Lacedæmon was considered: that of the allies by whom Lacedæmon was powerful, and without whom she scarcely could be safe, were neglected. The Lacedæmonians, themselves, were to recover all that had been taken from them; but their old and necessary allies, the Corinthians, were to remain deprived of their colonies of Soleium in Ætolia, and Anactorium in Acarnania: the Megarians were to put up with the much more distressing loss of Nissæa, their port, not a mile from the city; while the Eleians were suffering, not simply neglect, but injustice and oppression.

The Lacedæmonian administration had been in vain urging the dissentients to accede to the treaty. They were equally unsuccessful in the endeavour to accommodate matters with Argos; so that, with that state, a war seemed inevitable. Alarmed by these considerations, they proposed a defensive alliance with Athens, which was hastily concluded.

The complex intrigues, that ensued among the Grecian republics, form in the detail of them remaining to us from Thucydides, not indeed the most splendid, but one of the most curious and instructive portions of Grecian history. Nothing gives us so complete a knowledge of the political state of Greece in general, at the time, or the state of parties in the principal republics; and nothing affords equal ground for a high estimation of federal union, among detached independent states, founded on principles of justice, liberality, and reciprocity.

When the convention of the confederacy, which took place immediately after the peace, was dismissed; the Corinthian deputies, instead of returning immediately home, went to Argos, where means of confidential communication, with some of the leading men, were open to them. To these they

urged, that since the Lacedæmonians, resigning their antient character, or rather their pretension to the character of protectors of the liberty of Greece, had made not only peace, but a close alliance with the Athenians, its most dangerous enemies; it became the Argives to interfere toward the preservation of Peloponnesus. "The opportunity which present circumstances offered," they said, "was inviting: for, such was the disgust taken at the conduct of Lacedæmon, it would be only to declare by a public decree, the readiness of the Argives to enter into alliance with any independent Grecian cities, and they would quickly find themselves at the head of a powerful confederacy." The Argive chiefs were very well disposed to the measure thus recommended.

A concurrence of circumstances, at this time, favoured the purpose of the Corinthians. While the reputation of Lacedæmon had been considerably lowered in Greece by the events of the late war; Argos, keeping on good terms with all the contending powers, had thriven in peace. Ambition grew with increasing wealth and strength; and the decay of Lacedæmon seemed to offer an opening for Argos to recover its antient pre-eminence and command in Peloponnesus. Thus, the Corinthian deputies succeeded with the Argive chiefs, and these, with the people, and a committee of twelve men were appointed, with full power to conclude treaties of alliance defensive and offensive with any Grecian states, except Athens and Lacedæmon.

Not any liberal view to the improvement of the federal union of Greece, but the separate interest of particular republics, brought converts to the proposed new confederacy, under the presidency of Argos. The Eleans sent ministers to Corinth, who concluded a separate treaty of alliance with that state; and proceeding to Argos pledged their commonwealth to the new confederacy. Then the Corinthians, also, acceded to that confederacy, and their influence decided the Chalcidians of Thrace to the same measure. The Bœotians and Megarians were enough dissatisfied with Lacedæmon to declare their approbation of it, and an intention to concur.

Peloponnesus, thus, might seem now to have sheathed the sword drawn against external enemies only to give the

freer opportunity for internal convulsion. Athens, meanwhile, and her confederacy, were not better prepared for political quiet and civil order. In that state of the Athenian constitution, which gave means for Cleon to become first minister, the fate of the subordinate republics subjected to the arbitrary will of such a sovereign as the Athenian people, under the guidance of such a minister as Cleon, could not fail to be wretched.

Such was the character of the Athenian government, when the unfortunate Scionæans (who were not included in the late general pacification, as being in a state of siege) were reduced to the dreadful necessity of surrendering themselves at discretion to the Athenian forces; and the Athenian people added upon this occasion a shocking instance, to the many that occur in history, of the revengeful and unrelenting temper of their government. Though Cleon was no longer living to urge the execution of the decree of which he had been the proposer, it was, nevertheless, executed in full strictness: every male of the Scionæans arrived at manhood was put to death, and the women and children were all reduced to slavery: the town and lands were given to the Platæans.

Amidst such acts of extreme inhumanity, we have difficulty to discover any value in that fear of the gods, and that care about the concerns of what they called religion, which we find ever lively in the minds of the Greeks. The late change in the fortune of war, and the losses sustained by the commonwealth, led the Athenians to imagine, that the gods had taken offence at something in their conduct; but they never looked beyond some vain ceremony. The cruel removal of the Delians from their island had been undertaken as a work of piety, necessary toward obtaining the favour of the deity. The contrary imagination now gained ground; and it was believed that the pleasure of the gods had been mistaken, and the Delians were restored to their possessions. Possibly, some leading men found their ends in amusing the minds of the people with these contradictory mockeries, both of reason and religion.

The peace restored free intercourse between Athens and those Peloponnesian states which acceded to it; though ina-

bility, on one side, completely to perform the conditions, produced, immediately, on the other, complaint, with jealousy and suspicion, which soon became mutual.

The change in the annual magistracies in autumn brought a change in the politics of Lacedæmon, which of course affected all Greece. Lacedæmon, like other Grecian states, had its factions; and there was now an opposition, not only adverse to peace, but holding constant correspondence with the Corinthians, Bœotians, and other seceders from the confederacy. The political power of the kings, which should have given stability to the measures of executive government, was nearly annihilated; while the ephori, in the name of the people, had been gradually acquiring to their own office a despotic controul over the whole administration, and that office being annual, the Lacedæmonian councils became of course liable to much fluctuation. At the late change, two of the opposition, Cleobulus and Xenares, had been elected ephori. In the following winter a congress of deputies from all the principal states of Greece was assembled at Sparta, for the professed purpose of accommodating the numerous existing differences; but after much altercation, they parted without settling any thing.

While such was the mutual dissatisfaction between Lacedæmon and Athens, there was, in the latter, as well as the former state, a party, desirous of renewing the war; and at the head of that party, a new character was coming forward, singularly formed to set the world in a flame. Alcibiades, son of Clinias, was yet a youth, or at least in other cities, would have been esteemed too young to be admitted to a leading public situation; but high birth, great connections and extraordinary talents, gave him premature consequence. His family boasted their descent from Eurysaces, son of Telamon Ajax, and through him from Jupiter. His great grandfather, named also Alcibiades, had been among the associates of Harmodius in expelling the Pisistratidæ, and restoring the commonwealth. His grandfather, Clinias, had gained the honourable reward of the Aristeia for his conduct, in the first action with the fleet of Xerxes off Artemisium, in

a trireme which he had fitted out at his own expense; and his father, called also Clinias, fell in the service of his country, in the unfortunate battle of Coroneia against the Bœotians. His mother, Deinomache, was daughter of Megacles, head of the Alcmæonidæ, the first family of Athens; and by her, he was nearly related to Pericles; who, on the death of his father, became his guardian. Unfortunately, his connection with that great man, did not bring those advantages of education which might have been expected from a guardian, who so united the philosopher with the statesman, and, amid all the cares of his high situation, gave so much attention to science. A very large patrimonial estate afforded Alcibiades means for that dissipation and pursuit of pleasure, to which strong passions, and various circumstances, invited. The graces of his person are mentioned by cotemporary writers as very extraordinary. In the seclusion in which the Athenian ladies lived, they could be but little liable to the seduction of wit and engaging behaviour; but they were thence perhaps the more alive to the impression of personal beauty, when sacrifices and processions afforded the scanty opportunity of mixing with the world, so far as to see, though not to converse with men. Alcibiades was an object of passion and intrigue with many of the principal ladies of Athens. The splendor of his fortune, and the power of those with whom he was connected, at the same time, drew about him a crowd of flatterers of the other sex. Athenian citizens, allies, subjects and strangers, vied in paying court to him, and there was danger that the intoxicating power of adulation might destroy in the bud, all hope of any valuable fruit from the singular talents of his mind.

At this period of his life he became acquainted with the philosopher Socrates. That wonderful man, who had then for some time made it his delightful business gratuitously to instruct the youth of Athens, in those two points, the duty of man to man, and (as far as unenlightened reason could discover) the duty of men to God, justly considered Alcibiades as one who deserved his peculiar care, since he was certainly one whose virtues or vices might go

very far to decide the future fortune of his country. Alcibiades was not of a temper to rest satisfied with ignorance. Ambition, but still more the love of distinction, was the ruling passion of his mind. To obtain instruction, therefore, which might promote the gratification of that ruling passion, he submitted his other passions to the control of the philosopher. Consciousness of superior abilities and ambition, inflamed by flattery, had inspired Alcibiades with the purpose of putting himself forward as a public speaker, before he had attained his twentieth year; but the authority and advice of Socrates diverted him from that extravagance. A singular friendship grew between them. They were companions in peace and in war. Socrates, who was endowed by nature with a constitution of body, scarcely less remarkable for its firmness than that of his mind for its powers, served a campaign in Thrace with Alcibiades, then in earliest manhood. The soldier sage, yielding to none in courage, in the day of battle, was the admiration of all for his patience in want, fatigue, and the cold of that severe climate. Alcibiades was his most zealous emulator; but in action it was particularly his aim to outdo him. In a battle near Potidæa, he was severely wounded, and would have lost his life, but for the protection given him by Socrates, who fought by his side. Alcibiades returned the benefit in the unfortunate battle of Delium, where he saved Socrates from the swords of the pursuing Bœotians.

But the passions of Alcibiades were too strong for constant perseverance in submission to the advice of his incomparable friend. His predominant passion, the desire of pre-eminence in every thing, was not to be subdued. No sooner had he acquired possession of his estate, than the splendor of his style of living became such as, in Athens, had been utterly unknown. Much as things differed from those in our time and country, we may form some idea of his extravagant magnificence from one circumstance related by Thucydides. It had before been esteemed a splendid exertion for the greatest citizen to send one chariot to contend in the races at the Olympian festival; it was reckoned creditable for a commonwealth to send one at the public expense. Alcibiades sent no

less than seven to one meeting, where he won the first, second, and fourth honours. No commonwealth, nor any prince had before done so much. In the same manner, in all those public offices, which, in his rank and circumstances, were not to be avoided, presidencies of theatrical entertainments and athletic games, and the equipment and command of ships of war, his sumptuousness far exceeded what had been common. This ostentation, and the general splendor of his manner of living, while they attracted some friends and numerous followers, excited also much envy, and many murmurs. They were considered, and with much indignation considered by many, as repugnant to that moderation and equality which ought to be maintained among the citizens of a democracy; while by others they were looked on with more complacency, as the most innocent way of evaporating that boiling spirit, and reducing those large means, which might otherwise have been more dangerously employed.

In the midst of a career of dissipation and extravagance, that excited at the same time wonder, alarm, indignation and admiration, the circumstances of the times, and even the wishes of many grave men, seem to have invited Alcibiades to put himself forward in public business. Nicias, who, since the death of Pericles, had stood at the head of the most respectable party in the commonwealth, was sinking under the turbulence of Hyperbolus, the friend of Cleon, of similar birth, talents and character, and also the successor to his influence among the lowest of the people. In this situation of things the nephew of Pericles seemed a suitable associate for the successor of Pericles, and the gravity and mild dignity of Nicias, it was hoped, might temper the too vivacious spirit of Alcibiades.

But Alcibiades had not yet learnt the necessity of moderation in any thing: young as he was, he would hold no second place. With his influence, derived from inheritance and connection, and assisted by talents, wealth and profusion, popularity was much in his power, and he had no sooner determined upon being a public man, than he would in the very outset be at the head of affairs. It was generally important for those, who sought eminence in any Grecian common-

wealth, to have political connections among the other states of Greece. The family of Alcibiades were from ancient times hereditary public guests of Lacedæmon, and they had been connected by private hospitality with some of the first Lacedæmonian families. Alcibiades was a laconic name first given among the Athenians to the great grandfather of the pupil of Socrates, in compliment to a Spartan family, with which the Athenian was connected in close friendship. But the Lacedæmonian government, systematically indisposed to youth in political eminence, and not less systematically indisposed to the wild and luxurious extravagance of Alcibiades, slighted his advances, and when business occurred with the Athenian commonwealth, they chose rather to address themselves to Nicias or Loches.

This aversion on the part of Lacedæmon decided Alcibiades to a line of political conduct, adverse at the same time to Lacedæmon and to Nicias. He was about his twenty-sixth or twenty-seventh year, when he first tried the powers of his eloquence in the general assembly. He was heard with ready attention by the Athenian people. The opponents of the aristocratical cause were hostile to Hyperbolus. Alcibiades, to carry his point against Nicias, professed zeal for the democratical interest, and the experience of his abilities, as a speaker, added to the weight he derived from birth, property and connection, made him presently the head of a considerable party. He continued his invective against Lacedæmon; and the league hastily made by that state with Argos, afforded fresh matter. Nothing, he said, but hostile intentions against Athens could have induced the Lacedæmonians to form such a connection with such inveterate enemies as the Argians; their purpose could be only to deprive Athens of a valuable ally, that so they might with better hope renew the war. The people continued to listen with a favourable ear, and Alcibiades daily gained influence and authority. Meanwhile he had been communicating among neighbouring states; he had confidential intercourse with the leading men at Argos of the party adverse to Lacedæmon. Finding circumstances on all sides favourable, he formed an extensive and extraordinary plan, which he began immediately to carry into execution.

The Argian people were careless about peace with Lacedæmon, and inclined much rather to renew and improve their connection with Athens, an ancient ally, and of congenial government. Upon this disposition Alcibiades principally founded his project. He proposed to his friends in Argos, to procure that deputies should be sent to Athens, from their state, from Elis and from Mantinea, and he would then engage to make the Athenian commonwealth a member of the Argian confederacy. They undertook the business; the Argives were readily persuaded to concur in it: the influence of Argos prevailed with Elis and Mantinea, and, shortly, deputies from all those commonwealths met in Athens.

This unexpected stroke of the young Athenian politician, alarmed the Lacedæmonian government. There was apparent danger, that Athens might become the leading power of the very confederacy, at the head of which it was originally intended to establish Lacedæmon. Anxious to obviate this, they sent an embassy to Athens. The ambassadors were instructed by all means to private any league with Argos.

On their arrival at Athens, having audience from the council of five hundred, they found reason to promise themselves a favourable issue to their negotiation. This would not only ruin the immediate project of Alcibiades, but would go far to establish the power of the opposite party in Athens; and no common policy could prevent such consequences. Alcibiades was ingenious, and not scrupulous. He engaged the Lacedæmonian ambassadors in a private conference, in which he persuaded them, by no means to acknowledge before the Athenian people the fulness of the powers with which they were vested: they would find, he said, the arrogance of the multitude insupportable, and the only way to check the most unreasonable demands would be, to deny their plenipotentiary commission. If they would only take his advice in the matter, his opposition would cease, and he would even become the advocate of their cause. The reasoning, in itself plausible, was urged with such professions and protestations, that the Lacedæmonians implicitly assented to it.

Next day they had their audience of the assembled Athenian people. After they had declared the purpose of their mission, Alcibiades put the question to them "whether they came with full powers or with limited?" and they answered "that they were limited by instructions?" The members of the council, whom they had assured that their commission was plenipotentiary, had not expected this reply: Nicias was astonished, but presently the ambassadors themselves were still more astonished, when Alcibiades reproached them as guilty of gross and shameful prevarication, and concluded a harangue the most virulent against Lacedæmon, with proposing the question for engaging the Athenian commonwealth in the Argive alliance. His daring and well conducted treachery would have had full success in the instant, but for an accident which alarmed the superstition, and excited the natural fears of the Athenian people. The city was in the moment shaken by an earthquake. No mischief followed, but the assembly was immediately adjourned.

The delay of a day thus gained, giving time for passion to cool, and reflection to take place, was advantageous to the views of Nicias. In the assembly held on the morrow, urging that the people ought not to decide hastily, and in the midst of uncertainty concerning a matter of very great importance; he prevailed so far against Alcibiades, that, instead of immediately concluding the alliance with Argos, it was determined, first, to send an embassy to Lacedæmon, of which Nicias himself was appointed chief. But the measure which Alcibiades could not prevent, he contrived to render ineffectual. The embassy to Lacedæmon being voted, instructions for the ambassadors were to be considered. By address and management such instructions were given, as were designed to preclude all accommodation. Nicias and his colleagues were obliged to return to Athens, without obtaining any one object of their mission.

Indignation naturally arose upon such an occasion among the Athenian people, and art was not wanting to inflame it. The party of Alcibiades thus gained an accession of strength, which gave it a decided superiority in the assembly. The Argive and Eleian ministers were still at Athens, and a

league offensive and defensive for a hundred years with their republics (the dependent allies of each contracting power included) was proposed and carried. By this extraordinary stroke in politics, Athens, and no longer Lacedæmon, was the head of the principal confederacy in Peloponnesus itself.

While these transactions engaged some of the principal states, Alcibiades had been prosecuting intrigue, ably and successfully, within and without Attica. His measures at home procured his election to the high office of general in chief of the commonwealth; an occasional office created only in times of supposed emergency, but which, beside the importance of the military command, carried with it greater civil power than any of the permanent magistracies, or than all of them: for the general, having the right to assemble the people at all times, had no occasion to consult any other council, so that as long as he could command a majority in the assembly, he was supreme and sole director of the executive government. Nearly absolute sovereign, thus, in Athens, he was hardly less so in Argos; and his influence extended widely among other states in Peloponnesus. In the beginning of summer, with a small escort, he made a progress through the cities of the confederacy within the peninsula; and arranged matters every where so as to give a decided superiority to the party which favoured his views.

Among these turns in Grecian politics, the little republic of Epidaurus, a dismembered branch of the antient Argolic state, was firm in the Lacedæmonian alliance. A whimsical pretext was found for making war upon Epidaurus: it was the neglect to send a victim to a temple of Pythian Apollo in the Argive territory, due as a quit rent for some pastures held of Argos, by the Epidaurians. On this ground it was proposed to subdue Epidaurus, and measures were concerted with Alcibiades for the purpose. Many skirmishes between the Argives and the Epidaurians followed, but no important action.

The Lacedæmonians could not, without extreme uneasiness, consider the present state of affairs in Peloponnesus. Their own command and influence were diminished, and

what they had lost had accrued to their rivals of Athens and Argos. By midsummer of this year, B. C. 418, the continued pressure of the Argive arms had reduced the Epidaurians, old and faithful allies of Lacedæmon, to great distress. Some effort must be made, or all command and influence in Peloponnesus beyond their own territory, would be gone. The allies yet remaining to the state were summoned, and the Lacedæmonian army, amounting to ten thousand men, marched under the command of king Agis.

The Argives, quickly informed of these movements, dispatched to their allies urgent requisitions for assistance. The Mantineans and the Eleans joined them. Thus, in consequence of the treachery of Alcibiades, Peloponnesus was divided at arms within itself; while Athens, preparing indeed asssistance for her ally, but risking little, looked on and enjoyed the storm.

The Argives took a position near Methydrium in Arcadia. It was evening when Agis encamped on a hill over-against them, as if intending to engage next morning, but moving silently in the night, he passed on unperceived so as to secure his way to Phlius.

Sundry well judged movements followed, which were so successfully executed, that the Argive army was surrounded by a force so superior, that its destruction seemed inevitable. Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of Argos, saw the peril of his situation; he communicated upon it with Alciphron, an Argive of rank, and they determined together upon an extraordinary measure. They sent privately to Agis, and pledging themselves to lead their state to alliance with Lacedæmon upon terms that should be satisfactory, they prevailed with him to grant, of his sole authority, a truce of four months, and to the astonishment of the Lacedæmonian army, orders were immediately issued to retreat.

The Argive people, and their commanders, totally unpractised in war, upon an extensive scale, were so unconscious of the danger from which they had been rescued, that they imagined they had been deprived of a most favourable opportunity of crushing the Lacedæmonians. The public indignation rose so high, that Thrasyllus saved his life only through

the protection of an altar, to which he fled, and the people, by a decree, declared all his property confiscated.

Presently after the retreat of the Lacedæmonians, the auxiliary force from Athens arrived at Argos. They would have been immediately dismissed, as no longer wanted in Peloponnesus for any purpose of the confederacy. But Alcibiades was too watchful a politician to suffer his purposes to be so baffled; and the important alliance of Argos to pass from him. Quickly informed of all circumstances, he went to Argos as ambassador; and, in conjunction with the two generals, demanded an audience of the people. The Argives very unwillingly consented. The allied army instantly marched to Orchomenus. The fortifications of that little city were weak; the people, alarmed by the greatness of the force preparing to attack them, insured present safety by an early capitulation. Surrendering the hostages committed to their charge, and giving hostages of their own people, they were admitted members of the Argive alliance.

This blow being thus rapidly struck, the question was agitated, to what object the allied army should next be directed. The Eleans were urgent for Lepreum, but the allies proposed the far more important acquisition of Tegea. The Eleans were so dissatisfied with this preference of the great concerns of the confederacy to the particular interest of their state, that they marched home. The rest of the allied army prepared to march against Tegea.

The Lacedæmonians, more reasonably displeased with their prince than the Argians with their general, had been, however, more temperate in their anger. While peace was the apparent consequence of his measures, the public discontent vented itself only in expressions of disapprobation. But when, instead of breaking the force of Argos by one blow, they found, on the contrary, an allied city of some consequence lost, and their pledges for the fidelity of the rest of Arcadia taken from them, Agis was called to account with a degree of passion not usual with the Lacedæmonians. He was upon the point of being judicially condemned to the payment of a very heavy fine; and to the indignity of having his house levelled with the ground; but consideration for his for-

mer services, and respect for the blood of Hercules, and the dignity of the Spartan government, at length prevailed. His intreaty to be allowed an opportunity of proving, by future good conduct, that he had not deserved such severe censure, was granted, and he resumed the command of the army, but not without a limitation never before put upon Spartan kings: ten persons were appointed as his military council, without whose concurrence he was not to lead the forces beyond the Lacedæmonian dominions.

Meanwhile intelligence arrived at Lacedæmon from the party yet ruling in Tegea, that if assistance were not quickly given, that important city would be annexed to the Argive confederacy. The whole force of Laconia was in consequence assembled with unexampled celerity, and marched immediately. Tegea was quickly put into a state of security, and then the Lacedæmonians, with their Arcadian allies, entered the Mantinean lands, and the usual ravages of Grecian armies followed.

The views of the confederates upon Tegea being thus checked, nothing remained for them but to retreat, and leave their own country exposed to destruction, or to risk a battle. They chose strong ground upon which they formed. Agis, eager to do away the disgrace he had incurred, took the earliest moment to lead his forces into action. He was already within arrow's flight of the enemy, when one of the elder officers called aloud to him in the words of a Greek proverb, "that he was going to mend evil with evil:" meaning, that to atone for his former ill judged retreat, he was now rushing to an inconsiderate and ruinous attack. Seeing in a moment the justice of the admonition, Agis instantly gave orders to halt, and drew off without engaging.

The Argive generals pursued the Spartan king. This was precisely what Agis desired: and to provoke it, he had been employing his troops in diverting the course of a mountain stream, so as to damage the Mantinean lands. Being informed, however, that the confederates persevered in maintaining their strong post, he was returning, without due precaution, towards the hills, when he suddenly met them advancing, in order of battle, along the plain. Never was such

consternation known in a Lacedæmonian army. The excellence of the Lacedæmonian discipline, however, enabled the king to form his forces in order of battle, in so short a time, that before the attack could be made, they were prepared to receive the enemy.

The Argives and their allies, after a short exhortation from their several commanders, rushed forward with great fury. The Lacedæmonians used speeches of exhortation less than the other Greeks; well knowing that discipline long and carefully practised gives more confidence to troops than any harangue. To the astonishment of the confederates, who had seen with joy the tumult occasioned by the first alarm, they observed that the enemy, in perfect order, in silence, and without hurry, were stepping in exact time to the sound of numerous flutes, and preserving their front compact and well closed up. The number on either side is not known; but the extent of the Lacedæmonian front evinced their superiority. The two armies were the most numerous that ever had encountered each other in Peloponnesus. The Skirites and Brasidians attacked by the whole force of the Mantineans, together with a thousand chosen Argives, were cut off from the main body, overpowered, compelled to retreat, and pursued to the baggage of their army.

Meanwhile the rest of the Lacedæmonian line had every where the advantage, particularly in the centre, where Agis himself was posted. The Argive centre scarcely came to action with him, but fled at the onset. The Athenians, who formed the left of the confederate line, were thus completely deserted; the centre having fled while the right was pursuing. Their total destruction would have followed, but for the protection afforded to their retreat by their own cavalry.

Agis, true to the institutions of Lycurgus, pursued no farther than to make victory secure. The killed, therefore, were not numerous in proportion to the number engaged, and the completeness of the success. After collecting the spoils of the field, and erecting a trophy, the Lacedæmonians carried their dead to Tegea, and entombed them with the proper ceremonies. The enemy's dead were delivered to them on the usual application from the vanquished.

The event of this battle restored the Lacedæmonian character in Greece. The advantage of numbers, indeed, had been on the side of the Lacedæmonians, but circumstances attending the action proved their superiority in discipline. A contempt, which had been gaining for the Spartan institutions and discipline, as if hitherto too highly respected, was done away, and their character resumed its wonted superiority.

Scarcely any disaster could befal a Grecian commonwealth, from which advantages to some considerable portion of its citizens did not arise. The unfortunate battle of Mantinea strengthened the oligarchal cause in Argos. The fear of such another blow, and of the dreadful consequences of unsuccessful war among the Greeks, brought the Argives to a temper to hear advice, and produced an accommodation with Lacedæmon. The inconvenience of unbalanced democratical sway, which had been severely experienced, disposed them to think with less impatience of the necessity of trusting the executive part of government to a few. On this change in the public mind the oligarchical leaders founded a project to overturn the present political institutions, not only of their own state, but of all Greece. They first intended to propose to the Argives, simply to make peace with Lacedæmon; that being effected, the people might probably be persuaded to form an alliance with that state. Having thus far used the power of the people as the instrument of their measures, they would then turn those very measures against themselves: and with assistance from Lacedæmon, they proposed to abolish the authority of the general assembly, and establish an oligarchical government.

Such was the scheme, and it appears to have been ably conducted. Though the watchful acuteness of Alcibiades led him to suspect the intrigue, still the measures of the oligarchical party were so well taken, that the vote for peace was carried. This leading point gained, the oligarchical party proceeded to push their advantage. Matters had been prepared by secret negociation, and articles were soon settled, according to which it was agreed, "That all Peloponnesian cities, small and great, should be independent; that the siege of

Epidaurus should be raised: that if the Athenians persevered in prosecuting it, the Lacedæmonians and Argives should unitedly oppose them."

This blow to the politics of Alcibiades, and the interest of Athens, was quickly followed by an alliance offensive and defensive between Lacedæmon and Argos; accompanied with a renunciation on the part of Argos of the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea. Among the articles, the following deserves notice: "All cities of the confederacy shall have free and independent enjoyment of their own laws, and their own policy, according to ancient usage." "If city have difference with city, it shall be decided by judges to be duly appointed by both."

As soon as this second treaty was concluded, a requisition was sent to Athens, in the name of the united republics, for the immediate evacuation of the Epidaurian territory, with a declaration, that neither embassy nor herald from Athens would be received, while Athenian troops remained in Peloponnesus. The Athenian administration prudently yielded to the necessity of the moment, and Demosthenes was sent to withdraw the Athenian forces.

Success animated the administrations of the newly allied states, and they pushed it with a great degree of vehemence.

Ambassadors were sent to invite Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, to join the confederacy; with orders, at the same time, to ratify, by oath, in the name of the two states, to the Chalcidian towns, the alliance and engagement for protection, formerly made with Lacedæmon.

Measures, which had been for some time preparing, towards a revolution of the same kind at Argos, were now mature. Accordingly, those leading men who had conducted the negotiations with Lacedæmon, and had since directed the administration of Argos under the nominal authority of the popular assembly, assumed the supreme power of the state, and the authority of the popular assembly was expressly abolished. The Lacedæmonians then took upon themselves to regulate the little republics of Achaia, so as to restore the Lacedæmonian influence where it had been overpowered by a democratical party; and to confirm it where it was totter-

ing; and they found universal acquiescence. Thus, before the end of winter, all the effect of the treacherous policy of Alcibiades, which had been, at first, so threatening to Lacedæmon, was done away, and Peloponnesus was more completely than ever politically united against Athens.

This important change seems to have been produced by events not within the power of the wisdom of the Athenian administration to controul. It was scarcely ended, when another revolution took place. The oligarchical party was expelled from Argos, and an alliance effected between Argos and Athens.

The restoration of Argos, in its present state, to the Athenian confederacy, was but a step towards the recovery of that influence in Peloponnesus, which Athens had lately enjoyed; and a very slight gratification to the ambition of Alcibiades. That restless politician, therefore, looked around for opportunities to promote his own power and consequence, through an extension of the empire of his commonwealth.

Intrigues of the oligarchical party being still carried on, or feared, in Argos, Alcibiades went thither in the spring with twenty vessels of war, and with the assistance of the democratical party seized no less than three hundred of those supposed to be most connected with the oligarchical interest, whom he confined in several islands of the Ægean Sea under the Athenian dominion. The next step of the Athenian democracy, said to have been also dictated by Alcibiades, was much less defensible upon any plea of political necessity. Alcibiades would not recommend any direct hostility against Lacedæmon, but he recommended every thing likely to provoke Lacedæmon to begin hostilities. The people of Melos had been active in hostility against Athens. They were, however, of course, included in the peace between Athens and Lacedæmon; and we are not informed of any offence they afterwards gave; it was now determined, however, by the Athenian people, to subdue the island.

As a preliminary measure, the Athenians sent ambassadors to require the islanders to surrender. The conference between their deputies and the Melian statesmen is detailed by Thucydides, and is one of the most curious and interest-

ing pieces recorded in ancient political history, It may, indeed, well be styled the moral creed of conquering adventurers, more openly promulgated than in modern manifestoes, but containing the same sentiments which dictated, in our own times, the partition of Poland, with this difference, that modern robbers on a great scale, by some specious plea of right, do homage to the justice which they trangress; whereas the Athenian deputy did not shock common sense by any unfounded pretext. He stated the real title to the seizure of other people's property to be superior power—that the strong might use what freedom they pleased with the weak. There is not a single word said, tending to prove either right in the Athenians, or aggression on the part of the Melians. The Athenian states the power of his country, and the miseries the Melians would suffer if they attempted resistance. The peroration to this celebrated discussion fully illustrates the principles on which the Athenians proceeded—"You are determined," said the Athenian ambassador, "it seems, to learn by fatal experience, that fear never compelled the Athenians to desist from their designs; for during the whole of this long conference, you have not mentioned a single particular capable of affording any just ground of confidence. You talk of honour and independence, rejecting the offers of a powerful state, whose arms you are unable to resist, and whose protection you might obtain, at the expense of a moderate tribute. Lest shame should have had any share in this dangerous behaviour, we shall leave you to consult privately, only reminding you, once more, that your present deliberations involve the fate of your country." The Athenian ambassadors retired, and, shortly afterwards, the Melians recalled them, and declared their unanimous resolution, not to betray in one unlucky hour the liberty they had maintained for seven hundred years. But they entreated the Athenians to accept their offers of neutrality, and to abstain from unprovoked violence. The Athenians, irritated by opposition, invested without delay the capital of Melos, which was blockaded for several months by sea and land. The besieged, after suffering cruelly by famine, made several desperate sallies, seized the Athenian magazines, and destroyed part of their works. But towards the end of winter, being closely

pressed, they adopted the expedient of surrendering the place at discretion, to the Athenian people.

The Athenians had no pretence for the exercise of authority over the Melians, but that of force. Connected by blood, by similar habits, and by their form of government, with Lacedæmon, those islanders had nevertheless been cautiously inoffensive to Athens, till forced to become enemies. The punishment for this involuntary crime, even to the lower people, was the same the unfortunate Scionæans had undergone, for what was termed their rebellion. All the adult males were put to death, and the women and children of all ranks sold for slaves. The island was divided among five hundred Athenian families sent to occupy the vacant lands, cultivated and adorned for seven centuries by the ancestors of the Melians. With the most unquestionable testimony as to acts regarded with horror when perpetrated by a tribe of savages, we are at a loss to conceive how they could take place in the polished country where Pericles had spoken and ruled; where Thucydides was then writing; where Socrates was then teaching; where Xenophon and Plato and Isocrates were receiving their education; and where the paintings of Parrhasius and Zeuxis, the sculpture of Phidias and Praxiteles, the architecture of Callicrates and Ictinus; and the sublime and chaste dramas of Sophocles and Euripides, formed the delight of the people.

Though the late battle near Mantinea had restored the tarnished military glory of the Lacedæmonians, the recent conduct of their administration fixed an indelible stain on their national character. Their total abandonment of the faithful and unfortunate Melians was deeply disgraceful.—Their Argive friends, wandering up and down Peloponnesus, were the striking witnesses of their infamy. In the existing tumult of Grecian politics, some exertion was unavoidable, but it was generally feeble, irregular, and confined to unimportant objects.

Of the affairs of Sicily; and of the Athenian expedition to Sicilly.

The Athenian people were a very small portion of the Greek nation; but their men were all soldiers and seamen; they possessed a fleet that no state existing could resist; a high state of military discipline; officers of experience; a civil and political system, upon the whole, admirably arranged; and a great revenue derived from mines, and from tributary states. Under such favourable circumstances it was impossible to foresee how far their tyranny might have been extended over Grecian and foreign nations. The evident weakness in the political conduct of Lacedæmon, the only rival power, operated to the encouragement of chiefs and people; and during the same winter, in which the inhabitants of the little island of Melos were cut off from the face of the earth, the wild ambition of the people of Athens became eager for the conquest of an island larger than Attica.

Gelon, from a private citizen of Gela, became king of that city, and of Syracuse, and head of the Grecian interest in the island of Sicily. His dominion also comprehended all the Grecian settlements on the eastern coast, a great portion of those on the southern, some on the northern, and extensive influence over the inland barbarians. He was succeeded by his brother Hieron. The only considerable power, besides, in Sicily, was that of Theron, prince of Agrigentum.

Hieron, as well as Gelon, was a man of superior character, but less fitted for the difficult situation to which on his brother's death he succeeded. Hieron had not the art, like Gelon, to mediate between the higher and lower classes of citizens, and compose their jarring pretensions. It is not unlikely, that, disgusted with petulance and illiberality, he may have shown himself more indisposed to the democratical interest, than political prudence would allow. For the lower classes of the Greeks disdained labour as fit only for slaves, and, unless engaged in military employment, were ever busy in faction.—Hieron was reduced against his nature to use severity. He died nevertheless in peace, and was succeeded by his younger brother Thrasybulus.

He was accused of cruel severity, and a conduct generally despotic. The democratical party was certainly strong throughout the cities of his dominion: they engaged in their cause those who held the principal sway in Agrigentum, Himera, Selinus, and some other towns, and then openly revolted. The people of higher rank adhered generally to Thrasybulus, and the two parties divided the city of Syracuse between them; Thrasybulus maintaining himself in Ortygia and Acradina; while the rest was occupied by the insurgents. War was then carried on for some time: but at length Thrasybulus retired to Locri in Italy, where he passed the remainder of his days in private life.

On the expulsion of Thrasybulus, the democratical party every where predominating, every town of the dominion of the tyrants assumed independence. But as the acquisition had been effected through communication among all, it was proposed to secure it by friendly political intercourse; and, for this purpose a congress of deputies from the several towns was held. The principal measures of this meeting, reported by Diodorus, strongly mark the democratical principles by which it was animated. A festival was established, to be called the Eleutheria, or feast of freedom, open to all the Sicilian cities; at whose joint expence, a colossal statue of the Eleutherian Jupiter was to be erected, and on every return of the festival, four hundred and fifty oxen were to be sacrificed; whose carcases should regale the citizens entitled to assist at the rites. At the same time, it was resolved, that no less than seven thousand citizens, including most of the principal families, should no longer be eligible to the magistracy of the commonwealth. Diodorus, the historian, ascribes to this resolve the disorders which followed. Those injured men, refusing to acquiesce in the unjust decree, possessed themselves of two divisions of the city, Acradina and Ortygia, and carried on a war by land and sea against their opponents. From similar causes, troubles nearly similar arose, about the same time, in Agrigentum, Gela, Himera, Messina and Catania. Every where the parties were nearly balanced, cultivation was interrupted, produce was destroyed, and the acquisition of freedom involved one of the most fertile countries upon earth, after much ineffectual bloodshed,

in universal want. This at length produced a general accommodation; and a retreat being provided for those who could not arrange matters with the prevailing party in their respective towns, by allotting a portion of the Messinian territory for their use, it was hoped tranquillity might have been restored to the island.

In every little state lands were left to become public property, or to be assigned to new individual owners. The equal division of all the lands of the state was then every where resolved upon—a measure impossible to be perfectly executed, and as impossible to be maintained as executed, and of very doubtful advantage, if it could be perfectly executed and maintained. The attempt produced neither quietness, nor any other public benefit to Sicily. Private interest and party interest were every where busy, and every where powerful. In the inscription of citizens, many, through the favour of leading men, were admitted hastily, and with little examination; others were arbitrarily rejected; many, even of those benefited by the acquisition of land, envied others with portions more fruitful or better situated; while many others, deprived of both property and the municipal rights which they had before possessed, were reduced to the condition of vagabonds and beggars. New and violent dissensions followed. In many towns the government, with the favourite name of democracy, was so unsteady, that through the discontent of the lower people, sometimes arising from caprice, often from oppression, temptation arose for the powerful and wealthy to aspire to dominion. In Syracuse, particularly, this occurred; but of many adventurers none succeeded: Tyndarion lost his life in the attempt.

After the death of Tyndarion, Syracuse seems to have enjoyed a short season of rest under democratical government; and during this period an exertion was made against a foreign foe, which proved, that the navy of Syracuse was not totally decayed. The Tuscans, long powerful pirates on the western coast of the Mediterranean, took advantage of the dissensions among the Sicilian commonwealths to renew their depredations on the Grecian commerce and territories. The Syracusans fitted out a fleet against them, of sixty triremes, which, under the command of Apelles, spread terror through

the Tuscan seas; and a debarkation being made in Corsica, the coast was plundered, the town of Athelia taken, and the fleet returned to Sicily laden with booty, and prisoners, who were valuable as slaves.

Meanwhile, the ancient inhabitants of Sicily, who still kept possession of the interior, derived from the long distraction of the Grecian interest, a respite from oppression. This was so ably improved by a Sicilian prince, Ducetius, that he became the principal potentate of the island. Long confined to strong holds among the hills, and cultivating the vales only as they could snatch opportunity, at the risk of being carried off for slaves; the Sicilians had kept up little connection among themselves; every village having maintained its separate and independent polity. Ducetius united all, except the Hyllæans, under one dominion, and ventured to move his residence, and the seat of his government from Neæ, among the mountains, to a new town, which he founded and called Palice, in the vale beneath; by this method he acquired more complete possession of that vale, and could more effectually command its produce. Ducetius, having engaged in a war with the Agrigentines, took Motya, then held by an Agrigentine garrison, and the Syracusans having sent assistance to the Agrigentines, he defeated their united forces. Popular rage at Syracuse wreaked its vengeance upon the unfortunate general, who had commanded the expedition; he was condemned to suffer death as a traitor, and executed. But when passion subsided, wiser measures were adopted. The power, the tried abilities and the successes of Ducetius, excited general apprehension among the Sicilian Greeks. The Syracusans and Agrigentines, taking together the lead, a large force was collected in the course of the next summer, a battle was fought, and, after a very obstinate resistance, the Sicilians were routed. The Agrigentines quickly retook Motya, and joining the Syracusans, their united forces followed the motions of the Sicilian prince.

Ducetius had not the command of a civilized nation, nor disciplined troops. Deserted by some of the soldiers who attended his first flight, and upon the point of being betrayed by others, he took a measure which despair alone could dictate. Mounting his horse, he rode alone during the night

into Syracuse, and placed himself at an altar in the agora. Early in the morning the circumstance became known, and the magistrates assembled the people, to receive their orders as to the measures to be observed towards a suppliant of such importance. Diodorus, the warm advocate of the Sicilian Greeks, acknowledges that there were some among the Syracusans, who thought only of revenge against the unhappy prince for what they had suffered from his conduct in war; but the majority was decided by more generous sentiments. To permit him to remain in Sicily being deemed inexpedient, he was conducted to Corinth, where he was liberally maintained at the public expence of the Syracusan commonwealth.

The government of Syracuse, after a long course of troubles, appears at this time to have settled into some consistency; and the city, large, populous and wealthy, began to be sensible of its importance in Sicilian politics. The people of the smaller towns were aware, that they had been rendering themselves miserable for an independency which they could not maintain; that they were unable to form a federal union; and that they must unavoidably lean upon a superior power. The only competitor with Syracuse, for superiority among the Sicilian towns, was Agrigentum; and while the competition remained, a lasting peace could not easily subsist between them. The Syracusan chiefs brought back Ducetius from Corinth, apparently to make him the instrument of their own views for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They permitted, or rather encouraged, him to establish a colony of mixed people, Greeks and Sicilians, on the northern coast of the island. This was considered by the Agrigentines as a measure inimical to them: a war was the consequence, and the Agrigentines, being defeated, were compelled to receive terms of peace from Syracuse. Thus, the Syracusan democracy became the leading power among the Greeks of Sicily.

One Sicilian town, Trinacria, had always preserved independency, and its people refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of Syracuse. This was deemed a sufficient cause of war, and the wretched barbarians, after a most gallant resistance, were compelled to yield. All the principal men of vigorous age had fallen in action, the old men to avoid the

ignominy and misery of servitude, or of massacre, put themselves to death; the surviving inhabitants were made slaves, and the town was destroyed.

The Syracusans, having thus overborne opposition, proceeded to take measures for securing the dominion they had acquired. They exacted tribute, and from time to time augmented the exaction from all the cities of the island. With the revenue thus arising, they increased their navy, and their establishment of cavalry; and when the Peloponnesian war broke out, Syracuse was among the most powerful of the Grecian republics. Its alliance was, therefore, a great object to both the contending powers of Greece.

But the empire of democracy being found oppressive, opportunity only was wanting for revolt against that of Syracuse. The Leontines, whether from suffering more than others, or encouraged by better hopes of foreign assistance, were the first to resist. They were of Ionian origin, and their revolt was the signal for all the Ionian states in Sicily, to take arms against Syracuse. The powerful city of Rhegium, in Italy, whose people were also partly of Chalcidian descent, united with them. Camarina also joined the Ionian confederacy. All the other Dorian cities, however, more numerous and powerful than the Ionian, adhered to the Syracusans; as did the Epizephyrian Locrians of Italy.

In the fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, B. C. 427, the Syracusans blockaded Leontium, by land and sea. The Ionian towns all trembled for their fate; a subjection, still more severe than that which had excited the revolt would have been the certain consequence of the fall of Leontium, which they were unable to relieve. Under these apprehensions they turned their thoughts to Athens, as the mother state of the Ionian blood; and a deputation was sent thither to request assistance, with directions to urge the claims, not only of consanguinity, but of antient treaties of alliance.

The factions of Sicily, and the general prevalence of democracy had promoted the cultivation of oratory. Gorgias, of Leontium is reported to have been the first rhetorician who reduced his profession to a science. Gorgias was placed at the head of the embassy to Athens, and the novelty

of his eloquence is said to have wonderfully captivated the Athenian people. The season was however favourable for the effects of his talents. There were strong inducements for the interference of the Athenian government in the affairs of Sicily. The Peloponnesians derived thence supplies of corn; which, by means of a squadron to be stationed off the Sicilian coasts, it was proposed to arrest. Hopes, moreover, were entertained, that, under the name of alliance, the Athenian dominion might be extended to Sicily, which would bring, at the same time with increase of importance, opportunities of profit to every Athenian citizen. Thus incited, in opposition to the salutary advice left them as a legacy by their great minister, Pericles, the Athenians engaged in the affairs of Sicily. A squadron of twenty ships of war, under the command of Laches and Charæades, being sent in the autumn to assist the Leontines, took its station in the friendly port of Rhegium.

The immediate effect of this reinforcement was to render ineffectual the blockade of Leontium by sea, and supplies could be introduced. During the following summer the relief of Leontium from the land side being attempted, Charæades fell in action. Laches, however, conducted the allied forces against Messina, and obtained possession of that city by capitulation, and then sailing to the Epizephyrian Locrian coast, ravaged the country, defeated the Locrians, and took the small town of Peripolium.

The Syracusans, decidedly superior by land, but excluded by a squadron of only twenty triremes from their own seas, resolved to restore their marine, and give battle to the enemy's fleet. Intelligence of this was forwarded to Athens, with a request of reinforcement: and the success already obtained encouraging the Athenian government, it was determined to send such a fleet as should at once give superiority at sea, and command speedy success as to the final object of the war. Pythodorus was sent immediately with a small squadron to supersede Laches in the command, while triremes were preparing in the port of Piræus to follow in the spring, under Eurymedon and Sophocles, which would make the number of the relieving fleet sixty.

This change in the command seems not to have been advantageous. The operations of Laches in Italy and Sicily had been apparently judicious and vigorous, and, for the force he commanded, successful. His successor began his operations inauspiciously: debarking his forces on the Locrian coast he was attacked by the Locrians, and compelled to retire with loss.

In the beginning of summer, B. C. 426, the Syracusans, through secret intelligence with Messina, recovered that important place.

Meanwhile the fame of the various successes of Athens, and the general change in favour of that ambitious and restless republic, raised an alarm among all thinking men. This was increased by the arrival of the fleet, under Eurymedon and Sophocles, in the Sicilian seas. During the winter, Camarina and Gela, neighbouring cities of Sicily, regarding nothing but the separate convenience of their own communities, concluded a peace between themselves; each city binding itself to the conditions of its former confederacy, for all the purposes of war, against other states. But the superior political importance of Syracuse inspired her leaders, among whom Hermocrates was rising to eminence by his abilities, courage, and activity, with other views. The beginning of peaceful measures made by the Camarinæans and Geloans, appeared to Hermocrates a favourable opening for proposals for a general peace. He first succeeded in his measures in his own city, and then procured a congress at Gela, of deputies from all the cities of the island. A variety of clashing interests among so many little states made accommodation difficult; but the eloquence of Hermocrates displayed so forcibly the danger of foreign, and particularly of Athenian interference, that he finally prevailed. A general peace was concluded, by the conditions of which, every city retained what it held at the time, except, that for a stipulated sum, the Syracusans restored Morgantina to the Camarinæans.

The success of Hermocrates in this negotiation, effectually checked the ambitious views of the Athenians upon Sicily. The commanders of the fleet, seeing no opportunity of doing farther service to their country, sailed home. Indignation,

however, from their sovereign the people met them, for permitting their allies to make peace: Pythodorus and Sophocles were punished with banishment, and Eurymedon was condemed to pay a fine.

Hermocrates had no idea of the possibility of moulding all the Sicilian Greek municipal governments into one commonwealth; or even of establishing among them an effective federal union. The Sicilian patriot only admonished the congress to exclude foreign interference; erroneously trusting, that such wars, as might arise among themselves, would have no very important ill consequences. Through such extreme deficiency in Grecian politics, new troubles quickly arose in Sicily. Time, and various circumstances, had greatly altered the state of property in all the Sicilian commonwealths, since the iniquitous partition of lands, which had been made on the general establishment of democratical government, after the expulsion of the family of Gelon. In other cities the poor remained quiet under their lot; but, in Leontium they were ripe for a new and equal partition; and to strengthen themselves against the party of the wealthy, they carried in the general assembly a decree for associating a number of new citizens. The land owners, thus upon the point of being deprived of their patrimonies, applied to Syracuse for protection, and with its assistance expelled all the lower people. It was hardly possible that this violent measure could place them at ease. The worst evils that man can inflict on man, were constantly to be apprehended from the vengeance of the expelled. The Syracusans, therefore, carrying their kindness so far as to offer all the Leontine land owners admission into the number of Syracusan citizens; all migrated to Syracuse, and Leontium was totally deserted.

What, in their new situation, offended or alarmed these men, apparently so generously relieved, we are not informed, but a number of them quitted that city in disgust, and seizing a part of the town of Leontium, called Phoceæ, and a fort in the Leontine territory, named Bricinniæ, they invited their own expelled lower people to join them. Many of these, who had been wandering about Sicily, accepted the invita-

tion; and predatory war upon the Leontine and Syracusan territories became the resource of all for subsistence.

Intelligence of the expulsion of all the common people from the principal Ionic city of Sicily, could not be received with satisfaction at Athens. It was quickly followed by information of the partial revival of the democracy of Leontium, through the establishments made in Phoceæ and Bricinniæ. The resolution was then taken to send ministers to Sicily to discover the strength of the Athenian interest throughout the island, and to promote a league hostile to Syracuse. Phæax, son of Erasistratus, was sent with two others to manage this business, and he seems to have conducted it ably. Urging the notorious oppression of the Leontine people, and the evident disposition of Syracuse to assume tyrannical sovereignty over all Sicily, he succeeded with the powerful states of Agrigentum and Camarina. At Gela he failed. He next passed through the country of the Sicilians to Bricinniæ. The garrison there was greatly encouraged by his information of the alliances he had procured for them; and by his assurances of assistance from Athens. Returning homeward, he added to the Athenian interests in those parts by an advantageous treaty which he concluded with the Epizephyrian Locrians.

This prosperous beginning towards a restoration of Athenian influence in Sicily, by a revival of troubles among the Grecian colonies settled there, was early checked by the battle of Amphipolis, which happened during the summer of the same year. The negociations for peace between Athens and Lacedæmon, begun in the succeeding autumn, were brought to conclusion in the following spring. The party of Nicias then predominated; the maxims of Pericles again swayed the Athenian councils; views of farther acquisition to the dominion of the commonwealth were rejected, and all interference in the affairs of Sicily renounced.

The interest of the principal states of Greece in Sicilian affairs thus ceasing for nearly six years, we have little information concerning them. But during that interval, two small republics, named Selinus and Egesta, situated on the western end of the island, were engaged in that kind of domestic

war, which, according to the political doctrine maintained by Hermocrates in his speeches to the Sicilian congress, could have no ill consequences provided foreign interference was excluded. The Seluntines obtained assistance from Syracuse. The Egestans were presently blockaded by sea and land. It behoved them to find assistance equally powerful with that of Syracuse, but within Sicily it was impossible. Pressed, therefore, by the apprehension of what usually befel a captured town from a Grecian enemy, they determined to seek foreign aid; and none appeared so likely to be obtained, and to be so effectual as that of Athens. Ministers were accordingly sent, who used arguments which might have weight with the Athenian people. "The Syracusans," they observed, "had already exterminated the Leontines, a people connected with the Athenians, not only by ancient alliance, but by blood. If this passed with impunity, and that domineering people were permitted to go on oppressing all the allies of Athens in Sicily; let it be considered what a force might accrue to the Peloponnesian confederacy in a future, nay, a now impending war." To these arguments assurances were added, that the Egestans wanted nothing but troops, their wealth being ample.

Athens was at this time more than usually agitated by faction. Alcibiades was looking around for new opportunities of enterprise, and his design again to engage the commonwealth in war was notorious. The party of Nicias dreaded war on its own account, but still more on account of the increase of influence and authority which would result to Alcibiades; and they vigilantly opposed all his measures. This contest was favourable to Hyperbolus, who had great weight, in consequence of the support of that body of the citizens which had raised Cleon to greatness. Hyperbolus had nearly overborne Nicias by his vehemence of railing, and threatening prosecutions; but he could not so overbear Alcibiades. Against him, therefore, he directed another kind of policy. The vast ambition of Alcibiades, his splendid manner of living, and the superiority he affected in every thing, gave occasion for the suggestion, that his power and influence were greater than could be safely trusted in a democracy, and that

ostracism was necessary to bring such men to a proper level. Alcibiades and his friends were alarmed at this idea, and at the readiness with which it appeared to be received by the people. They endeavoured first to counterwork it, by urging, that not Alcibiades, whose power rested entirely on the favour of the people, but Nicias and the aristocratical party, were the persons really to be feared; and that the banishment of the head of that party would best restore a just equilibrium in the commonwealth. Hyperbolus used all his art to inflame the dispute; and, at the same time, to set the people against both the leaders. His influence was such, that it was evidently in his power to decide which of the two should be banished. But he had a politician to encounter such as Cleon never met with. Alcibiades communicated with Nicias; an assembly of the people was held; both collected their strength, and Hyperbolus was named as a person, by his wealth, influence, and seditious designs, dangerous to the commonwealth. The people were surprised; for no man of his mean condition was ever before proposed as a subject for the ostracism. But the Athenian people loved a jest, and this appeared to be a good one: they *would* honour him by ranking him with Miltiades, Aristides, Themistocles, and Cimon. To the whim of a thoughtless multitude, was added all the weight of the interests of Alcibiades and Nicias, and the banishment of Hyperbolus was decided.

The coalition of parties, however, lasted no longer than to strike this blow against a man whom they both feared. One was still as eager for war, as the other was anxious to maintain peace. The embassy from Egesta afforded an opportunity such as Alcibiades wished. As general of the commonwealth, he received the Egestan ministers in the most favourable manner, and warmly recommended their cause to the people. None of his measures seem to have been opposed with more effort by the party of Nicias. For a time they prevented any decision in favour of the Egestans; but, at length, the various arguments and repeated supplications of their ministers, in some degree prevailed with the people. In the autumn of the sixteenth year of the war, commissioners were sent into Sicily to gain information of the state of affairs;

and particularly to inquire, whether the Egestans really possessed those funds for supporting a large armament, which their ministers pretended.

In the following spring, B. C. 415, the commissioners returned, accompanied by new ministers from Egesta, who brought with them sixty talents of silver, about $60,000, as a month's pay, in advance, for sixty triremes, which they were directed to request. With this specious voucher in their hands, they were introduced into the Athenian assembly. The commissioners, devoted to the party of Alcibiades, concurred with them in every representation, true or false, that might induce the people to vote the assistance desired; not scrupling to add their testimony to the assertion, that the sum produced bore but a small proportion to the contents of the treasury of Egesta, and the wealth of its temples. This was found afterwards to be a gross imposition; but the assembly was persuaded, and the decree passed for sending the sixty triremes.

Though Nicias so vehemently opposed the favourite measure of Alcibiades, yet Alcibiades would not appear the opponent of Nicias: on the contrary, he used the weight and influence of Nicias against Nicias himself. The decree for sending a force to Sicily being carried, the commanders were next to be named. The partisans of Alcibiades were still the proposers of all measures; yet Nicias was named first in command, Alcibiades second, and for a third Lamachus was chosen, a man of birth, who, though yet in the prime of life, had seen much service, but he was a soldier of fortune, of a dissipated turn, and of no great abilities or property. Instructions were then voted, that the generals should use the force committed to them, first, to give security to Egesta against the Selinuntines; next to restore the commonwealth of Leontium, and afterwards to take any measures they might judge proper for promoting the Athenian interest in Sicily. For the better carrying into effect these purposes, it was decreed, that they should have discretionary powers.

Such rapid decision could not but be hazardous, especially where the measures of executive government were directed by a whole people. But it was the object of Alcibiades, and

his party not to let popular passion cool. Four days only were allowed to pass before a second assembly was held, to decide upon the detail of the armament, and to grant any requisition of the generals, for which a vote of the people might be necessary. Nicias, before unprepared to oppose a decree which had appointed him to a great command, and disapproving its purpose, which he knew to be really the conquest of Sicily, now stepped forward to admonish the multitude.

"To urge to Athenian tempers," he said, "that in reason they should rather take measures to secure what they already possess, than engage in wild projects for further acquisition, I fear will be vain; yet I think it my duty to endeavour to show you, how rash and unadvised your present purpose is. Within Greece you seem to imagine yourselves at peace; yet some of the most powerful states of the confederacy with which you have been at war, have not yet acceded to the treaty; and some of the articles are still controverted by all. In short it is not a peace, but merely a dubious suspension of hostilities, prolonged by ten days' truces, which will hold only till some misfortune befalls us, or till Lacedæmon gives the word for war. At the same time your ancient subjects, the Chalcidians of Thrace, have been years in a rebellion which they are still maintaining; and some others, whom you esteem dependent states, pay you but a precarious obedience. Is it not extreme impolicy to incur, needlessly, new and great dangers, with the view to increase a dominion already so insecure?

"If there is among you a young man born to great wealth and splendid situation, whose passion for distinction has led him far to exceed in magnificence, both what suited his means, and what became his situation; if he is now appointed to a command above his years, but with which, at his years especially, a man is likely to be delighted; above all, if repairs are wanting to a wasted fortune which may make such a command desirable to him, though ruinous to his country; it behoves you to beware how you accede to the advice of such a counsellor. I dread, indeed, the warm passions of that crowd of youths, the followers and supporters of the person of whom I speak: and notwithstanding the decree of the last

assembly, all men of sober judgment ought yet to interfere, and prevent rash undertakings of a magnitude that may involve, in their failure, the downfall of the commonwealth. If, therefore, honoured as I am by the voice of my country, with appointment to the chief command of the intended expedition, I may presume to advise; it shall be, that the expedition be not undertaken—that the Sicilians be left still divided by their seas from Athens—that the Egestans, as, without communication with Athens, they engaged in war with the Selinuntines; so without our interference, they accommodate their differences—and that, in future, the Athenians engage in no alliance with states which in their own distress will claim assistance, but in the distress of Athens could afford none."

Alcibiades, thus particularly called upon, mounted the bema to reply. He began with insisting upon his just pretension to the high command to which he was raised, and with glorying in the extravagances of which he was accused. "My ancestors before me," he said, "have been honoured for that very conduct which is now imputed to me as criminal. I own, and it is my boast, that I have exceeded them all in magnificence, and I claim merit with my country for it. The supposition had gained throughout Greece, that Athens was ruined by the war. I have shown that an individual of Athens could, yet, outdo what any prince or state had ever done. I sent seven chariots to the Olympian festival, and gained the first, the second, and the fourth prizes: and the figure I maintained throughout, at that meeting of the whole Greek nation, did not disparage the splendor of my victory. Is this a crime? On the contrary, it is held honourable by the customs of Greece, and reflects honour and renown, even on the country of those who exhibit such magnificence. With regard then to my extravagance, as it has been called, perhaps I may have drawn on me the envy of some of our own citizens; but strangers are more just, and in my liberality and hospitality they admire the greatness of the commonwealth.

"Glory, I will own, I ardently desire; but how have I sought to acquire it, and what has been my success? Have I pro-

moted rash enterprize? Have I been forward, as it is said youth is apt to be, to engage the commonwealth wildly and without foresight in hazardous war? or, was it I, who by negociation, without either danger or expence to yourselves, brought all Peloponnesus to fight your battles for you against Lacedæmon, and reduced that long-dreaded rival state to risk its existence in Mantinea, in arms against its own ancient allies? If such have been my services on first entering upon public business, you need not, I hope, fear, but my greater experience will now be advantageous to you.

"With regard then to Nicias; I readily acknowledge his merit, and have no objection to serve with him; on the contrary, I think it would become your wisdom to employ us together. Nicias has the reputation of cautious prudence and singular good fortune; I am said to be more enterprizing than is prudent. For want of enterprize, his wisdom, and the good fortune with which the gods have been accustomed to bless it, will be unavailing to the commonwealth; checked by his prudence, my disposition to enterprize cannot be dangerous.

"To come then to the question more immediately before the assembly, the opportunity, now offered to the commonwealth for acquisition in Sicily, ought not to be neglected. The power of the Sicilians, which some would teach you to fear, has been much exaggerated. They are a mixed people; little attached to one another; little attached to a country which they consider as scarcely theirs; and little disposed to risk either person or fortune for it; but always ready for any change, whether of political connection or of local establishment, that may offer any advantage or relieve from any distress. Nor is their military force such as some have pretended. Several Grecian states, and all the barbarians of the island will be immediately in our interest. Distracted then by faction as the rest are, negociations, well managed, may soon bring more to your party.

"But it is endeavoured to alarm you with apprehensions of invasion from Peloponnesus. With regard to this, late experience has demonstrated what may suffice us to know. The Peloponnesians are always able to overrun the open

country of Attica, even when none of our force is absent on foreign service; and should the expedition, now proposed, take place, they can do no more. Ought we then to abandon allies whom treaties, ratified by oath, bind us to protect? Is it a just reason for so failing in our engagements that those allies are unable to afford us mutual protection? It was surely not to obtain Egestan forces for the defence of Attica that the treaty was made, but to prevent our enemies in Sicily from injuring Attica by finding them employment within their own island. It has been by readiness to assist all, whether Greeks or barbarians, that our empire, and all empire has been acquired. Nor, let me add, is it now in our choice how far we will stretch our command; for, possessing empire, we must maintain it, and rather extend than permit any diminution of it, or we shall risk our own subjection to a foreign dominion. I will then detain you no longer than to observe, that the command which we possess of the sea, and the party of which we are assured in Sicily, will sufficiently enable us to keep what we may acquire, and sufficiently insure means of retreat, if we should fail of our purpose; so that, with much to hope, we have, from any event of the proposed expedition, little to fear. I am therefore firmly of opinion that your decree for it ought not to be rescinded."

This speech of Alcibiades was received with great applause. It was followed by speeches of the Egestan and Leontine ministers, imploring pity, and urging the faith of treaties, which also had their effect; and, at length, the disposition of a large majority of the people to favour the purpose of Alcibiades become so evident, that Nicias would not any longer directly oppose it. But as first of the generals elect, it was his privilege to name the force that he judged requisite for the enterprize; and he thought to damp the present ardour, and excite a little reflection, by naming what would be deemed extravagantly great. While, therefore, he appeared to accede to the general wish, he endeavoured to direct it from its object by reciting the difficulties that would oppose its accomplishment.

The prudence of the experienced Nicias, was no match for the versatile sagacity of the young politician, with whom

he had to contend. The friends of Alcibiades received this speech with the highest approbation; affecting to consider it, not at all as dissuading or discouraging the undertaking, but, on the contrary, wisely and providently recommending what would insure success. The whole people were infatuated with the spirit of enterprize. Love of novelty and change, with certainty of present pay, and hope of they knew not what future acquisition, influenced the thoughtless of all ranks; while the past successes of Athens, and the evident weakness and inefficiency of the Lacedæmonian administration, encouraged even the more experienced and prudent; insomuch that if any thinking men disapproved of the measure, a declaration of their sentiments might have subjected them to the danger of being deemed disaffected to the commonwealth, and fined, banished, or capitally condemned, according to the momentary caprice of the despotic sovereign multitude.

Such being the disposition of the people, Nicias was called upon to declare precisely what was the force he thought necessary. He would have declined in the moment, urging that he wished to consult his colleagues, but popular impatience would admit of no delay; and overcome by importunity, he at length said, that less than a hundred triremes, and five thousand heavy armed soldiers, with a due proportion of bowmen and slingers, (making in the whole at least thirty thousand men, those in the sea service included,) would be insufficient; and that stores and all necessaries ought to be plentifully provided to accompany the fleet, which could not be left dependant upon precarious supplies. Popular zeal did not confine itself to the mere grant of what was thus demanded; but a vote was immediately passed empowering the generals to command for the expedition, whatever they should judge expedient for the prosperity and glory of the commonwealth. The ravage made by the pestilence at the beginning of the war, was now in a great degree repaired; and the revenue, far exceeding the ordinary expences of the commonwealth, encouraged ambition. Preparations, thus amply supplied, were made with a celerity proportioned to the zeal of the people.

During the equipment, and while the popular mind was bent, with a singular degree of passion, upon the proposed conquest, enjoying already, in idea, a large acquisition of sovereignty, whence tribute would accrue, such as might enable every Athenian citizen to be for ever exempt from labour and from poverty, without occupation or profession, except that of arms; every thing was suddenly disturbed by a strange circumstance, to which Grecian superstition alone could attach any importance. There was a custom among the Athenians, derived from very early times, when art was rude, to place an imperfect statue of Mercury, the head completely carved, the rest a block merely squared, in front of every residence whether of gods or men: this custom was still held sacred, and no temple, or house, at Athens, was without one of those guardians. In one night, a great number of them had the face mutilated by persons unknown. Alarm and indignation immediately filled the city; the matter was taken up most seriously by magistrates and people. Though, doubtless, the act of designing men, it was very generally considered as an omen forboding ill to the proposed expedition; and great rewards were publicly offered to any freeman or slave who should discover the perpetrators. With regard to the offence in question, enquiry and temptation were equally ineffectual; not the least discovery was made; but intelligence was obtained of the mutilation of some statues, some time before, by young men heated with wine, and also of a profanation of the sacred mysteries by a mock celebration of them in certain private houses. In this accusation Alcibiades was involved.

The party in opposition to Alcibiades, was composed of all who leaned towards oligarchy, and generally of the most powerful men of the commonwealth, who indignantly bore the superiority assumed by that young man; by whose abilities, supported by the favour of the people, they found themselves so completely overwhelmed, that they had for some time past submitted in silence. But the present was an opportunity not to be neglected; they set themselves instantly to take advantage from it to ruin him in the favour of the people, that foundation of sand, on which all power in Athens rested; and then the reins of the commonwealth

would of course pass into their own hands. The report was sedulously propagated, that Alcibiades was the principal author of all the late outrages. Facts, it was said, afforded sufficient presumption of what could not be directly proved; and the mere style of Alcibiades's living, so unbecoming the citizen of a commonwealth, demonstrated that nothing less than the tyranny of Athens, was the ultimate object of his ambition.

On comparing all circumstances, we find strong reason at least to suspect that the enemies of Alcibiades were the authors of the profanation from whence the disturbance arose. Alcibiades was known in his revels to have committed irregularities, which would give colour to suspicions against him. But the mutilation of the Mercuries was not the result of a revel, it was evidently a concerted business, conducted with the most cautious secrecy. Nothing could be more injurious; nothing more completely without temptation for him; while the strongest motives urged them to commit the deed in secret, with the hope of fixing upon him the suspicion. In no one circumstance of his public life does Alcibiades seem to have conducted himself more unexceptionably than under this accusation. He neither avoided inquiry, nor attempted to overbear it; but, coming forward with the decent confidence of innocence, he earnestly desired immediate trial, and deprecated accusation in his absence. "If guilty," he said, "he was ready to submit to the death which he should deserve; if innocent, he ought to be cleared of the shocking imputation." But as usual with all factions, what prudence dictated for the benefit of the commonwealth, was, with his opponents, but a secondary consideration; to advance the power of their party was the first. Dreading, therefore, his popularity with the army, and apprehensive that blame might fall upon themselves, they determined neither immediately to accuse, nor wholly to give up accusation; and they prevailed with the people to decree simply, that Alcibiades should retain his command, and proceed on the expedition.

This being determined, popular zeal returned to its former object, and by midsummer the preparations were completed.

So great and so splendid an armament was never before sent by any Grecian state on foreign service. The importance of the armament itself; the importance and distance of its object; and the popular predilection with which it was favoured, occasioned extraordinary allowance for the equipment. Private zeal contended with public; the commanders of triremes not sparing their own purses, every one desiring to have his crew and his vessel most completely fitted for show and service. The daily pay of a drachma, about eighteen cents, was given to every private sailor, and the captains added extraordinary pay to able seamen, and to all the rowers of the upper bench, whose situation was more exposed. The heavy infantry, all chosen men, vied with each other in the excellence and good appearance of their arms and appointments.

On the day named for embarkation, the Athenian citizens enrolled for the expedition appeared on the parade at daybreak. The whole city accompanied them on their march to the Piræus. The citizens were divided, between hope and fear, at seeing so great a proportion of the strength of the commonwealth committed to the rage of elements and the chance of war, at a distance, which for ancient navigation was very great; while the numerous foreigners more calmly gratified their curiosity with so splendid and interesting a spectacle. As soon as the embarkation was completed, and every thing prepared for getting under way, trumpets sounded for silence, and prayers for success were put up to the gods, with more than usual formality; heralds directing, and the whole armament uniting their voices. Goblets of wine were then produced in every ship; and officers and privates, together, out of gold and silver cups, poured libations, and drank to the prosperity of the armament, and of the commonwealth. This ceremony being performed, the pæan was sung, and the whole fleet moved for Ægina, thence to take its departure for Corcyra.

Intelligence of the extraordinary magnitude of the Athenian preparations passed, from various quarters, to Syracuse; and the destination, in a democratical government, could not remain a secret. Nevertheless, it was long before

the news gained such credit among the Syracusan people, as to produce any measure for obviating the threatened evil.

At length it was thought proper to convene the general assembly. The patriotic and able Hermocrates was among the foremost to propose vigorous measures against foreign attack. Representing the Athenian armament as really great and formidable, he proposed to strengthen the Syracusan confederacy by conciliating the barbarians of the islands, and by extending alliance among the Italian Greeks; he would even make overtures to Carthage, the richest commonwealth upon earth; and it was reasonable to suppose, he said, that apprehension of the growing power and extravagant ambition of Athens would dispose the Carthaginians to the connection. Application ought also to be made to Corinth and Lacedæmon, whose favourable disposition could not be doubted. He was clear that they ought to meet the foe before he reached them; and high as the reputation of the Athenian navy was, yet local circumstances gave them such advantages, that a proper exertion of the naval force, which the Sicilian states were able to raise, might make it impossible for the Athenians ever even to reach their coast. The idea was founded on the topography of the intermediate places, of which he gave the clearest as well as the most authentic information.

This able advice to a whole people in assembly directing executive government did not find the attention it merited. Many would not yet believe, that the Athenians meant to invade Sicily with views of conquest; some even ridiculed the idea; various contradictory opinions were warmly maintained; and Athenagoras, chief of the democratical party, endeavoured to use the opportunity to carry a point against the nobles: "The ambition of young men," he said, "panted for military command; but the city would not impose a yoke upon itself. On the contrary, prosecution should prevent the seditious purposes of those who wished to spread alarm, and punishment should not fail to attend such offences against the common welfare." He was proceeding thus in the endeavour to excite popular feeling, when one of the generals (for the Syracusan constitution at this time intrusted the

chief military command to a board of fifteen,) interfered with the authority of office. He strongly reprobated the attempt to check the freedom of debate, and deter individuals from declaring their opinion on public affairs. Without putting any question to the vote, he then dismissed the assembly.

While such, through the defects in the constitution of the government, was the unprepared state of Syracuse, the whole of the Athenian forces was already assembled at Corcyra. The fleet consisted of a hundred and thirty-two triremes. The heavy armed soldiers were in all five thousand one hundred; and the regular light armed amounted to 2000. A single horse-transport carried thirty horse. The store-ships, provided by the Athenian government, were thirty of large burden, and a hundred smaller; but many other vessels, belonging to individuals, followed for the sake of the profit arising from the market of so large an armament.

So deficient were they in point of intelligence, that it was yet unknown to the generals, what Italian or Sicilian cities would receive them. Three triremes were therefore dispatched to enquire and to negociate; with orders to meet the fleet as soon as possible with information. The whole then moved from Corcyra in three divisions. All, however, crossed the gulph, and made the Japygian promontory without misfortune. Then they dispersed to seek supplies around the bay of Tarentum; but not a single town would admit them within its walls; or even supply them with provisions. Tarentum and Locri denied them water, and the shelter of their ports. At length the whole fleet re-assembled without disaster at Rhegium, the first allied city in their course. But even the Rhegians cautiously refused to admit them within their walls; they allotted them, however, commodious ground for encampment, and procured for them a plentiful market.

The Syracusans, at length, convinced of the necessity of giving up private ease for public service, and no longer hesitating between party interest and general welfare, permitted their leaders to make serious preparation to meet the coming evil. Ministers were sent to conciliate some of the Sicilian tribes; garrisons were placed in situations to controul others; and troops were marched to occupy some of the important posts of the Syracusan territory.

Meanwhile the three Athenian ships dispatched from Corcyra, had been as far as the Egestan territory, and did not rejoin the fleet till it arrived in the harbour of Rhegium. They brought information that the representations made by the Egestan ministers at Athens, of the wealth of their state, were false; and, that the commissioners sent by the Athenian government to enquire concerning it, had been grossly deceived. After being conducted to a display of these sacred riches, the commissioners had been invited and entertained by the principal Egestans, and wherever they went, not only all the gold and silver plate of the place was studiously collected, but whatever besides could be borrowed from the neighbouring towns. These commissioners had been appointed by the influence of Alcibiades and his party. They either belived, or affected to believe, and reported to the Athenian people accordingly, that they could not sufficiently admire the wealth of Egesta. The commissioners sent from Corcyra were, on the contrary, such as Nicias, the first in command, approved; and their purpose being not to procure partial evidence to promote a decree for the expedition, but to find means to prosecute its purpose, they made strict scrutiny. On their return, they reported, that the Egestans could only show thirty talents, and that their wealth was very problematical. This disappointment, however, did not come unattended. The Rhegians had been upon the point of yielding to the solicitations of the Athenian generals, who urged them to join their arms to those of their ancient allies, for the purpose of restoring their common kinsmen, the oppressed Leontines: they now gave as their decisive answer, "That they would do every office of friendship to the Athenians within the limits of an exact neutrality, but they would engage in no hostilities unless in concurrence with the Italian states of their alliance."

This determination of the Rhegians was a disappointment, less on account of the force which they could have furnished, than for the check it would give to negociation among the Sicilian towns, where the example of Rhegium would be of weight. The Athenian generals found themselves, in consequence of the measure, embarrassed. When it came to

be debated what should be the first movement of the armament, the three generals differed; and each had plausible grounds for his opinion. Nicias proposed to relieve Egesta, which was the primary object of their instructions; and, unless the Egestans could fulfil their engagement to furnish pay for the whole armament, or readier means should occur than yet appeared for restoring the Leontines, not to risk the forces, or waste the treasures of the commonwealth, but to return immediately home.

Alcibiades, whose temper was impetuous, had formed his own plan for laying the foundation of extensive conquest, and persevered in it. "Such a force," he said, "as they commanded, ought not to return home without achievement, and without honour. He would therefore propose, that negociation should be tried with all the Grecian cities, except Syracuse and Selinus, and with every barbarian tribe of the island. A beginning should be made with Messina, the most commodious city and port of the island, for their principal station, whence to carry on the war. When trial had been duly made, which might be done by negociation, they should have a clearer view of the business before them, and Selinus and Syracuse must undoubtedly be the first objects of their arms."

Lamachus differed from both his colleagues; "their whole force," he said, "ought immediately to be directed against Syracuse. If the city could not be taken by a brisk effort, which he thought not impossible, the other towns of the territory would, however, fall into their hands before the effects in them could be removed, and the produce of the country would of course be theirs. Thus they should acquire means to prosecute the war without the invidious measure of applying to Athens for money."

It appears that the opinion of Lamachus was not the least judicious; but being overruled, that general chose to concur with the opinion of Alcibiades, to which Nicias was compelled to yield, Alcibiades then undertook himself the business of negociation with Messina. He could not, however, prevail upon the Messinians to join in the war against Syracuse, but he obtained permission for the Athenian arma-

ment to contract for provisions throughout their territory. He then went to Naxus, and he found the people of that city so much more favourably disposed, that he engaged them to join in a league defensive and offensive with Athens. Thence he proceeded to Catana, but the prevalence of the Syracusan party there, produced a refusal even to treat. After some time, the detached squadron rejoined the fleet, and all together went to Catana.

Meanwhile, a change had been so far wrought in the minds of the Catanian leaders, that they consented to admit the Athenian generals to declare their proposals to the assembled people. The forces being landed, were stationed without the walls, while the generals went into the town; and Alcibiades undertook to address the Catanian people. While he was speaking, some of the Athenian soldiers observed a small gate-way unguarded, through which in mere wantonness they made their way into the town, and quietly joined the assembly. The sight struck instant alarm into the Syracusan party, who imagined the city betrayed by their opponents. Some of them hastily, but silently withdrew, and the rest concurred in a decree, which was proposed for an alliance offensive and defensive with Athens. Shortly after, the whole fleet moved from Rhegium to Catana, which it was resolved to make the principal naval station.

Soon after these events, the Salaminian, a ship appropriated to purposes of sacred and solemn office, arrived at Catana, and brought an order from the Athenian people for the immediate return of Alcibiades, and some other officers to Athens, to answer accusations preferred against them for mutilating the statues and profaning the mysteries.

Since the armament sailed for Sicily, Athens had been experiencing the evils of democratical frenzy. The oligarchical party had resolved upon the bold project of making democracy itself their instrument for exciting popular passion, with the hope of directing it to the promotion of their own interest. Immediately after the departure of the fleet, they became sedulous in diffusing rumors and observations tending to excite suspicion and alarm. The power and influence of Alcibiades, his magnificence, his ambition, his unprinci-

pled conduct, and his various extravagancies, were made constant subjects of public conversation. Every occurrence was made, by some construction, to establish a plot for establishing tyranny. Fear, suspicion, and their certain concomitant, a disposition to severity, gained complete possession of the public mind. Every one was bent upon discovering the plot, and its authors. Officers were appointed, entitled examiners, with full authority to make search and enquiry; and great rewards were offered for any who would indicate any thing. The most suspicious and incoherent evidence was obtained from slaves, and men of the vilest characters. But public alarm, once excited, was not to be readily quieted. "It was deemed better," says Thucydides, "that just men should suffer, than that the constitution should be endangered." Many of principal rank, and most respectable character, were in consequence imprisoned. It appears, indeed, difficult to discover for whose benefit the Athenian constitution, as it stood, was administered. The common people, at least, should have had some confidence in protection for innocence from that government in which they were nominally supreme. But on the contrary, when Pisander and Charicles, two of the examiners, declared their opinion that a plot for overthrowing the democracy was in agitation, and farther enquiry, therefore, necessary, all the people fled from the agora, every one fearful of accusation and imprisonment. Nor was this indiscriminating jealousy the humour of a day. It increased daily. Suspicion extended; more persons were imprisoned; and there was no foreseeing where popular rage would stop.

One of the most obnoxious of those imprisoned, in conversation with one of his fellow prisoners upon the subject of their present sufferings and danger, yielded to the argument, that guilty or not guilty, it was better to confess something: "The popular mind," it was urged, "would evidently not otherwise be appeased: and a confession would not only be more likely than perseverance in asserting innocence, to procure his own safety, but would restore quiet to the city; and though some must be sacrificed, yet numbers might be saved from that mad vengeance, excited by fear, which now

threatened indiscriminately and unboundedly." Information, thus extorted by the pains of a prison and the fear of death, against several persons as concerned in the mutilation of the Mercuries, was received by the people with a childish joy. The dark plot was supposed to be completely discovered; the informers were set at liberty, together with all whom they did not accuse. Though the proof of the facts alleged against the accused might be frequently defective, yet none escaped capital condemnation. All who were in prison, or could be taken, suffered death immediately; and public rewards were offered for killing those who fled from this summary justice.

To carry the business thus far, little or no deliberation was thought necessary. The difficulty was, to bring within reach of the democratical dagger, those of the accused who were with the army in Sicily, and especially Alcibiades, now become an object of terror, as he had before been of favour, with the people. His death, as Thucydides assures us, was determined; but they were afraid to apprehend, while with the army, the favourite of the soldiery. It was, therefore, resolved to send heralds in the sacred trireme, called the Salaminian, not to arrest him, or any other accused persons belonging to the army, but merely, in the name of the people, to command their return to Athens. Immediate obedience was paid to the order. Alcibiades followed the Salaminian in his own trireme. In the usual course of the ancient navigation, they stopped at the friendly town of Thurium, and there Alcibiades, and all the other accused persons absconded together. The heralds and officers of the Salaminian, having made search and enquiry for some time to no purpose, returned without their prisoners, and the Athenian people pronounced sentence of death against them, in what was called, a deserted judgment.

The soul of political intrigue and extensive enterprise being thus taken from the armament destined for the conquest of Sicily, it remained for Nicias and Lamachus to decide upon future measures. The plans of Alcibiades were immediately abandoned. It was determined to conduct the armament immediately toward Egesta and Selinus. Proceeding westward, they succeeded in an assault upon Hyccara, a Si-

canian town, whose inhabitants they made slaves, and then gave the place to the Egestans. Nicias went with a small escort to Egesta to demand the supplies promised; all he could obtain was thirty talents. The concluding measures of the campaign did him no honour: the prisoners already taken, were distributed aboard the fleet, which returned to its former station at Catana; the army marched for the same place by an inland road, through the country of the Sicilians; and the unhappy barbarians suffered for the false promises of the Egestans. They were seized in such numbers, that a market being opened for the sale of them at Catana, they produced a hundred and twenty talents. The celebrated Lais is said to have been a Sicilian girl, bought on this occasion by a Corinthian merchant.

Perhaps some peevishness in a command which he originally disliked; in the course of which he met with little but disappointment; and which, nevertheless, he could not resign; co-operated with the necessity of his situation in dictating a measure, to which the mild temper of Nicias would otherwise have been averse; though among the ancients, to drag barbarians, wherever met with, into slavery, was not commonly deemed a breach of either justice or humanity. But, apparently, Nicias found himself compelled to follow the opinions, and gratify the wishes of others, in still prosecuting the scheme of conquest. Money was absolutely necessary; the expectations of the Athenian people had met with a disappointment at Egesta, which he had always foreseen and foretold, yet, probably, he did not dare to ask remittances from Athens.

It was, however, next determined, after a campaign nearly wasted, to carry war against Syracuse, and with the beginning of winter preparation was made for the purpose. The first certain news that the Athenian armament had crossed the Ionian gulph, excited alarm that went far to justify the advice of Lamachus. With every day's delay, terror abated and confidence took place. But when, after the recall of Alcibiades, the armament moved away to the furthest corner of Sicily, it began to be held even in contempt and derision, and when, on its return, still no movement was made towards Sy-

racuse, the common people increasing in boldness, demanded of their chiefs to lead them to Catana. The chiefs were too wise to comply; but the parties of horse sent out to reconnoitre, sometimes approached and insulted the Athenian camp, and asked, "if, instead of restoring the Leontines, the Athenians intended to settle themselves in Sicily."

The Athenian army was so deficient in cavalry, that it would have been hazardous to have marched through the open country toward Syracuse, in the presence of the Syracusan horse. As in most of the Sicilian towns in the Syracusan interest, there was an Athenian party, so in Catana, there still existed a Syracusan party. A Catanian was gained who held communication with Syracuse. Through him the Syracusans were told, that the Athenian camp was negligently guarded; that many commonly slept in the town; that if the Syracusans would attack with their whole force at day-break, their friends in Catana would rise, and they could not fail of success. A day was appointed for the attempt, which was accordingly made. Nicias and Lamachus, informed of every thing, embarked in the night with all their forces, sailed for Syracuse, and debarked without opposition. They seized a situation favourable for operations against the city, for communication with their fleet, and, at the same time, inaccessible to the Syracusan cavalry.

The first intelligence of this movement filled the Syracusans with surprise and alarm. They hastily returned to Syracuse, examined the Athenian camp, and finding it too strong to be attacked, encamped for the night. Meanwhile the Athenian generals, having ground before them on which the enemy's horse could not act, marched out of their camp in order of battle. The Syracusans then, also, hastily formed. A sharp action ensued; but a thunder storm alarmed the more inexperienced soldiers, and the Syracusan infantry, at length, every where gave way, and they retired within the city walls.

On the morrow after the battle, the Athenian generals re-embarked the whole of the forces and returned to Catana. This flash of victory had its advantages. It restored the sullied reputation of the Athenian arms; confirmed the allies,

and furnished means for further negociation with Sicily. The want of cavalry was found to be the great deficiency of the armament. It was therefore determined to collect, during the winter, the greatest force of that kind which could by any means be obtained within the island, and also to apply for a body from home. Large supplies of money were also indispensable; and it behoved the generals to exert themselves, in solicitation among allies, and in rapine against enemies, that they might spare the Athenian treasury, upon which, nevertheless, some demand was unavoidable. The siege of Syracuse was resolved upon for the first object of the ensuing campaign. For the interval the fleet was laid up, and the army disposed in quarters at Naxus and Catana.

Meanwhile, among the Syracusans, though much uneasiness arose from the late event, yet the misfortune was not without salutary consequences. The depression of the public mind imposed silence upon faction, repressed forward ignorance, and permitted abilities and patriotism to come forward. The general assembly met, and the people listened with anxious attention while Hermocrates spoke. "Their late defeat," he said, "was no cause for dejection, such as he saw prevailing. Mere levies, as they comparatively were, and not formed soldiers, it was much for them to have shown themselves so nearly equal to select troops of the first reputation in Greece. Besides, the very circumstances of the action pointed out the means of future success. It was not in strength, but in order and discipline; not in bravery, but in a system of command and subordination that they were inferior. The alteration necessary was obvious; the chief commanders should be few, but they should be experienced; they should be trust-worthy, and they should be trusted. The winter should then be diligently employed in improving discipline. Courage and confidence," he continued, "will of course revive with improved system, improved skill, and increased force; and in the spring I do not doubt, but that we may meet the enemy upon equal terms."

It were indeed difficult to imagine any thing more inconvenient, or more adverse to effectual exertion, than the system of command which democratical jealousy had establish-

ed at Syracuse. The supreme military authority was divided among no less than fifteen officers; and even this numerous board was upon all momentous occasions to take its orders from the people. But the present alarm, and the pressure of evident necessity, gave force to the advice of this patriot. The command in chief was committed to Hermocrates himself, with only two colleagues; and they were vested with discretionary powers. Vigorous and judicious measures immediately followed. The new generals extended the fortifications of the city, and they occupied with garrisons two essential posts in the neighbourhood. Having thus provided for immediate security, they extended their views. A watchful eye was kept upon the motions of the Athenians among the Sicilian states. It was known that the Athenian generals were carrying on negociations at Camarina. To counteract them, and attach the Camarinæans to the Syracusan cause, Hermocrates thought it important that he should go himself at the head of an embassy to Camarina.

As far as the connexion with Athens was to be broken, the business undertaken by Hermocrates was easy. But when he attempted to persuade the Camarinæans to assist the Syracusans, he could only obtain a declaration, "that being engaged in alliance with both Athens and Syracuse, the Camarinæans could not side with either consistently with their oaths, but that an exact neutrality should be observed."

The Syracusan leaders directed their attention also to those states in Greece itself, in which they might reasonably expect to find a disposition friendly to themselves, and hostile to Athens. An embassy was first sent to Corinth, the parent state of Syracuse. There a disposition was found, if not of kindness to Syracuse, yet of the utmost readiness to oppose Athens. Ministers were appointed to accompany the Syracusan ministers to Lacedæmon. The ephori and others encouraged them by words, and were even willing to assist by negociation; but backward to give the more efficacious assistance, which the necessities of Syracuse required.

But an Athenian now became the most formidable foe to Athens. Alcibiades had passed in a merchant vessel from the Thurian territory to the Elian port of Cyllene, whence

he proceeded to Argos, and afterwards to Sparta, where his interest had been powerful.

On his arrival at Sparta, the senate assembled, and the people being summoned to give him audience, all listened with anxious attention while he communicated information and advice. "The views of conquest entertained at Athens," he said, "were extensive. It was proposed first to reduce all Sicily, then the Grecian possessions in Italy. With the inexhaustible supply of ship timber, which Italy afforded, it was intended so to increase the fleet, that the conquest of Carthage might be undertaken. Spain and all the western shores of the Mediterranean would then be open, and mercenary troops might be obtained in any numbers, and of the best kind. These would be employed against Peloponnesus by land, while the fleet blockaded it by sea; and thus it was proposed to complete the subjugation of Greece. The conquered countries, it was expected, as they were reduced, would furnish supplies for further conquest, without burdening Athens.

"And however wild and visionary," continued Alcibiades, "these vast projects may at first sight appear; I, who have long meditated upon them, who know the resources of Athens, am confident that success is not impossible. The Sicilian Greeks have little military discipline or skill. Syracuse, having already suffered a defeat by land, will presently be blockaded by land and sea, and, unassisted, must unavoidably fall. Sicily may then be considered as conquered, and Italy will not hold long. Thus, not Sicily only, but Peloponnesus itself is deeply interested in the event."

Having, by this representation, sufficiently alarmed the Lacedæmonians, he proceeded to inform them how the danger might be averted. "A fleet," he said, "you have not equal to that of Athens; but troops may be sent to Sicily, making them work their own passage, in sufficient numbers to form, with the Sicilians, a competent force of regular heavy-armed infantry. But what I consider of more importance than any troops you can send, is to send a Spartan general to Sicily, to establish discipline among the Sicilians, already firm in the

cause, and whose authority may bring over, and unite under one command, those not disposed to obey the Syracusans.

"But it will be necessary, in order to encourage the Syracusans and distract the Athenians, to begin hostilities in Greece. Nothing can be so efficacious, and nothing the Athenians so much dread, as your occupying and fortifying a post in Attica. Their country will then no longer be theirs, but yours; no revenue will accrue to them from it; and what is still more important, nothing will equally produce the revolt of those distant possessions whence their principal revenue is derived, as the knowledge that they are pressed at home."

Having thus indicated and advised what would most contribute to his country's downfall, Alcibiades offered some apology for such conduct. "I hold that," he said, "no longer to be my country which is governed by a set of men, who have so injuriously driven me from it. Nor ought I to be considered as exciting war against my country, but rather as endeavouring to restore myself to a country which was once mine, and that country to its due government within itself, and its just situation among the Grecian republics. I account him a true patriot, who being unjustly expelled rests not in banishment; but still animated by love of his country, does his utmost to return. Upon you, Lacedæmonians, I depend for the greatest benefits to my country and myself."

The eloquence of Alcibiades, his advice, and still more the expectation of advantage from the important information which he was able to give, decided the Lacedæmonians, and it was resolved to assist Syracuse, and renew the war with Athens.

The resolution for war being taken at Lacedæmon, the business of Sicily first required attention. To command the force to be employed there Gylippus was appointed. A man better qualified could hardly have been selected.

The renewal of the war with Athens might give reason to expect some vigour in the Lacedæmonian councils; but the first operations of their arms indicated none. In the spring, the force of Laconia was assembled and marched against the Argive territory. On its arrival at Cleonæ, an earthquake, a common circumstance in Greece, without doing any con-

siderable mischief, threw all into consternation; superstition saw in it the anger of the gods; the army immediately retreated; and the expedition was given up. Such conduct encouraged and invited the Argives to revenge. Entering the Lacedæmonian territory of Thyreatis, they collected plunder that sold for about $24,000, which was esteemed a large booty, and well rewarding the enterprize.

The passion of the Athenian people for conquest in Sicily had not abated. The application of the generals had met with success far beyond their expectation, and all their requests were granted without delay. Three talents in silver, amounting to about $300,000, and stores of all kinds in abundance were sent.

The generals resolved immediately to lay siege to Syracuse. Nature, art, and a numerous population, concurred to render Syracuse a strong city; and, to reduce a place but of moderate strength, we have seen, in the art of attack of that age, a contravallation always necessary. Here two difficulties occurred, the extent of the town, and the form of a hill, over the skirt of which a suburb extended. The hill sloping toward the town, was precipitous towards the country, and the suburb from its situation overlooking the town, was called Epipolæ.

The Athenian generals, embarking their whole army, had passed undiscovered to a place near Syracuse, called Leon, where a body of infantry was hastily debarked, and marched immediately to Epipolæ, less than a mile distant; and, by a pass called Euryelus, they mounted the hill unopposed. Information of this surprize being next morning carried to the Syracusans who occupied the meadow of the Anapus at the distance of three miles, it excited great consternation. Their courage, however, did not fail them. With much zeal, but in great disorder, all hastened to repel the invaders. A fierce conflict ensued, but tumultuous valour was little efficacious against steady discipline, and the Syracusans were compelled to retreat.

The Athenians, returning to Epipolæ, applied themselves to construct a fort at Labdalum among the highest precipices,

as a citadel, in which to place their military chest, and other valuables. The fort being quickly completed, the army descended into the plain, and the work of circumvallation, from Epipolæ to the sea on each side, to the Trogillian port on the north, and to the great port on the south; they became, on the northern side, through their superior practice and skill, every possible preparation having been made during winter, so far advanced as to astonish, and greatly alarm the Syracusans. Their generals resolved to venture a battle, rather than quietly permit the prosecution of works which threatened the inevitable capture of the city. They accordingly led out their forces, but were obliged to retreat within the walls.

All hope of intercepting the contravallation, or preventing its completion, was soon given up by the besieged; and despondency, and its consequence, discord, began to gain ground among them. This became quickly known among the neighbouring states, and a general disposition to abandon the Syracusans, and submit to the Athenians followed. This feeling spread as far as the Italian cities; apprehensions arose that their refusal to furnish a market might draw on them the vengeance of the conquering commonwealth; and supplies flowed to the Athenian armament from all quarters. Those of the Sicilian tribes, also, who had before superciliously rejected invitations from the Athenians, now solicited their alliance.

Meanwhile the Syracusan multitude, impotent against their enemies, vented their discontent against their generals; and Hermocrates and his colleagues were removed from their office. At the same time, suspicions of treachery between party and party, the universal bane of the Grecian commonwealths, especially in adverse circumstances, arose. The common people were far from being equally apprehensive with their superiors of the consequences of yielding to the Athenians; capitulation became the subject of frequent debate in the general assembly; and even messages passed to Nicias on the subject; but the terms proposed were not such as that cautious servant of the Athenian people supposed would satisfy his greedy masters. Thus nearly was a great point carried towards realizing the magnificent visions of the

ambition of Alcibiades, and so nearly was Nicias, almost against his will, made conqueror of Syracuse and of Sicily, and so near was Athens to the greatest acquisition ever yet made by Grecian arms.

Gylippus arrived at Leucas with only two Lacedæmonian and two Corinthian ships; intelligence there reached him of the situation of Syracuse, so exaggerated, that he gave up Sicily for lost; and thought he should do much, if he could save the Italian states of the Peloponnesian confederacy. To this object, therefore, he determined to direct his efforts. Taking Pythen, the Corinthian admiral, with him in his small squadron, he went first to Tarentum, a Lacedæmonian colony, where he was well received. In sailing along the coast to try negociation with other towns, a violent storm interrupted his course, and after narrowly escaping shipwreck, he returned to Tarentum.

Some days were necessary to refit his shattered galleys. He then proceeded with Pythen to Locri, from whose people, through local interest always adverse to the Athenians, they found a favourable reception. There they gained the first authentic intelligence of the real state of things at Syracuse. They learnt, that though the circumvallation was really extended from Epipolæ to the sea on each side, and so far completed that any attempt upon it without a very superior force would be rash; yet over the crags of Epipolæ it might be possible to introduce troops into the city. Learning further that the strait of Messina was unguarded, they proceeded by sea along the northern coast of Sicily to Himera, and with the people of that place they succeeded. Gylippus then immediately determined to lay up his triremes in the port of Himera, and march across the country to Syracuse, with such force as he could collect. He engaged the Himeræans to send with him a thousand heavy and light armed infantry, and a hundred horse, and from others he engaged so many, that his force all together was about five thousand men.

During these transactions in Sicily, the squadron, assembled at Leucas, sailed for the Italian coast, leaving behind Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who happened not to be ready. This accidental circumstance had most

important consequences. Gongylus, as soon as his trireme was prepared, crossed the gulf, arrived on the Sicilian coast before the squadron, and entered the harbour of Syracuse unopposed; for Nicias, thinking success now assured, kept little watch. The arrival of Gongylus was most critical. Summons had been issued for a general assembly to meet, for the declared purpose of debating concerning terms of capitulation. Hope, raised by the arrival of the Corinthian admiral, gave strength to the party adverse to the surrender; the question of capitulation was postponed; Gongylus was allowed to address the people, and the warm assurances he gave of speedy and effectual succour, not only from Corinth, but from Lacedæmon, turned the popular mind.

It could not be without gross neglect in Nicias, that Gylippus, shortly after, ascended Epipolæ unopposed, by the way of Euryalus, where the Athenians had first obtained possession of that important post. The Syracusan forces actually went out to meet him, and to the astonishment of the Athenian general and army, busied in the works on the south of the city, the combined forces made their appearance as if to offer battle. Gylippus, however, had the precaution to halt, while retreat was still in his power; he sent forward a herald with the proposal, "That if the Athenians would quit Sicily in five days, with their arms and baggage, he was willing to make a truce for that purpose." The message was of course received with disdain by those who thought themselves on the point of becoming conquerors of Syracuse and of Sicily. Nicias, however, continued motionless, and the herald was merely ordered to withdraw. Meanwhile the able Gylippus had sufficient opportunity to observe, that the Syracusan forces were deficient in discipline to a degree beyond what he had imagined.

Having, by this succession of daring, but well concealed measures at the outset, wholly changed the face of affairs, Gylippus prudently checked the spirit of enterprise, that he might give stability to the advantage obtained. Master of Epipolæ, through his success against Labdalon, he began immediately to carry out works to intersect those of the Athe-

nians, and they were speedily carried beyond the Athenian line.

Adversity began to affect the Athenians. Nicias had sent twenty triremes to the Italian coast to intercept the squadron from Leucas. They sailed, and the enemy's squadron, consisting of twelve triremes, entered the little harbour of Syracuse. The force thus added, gave the city, for the present, complete security. It was, therefore, resolved to act upon the offensive against the Athenians; and, with this view, it was proposed to collect a still greater strength. Ministers were sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth, and the active Gylippus went himself to all the Sicilian cities to excite the lukewarm, and win the adverse to exert themselves in the cause of Lacedæmon and of Syracuse; which, he contended, was the cause of liberty, of justice, and of the general interest of Sicily.

What opinion the Athenian general now had of his own situation we learn from his account, transmitted by Thucydides. Writing was beginning to be used for ordinary purposes. The despatches of generals were mostly, or rather universally, committed to trusty messengers, who delivered them verbally. Thucydides speaks of Nicias as the first general who transmitted his reports constantly in writing. He had observed, says the historian, "that messengers, in delivering verbally to the sovereign people in assembly the reports committed to them, generally gave an impression wide of the reality." From his first appointment, therefore, he had used the precaution of frequently sending despatches in writing with an exact account of every transaction, and these were always formally read to the assembled people by the secretary of the commonwealth. He had now determined, in consequence of his ill success in the late battle, to remain upon the defensive during the rest of the summer. For this, he thought it necessary to apologize very particularly in his despatches to Athens. He, therefore, committed them to officers whom he selected as most competent to answer any questions that might be put to them; yet he scrupulously protested, that his written despatches only should be considered as having his authority.

In these he represented the disastrous state of the Athenian affairs, and concluded thus, "I can affirm, that neither your generals nor your army have deserved blame for their conduct in your service here; but as Sicily is now united against us, and reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, I will venture to declare, that it is become absolutely necessary for you to determine on one of two measures; either your forces, now here, must be immediately recalled, or an additional armament, not inferior in either land or naval force to the former, must be sent hither; it must be here early in the spring, and a large sum of money for its use will be indispensable. For myself, I request, that I may be superseded in the command, for which ill health disqualifies me."

The Athenians were not yet practised enough in misfortune, to listen to wise advice thwarting a favourite purpose. They would not on the remonstrances of Nicias give up their views of conquest in Sicily; they would not even allow their infirm and deserving general to retire. An additional force was immediately voted; Nicias was required to remain with the command in chief; Menander and Euthydemus, officers now in Sicily, Demosthenes, who had already so much distinguished himself by important services, and Eurymedon, who had commanded at Corcyra, at Pylus, and in Sicily, were named to lead the reinforcement.

While the Athenians were thus madly intent upon distant conquest, a more serious attack than they had yet experienced, was preparing against their own country. The success of Gylippus; the prospect of assistance from the whole force of Sicily; the evident embarrassment of Athens; the exhortations of Corinth; and the advice of Alcibiades; determined the Lacedæmonians to recommence hostilities against Athens. The war became popular; and so prosecute hostilities with vigour was determined upon with alacrity. It was resolved to carry into execution, the long meditated purpose of occupying a post in Attica; and, in pursuance of the advice of Alcibiades, Decelea was the place chosen.

In the beginning of the next spring, at a very early season for military operations, the Lacedæmonians with their allies, under Agis, son of Archidamus, entered Attica; and, after

extending their ravages over the plain which had been abandoned to them, applied themselves to fortify Decelea, a town in sight of Athens, and well situated for commanding the richest part of Attica.

Meantime Gylippus was using his wonted activity and skill against the infirm and desponding Nicias. From the several Sicilian cities he had collected a considerable force, with which, about the time that Demosthenes sailed from Athens, he entered Syracuse. The Athenians kept their land force within their fortifications, which he thought himself not strong enough to attack, unless he could divide their strength. He proposed therefore another measure, which to some might appear still bolder; he would man the ships and attack the enemy's fleet. The reputation of the Athenians for naval superiority was so established by their various successes against the Peloponnesians in the beginning of the war, that the Syracusans were startled at the first idea of engaging them at sea. But the influence of Hermocrates powerfully seconded the authority of Gylippus. Together, they encouraged the Syracusans, by representing to them that nothing so daunted an enterprizing people, as daring and unexpected attacks upon them. "The Athenians themselves," they added, "had not always been a sea-faring people; the invading Persians had first forced them to become such." Recent good fortune had prepared the Syracusans for encouragement. Having already, under the conduct of Gylippus, succeeded so much beyond their hopes, they were disposed now to proceed in their career. Accordingly, they submitted themselves to his direction; thirty-five triremes, fit for service, lay in the great port, and forty-five in the little port; all were manned by night, while Gylippus led the whole force of infantry toward the Athenian forts at Plemmyrium.

At day break, the stir in the Syracusan fleet became visible to the Athenians, who hastily manned sixty triremes. Gylippus, meanwhile, hastening his march, carried the largest of the three forts by assault, upon which the other two were immediately abandoned by their garrisons. By this time the fleets were engaged. Within the great port, the Syracusans had at first the advantage; but their larger division was defeated,

and then the conquering Athenians, hastening to the relief of their pressed ships, quickly compelled the other division of the Syracusan fleet to fly. Eleven Syracusan ships were sunk; the crews of three were made prisoners; those of the others mostly perished. Three Athenian ships were destroyed. The Athenians erected a trophy for their naval victory; the Syracusans erected three trophies for the three forts taken.

More important tokens of success, however, than any trophies, remained to the Syracusans. The killed and prisoners in the forts, notwithstanding the numbers that fled, were many; the military chest; all the most valuable effects of the principal officers; large magazines of provisions; most of the stores of both army and fleet; masts for forty triremes, and three complete triremes laid up ashore were taken. Notwithstanding, therefore, their naval victory, the consequences of the late complex action was very seriously disadvantageous to the Athenians. Alarm and despondency began to pervade the armament.

Meantime the conduct of the Syracusans, under the able direction of Gylippus and Hermocrates, was all energy. Notwithstanding their late naval defeat, they resolved not to give up their purpose of disputing with the Athenians, the command of the sea. Accordingly, to secure their station in the great port, whence they might best annoy the Athenian fleet, they formed before it a kind of rampart of piles. To prevent the completion of this, and to destroy what was already done, became an important object for the Athenians. A party, in boats, fastened ropes about the piles; divers went down and sawed them at the bottom; and thus most of them were hauled up, or broken. The Syracusans continued to drive piles; and some in such a manner, that not appearing above water, they were very dangerous to the Athenian boats, yet divers were found for large rewards to saw and fasten ropes even to these, so that the labour of the enemy was continually to be renewed; and as the present view of the Athenian general was defence, and to gain time for the arrival of the reinforcement which he expected, his purpose was in a great degree accomplished.

While the Athenian affairs were thus waning in Sicily, Athens itself began to feel severely the consequence of having a Peloponnesian garrison established in the heart of its territory. In the former invasions, a considerable part of the harvest had been consumed or carried off, and the vineyards, orchards and olive plantations, had been destroyed or greatly damaged. The injury, however, had not extended over the whole country. The Lacedæmonian army, for want of magazines, could not stay long, and when it was gone, the herds and flocks returned to their pastures, and the owners of the lands might make any use of them that the interval till the next summer would admit. The garrison of Decelea kept the whole country and the city itself in constant alarm. Its very wants compelled exertion; for the troops, little supplied by their cities, subsisted chiefly by plunder; and the assistance, which they received occasionally from home, was less in money or stores, than in reinforcements to assist in rapine. The Spartan king Agis, who had led the expedition and superintended the construction of the works, remained after the departure of the rest of the army, as governor of the garrison, and assiduously and ably directed its measures. Not only all produce and revenue from the lands of Attica, with all the herds and flocks which they had maintained, were lost to the Athenians; but more than twenty thousand slaves deserted, the greater part of whom were mechanics and manufacturers. The Athenian cavalry were to little purpose employed in the endeavour to check the ravage and desertion. Many of the horses, the art of shoeing that animal being yet unknown, were lamed by unremitted service on rough and rocky ground; some were disabled by wounds, and the rest soon worn down.

Among the inconveniences ensuing from the establishment of the enemy in Decelea one is mentioned, which marks, to a surprizing degree, the imperfection of ancient navigation. The large and fruitful island of Eubœa was, at all times, the principal resource of the Athenians for supplying the deficiencies of the scanty and arid soil of Attica. The produce was mostly brought to the port of Oropus, and thence conveyed, by land, along a hilly road of about forty-

four miles, to Athens. The nearest, and almost the only practicable road for heavy burdens, passed through Decelea. The occupying of that post by the enemy, therefore, made it necessary to carry every thing by sea. With the advantages of modern navigation this would be incomparably the preferable method; but Thucydides assures us, that in that age the expense of the transport all the way by sea, far exceeded that of the old practice. He also observes, "that, instead of a commonwealth, Athens was reduced to the condition of a garrison. Without a territory, it depended upon supplies by sea for subsistence. The whole people were harrassed with military duty so incessant, as to admit of little other employment. During the day they mounted guard by reliefs; but for the night none were at any time excused, and this continued throughout all seasons during the remainder of the war.

Pressed by every inconvenience of a siege at home—such continued to be the zeal of the Athenian people for foreign conquest—such the ardor with which they insisted on the prosecution of the siege of Syracuse, a city scarcely inferior to Athens in size or population, that unless seen, says the historian, nobody would believe it. The expectation of all Greece was strangely disappointed, and the opinion generally entertained, both of the power and of the perseverance of Athens, proved unfounded. The pressure of new evils served but to bring forward new resources. All revenue from Attica, public and private, ceasing, it was necessary to look abroad for supplies. A total change was made in the collection of revenue from the subject states; the ancient tribute was abolished; and instead of it, a tax was imposed resembling the modern customs, being a twentieth of the value of all imports and exports. This, though light in comparison with modern taxes, was the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that time known in the world.

While the Athenians were suffering from the Peloponnesians established in Decelea, a cruel stroke fell upon their neighbouring enemies of Bœotia. Thirteen hundred armed Thracians hired for the Sicilian expedition, did not arrive till after the fleet, under Demosthenes, was gone.

Means to forward them were not ready, and their pay was burdensome, being an Attic drachma, about eighteen cents a head, daily. It was resolved, therefore, to send them home; but, by the way, to make use of them against the enemies of the commonwealth as opportunity might offer. The command was committed to Dietrephes an Athenian; who, passing through the Euripus, debarked his barbarians on the hostile shore of the Tanagræan territory. Having collected some booty, he hastened to deposit it in the neighbouring friendly town of Chalcis in Eubœa, and in the evening again crossed the Euripus for farther plunder. During the night he directed his march toward Mycalessus, a large and populous Bœotian town in perfect amity with Thebes, and at such a distance from the Attic border, and from the sea, that the inhabitants, unaccustomed to fear surprizes, spared themselves the expense and fatigue of maintaining fortifications, and keeping a regular watch. Dietrephes halted toward midnight, and recommenced his march so as to reach Mycalessus, only two miles off, about day-break. Finding a gate open and unguarded, his barbarians rushed instantly to pillage; and massacred as they went, sparing neither sex nor age; for the Thracians, like most barbarians, are commonly bloody-minded in success. There was a very large school in which the boys were just assembled, when the Thracians broke in and put every one to death. Destruction so unexpected and so complete, scarcely ever fell upon any town.

News of this scene of bloodshed being quickly carried to Thebes, a body of forces instantly marched, too late to give relief to the Mycalessians, but in time to overtake the Thracians. Those barbarians, who in courage were inferior to none, repulsed the Theban cavalry. They were, however, compelled to abandon all their booty, and when they arrived on the beach, in the confusion of embarkation, they suffered greatly. About two hundred and fifty of them were killed.

Meanwhile Demosthenes, having joined Charicles, was meditating measures for revenging on Lacedæmon the evils suffered by Athens from the garrison of Decelea. Upon the Epidaurian coast he made a descent, and collected some booty. Proceeding to the Laconian coast, he de-

barked again opposite Cythera. The first business was plunder, as far as it could be conveniently extended. A neck of land was then occupied on which to erect a fort. It was proposed that this should be, on the eastern side of the country, like Pylus on the western, a place of refuge for runaway Helots, or any others who might be disposed to live by rapine on the Laconian lands. Matters being so far settled, Demosthenes proceeded on his voyage.

Arriving at Corcyra, he added his personal influence to the public authority for collecting reinforcements among the allies of Athens in western Greece. Naupactus, Cephallenia, Jacynthus, Alyzia, Anactorium, contributed to strengthen the armament. At Anactorium he found Eurymedon collecting provisions for Sicily, and from him he learnt the unwelcome news, that Plemmyrium was in the hands of the enemy.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon having prepared every thing for the prosecution of their voyage, crossed the Ionian gulf to the Japygian promontory. There they stopped to renew the ancient alliance of Athens with Artas, a powerful chief of the Japygian barbarians, through whom they obtained a small reinforcement of dartmen of the Messapian tribe. Proceeding to Thurium, they found a revolution had taken place there favourable to their cause; the party friendly to Athens were in possession of the government, and those of their opponents who had escaped with life were in banishment. After making arrangements advantageous for the Athenian interest, and obtaining a reinforcement of a thousand men, they proceeded to the Rhegian port of Petra.

As soon as the Athenian fleet, under Demosthenes, had clearly quitted the Grecian coast, the Corinthian admiral, Polyanthes, resolved upon the bold measure of offering battle, though with inferior numbers, to the Athenian squadron at Naupactus. He chose his place for the purpose judiciously. Experience had led the Corinthians to improve the construction of their galleys, by strengthening the bows with an addition of timber and metal, which might enable them to resist the destructive shock of the enemy's beak. After a short contest, three Corinthian ships were sunk, but seven Athenian were disabled, through the superior strength of the Corin-

thian bows. The Corinthians retired; but the Athenians were not in condition for effectual pursuit. The Corinthians, therefore, erected a trophy, thinking it much not to have been more decisively defeated. The Athenians, on the contrary, though they remained masters of the wreck, the common criterion of victory, would erect no trophy, dejected as by a defeat, because with superior numbers they had not been more completely victorious.

During these transactions, the natural consequences of recovered prosperity attended the negociations which Gylippus and Hermocrates were prosecuting in Sicily. Of the Grecian cities, none remained attached to Athens; Agrigentum alone persevered in neutrality.

Intelligence arriving of the formidable reinforcement coming from Athens, Gylippus and Hermocrates determined to use the opportunity yet remaining for attempting a decisive blow against the dispirited armament of Nicias. They, like the Corinthians, had learned from experience the deficiencies of their triremes, and they adopted nearly the same plan of improvement. The Syracusans prepared with new confidence for action. All being ready before the fleet moved, Gylippus drew out the land forces. They engaged the whole attention of the commanders with a false attack. This feint taking full effect, the fleet, consisting of eighty triremes, advanced towards the Athenian naval station. The Athenians, in alarm and confusion, hastily manned seventy-five triremes, and met them. The contest was long; two Athenian triremes were sunk, but the fleets parted without any great advantage gained on either side.

Next day the Syracusans did not move. But no encouragement arose hence to the Athenians. They felt that they had lost the superiority by sea as well as by land, and they concluded that the enemy would not long rest satisfied with the progress already made. Nicias, therefore, directed his principal attention to the security of his fleet. He had already formed a stockade in the water for the defence of his naval station. In front of this, he now moored large merchant ships. In these were placed machines bearing instruments of vast weight, called dolphins, so suspended over the

sea that they might be dropped on any vessel passing near, and with such violence as to sink it.

The Syracusans did not disappoint the expectation of the Athenian general. The very next morning their land and sea forces moved at once towards his camp and naval station; but the serious attack as before was on the fleet. A Corinthian fleet, when going to seek an enemy, took three day's provision aboard. But when immediate action was expected, as on the present occasion, the general practice was to leave every thing but their arms in their naval camp; not encumbering themselves on shipboard with a single meal. Toward mid-day, in pursuance of the advice of Ariston, the Syracusans retreated, but in perfect order, toward their naval station. The Athenians, fatigued with unavailing contest, did not pursue. The Syracusans, on reaching the shore, found a market of eatables provided. The magistrates, in consequence of notice from the naval commanders, had compelled all persons in the city to send whatever provisions they had ready, and the crews debarking, took hasty refreshment.

Meanwhile the Athenians retreating to their naval camp, had dispersed, expecting no interruption of leisure for their meal; when suddenly they perceived the Syracusan fleet approaching again in order of battle. With much tumult, and mostly without refreshment, they hastened aboard, and the action was renewed. But it was no longer equally maintained as before. The strengthened bows of the Syracusan galleys damaged several of the Athenian; the numerous dartmen on the Syracusan decks plied their weapons efficaciously; and practice had given the Syracusan leaders a new mode of annoying an enemy. Dartmen, in boats, venturing under the quarters, and even under the lateral galleries of the Athenian galleys, gave more annoyance to their seamen than even the dartmen on the decks. Seven Athenian ships being sunk, several others much damaged, the whole fleet sought the shelter of their floating fortresses. So far the Syracusans pursued, and three of their ships, elate with success, pushed within them, but two were sunk, and the other was taken with her whole crew. The rest retired satisfied with the success of the day, and confirmed in opi-

nion that they were now superior by sea, as well as by land, to that enemy from whom they had so lately apprehended subjugation. It was, therefore, unanimously resolved at the earliest opportunity to renew the attack on both elements.

In the short and critical interval between the resolution taken and the proposed execution, Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with a fleet of seventy-three triremes, and a land force of nearly twenty thousand men. Alarm and astonishment now returned with double force upon the Syracusans. They had been assured that Attica itself was in the possession of an enemy; and it appeared an unaccountable paradox, that, so pressed at home, the Athenians should send out such a force to make foreign conquest, a force in all points equal to that which Nicias had first led to Sicily. The power of Athens thus appeared stupendous; its resources beyond calculation; and their own danger consequently endless.

Demosthenes having landed his forces, viewed his ground and judiciously decided on the measures proper to be taken. In his younger days he had been enterprizing even to rashness. Now, in mature age, neither the hope of profit, nor the prospect of fame, nor the fear of a tyrannical multitude, could move him from what he thought the welfare of his country required. The safety of the Sicilian army was not to be staked against any hope of conquest; the gain would be a precarious advantage to the commonwealth; the loss almost certain ruin. His first resolution, therefore, was to avoid the error of Nicias, losing opportunity by delay; his next, to fix upon some one undertaking, in which success might be in some degree decisive, and failure not fatal; and finally, he determined, that should such a first attempt be defeated, it would be improper to risk farther so large a portion of the strength of the commonwealth; and whatever indignation he might incur from the Athenian people, he would lead the armament home.

The Athenian force was clearly superior in the field. The principal obstacles to the progress of the siege were the enemy's counterwork intersecting the line of the contravallation, and their possession of Epipolæ. Demosthenes observed that the counterwork was only a single wall without defence be-

hind, so that possession of Epipolæ would give him possession of the counterwork. He therefore judged that the assault of Epipolæ would be the best criterion; its success, or its failure, would determine whether the siege of Syracuse should be vigorously prosecuted or abandoned without delay. This assault was therefore resolved upon.

To attack otherwise than by surprise, so great a force, in a post so strong by nature and by art, was deemed unadvisable. Night was therefore chosen for the purpose; the army moved about midnight. They passed the first Syracusan post unperceived. Surprizing then a small outwork, they put part of the guard to the sword; but the greater part escaping, alarmed the camps in Epipolæ. All was quickly in motion to oppose the assailants; but the Athenian van, led by Demosthenes, repulsed the first troops they met, and continued mounting the hill; while those who followed demolished the fort. Attacks were renewed by Gylippus, but still unsuccessfully; the Athenians pushed forward; but in confidence now of success, they grew more careless of their order. In this state the Bœotians who were among the allies of Syracuse met and checked them. Among a large body of men confined within a narrow space on rough ground and by night, confusion once arising spread rapidly. To communicate commands was difficult; and though the moon shone bright, yet when established arrangements were once disturbed, it was no longer easy to distinguish friends from foes. The repulsed Athenians meeting those yet advancing, were received with pointed spears. This occasioned frequent and clamorous passing of the word, which thus became known to the enemy, and of course useless or even prejudicial to themselves. But beyond all things, the song or shout of battle, which the Greeks always used in the moment previous to attack, increased the confusion; for that of the allies of Athens being the same with the Syracusan, alarmed the Athenians wherever they heard it; and as disorder extended, the troops of the Athenian army in several parts fought one another. At length all took to flight. The only road for retreat was narrow; the fugitives were numerous; and, hastening to

avoid the pursuers' swords, many perished by falling down precipices.

The morrow was a day of mourning to the Athenians, as of triumph to the Syracusans.

Every circumstance appeared now to require that the Athenian generals should quickly enter upon some new plan. The armament was sickly, and the hope of soon reducing Syracuse, or indeed of at all reducing it, seemed frustrated. Demosthenes, therefore, urged his opinion, before given, that the experiment having been made, and having failed, all purpose of conquest in Sicily should be at once abandoned, and the armament conducted home. Nicias positively refused to concur in this arrangement. "The temper of the Athenian people," he said, "is well known to me; warm in expectation and jealous of their authority, they would highly resent a measure, so disappointing to their hopes, unauthorised by their decree. Our conduct, then, let it be recollected, must be submitted to the judgment, and our fate must be decided by the vote, not of those who have seen and who know what we know, but of those who will be persuaded of any thing by any eloquent accuser. Even of those now under our command; of those now loudest in complaint of the evils they are suffering; some, nay many, will unsay their assertions, blame the abandonment of the expedition; impute corruption to their generals, and perhaps become our accusers, or at least join in the vote for our condemnation. I, therefore, if I am brought to the alternative, will not risk a shameful death from the injustice of my fellow citizens, to avoid an honourable death from the valour of the enemy. But I think we are not yet so straitened. Ill as the face of our affairs appears, I well know the condition of the Syracusans is worse. In some points they are under great difficulties, in others reduced to absolute inability. They are ruined by their expences. Their fleet therefore they cannot long maintain; and, on the least failure of payment, their auxiliaries will abandon them. We are under no equal difficulty; and, on these considerations, I hold it utterly improper to give up the enterprize."

Such were the sentiments of Nicias, delivered in the council of war. But beside his extreme horror of the prospect of living under the Athenian democracy with credit so impaired, (as it must have been by relinquishing the enterprize,) he had reasons for his perseverance which he did not communicate. There were among the Syracusans some who wished well to the Athenian arms. These communicated secretly with Nicias; they informed him accurately of the state of things in the city; they urged him to persevere in the siege, and they encouraged him to hope, that the very distress of the enemy, with little exertion on his part, would enable him still to return home conqueror of Syracuse.

Unexpected success had now prepared the Syracusans for any exertion. Gylippus was successful in a journey which he undertook into the Sicilian country. Besides collecting a considerable force among the barbarians, he was joined by a body of Peloponnesians, who, to avoid the Athenian fleet, had made the coast of Africa, and thence crossed to Selinus, and he led the whole without opposition into Syracuse.

Meanwhile the Athenian armament, dispirited by disappointment, was also weakened daily by sickness. Intelligence that Gylippus had introduced a powerful reinforcement within the Syracusan lines, excited new apprehension. Nicias at length was persuaded to give the sanction of his consent to the retreat of the armament. Orders were given with cautious privacy for the fleet and army to prepare for quitting their station. All was accordingly ready when the full moon was suddenly eclipsed. None had then science to foresee the regular return of that phenomenon; few could be persuaded that the cause was in the order of nature. It struck the armament with terror, as a portent boding ill to their purpose; application was made to the generals, deprecating the intended march; the augurs and soothsayers declared, that to bring the heavenly powers again to a friendly aspect, required a delay of thrice nine days, and Nicias, more superstitious than the rest, affirmed, that till that period was completed, he would not even consult about removal.

There seems to have been nothing in this omen to persuade the Athenians more than the Syracusans that the ill

boding regarding them. But omens of undecided import, such is the nature of superstitious fear, commonly were taken as unfavourable by those in adverse circumstances. On the other hand, the knowledge that the Athenians held themselves to be the objects of the portended divine displeasure, sufficed for the Syracusans to derive encouragement from the portent. They were confident of superiority by land; they considered the intention of secret retreat as a proof of fear to stand a battle. They resolved, therefore, not to allow the enemy to establish themselves any where in Sicily, but to attack them by sea and land in their present situation, and by their total destruction to deter future invasions.

This grand attack was resolved upon. Accordingly, seventy-six triremes moved from the naval station, and the whole land force advanced towards the Athenian lines. The Athenians, superior by ten triremes, met their fleet. Eurymedon, who commanded the right, stretched away with a view to surround the left of the enemy. The centre, spreading to obviate the danger of too great an interval between the divisions, weakened itself by making the intervals too great between ship and ship. In this state it was attacked by the enemy in close order, and presently defeated. The Syracusans, then directing their principal effort against the division of Eurymedon, now cut off from the rest of the fleet, took, destroyed, or drove aground every ship, and Eurymedon himself was killed. The left wing, thus wholly without support, fled, pursued to the shore. The land forces were now called into action, on the one side to capture, and on the other to defend the stranded vessels. The Athenians finally prevailed, and they saved most of them. The Syracusans, however, took eighteen, and of these the whole crews perished. The Syracusan fleet then retired, and each party erected its trophy; the Syracusans for their naval victory, the Athenians for their success by land.

But the event of the naval action was a disaster so momentous, and so little balanced by the better fortune of the land forces, that the deepest dejection pervaded the Athenian armament. On the other hand, the Syracusans began to consider themselves no longer as struggling in the almost

hopeless defence of every thing dear to them. They looked forward to success that might entitle them to the high appellation of vanquishers of Athens. Accordingly they applied themselves immediately to blockade the port; desiring now to prevent the departure of that force from which they had expected the worst evils of subjugation; and proposing no less than to destroy, or reduce to the dreadful condition of prisoners at discretion, the whole of that formidable fleet and army.

Meanwhile, not dejection only, but the most urgent of wants pressed the Athenians. In consequence of the resolution taken to raise the siege (no suspicion being entertained that the enemy could prevent their departure by sea) they had forbidden farther supplies of provisions from Catana. Naval superiority lost, the means of intercourse with Catana were gone, and thus the desire to depart was enforced, as the means of effecting it were rendered precarious. A council of war was called to consider of these untoward circumstances. The result of the deliberation was a resolution to withdraw the whole armament by sea. This being determined on, the subordinate resolution to use all possible means for strengthening the fleet followed; and with this view they agreed to abandon immediately their extensive line of contravallation, and reduce their works to a single fort, near the naval station, large enough only to contain the baggage and sick, with a competent garrison. The lightness of the vessels, a quality necessary to swift rowing, and in open sea of inestimable value, would be of little avail within the harbour of Syracuse. On the contrary, to be able to maintain a stationary fight, as between infantry ashore, was deemed a matter of principal importance. It was finally resolved, that every man capable of bearing arms, beyond the necessary garrison of the fort, should be taken aboard; that numerous bowmen, with the ablest dartmen, should be stationed on the decks; and that, on the prows, grappling irons should be fixed which might at once obviate the shock of the enemy's stronger bows, and, preventing their retreat, give opportunity to their own numerous heavy-armed soldiers to

act. Pursuant to these resolutions, about a hundred and ten triremes were equipped and manned.

The bustle of preparation in the Athenian fleet was observed by the Syracusans, and intelligence reached them of the grappling irons with which the Athenian prows were to be armed. Gylippus and Hermocrates, though they could not equip eighty triremes, nevertheless determined to pursue the contest for naval superiority. Against the new mode of action proposed by the Athenians, they thought it necessary to prepare; but for this it was held sufficient to cover the forecastles of their triremes with bull-hides, on which the grappling irons would not readily take a firm hold.

While the animation of the Syracusans and their confederates seconded the spirit of their leaders, a general dejection prevailed among the Athenians. The discouragement arising from the late naval defeats was proportioned to the former confidence in the opinion of their decided superiority. But as the spirits of those under his command sunk, the animation, and, indeed, the whole character of Nicias seemed to rise. His behaviour on the occasion was truly great. Little ambitious, when favoured by fortune; rather deficient in exertion, and sometimes culpably remiss in his command; his activity and animation increased as evils pressed and dangers threatened. None was now so warm in endeavours to revive the drooping courage of the soldiers and seamen. When all was ready for the proposed attempt, he went around the whole armament, and exhorted every one by his own glory, and by that inherited from his ancestors, to exert himself in the approaching battle. Leading then the whole to the shore, he there committed them to Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus, under whose orders they embarked, and moved immediately to the harbour's mouth to force their way out.

The enemy, who carefully watched their motions, quickly made towards them under the Corinthian Pythen, and Sicanus and Agatharchus, Syracusans. With the first shock, the Athenians made themselves masters of the vessels that blockaded the mouth of the port, and were hastening to unmoor

them and clear the passage, when the Syracusans approached, and a most obstinate battle ensued.

Meanwhile, the Athenian army stood on the shore, observing, with the most anxious attention, what passed at so short a distance that they could see and hear almost every thing. When, therefore, after a long contest, the advantage of the Syracusans became decisive, and the whole Athenian fleet fled and was pursued, grief, indignation, and dismay rose to the highest pitch.

The dejection that pervaded the defeated armament was so extreme, and the danger impending so urgent, that the sacred dues of the dead were totally neglected; no herald was sent to request the restitution of their bodies; no care was taken about their burial, but every thought was absorbed in the evils that pressed, and the perils that threatened, the living. Amid the general despair, however, Demosthenes did not lose his usual energy of mind. Going to Nicias, he proposed what might still have saved the greater part of the forces. Sixty triremes remained to the Athenians; those of the enemy, though victorious, were reduced to fifty. He thought it therefore very possible still to force a passage out to sea, if, embarking that very night, they made the attempt at day-break. Nicias approved, but the crews absolutely refused. They said that "they would go any where by land, and fight their way, if necessary; but by sea, the experience of the past sufficiently proved that they could expect nothing but destruction." The execution of this salutary measure was thus prevented.

Gylippus and the Syracusan chiefs became more than ever desirous to prevent the departure of the enemy. Gylippus hoped, indeed, to conquer Athens itself, in Sicily. The opinion was general, in Syracuse, that the Athenians would now think only of retreat by land; and it was supposed they would move that very night. But the Syracusan people, wearied with the labour of the day, and exhilirated with its success, were more eager to enjoy the leisure which they had so well earned, than solicitous about any future events. Hermocrates knew his fellow citizens and mankind too well to attempt, in such circumstances, to force their inclination; but his

fruitful genius provided still a resource for the attainment of his purpose. In the evening some persons, under his direction, went on horseback to the Athenian camp, and approaching near enough to be heard, when they could not be distinctly seen, pretended they were of the party which had been accustomed to communicate with Nicias. Obtaining credit so far, they charged those whom they had engaged in conversation, to go and tell the general "that the passes were already occupied by the Syracusans, and that he would therefore do well not to move that night." The fatal bait was taken, and the next day was spent by the Athenians in various preparations for the march.

But Gylippus and Hermocrates, though they had yielded at the moment to the wishes of their people, found means, before the morrow ended, to engage them in their own views. Their victorious fleet went to the Athenian naval station; and no opposition being attempted, they carried off or burnt on the spot, every ship. The army, at the same time, marched out under the conduct of Gylippus, and occupied all the principal passes around the Athenian camp.

On the next day, every thing being prepared, orders were issued by the Athenian generals for marching. Upon that occasion every horror presented itself that the human body can suffer, or the human mind conceive. No slight distress arose from the reflection, that instead of fulfilling the lofty hopes of their enterprise, the whole of so powerful a fleet was destroyed; that through their failure, ruin threatened their country; and that, instead of returning conquerors of Sicily, an ignominious flight was their only and almost hopeless resource to avoiding slavery or death. But in the circumstances of that flight, many dreadful considerations, many lamentable objects presented themselves, and came home to the feelings of every individual. The dead lay yet unburied, and the recollection, or in many instances the sight, of a relation or a friend, so neglected, struck not only with grief but with horror. Yet the voices and the actions of the many living, whom wounds or sickness rendered unable to march, their complaints, their expostulations, their prayers, their embraces, and the painful, yet fruitless endeavours of some

to follow their friends, were still more distressing than the compunction which arose from the neglect, impious as it was deemed, of the still and silent dead. Mutual reproach then, and self-reproach for that share which any one had had in inducing or enhancing public calamity, whether by promoting the enterprise or by obstructing the retreat, aggravated the bitterness of calamity. Such was the accumulated weight of misery, that it threw the whole multitude into tears; and, absorbing the apprehension of farther danger, took away almost the desire or power of moving.

At length the march commenced: it resembled that of a whole city flying from a besieging army. The numbers, including attendants, were not less than forty thousand. Attendants, however, were of little importance; mostly slaves, they deserted openly; and on the instant of the army's moving, the greater part of them disappeared. Thus, even the cavalry and the heavy-armed infantry were reduced to carry their own provisions and necessaries; some being without attendants, some mistrusting those who remained with them; and the small portion of provisions they possessed demanded every care, since it was far from being equal to their probable wants.

Amid the extreme dejection and anguish pervading the armament, Nicias wonderfully supported the dignity of his character and situation. Individually, the distress of the existing circumstances appeared not to affect him, his only anxiety seemed to be to relieve that of others, and to diffuse encouragement among all. The speech, either made by him, or for him by Thucydides, is highly interesting, as it marks the opinion entertained of the divine providence by a man of extensive information and experience, just, and religiously disposed, but never taught to consider this life as a state of probation, or to expect, in futurity, the reward of good, and the punishment of evil deeds. Nicias, exerting his voice to the utmost, desired the troops to advert to his own case: "I," he said, "am in body very far from being the strongest among you. In the blessings of high fortune I was once inferior to none; but now I must bear every present evil, I have to apprehend every threatened danger, in common with

the lowest under my command. Such is my lot, who have always been regular and zealous in every duty to the gods, and not only, as far as depended simply on myself, scrupulously just, but liberally charitable among men. Hence I have hope and confidence that our fortune will change for the better. The affliction we now suffer is surely beyond our desert; the enemy have already been sufficiently fortunate; and if our enterprize against this country has offended any of the gods, it cannot be but our present evils are adequate punishment. For we are not the first who have drawn our swords in the attempt, unjustifiable be it confessed, to subjugate and reduce to slavery our fellow creatures, and seize to ourselves their possessions. In thus doing only what is ordinary among men, others have suffered for it only what men may bear. We, therefore, have surely reason to hope, that the gods will at length moderate their apparent excess of vengeance against us, objects as we are already become of pity rather than of indignation.

"Confiding thus far then in the divine mercy, let us look to what, mere human things considered, our circumstances are, and surely we ought not to despond. Such a force as we possess; with so large a proportion of regular troops; wherever we establish our abode, we are not only a formidable army, we are a commonwealth. Certainly no Sicilian state, Syracuse excepted, will easily drive us from any situation we may occupy, or even prevent us from occupying any we may desire. To be safe, indeed, we have only to reach the Sicilian territory, for their fear of the Syracusans ensures to us the friendship of the barbarians. Firm minds and orderly conduct, then, are principally necessary to your welfare, and not to yours only, but that of the Athenian commonwealth; which, however lamentably fallen through our misfortune, it may not be beyond our ability to restore; since the strength of a state consists, not in towns, not in territory, not in ships, but in men."

Having thus spoken, Nicias led the march; the army being disposed in two divisions with the baggage between them; himself commanding the van, Demosthenes the rear. The road chosen was that by which they hoped most readily to

reach the Sicilian country, where soonest they might find food and safety. At the ford of the Anapus, very little distant from their camp, they found a body of Syracusans posted to oppose the passage. These they soon forced to retire, but the enemy's horse and light infantry, hanging on their flanks and rear, gave such continual annoyance, that after a march of only five miles, finding a rising ground commodious for the purpose, they encamped for the night. The next day they made still less progress. Want of provisions induced them to halt, after a march of only two miles and a half, in a plain where, beside collecting cattle among the farms and villages, they could supply themselves with water for their progress over the hilly and dry country which lay next in their way. But on the third day, the Syracusan horse and light troops, in larger force than before, gave so much greater annoyance, that after many hours wasted in unavailing attempts to repress them, the distressed Athenians returned to the camp they had last occupied. Nor could they profit, as on the preceding day, from their situation; even to obtain water, such was the enemy's superiority in cavalry, was difficult and hazardous.

Either a change of plan or some greater effort than had yet been made was clearly indispensable. On the next morning, therefore, they moved earlier than usual, and pressed their march with the view of occupying the Acræum Lepas, the first narrow pass at the entrance of the highlands. But on their arrival at the Acræum Lepas, they found, not only an armed force to oppose them, but the natural difficulties of the pass increased by a fortification. An assault was immediately attempted, which was not successful. Meanwhile, a storm came on, such as in the autumnal season is common; but in the present wane of the Athenian affairs every thing was construed as an ill omen, and the generals could not persuade their troops to renew the attack. As constant exertion tends to maintain the animation which success has raised; so new and unexpected opposition commonly increases the depression of the unfortunate.

When they moved again, still with the view to force the passage of the mountains, they had no sooner quitted their

camp, than the Syracusan horse and light troops attacked their flanks and rear. If they halted to repel them, the enemy instantly retreated; but the moment they resumed their march, the attack was renewed; and this, so repeatedly and efficaciously, that, after advancing only one mile through the plain, they encamped again. Then the Syracusans also retired to their camp.

The distress of the Athenians was now become very great: numbers were suffering from wounds received in the skirmishes, all were in almost total want of provisions, and of all necessaries. The generals, therefore, came to a sudden resolution to break up their camp which they had been hitherto following, and on which the enemy waited to intercept them. For, pursuing along the coast the way to Camarina and Gela, they might still reach the Sicilian territory. The usual fires were lighted to obviate suspicion in the enemy, and the army was then silently assembled and the march begun. Nicias led with a hasty pace, yet preserving due regularity. Through some unknown fatality, alarm and tumult arose in the division commanded by Demosthenes. Order was after some time restored, but the two divisions were completely separated.

The Syracusans, as soon as day broke, perceiving the Athenian camp deserted, with the usual blindness of democratical jealousy, began to criminate Gylippus as if he had traitorously permitted the enemy to escape. To discover which way so large a body had directed its march was, however, not difficult, and shortly all joined in zealous pursuit. Demosthenes, notwithstanding the misfortune which had retarded him, had before day-break reached the road leading from Syracuse to Florus. A little farther he found a body of Syracusans raising works to obstruct his passage. These he soon dispersed. He proceeded still near the coast to the brook Erineus, and there the cavalry of the Syracusan army overtook him.

From the first, there seems to have been some difference of opinion between the Athenian generals concerning the manner of conducting the retreat. Nicias thought the safety of the army depended beyond all things upon the rapidity of

its march; that insults should therefore be borne; and halts made to repel attacks, only when they threatened very important consequences. But Demosthenes was more disposed, on every occasion, to revenge, with the view to deter annoyance. No sooner, therefore, did the Syracusan horse press upon his rear, than he changed that line of march by which he could best gain ground, to form his troops so as to act most efficaciously against the enemy. The Syracusans saw their opportunity, and pushed by him while he halted. Their infantry quickly came up, and Demosthenes was surrounded. Too late discovering his error, he took the best measure that circumstances would then admit, by occupying a walled enclosure near at hand, where the enemy's horse could not reach him, and where he could defy even their heavy-armed infantry. Repeated sufferings, in the course of this long war, had taught the Lacedæmonians the value of light troops and missile weapons. Gylippus employing his heavy-armed troops only in false or desultory attacks, made principal use of his bowmen, dartmen, and slingers, and from these, through the remainder of the day, the Athenians had no rest. In the evening, when many were thus wounded, and all worn with hunger, thirst, and fatigue, he sent a herald with a proclamation, promising liberty to any of the islanders who would come to the Syracusan camp, and surrender their arms. Not many, even in so hopeless a situation, when all the evils that the barbarity of ancient warfare could inflict were impending, would forsake their general and their comrades. So desperate, indeed, were their circumstances, that in the same evening Demosthenes capitulated for the rest of his troops, surrendering himself and them prisoners of war, with no other stipulation, than that none shuld suffer death, either through violence or for want of sustenance. With their arms, they gave up all their money, throwing it into the hollow of shields held to receive it, and four shields were thus filled with silver. The prisoners, in number about six thousand, were immediately conducted to Syracuse.

Meanwhile, Nicias crossed to the Erineus, passed that stream considerably above the scene of Demosthenes's fate, and encamped on some high ground near the opposite bank.

Early next morning, the Syracusan army hastened in pursuit of him, and the horse quickly overtaking him, gave information of the fate of Demosthenes, and summoned him to surrender himself and the forces under his command. Refusing credit to such intelligence, so transmitted, he asked a safe conduct for a horseman of his own, in order to ascertain the fact, which was granted. The return of his messenger assuring him of the truth of the statement, he next sent to propose, in the name of the Athenian commonwealth, reimbursement to Syracuse of all the expences of the war, upon condition only that the troops under his command might depart in safety; and for security, he would leave Athenian citizens, as hostages, one for every talent that would thus become due. The proposal was rejected, and the Athenian army was quickly surrounded by the enemy, who would, however, neither make nor sustain any regular attack, but continued, till evening, unceasing annoyance with missile weapons.

Among the distresses of the Athenians, not the least was the want of provisions. Could they have supported the enemy's assaults on their present ground, they could not have subsisted there. Nicias, therefore, about midnight called to arms as silently as possible, with intention to pursue his march; but the watchful enemy perceived his motions, and immediately sang the pæan. Upon this he gave up the design and remained in his camp; but a body of about three hundred, without his orders, made a successful push at the enemy's line, broke through, and, under favour of the obscurity, quickly got beyond immediate pursuit. Nicias waited for the dawn, and then continued his march. Even then, the enemy, under the able conduct of Gylippus and Hermocrates, would come to no regular action, but only infested as before with missile weapons and desultory charges of cavalry. Sicily, through the greatest part of its extent, is high land, intersected with numerous valleys, whose sides are commonly steep, and the banks of the streams flowing through them often craggy. At no great distance from the camp which the Athenians had quitted, the river Assinarus has a deep and rocky channel. While extreme thirst urged their steps to its stream, they hoped, that if they could once reach its fur-

ther bank, they should gain some respite from the annoyance of the enemy's cavalry. But when they reached the bank, the enemy's heavy armed were close upon them. Discipline then yielded to the pressure of evil felt, and danger threatening. Without any order, they hurried down the steep, pushing and trampling on one another, and in the tumult some were destroyed by the spears of their comrades. The first object of most was to assuage intolerable thirst. Meanwhile the enemy's light-armed reached the opposite bank before them, and the whole Athenian army, enclosed in the hollow, was exposed to missile weapons on both sides. The Peloponnesians, at length, led the way for the Syracusans down into the hollow to complete the slaughter, while the Athenians, still resisting to the utmost, were so pressed by extreme thirst, that in the midst of action many of them would drink the turbid and bloody water, and even fight for it.

Already they were lying dead in heaps in the river, when Nicias, whom nothing could induce to submit to the Syracusans, found opportunity to surrender himself to Gylippus. That general then commanded to give quarter, and was obeyed. Among the rocks and in the windings of the stream, a large number of the Athenians found opportunity for either concealment or flight; the rest were made prisoners. No capitulation was made; prisoners being valuable as slaves, the Syracusan soldiers were diligent in embezzling them as their private property. In this they were so successful, that the prisoners of the Syracusan state remained comparatively few. A detachment was sent after the three hundred who broke through the Syracusan line in the night, who took them all. The public prisoners, with what spoil could be collected, were conducted to Syracuse.

It would have been a glorious and a singular triumph for Gylippus, to have carried the Athenian generals, the two most illustrious men of their time, prisoners to Sparta. But a decree of the Syracusan people condemned both to death, and they were executed. In the ancient democracies, the most worthless individual, touching at any time a chord in consonance with popular passion, could procure the sanction of sovereign authority for any villany. For where no one per-

son or select body was responsible, but the whole people were the common authors of every public act, the shame of flagitious measures was so divided, that it was disregarded. For any one to own himself author of the black decree against Nicias and Demosthenes, the one entitled to the protection of the Spartan general, the other under that of a capitulation solemnly granted in the name of the Syracusan people, appears for a time, at least, to have been avoided. Thucydides, says, "the circumstances immediately leading to the measure were not in his time with any certainty known at Athens." All authorities, however, agree, that it was a public and solemn decree of the Syracusan people which consigned the Athenian generals to execution.

Meanwhile the miserable remnant of this once flourishing army, the greatest ever sent out by any one Grecian state, was reserved for a still severer lot. A vast quarry in the hill of Epipolæ, whence the stone had been principally taken for building the city, was judged the most secure and commodious place for the confinement of such a multitude of men, so versed in the use of arms. Into this the freemen were conducted to the number of about seven thousand; the slaves were sold by public auction. But the faith of the Syracusan people, so shamefully broken with the generals, was not kept with those of inferior rank. On the contrary, their whole conduct was marked with a spirit of deliberate cruelty, the general vice of the fairest days of Greece. This was in a great degree the unavoidable result of the spirit of the times, and the political state of the country. The Syracusans saw in the Athenian prisoners, not generous enemies, but oppressors; who would have reduced them to the deepest misery. Food was not wholly denied, but it was given in quantity barely sufficient to support life, and cruelty was still more shown in the scanty allowance of water. No shelter was afforded from the inclemency of the sky, and while the heat of the mid-day sun in the open and capacious dungeon was scarcely tolerable, the chill of autumnal night produced an alternation in the air very injurious to health. No means were given to avoid their own filth; no care was taken of those who sickened; and when any died, as many did, some of un-

attended wounds, the bodies remained to putrefy among their living companions. No suffering could result from so wretched a situation, which was not experienced by the Athenian prisoners. Towards the end of November, after a confinement of about seventy days, the islanders and others, who were not citizens of Athens or of some Grecian town of Sicily or Italy, were taken out for the milder lot of being sold as slaves. The Athenians, with the Sicilians and Italian Greeks, remained; and we are not informed that they were ever released.

Meanwhile those of the army under Nicias, who, instead of public prisoners of the Syracusan state, had been made the private property of individuals, suffered variously, according to the condition or temper of the masters under whom they fell, and of those who had escaped by flight; few fared better; for, unable to find subsistence, they were mostly reduced to the hard resource of offering themselves, in any town they could reach, to voluntary slavery. Thus all the towns of Sicily abounded with Grecian slaves. A few only had the good fortune to make their way immediately from the field of action to the friendly city of Catana, whence they got their passage to Athens. Afterwards others found means to fly from bondage to the same asylum.

In the miserable state of servile dependency to which such numbers of Athenians were reduced, the science, literature, fine taste, and polite manners of Athens, are said to have been beneficial to many. Some, who were fortunate enough to meet with masters of liberal disposition, were treated with the respect due to superior accomplishments; some were even presented with their freedom. Since the days of Hieron, the literature of Greece had been neglected in Sicily, and through defect of materials copies of books were not multiplied. But many of the Athenians retained in their memories much of the works of Euripides, whose moral and pathetic strains, which they used to sing as the solace of their bondage, singularly touched the Sicilians. Euripides lived to receive the grateful acknowledgments of some who returned to Athens, and related what kindness they had received in servitude, and what relief in beggary, through the

pleasure they gave by speaking, singing, or teaching his verses.

The news of the total destruction of the most powerful armament that ever sailed from a Grecian harbour, did not immediately find credit at Athens; but multiplied and concurring testimonies soon removed every doubt of the magnitude of the calamity, and the public anguish became extreme. In one rash enterprize the Athenians lost their army, their fleet, their best generals—their proudest hopes perished in the harbour of Syracuse.

What was afflicting to them, gave unspeakable joy to their neighbours. Many feared, most hated, and all envied, a people, who had long usurped the sovereignty of Greece. Their allies, scattered over so many islands and coasts, prepared to assert their independence. The republics, which had hitherto declined the danger and uncertainty of a doubtful contest, now meanly solicited to be engaged in the war, that they might assist in the destruction of Athens.

In the mean time, the Lacedæmonians enjoyed with unspeakable satisfaction the view of this various ferment, and prepared to profit by the misfortunes of their neighbour. They now considered the establishment of their own permanent superiority over all Greece, as completely within their power. There was still another enemy behind, from whose strength and animosity the Athenians had every thing to fear. Darius Nothus, who had now succeeded to the government of the Persian empire, had employed his arms in extending his dominion towards the shores of the Ægean Sea, of the Hellespont and Propontis. The recent misfortunes of the Athenian people flattered the Persian commanders, who governed in Asia Minor, with the hope of restoring the whole of that coast to the authority of the great king.

The terror of such a powerful combination might well have reduced the Athenians to a state of despair. But in free governments there are many latent resources, which public calamities alone can reveal. The first spark of generous ardour, excited by the love of virtue, of glory, and of their republic, was diffused and cherished by the natural con-

tagion of sympathy. The whole surrounding multitude caught the patriotic flame. The Athenians resolved with one mind and one resolution to brave the severity of fortune, and to withstand every assault of their collective foes.

Nor did this resolution evaporate in useless speculation. The wisest measures were adopted, and immediately put into execution. They began to restore the navy, to collect stores, to raise money, to save, and use it, as the exigency of affairs seemed to demand. They abridged, not only private, but public luxury. They endeavoured to obviate the defection of the allied and subject states, and particularly of Eubœa, the most valuable dependency of the commonwealth, and without which, the city of Athens could not easily subsist. Never were the Athenian people so disposed to listen to and obey wise and proper advice. "It was so resolved, and it was done."

The year following the defeat of the expedition against Sicily, the Peloponnesians equipped a fleet of one hundred sail. By the defeat in Sicily it was generally supposed that the command of the sea was completely lost to Athens; and immediately the Greek Asiatic cities began to think of revolting. The Lesbians set the example, and the Chians and Erythræans followed. Diffident, however, of their own strength, their first measure was to communicate with Tissaphernes, one of the Persian governors in Asia Minor, but the satrap did not think himself able with his own forces to give them protection. He therefore gladly united his interest with theirs, and conjointly they sent ministers to Lacedæmon. The fleet, which the Peloponnesians had prepared, was destined to encourage and support the revolt of the Asiatic subjects of the Athenians. Tissaphernes, on his part, promised, if they would send a part of this armament to the assistance of the Chians, Lesbians, and Erythræans, that he would pay the soldiers, and victual the ships.

At the same time ambassadors arrived from Cyzicus, a populous and opulent city situated on an island of the Propontis. They requested the Lacedæmonians to send their armament to expel the Athenian garrisons from their island. Pharnabazus, the Persian governor of the northern district

of Asia Minor, seconded their proposal, and offered the same terms as Tissaphernes. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, unable to come to any resolution for a great length of time, held many consultations. They hesitated, deliberated, resolved, and then changed their determination; but at length Alcibiades prevailed upon them to accept the overtures of Tissaphernes and the Ionians, and to abandon at present the cause of Pharnabazus and the Hellespontines.

Meanwhile the Spartans and their allies sent squadrons, successively, to the Ionian coast, under the command of Alcibiades, Chalcideus, and Astyochus. The fleet under Alcibiades sailed to Chios, and on its arrival excited universal alarm among the inhabitants, excepting those of the aristocratical party. The council, according to previous concert, was now sitting. Alcibiades boldly asserted that a large fleet was on its way from Peloponnesus. A decree was proposed renouncing the confederacy with Athens, and entering into an alliance with the Peloponnesians, which was immediately carried. The Erythræans followed their example. Clazomene also surendered. Miletus soon after did the same. Thus, with the trifling force of a few triremes, Alcibiades struck a great blow.

The superiority which the Peloponnesians now possesed over the fleet of Athens, was of itself sufficient to acquire or maintain the submission of the neighbouring cities and islands. In other respects, also, the Peloponnesians had many advantages over their unfortunate rivals. Tissaphernes victualled their ships, and paid their soldiers; and had procured the allies a reinforcement of one hundred and fifty Phœnician gallies. In this dangerous and dreadful crisis, Alcibiades, who had so long been the misfortune and the boast of Athens, was destined, by a train of singular and almost incredible accidents, to become the defender and saviour of his country.

During the time of his residence in Sparta, Alcibiades assumed the gravity and the austerity of the Lacedæmonian manners, and used himself to the spare diet and laborious exercises which prevailed in that republic. His real character and principles were, however, still the same. His intrigue with

Timæa, the wife of Agis, king of Sparta, was discovered by an excess of vanity; he frequently told her maids that her son's name ought to be Alcibiades, and that the father of her child was the greatest and handsomest man of his age. The injured husband felt the keenest resentment for the dishonour done to his bed, and for the open and shameless publication of that dishonour. The magistrates and generals of Sparta, jealous of the fame, and envious of the merit of a stranger, readily sympathized with the misfortune, and promoted the revenge of Agis. They resorted to a disgraceful and nefarious expedient for obviating the mischief. Private instructions were sent to Astyochus to procure the assassination of Alcibiades, but the crafty and active Athenian eluded all the attempts of Astyochus, and betook himself to Tissaphernes.

Alcibiades, notwithstanding the favour which he had found at Sparta, was secretly uneasy, and his sole object was to restore himself to his country, before that country was reduced so much as not to be worth returning to. With this view he had assiduously and successfully courted Tissaphernes. In the selfish breast of the satrap, neither the advantage of the Persian empire nor that of the Peloponnesian confederacy was regarded, but as it promoted his own private interest. An opportunity, therefore, was not wanting for insinuations and advice, that might occasion a difference between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians, and render Alcibiades not only agreeable, but useful to the Persian. Tissaphernes, pressed for money by his court, and the exigencies of his own government, listened with great attention to any suggestions by which he could hope to spare his treasury, and to amass wealth for himself. Alcibiades told him, that the pay to the Peloponnesians was extravagant. The Athenians, he said, allowed their seamen only half a drachma per day, not from any motives of economy or inability to afford more, but because they esteemed greater pay disadvantageous to the service.

Tissaphernes heard the proposal with all the attention of an avaricious man, desirous of saving his money.

Alcibiades now saw a crisis approaching that might enable him not only to return to his country, but to acquire the glory of restoring Athens to its former splendor and reputation. The Athenians, in their distress, had made wonderful exertions; but it was evident that these exertions had almost exhausted them; and the more intelligent among the people were sensible that they could not long resist the Peloponnesian confederacy, aided, as it then was, by the wealth and power of Persia. At this juncture Alcibiades applied secretly to Pisander and other persons in the Athenian camp. He gave them assurance that he would engage Tissaphernes in their interest, and through him lead the Persian monarch himself to an alliance with Athens, provided they would consent to demolish the turbulent democracy which was odious to Darius. His overtures excited attention, and a great majority of the people approved the proposal.

In the mean time, Pisander and his colleagues were endeavouring at Athens to overturn the democratical form of government. The compact body of conspirators warmly approved the proposal, but many and loud murmurs of discontent were heard from different quarters. Pisander asked the reason of this conduct. "Have you," said he, "any thing better to propose? If you have, come forward and explain the grounds of your dissent. But, above all, explain how you can save your country, your families and yourselves, except by complying with the demands of Tissaphernes. The imperious voice of necessity is superior to every thing, and when the danger has subsided, you can re-establish that form of government which you most approve." A decree was immediately passed by the assembly investing ten persons with full power to treat with the Persian satrap.

The ambassadors proceeded to Magnesia, where Tissaphernes usually resided, and were admitted to a conference, in which Alcibiades acted for the satrap. Alcibiades, however, did not possess that degree of influence over the Persians which he had pretended; it was evidently therefore, his purpose to render the conference abortive by making such demands for Tissaphernes as the commissioners could not grant. But finding them disposed

to concede much, he required, on the part of the Persian monarch, the cession of all Ionia and the adjacent islands.

The artifices employed by Alcibiades convinced the Athenians that his credit with the Persians was less than he represented. The aristocratical party were therefore glad to get rid of a man, whose ambition rendered him a dangerous associate; but they persisted with great activity in executing their purpose, and Phrynichus, who had opposed them only through hatred to Alcibiades, became an active abettor.—When persuasion was found ineffectual, they recurred to violence. Many of the licentious demagogues were assassinated; and four hundred men, chosen from among the people, were appointed to conduct the administration of their country. These were to be men of dignity and opulence in the state, and assembled, as often as thought proper, five thousand citizens whom they judged most worthy of being consulted in the management of public affairs; and thus was the Athenian democracy subverted, after it had subsisted one hundred years with unexampled public glory, though with much intestine disorder.

But the conduct of the four hundred tyrants, for such they certainly were, abolished every vestige of remaining freedom. They neglected the opportunity of attacking the Peloponnesians when mutinous for want of pay and subsistence; but they sent a humiliating embassy to Sparta, to solicit peace on the most dishonourable terms. Their tyranny became odious in the city, and their cowardice contemptible in the camp at Samos. The generous youths engaged in the defence of their country by sea and land, were indignant at the insults and outrages offered to their fellow citizens. Their murmurs broke out at last into loud and licentious clamours, which the approbation of the Samians greatly promoted. Activity and boldness were given to the insurgents by Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, two officers of great merit, but not entrusted with a share in the principal command. The abettors of the new government at Samos were attacked by surprize; thirty of the most criminal were put to death; three were banished; and the rest, submitting to democracy, received a free pardon.

The first concern of Thrasybulus, who had been appointed to the supreme command of the armament, was to recal Alcibiades, who had been deceived and disgraced by the tyrants, and who was most capable of avenging the indignities and wrongs, both of himself and his country. Accordingly, an assembly of the Athenian citizens belonging to the armament was convened, as the legal body of the commonwealth, and this assembly assenting to the recal of Alcibiades, Thrasybulus went to communicate the information to him. He was then residing with Tissaphernes, and they returned together to Samos. Several years had now elapsed since the eloquent Alcibiades had spoken in an Athenian assembly. He began by lamenting his calamities, and accusing his fortune. His banishment, however, though otherwise unfortunate, had procured him, he said, the acquaintance and the friendship of Tissaphernes, who, by his entreaties, had withheld the pay from the Peloponnesians, and would, he doubted not, continue his good offices to the Athenians, supply them with every thing necessary for continuing the war, and even assist them with a Phœnician fleet.

These flattering promises raised his credit with the army, by whom he was immediately appointed general; widened the breach between Tissaphernes and the Spartans; and struck terror into the tyrants of Athens, who were soon made acquainted with the speech of Alcibiades. Affairs being thus settled, the Athenians at Samos already despised the efforts of the Peloponnesians. They prepared to revenge themselves on the four hundred tyrants at Athens; but Alcibiades dissuaded them from their purpose, and declared that it would be proper to communicate first with Tissaphernes; show himself in the situation in which they had placed him, and consult about future arrangements. Accordingly he set off for Magnesia, anxious to prove to Tissaphernes the power he possessed among the Athenians, as he had been desirous to impress the Athenians with an opinion of his influence with Tissaphernes; and as he could now be a valuable friend, or a formidable foe, to either, he awed the Athenians with the name of Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with that of the Athenians. Upon the arrival of Alcibiades from Magnesia, he

found the partizans of democracy, who had been inflamed at the report of the indignities and cruelties committed at Athens, ready to sail thither to take vengeance on their enemies, and to protect their friends. By such a measure, Athens would have been plunged into the horrors of a civil war. No man but Alcibiades was capable of preventing the people from committing this rash and destructive action; and he effectually checked the design; but, at the same time, he commanded it to be declared to the usurpers at Athens, that, unless they divested themselves of their illegal powers, and restored the ancient constiution, he would sail with a fleet to the Piræus, and deprive them of their authority and their lives.

When this message reached Athens, it contributed to increase the disorder and confusion of that city. The four hundred soon began to disagree among themselves. Divided into factions, they pursued each other as furiously, as they had before persecuted the people. The cruel and tyrannical measures pursued by their colleagues were opposed and condemned by Theramenes and Aristocrates. Phrynichus was publicly stabbed by one of the city guards; and the horrors of a Corcyrean sedition seemed ready to be renewed in Athens, when the old men, women, children, and strangers, interposed for the safety of a city, which had long been the ornament of Greece, the terror of Persia, and the admiration of the world.

To the duplicity of the satrap, and the treachery of their own officers, the Peloponnesians justly ascribed the want of pay and subsistence, and all the misfortunes which they suffered. Their resentment becoming violent and furious, they attacked and destroyed the Persian fortifications near Miletus; the garrison was put to the sword, and Astyochus, their own general, saved his life by flying to an altar.

About this time a squadron of forty-two gallies, commanded by the Spartan Hegesandridas, sailed towards the island of Eubœa.

The inhabitants of that island had long desired an opportunity to revolt, and therefore supplied the Peloponnesian fleet abundantly with provisions; but they refused to furnish

a market for the Athenians. The commanders were therefore obliged to send detachments into the country to obtain necessaries. Hegesandridas seizing this opportunity to attack them, most of their ships were taken, and the crews swam to land, where many of them were killed. After this defeat, the whole of Eubœa, except Oreus, immediately revolted to the Peloponnesians.

The consternation at Athens, when the news of this misfortune reached the city, was greater than even from the complete defeat and destruction of the armament that sailed against Sicily. Corn, meat, every article of food, came principally from Eubœa. Attica itself was not half so valuable and productive to Athens as that island.

In the mean time, Theramenes encouraged the people to disburden themselves of those who were believed to have summoned the Peloponnesian fleet to the coast of Athens, that they might enslave their country. Antiphon, Pisander, and others, most obnoxious to the friends of liberty, escaped, and the rest submitted. The restoration of Alcibiades, and approbation of the conduct of the troops at Samos, were then decreed; and the constitution was re-established on its original principles as founded by Solon.

The Spartans, who had formerly neglected, now courted the friendship and protection of Pharnabazus; and a numerous and powerful armament was sent to the province where he commanded. As soon as it was known that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed for the Hellespont, the Athenians, animated by the manly counsels of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, pursued the same course, and in the straits which join the Euxine and Ægean seas, began a conflict which continued a long time. In three successive engagements the Athenians prevailed over their Peloponnesian enemies. The first battle was fought in the narrow channel between Sestos and Abydos, in which Thrasybulus took twenty Peloponnesian ships, but lost fifteen Athenian gallies. The glory of the day, however, remained entirely with the Athenians.

A squadron of fourteen Rhodian vessels was intercepted near Cape Rhegium, by the Athenian fleet. While the islanders defended themselves with great bravery, Mindarus, the

Spartan admiral, seeing their engagement, hastened to their assistance. The principal squadron of the Athenian armament attacked the Peloponnesian. Through the greater part of the day, the fight was maintained with various success, in different parts of the line; but, towards evening, eighteen Athenian triremes were seen entering the strait from the south. This proved to be the squadron under the command of Alcibiades. The Peloponnesians immediately fled, but the Athenians captured thirty triremes.

The Spartans now yielded possession of the sea, and retired to the friendly harbour of Cyzicus, to repair what remained of their shattered armament. It was determined, chiefly by the advice of Alcibiades, to attack the Peloponnesian fleet at Cyzicus. As the Athenian armament approached that place, they descried the Peloponnesian fleet manœuvring, at such a distance from the harbour that it was readily intercepted. The enemy, perceiving the Athenian armament so much stronger than they expected, were in great consternation. It was impossible for them to return to port. A general engagement ensued, and the Athenians obtained a complete victory. The whole of the Peloponnesian fleet was captured, except the squadron from Syracuse, which was burned in the face of a victorious enemy by Hermocrates. The circumstances and consequences of this victory were related in few but expressive words to the Spartan government, in a letter from Hippocrates, the second in command, which exhibits one of the most curious and authentic specimens of the laconic style. "Success has turned against us; Mindarus is slain; the men hunger; what to do we know not." These four short sentences made up the whole of the dispatch.

Alcibiades now raised contributions on the inhabitants of Cyzicus. The fleet then proceeded against Perinthus and Selymbria, and exacted from these places large sums of money. Proceeding thence to Chrysopolis, Alcibiades caused that place to be fortified, and there established a custom-house for levying a duty of a tenth in value on all cargoes passing the strait. As this mode of collecting money re-

quired a force, he left a garrison and thirty vessels there, under the command of Theramenes.

In the mean time the Peloponnesians, assisted by Pharnabazus, were busily employed in equipping a new fleet, the materials of which were easily procured in the Persian dominions. They were, however, deprived of the wise counsels of Hermocrates, who was degraded from his office, and punished with banishment, by the populace of Syracuse.

For several years the measures of the Athenians had been almost uniformly successful, but the twenty-fourth campaign was distinguished by peculiar good fortune. The Persians and Peloponnesians were repeatedly defeated by the Athenians, driven from their encampment and fortresses near the shore, and pursued into the country, which was plundered and desolated by the victors. The Athenians returned in triumph to attack the fortified cities, which had not yet submitted to the conquerors. Alcibiades displayed the wonderful resources of his extraordinary genius in this kind of warfare. By gradual approaches, by sudden assaults, by surprize, by treason, or by stratagem, he soon became master of Chalcedon, Selymbria and Byzantium. His naval success was also equally conspicuous. The enemy had fitted out several small squadrons, which, without much difficulty, he conquered. It was computed that Alcibiades, since assuming the command of the Athenian armament, had taken or destroyed five hundred Syracusan or Peloponnesian galleys; and his naval victories enabled him to raise such contributions in the Euxine and Mediterranean seas, as abundantly supplied his fleet and army with all necessary subsistence and accommodation.

Alcibiades hoped, that, after so many foreign conquests, he might perhaps be able to alleviate the domestic sufferings of his country. He longed also to revisit his friends, relations, and native city, after having been absent six years; and he hoped, likewise, to enjoy the rewards and honours, which the Greeks generally bestowed on successful valour.

Notwithstanding all the services he had rendered the republic, there was still a strong party in Athens inveterately inimical to him. He therefore declined landing in Piræus,

until he was informed the people had revoked the decrees against him. Information from his confidential friends reached him at sea that he had been elected general of the republic, and that the decree respecting his banishment had been repealed. Even after receiving this agreeable intelligence, he was unable to conquer his well founded distrust of the inconstant and capricious humours of the people. Nor would he approach the Attic shore, until he beheld among the multitude that crowded from the city, his principal friends and relations inviting him by their voice and action. He then landed amidst the almost universal acclamations of the spectators. The general language was, that Alcibiades was the most meritorious of the Athenian citizens; that his condemnation had been the pernicious measure of a conspiracy of wicked men, who scrupled nothing to promote their own interest; that his abilities were transcendant; that he had been compelled to oppose his country; and that his readiness and eagerness to return to its service proved his patriotic disposition.

While, however, these were the general sentiments and expressions of the people, a few were heard to murmur, that Alcibiades alone had occasioned all the past misfortunes and disasters of the republic. His friends did not entirely confide in the protection which the lately established government could, or would afford. They came, therefore, prepared to resist any attempt that might be made against his person; and, surrounded by them, Alcibiades proceeded to the city.

His first business was to attend the council of five hundred, and then to address the general assembly of the people. Before both he asserted his innocence with respect to the sacrilegious profanation of which he had been accused; contrasted the situation of Athens prior and posterior to his taking the command of the Athenian armament; apologized for his conduct during his banishment, and criminated his prosecutors. It was not difficult for Alcibiades to plead his defence before judges so favourably disposed to hear and to believe him; and the popular favour was so great and so evident, that not a word was spoken in opposition to him. But the transports of the people became immoderate, and they would have loaded their favourite with honours incom-

patible with the genius of a republic. The crowns and garlands, and other pledges of public gratitude, he thankfully received; but respectfully declined the regal sceptre, and expressed his firm resolution to support and maintain the liberty of Athens. The state, he said, did not stand in need of a king, but of a general, who should possess undivided power, capable of restoring the ancient glory and splendour of the commonwealth. To this illustrious and exalted rank, which Themistocles and Cimon had formerly filled, Alcibiades might justly aspire. He was accordingly chosen commander in chief by sea and land, with supreme authority. The Athenians immediately equipped one hundred gallies, and prepared transports for containing fifteen hundred heavy-armed men, with a proportional body of cavalry.

Alcibiades prepared to sail for Asia Minor; and about this time, Lysander was appointed to the command of the Peloponnesian fleet. Lysander had been educated in all the severe discipline of the Spartan state, but his transactions with the world had taught him to soften the asperity and severity of the Spartan manners; to obtain by fraud what could not be gained by force; and, in his own language, to "eke out the lion's with the fox's skin."

While Lysander was manning his vessels, seventy-three in number, and preparing them for action, Alcibiades attacked the small island of Andros; but meeting with more resistance than he expected, and being obliged to procure pay and subsistence for his troops, he sailed to the Ionian or Carian coast, with a view of raising contributions. He committed the principal armament to Antiochus, a man wholly unworthy of such an important trust, and commanded him to continue in the harbour of Notium, where the fleet lay during his absence; and by no means to risk an engagement. No sooner, however, was Alcibiades departed, than Antiochus sailed towards Ephesus; approached the sterns of the ships of Lysander, and challenged the Spartans to battle; but Lysander had the prudence to delay the engagement until the presumption of the enemy had thrown them into confusion. A general action was therefore brought on gradually, in which the Athenians lost fifteen vessels, with a considera-

ble part of their crews. This was a very mortifying event to Alcibiades. He hastened back to his fleet; and, anxious to restore the tarnished lustre of the Athenian armament, sailed to the mouth of the harbour of Ephesus, and again offered battle; but Lysander declined to venture a second engagement with the superior strength of Alcibiades.

The people of Athens, who expected to hear only of victories and triumphs, were not a little mortified when they received the intelligence of this defeat, and as they could not suspect the abilities, they distrusted the fidelity of their commander. The enemies of Alcibiades immediately took advantage of the popular temper; and Thrasybulus arrived from the fleet, in order to impeach him. He represented the misconduct of Alcibiades as having ruined the affairs of his country. He had selected, he said, such friends as were the meanest and most worthless of men, and to such improper persons he had committed the command of the fleet, whilst he passed his time in the effeminate pleasures of Ionia.

In this assembly, and on the same day, Alcibiades was accused, and almost unanimously condemned; and that the affairs of the republic might not again suffer by the abuse of undivided power, they proceeded to elect ten generals. Among the newly appointed commanders were Thrasyllus, Leon, Diomedon, Conon, and Pericles, men, whose approved valour and love of liberty had recommended them to public honours.

These had scarcely assumed the command of the Athenian fleet, when Callicratides was sent to succeed Lysander, the Spartan admiral. On his arrival at Ephesus, Lysander told him, that he resigned to him a fleet which commanded the seas. "Pass, then," replied Callicratidas, "along the isle of Samos (where the Athenians then lay), and surrender the armament to me at Miletus." Lysander endeavoured to elude this, by saying, that he was no longer admiral. A universal discontent prevailed on account of the change which had taken place in the Spartan command. In order to bring matters to an issue, Callicratidas asked them, whether he should retain his authority, and they give him their zealous co-operation, or return home, and relate the present state of

things in the Peloponesian armament? Order was immediately established, and the commands of the Spartan government were obeyed.

The first operations of Callicratidas were directed against the isle of Lesbos, or rather against the populous and wealthy towns of Methymna and Mitylene, on that island. Methymna was taken by assault, and the allies proposed the sale of the inhabitants; but Callicratidas nobly declared, that where he commanded, no Greek should be made a slave.

The Athenian commander having sailed with a squadron of seventy ships to protect the isle of Lesbos, Callicratidas, with a far superior fleet, intercepted the return of the armament to Samos. The Athenians fled towards the coast of Mitylene, but were so vigorously pursued by the enemy, that they entered the harbour together. Conon, thus compelled to fight, lost thirty triremes, and only saved the rest by hauling under the protection of the battlements of the town. Callicratidas, stationing his fleet in the harbor, and sending for infantry to Methymna and Chios, formed the siege of Mitylene, both by sea and land.

Conon was now in a very distressing situation. He embarked some of his bravest and most experienced seamen in two swift sailing vessels, one of which, eluding the vigilance of the enemy, escaped to the Hellespont, and informed the Athenians of the misfortune of their general. This news soon reached Samos and Athens. The importance of the object, which was no less than the safety of forty ships, and more than eighty thousand brave men, excited the attention and activity of the Athenians. A fleet of one hundred and fifty sail was immediately equipped and manned.

This large and powerful armament instantly sailed for Lesbos to the relief of Conon. The Spartan admiral did not decline the engagement. Having left fifty triremes, under the command of Eteonicus, to continue the blockade of Mitylene, he went with one hundred and twenty ships to meet the enemy. The same evening the Athenians had advanced to the islands, or rather rocks of Arginusæ. At the

dawn, the two armaments prepared to engage; but some experienced seamen, and the chief counsellors of Callicratidas, advised him not to hazard a battle against the superior strength and numbers of the enemy. The generous and intrepid Spartan answered: "My death cannot be destructive to Sparta, but my flight would be dishonourable, both to Sparta and to myself." The fleets met, and the action was bloody and obstinate on both sides. The fight was maintained for some time with much equality. Callicratidas, striking an enemy's galley with the beak of his ship, fell overboard and perished. Different turns of fortune prevailed in different parts of the battle; but the Peloponnesians at length were compelled to give way on all sides. Seventy of their gallies were taken, and the rest escaped.

It was now the design of the Athenian admirals to proceed against Methymna, Mitylene, and Chios, and to attempt the recovery of the bodies of the drowned or slain. But Eteonicus, having notice of the defeat of the Spartan armament, gave orders to the galley to put to sea again, and to return by broad daylight into the harbour, proclaiming that Callicratidas had been successful against the Athenian fleet. This contrivance succeeded. The Spartans returned thanks to the gods. The sailors were enjoined to refresh themselves by a copious repast, and to profit by a favourable gale for sailing to Chios; while the soldiers burned their camp, and marched to garrison Methymna.

This place was now too strongly fortified to be taken by assault; the Peloponnesian fleet had secured itself in its harbour, and the Athenians found it impossible to effect their designs. In the mean time, at Athens, the flattering intelligence which had been received respecting the victory was converted into disappointment and sorrow, when it was understood the fleet had returned to Samos, without attempting any thing besides. They lamented beyond measure, the loss of the wreck, by which their brave and victorious countrymen had been deprived of the sacred funeral rites; a circumstance viewed with considerable horror, because, according to a superstitious tradition, their melancholy shades

were supposed to wander a hundred years on the banks of the Styx before they were admitted into the regions of light and happiness.

Hence followed one of the most disgraceful and most fatal strokes of faction recorded in history. The people by a decree deprived all their generals of their command, Conon only excepted. Protomachus and Aristogenes chose a voluntary banishment, and the rest returned to answer the charges brought against them.

The accused were not allowed the usual forms of defence, and each was permitted only to make a short speech to the people. The commanders were accused, tried, condemned, delivered over to the executioner, and immediately put to death. This cruelty of the Athenians was followed by a speedy repentance, and punished by the sharp pangs of remorse, which they endeavoured to mitigate, but without effect, by inflicting a well-merited vengeance on Callinexus, who had been the chief promoter of this unjust and tyrannical deed.

The removal and execution of the Athenian admirals, and the defeat and death of Callicratidas, suspended the military operations on both sides for some time. Two other commanders, Philocles and Adimantus, had been joined in authority with Conon. The former was a man of a violent temper, incapable of governing either others or himself. The latter did not want humanity, but was destitute of spirit and activity.

The squadron which had escaped from Mitylene remained at Chios. Eteonicus, the commander, had rejoined it from Methymna, but he was without money to pay the troops, and without resources. A conspiracy was formed by the troops to make themselves masters of the island, and they determined to become rich at once, by seizing and plundering the large and wealthy capital of Chios.

This design, though formed in secret, was nevertheless openly avowed. The conspirators, that they might assume a distinction which should enable them the better to know their associates, agreed that every man of their party should carry a reed. The intelligence of this plot did not reach Eteoni-

cus, until it was hazardous to oppose the mutiny by open force. He therefore selected fifteen persons in whom he could confide, and arming them with daggers, they patroled the streets of Chios. The first person they observed to carry a reed was instantly put to death, and a crowd assembling about the body to know why the man was slain, they were told it was for carrying a reed in his casque. This information was quickly communicated through the city. The conspirators, unprepared, hastened to throw away the reeds which exposed them to the dangerous assaults of their unknown enemies; and thus, with the loss of only one man, a mutiny was completely quelled, which, under a hesitating commander, might have spread havoc and desolation over one of the most populous and wealthy islands of the Ægean Sea.

A congress of the Peloponnesian confederacy was about this time held at Ephesus, whither the Chians and all the Asiatic confederates sent deputies. In this convention, it was decreed to send ministers to Lacedæmon, in the joint names of Cyrus, the armament, and allies, to represent the present state of affairs, and to request that Lysander might be re-appointed commander in chief.

If we except Brasidas, we may safely affirm, that no Spartan had ever so conciliated the esteem of the allies as Lysander; no Spartan was equally acquainted with the method of rendering himself agreeable to a Persian prince. The military and political conduct of Lysander had besides been distinguished.

The Spartans, though inclined to comply with the wishes of their allies, were, nevertheless, much perplexed by an ancient law enacted in the jealousy of freedom, namely, never to commit the chief command of the fleet twice to the same person. Urgent circumstances contributed not a little to induce them to relax in this point. They nominally adhered to the law, while they complied with the request of Cyrus and of their Grecian confederates. They invested Aracus, a weak and obscure man, with the name of admiral, and sent Lysander to command in Asia, under the appellation of vice-admiral.

Lysander arriving at Ephesus, made great exertions to prepare a fleet, powerful enough to oppose the Athenian armament. He hastened to pay his compliments in person to the Persian prince at Sardis. Cyrus received him with demonstrations of joy, and supplied him with money to satisfy the immediate expenses of the fleet. He returned to Ephesus, paid off the arrearages of the seamen, and directed his attention to the means of prosecuting offensive operations against the Athenians.

In the mean time, so great had been his exertions, aided by an unfailing treasury, that the fleet was already equal in strength to that of the Athenians. His emissaries had universally engaged, or pressed, the seamen on the Ionian and Carian coasts. Lysander, however, determined not to risk a general engagement. In all the towns on the Propontis and the Hellespont, which had submitted to the Athenian republic, under the command of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, a Lacedæmonian faction still existed. The consequences, therefore, of giving efficacy to such a party would probably be the obstruction of the revenue that supported the Athenian fleet, and the recovery of the trade with the Euxine, which furnished the best supplies of corn.

For these reasons the Hellespont was the point to which Lysander directed his principal attention. He accordingly coasted along the shores of Asia, and reached Abydos. Here his fleet rode in security in the harbour. The important town of Lampsacus was then attacked, and the place, though bravely defended by the natives and Athenian garrison, was at length taken by storm. The city was abandoned to the licentious rapacity, the lust and fury of the conquerors, according to the barbarous and predominant custom of the age.

Confident of success, the fleet of Athens passed from Samos to the coast of Asia. They then sailed for Ephesus, but received intelligence that Lysander had already proceeded northward. Alarmed for the dependencies of the commonwealth on the Hellespont, they immediately hastened after him. Lampsacus was, however, taken before they reached Elæus. Staying, therefore, at this place only to take re-

freshment, they proceeded to Sestos, and arrived the same evening at Ægospotamos.

The strait between that place and Lampsacus being only two miles wide, the arrival of the Athenian fleet was almost immediately known to Lysander. The morning no sooner dawned, than his crews had taken their meal, and repaired on board. Every thing was in readiness for action, but no movement was made. The sun was scarcely risen, when the Athenians advanced in order of battle to the harbour of Lampsacus,—waited until the evening, and then returned in triumph as the acknowledged masters of the sea. No sooner, however, had the armament of Athens withdrawn from before the harbour of Lampsacus, than Lysander sent two of his swiftest gallies after them, with instructions to the commanders, to observe whether the enemy debarked, and to form some judgment of their immediate intentions; and then to hasten back with the information. This was punctually executed. In the mean time Lysander kept his fleet in readiness for action, and not until he was assured that the enemy's motions indicated no intentions of attempting an enterprise did he dismiss his troops to procure refreshment. The next morning they repeated their insults, and the two following days also he prudently indulged their presumption.

Lysander observed, that every day's experience of his inaction increased the negligence and confidence of the Athenians. He was informed by the vessels which he sent to watch their motions, that they did not confine themselves to the market of Sestos, but wandered into the country. In the morning they failed not to offer battle to the Peloponnesian fleet, and in the afternoon returned again to their camp. On the fifth day, they advanced as usual to the harbour of Lampsacus, and provoked the hostile fleet to an engagement by more daring menaces than on any former occasion. Confident of success, they yielded, without reserve, to all the petulance of power and prosperity. They even debated among themselves in what manner the Lacedæmonian prisoners should be punished, who had the misfortune to fall into their hands. The cruel Philocles proposed that they should have their right hands cut off; that those enemies of the republic might be incapa-

ble of handling the oar or brandishing the spear. This inhuman proposition, though opposed by Adimantus, was approved by the majority of his colleagues, and finally resolved on. After insulting the Peloponnesian fleet in the most mortifying and disdainful manner, they returned with an air of exultation and contempt to their station.

Lysander then gave directions to the commanders of his reconnoitring ships, if they observed the Athenians disembark and disperse as usual, to hasten their return, and, by the elevation of a shield, communicate the intelligence. The advice boats, therefore, having followed the enemy to a convenient distance, noticed that they had no sooner landed at their station, than the troops straggled about the shore, advanced into the inland country in quest of provision or amusement, and indulged in indolence, or revelled in disorder. Lysander had embarked the troops; cleared his ships, and made every necessary preparation to avail himself of the opportunity of effecting, by stratagem, what would have been difficult and dangerous to have attempted by force. The advice boats returned; the signal was made, and the fleet steered across the strait.

Conon endeavoured seasonably to assemble the strength of the Athenians, but his advice was disdained by officers incapable and unworthy of commanding, and the seamen despised his orders. At length, however, when it was too late, they became sensible of their error. The Peloponnesians were upon them, before any effectual and salutary measures of defence could be taken. The soldiers and seamen were equally dispersed, and most of their gallies were altogether empty, or manned with such feeble crews as were incapable of working, much less of defending them. The Peloponnesians, with their regular onset and disciplined valour, attacked the Athenian troops as they flocked without order to the shore. Those who fought were slain; the rest fled into the inmost recesses of the Chersonese, or sought protection in the Athenian fortresses scattered over that peninsula.

Conon's trireme, with seven others of his division, and the sacred ship Paralus, had their crews complete, and pushed off from the shore. One hundred and seventy-one gallies were

seized by the enemy at anchor, or on the beach. No effort within the power of nine ships could have any other effect, than to add the loss of them to that of the rest of the fleet. While the enemy were intent upon their capture, Conon fled, unpursued, to the island of Cyprus. Three thousand prisoners were taken, among whom were Philocles and Adimantus, and Lysander returned with his invaluable spoil to Lampsacus, amidst the joyous acclamations of naval triumph. B. C. 405.

It now became a matter of serious consideration, how they should dispose of such a number of prisoners. The allies, accordingly, were assembled for consultation, and an animosity appeared in their proceedings, which the ancient manner of warfare was calculated to excite. The injustice and cruelty of the ambitious Athenians were copiously described and maliciously exaggerated by this dreadful tribunal. "It would be tedious," they said, "to enumerate the multiplied and abominable crimes of which so many individuals and so many communities had been the innocent and unhappy victims. Even lately, they had taken a Corinthian and an Andrian vessel, and thrown the crews down a precipice, and destroyed them. The gods had averted the odious and inhuman proposition of Philocles, of which the author and approvers were equally criminal, nor could those deserve pardon or mercy, who had no pity for the sufferings of others."

It was therefore instantly resolved, that all the prisoners who were Athenian citizens, except Adimantus, should be put to death. The unarmed prisoners were then conducted into the presence of their armed judges; and, as a prelude to the inhuman massacre, Lysander sternly demanded of Philocles what he ought to suffer for his intended cruelty. The Athenian replied, with firmness and intrepidity, "Accuse not those whom it is in your power to judge, but inflict that punishment on us, which we in your situation would have inflicted on you." No sooner had he spoken thus, than Lysander began the execution, and killed the general with his own hand. The Peloponnesian soldiers followed the bloody and inhuman example of their commander. Of the three thousand Athenians, Adimantus alone was spared.

On the coasts of Greece and Asia, there was no naval force capable of contending with the fleet of Lysander; nor, if we except the city of Athens alone, was there any fortified place in all those countries sufficient to withstand the impression of his army. In these circumstances, it was of importance to establish or confirm the Lacedæmonian power and empire over those valuable and extensive coasts. He had nothing more to do than to direct the course of his victorious fleet, and to take possession. As soon as he appeared between Byzantium and Chalcedon, the inhabitants of those places, astonished and terrified by the dreadful misfortunes of their Athenian allies, offered to capitulate. The Athenian garrisons were allowed to depart, but policy, more than lenity, prompted this measure: Lysander looked forward to the conquest of Athens; and against the uncommon strength of the fortifications, and other obstacles with which he would have to contend, famine was considered as the most certain and efficacious weapon. As, therefore, every augmentation of their numbers would promote his purpose, he permitted all Athenian citizens to go to Athens, and to Athens only.

In the mean time, the Paralus, arriving by night at the Piræus, communicated to the Athenians intelligence of their late defeat. The alarm and lamentations commencing immediately in the vicinity of the harbour, were quickly communicated through the town of Piræus, and passing from one town to another, reached the city. The consternation immediately became universal, and during that night no person slept in Athens. Grief for the slain, the best part of the Athenian youth, and among whom every one had some friend or relation, was not the prevailing passion; this was overborne by the dread of the fate which threatened themselves, and every feeling was absorbed in personal considerations.

Exclusive of the incompetency of the republic to oppose an equal force to that which could be brought against it, the endless strife of factions, and the violence of intestine tumult, had destroyed all coherence in the constituent parts of the government. On the morrow after the arrival of the Paralus, a general assembly was convened, and such measures were resolved on as the exigency of affairs seemed to require.

They expected an immediate siege by sea and land, and as it was impossible to raise a fleet able to oppose that of the Peloponnesians, they determined to block up all the ports except one; to repair the walls; to appoint guards, and to prepare every thing in their power to resist the enemy, and to sustain a blockade.

In the mean time Lysander, having awed the Hellespontine cities into submission, sailed to the island of Lesbos, reduced Mitylene, and confirmed the allegiance of Methymna. Whilst he was extending his arms over the coast of Lydia and Caria, and the neighbouring islands, he sent Eteonicus with ten ships to the Thracian shores, who ravaged the maritime parts of Macedon, subdued the towns and cities of Thrace bordering on the coast, and rode triumphant in the Hellespont and Propontis, the Ægean and Euxine seas. Soon after the disaster of the Athenians at Ægospotamos, the fairest and most favoured portion of the ancient world submitted with reluctance to the power, or voluntarily accepted the alliance, of Sparta.

During this long series of triumphs, Lysander never lost sight of the reduction of Athens. He therefore sent information to Lacedæmon and Decelia, at the same time, that he was ready to sail to Piræus with two hundred gallies. The Lacedæmonians, as soon as they received this intelligence, resolved to make great exertions, that they might terminate a war which had continued for such a long series of years with little or no intermission. Their allies were summoned to arms, and the whole force of Laconia joining them, they marched toward Attica, under the command of Pausanias. Agis united the troops from Decelia to this numerous and powerful army, and both proceeded to the gymnasium of Academus, close by the city, where they fixed their quarters.

The Athenians, though destitute of allies, of a fleet, of stores, and blockaded by a powerful enemy by sea and land, made no proposals of capitulation. In sullen and silent despondency they beheld the formidable appearance of the Peloponnesians on the sea and in the field; and with all the means in their power, they prepared for a defence, which, at best, could only procrastinate their final doom. When Lysander

had blocked up the entrance of their harbours, and no supplies could be procured for the city, famine soon began to be severely felt by the Athenians. Still, however, they defended with vigour their walls and ramparts; patiently endured hardship and hunger; and beheld, with obstinate unconcern, the affliction of their wives and children. Disease and death now advanced among the unfortunate Athenians with increasing horror; yet, even amidst this dreadful scene of woe, they declared that their independence and their lives should perish together.

But, notwithstanding the noble sentiments and melancholy firmness of the popular assembly, a numerous and powerful party of men existed in the state, who were governed by interest more than by honour; and the greatest enemies of the liberty of Athens flourished in the bosom of the commonwealth. The whole body of the senate was infected with the leaven of the five hundred, and not only Theramenes, but several other men of abilities and influence in the state, regretted the destruction of that tyranny, and the restoration of the democratical form of government. Amidst every shape of public distress the Athenians caballed, clamoured, accused, and persecuted each other; and the aristocratical faction, from the smallness of its numbers, being capable of acting with superior concert and vigour, destroyed by every base, cruel, and illegal means, the friends and partizans of democracy.

A deputation, however, was at length agreed on between the two factions; and, accordingly, ministers were sent to Agis, the Spartan king, who commanded the blockade. The Athenians proposed an alliance offensive and defensive with the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, which, in the language of the politics of Greece, meant nothing less than the subjection of Athens to Sparta, and stipulated only for the preservation of their fortifications and of their harbours. Agis replied, that he had no power to treat, and that proposals must be addressed to the administration at Lacedæmon. Ministers were then sent into Peloponnesus; but when they arrived at Sellasia, on the borders of Laconia, they received a proud and haughty message from the ephori, commanding their

immediate return; and informing them, that the terms they brought were already known at Lacedæmon, and if they desired peace they must procure more ample powers from Athens.

This answer being communicated in the city, the Athenians were filled with despair. They now considered themselves as already condemned to slavery, if not to death, by their merciless and implacable enemies; and, even before another deputation could return with an answer from Lacedæmon, many must perish with hunger. It was understood that the Lacedæmonians proposed, among other things, that for ten furlongs the long walls should be demolished. Theramenes ventured to offer that, if the Athenians would commission him to go to Lacedæmon, he would undertake to bring certain information, whether the Peloponnesians really intended to reduce the Athenians to slavery, or whether the demolition of the walls were only required to insure political subjection. He named nine persons to be his colleagues in this mission, and flattered the people that they would procure some moderate terms of accommodation. A decree was therefore immediately passed by the Athenians in assembly, investing the ambassadors with full powers.

Having assumed the sacred badge of their inviolable character, they proceeded to the Spartan camp; held a conference with Agis the Lacedæmonian king, and then set forward on their journey towards Sparta. But the embassy was again met by an officer from the ephori, who would not permit them to proceed farther, until they had given assurance that they were invested with indefinite authority to treat for a peace with the Lacedæmonian commonwealth. When they reached Sparta, an assembly of the deputies of the Peloponnesian confederacy was convened, in which the fate of the Athenian republic was to be decided. The deputation from Corinth and Thebes vehemently contended, that no terms whatever should be granted the Athenians. "The commonwealth of Athens," they said, "which was the enemy of the common liberties of Greece, and had been so nearly successful in the horrid attempt to enslave or exterminate the

whole nation, ought to be annihilated; the people should be sold for slaves; and the site of the city should be made a sheep-walk, like the Crisæan plain." Many of the other deputies also supported the same opinion. The Lacedæmonians, however, whose administration was little subject to passionate counsels or hasty decisions, had previously considered the matter, and thought otherwise. Athens, if deprived of its navy, and of the revenue and power arising from transmarine dependencies, might, under an oligarchical government, become a necessary and valuable acquisition to Lacedæmon.

With an ostentation, therefore, of regard for the common welfare and glory of the Grecian nation, the Lacedæmonians declared, that "it would not become the Peloponnesian confederacy, and least of all the Spartans, to reduce to slavery a Grecian people, to whom the Greeks had been more than once beholden for important services in great and imminent dangers." Accordingly, it was proposed and resolved, that the conditions on which the Athenians should be permitted to retain their civil freedom, should be the following: that all their ships of war (except twelve) be surrendered; that the long walls, and the fortifications of Piræus be destroyed; that all exiles and fugitives be restored to the rights of the city; that the Athenians consider the same states as friends or enemies, which should respectively be so considered by the Lacedæmonians; and that the Athenians should send their forces wherever Lacedæmon should command, by sea or land.

With these terms Theramenes and his colleagues hastened back to Athens. During the long absence of their ambassadors, the Peloponnesians had pressed the siege with redoubled vigour. The Spartans, reinforced by the Thebans and their other allies, had surrounded the city on every side. Lysander blockaded the harbours with the Peloponnesian fleet, and had made himself master of Melos, Ceos, Ægina, and Salamis, islands so near to Athens, that they were almost regarded as a part of the Attic territory. Within the walls the greatest misery prevailed; the famine and the dis-

eases which it engendered were intolerable. It was considered by the besieged as impossible to hold out many days longer.

No sooner, therefore, was the arrival of the ambassadors announced at Athens, than people from every part of the city flocked about them, in the most painful suspense, lest an irresistible enemy should still refuse to treat, and no other alternative remain than to perish with hunger, or submit to the mercy of those from whom they scarcely hoped to receive compassion. The information that a treaty had been concluded gave relief for the night. The day following an assembly of the people was convened. Theramenes declared to the Athenians the terms, which, he said, were the best that himself and his colleagues could obtain, and such as, in his opinion, in their present distressed and unfortunate situation, they would do well to accept. When these unexpected fruits of his boasted negociation were produced, the people had no longer strength or spirit to resist, or even courage to die. A considerable body, however, pertinaciously declared, that they would never consent to the demolition of the walls.

But the principal leaders of the patriotic party had been destroyed, and their opponents were prepared to bear a foreign yoke, provided they were allowed to exercise domestic tyranny. That faction was ready to approve the measures of Theramenes, however degrading and servile; and Theramenes himself might well influence the resolution of the assembly, by informing them that the severity of the Lacedæmonians was extremely moderate and lenient, in comparison with what was proposed by the implacable Corinthians and Thebans. Arguments of this nature he certainly might have made use of, if necessary, to justify his negociations with the Spartans, and to persuade his countrymen to accept the terms offered; but the full period of thrice nine years, which had been assigned by repeated oracles and predictions as the continuance of the Peloponnesian war, and of the greatness of Athens, having elapsed, it seemed vain to contend. The treaty concluded by their ambassadors was therefore confirmed and ratified by the voice of the aristocratical faction; and submitted to, rather than accepted by,

the majority of the popular assembly, with the silence and sullenness of despair.

The acceptance of the offered terms being notified to the besieging armament, on the sixteenth of May, B. C. 404, Agis took possession of Athens; and Lysander, with his fleet, entered the harbour of Piræus.

The demolition of the fortifications of Athens was a peculiar occasion of rejoicing and triumph throughout the whole of Peloponnesus. The enemy commenced this destructive operation at the sound of military music; and with an eagerness and zeal almost incredible. They boasted that succeeding ages would consider the demolition of Athens as the true era of the freedom of Greece. No sooner, however, had they effected their purpose, and satiated their resentment, than they seemed to regret the injury they had done.

A magnificent festival concluded the day; in which the recitation of particular passages of the Grecian poets formed, as usual, a principal part of the entertainment. The Electra of Euripides was rehearsed, and particularly the pathetic chorus, "We come, O daughter of Agamemnon, to thy rustic and humble roof." The words were scarcely uttered, when the whole assembly melted into tears. The forlorn and helpless condition of that young and virtuous princess, who, having been expelled her father's house, was obliged to inhabit a miserable cottage, in want and wretchedness, recalled to their minds the dreadful vicissitudes of the fortune of Athens. That city, once mistress of the sea and sovereign of Greece, was deprived, in one fatal hour, of her ships, her walls, and her strength, and reduced from the pride and prosperity of her situation, to misery, dependence, and servitude.

Thus did the conquest of Athens terminate the memorable Peloponnesian war of twenty-seven years. Lacedæmon, now allied to Persia, became decidedly the leading power of Greece, and aristocracy, or rather oligarchy, triumphed over the democratical form of government, in almost every commonwealth of the Grecian people.

The Peloponnesian war was truly a civil war; it was less a contest between Lacedæmon and Athens, than between the

oligarchical and democratical interests throughout the Grecian commonwealths, in every one of which there was a party friendly to the public enemy, with whom it had a community of interest. The apprehension excited among the oligarchical states by the growing preponderance of the Athenian democracy, rendered terrible by its spirit of conquest, was the real source of the war. The purpose of the Peloponnesians was not to conquer Athens, but to reduce her to a state of inability to conquer them. With this view, it was held necessary to deprive her of that dominion over other Grecian states, which, by affording a superior revenue, enabled her to maintain the most formidable navy in the known world, and carry hostilities to distant countries.

Solon committed absolute sovereignty immediately to the multitude, who could not be made responsible for any measure. He intended, indeed, that the councils of the Areopagus and of the Four Hundred (afterward Five Hundred) should balance the authority of the popular assembly, and they might have operated to check a representative body of the people; but against sovereign power exercised by the people at large, no balance could be constituted. The Athenian government became, what in that very age we find it was called—and the people seemed to have been pleased to hear it—*a Tyranny in the hands of the People.*

The institution of wages for serving in the ten ordinary courts, was a mode of bribing the people. Three oboli were the daily pay of a dicast, whose office resembled that of our juryman. The rich and the industrious avoided; the poor, the idle, the profligate, thenceforward sought the office; it became their resource for a livelihood. To extend the gratification among that sovereign order, the juries were made immoderately numerous. Five hundred was the ordinary number. In the ten courts, no less than six thousand citizens are said to have been daily employed, with the exception of holidays, throughout the year; and, for a cause of extraordinary importance, the whole six thousand were sometimes assembled, and composed the tribunal called Heliæa. But the holidays themselves, which interrupted the business of the courts, afforded also a pretence, and a mode of bribing

the people. They were truly seasons of festival, during which the numerous carcasses of animals offered as sacrifice, were distributed to the multitude. Demagogues, therefore, would omit no opportunity for ingratiating themselves at so easy a rate, as by the proposal of a new festival; and thus the Athenian holidays were multiplied till they became twice as numerous as those of any other Grecian city.

In the absence besides of the subsistence provided under the name of sacrifice, a lawsuit, or a criminal prosecution, became the resource of the Athenian populace. Besides the certain pay, which was but small, there was the hope of bribes, which might be large; while pride was gratified by the importance which accrued to the meanest individual, who could call himself an Athenian citizen. Fine and confiscation, ordinary punishments of the Athenian law, conveyed the property of the wealthy to the treasury, to be thence distributed in various ways: theatrical exhibitions, processions, and feasts for the gratification of the people, or wages, under the pretence of paying for their services. Suits and prosecutions, therefore, encouraged by the interest of the populace, became innumerable; and life and property were rendered insecure. The security enjoyed by the citizens of the United States, which requires the solemn sanction of a grand jury to the merit of the accusation, before any man can even be subjected to trial, was unknown at Athens. There, any man might constitute himself the accuser of another, and the king archon was bound by his office to bring the accused to trial. When the cause came before the jury, no right of challenge afforded the accused Athenian means to guard against the partiality of his judges. It was, indeed, proposed to obviate the effect of partiality in some by numbers, who, it was supposed, would not concur in the improper measures of a few; but the disadvantages of such a resource exceeded its beneficial effects. In no conference, among themselves, could the well informed of so numerous a court correct the prejudices and want of judgment of the ignorant, careless, or impassioned, or prevent the effects of misused eloquence; nor was it possible to make so large a portion of the sovereign people responsible for the most ir-

regular or flagitious decision. Punishment could not take place, and among the multitude shame was lost. By a judicature so constituted, a victorious and deserving general, the ablest and most upright magistrate, or the most inoffensive private citizen, might be brought to trial for his life, at the pleasure of the most profligate of mankind. Even the allegation of a specific crime was unnecessary. Constructive treason, any imputed disaffection to the sovereignty of the people, sufficed; and as passion and prejudice, or the powers of oratory, or solicitation and bribery moved them, condemnation or acquittal was pronounced.

Attica, fortunately, possessed, in the silver mines of Laureon, an advantage unknown in any other part of Greece Proper. Those mines were public property, but individuals were allowed to work them for their private benefit; paying only, into the public treasury, a twenty-fourth of the ore obtained. This was the great source of the regular public revenue of Athens. The sacred olive trees were a second branch. These, scattered among the lands of individuals, in various parts of Attica, were consecrated, together with the ground immediately around them, to the goddess, protectress of Athens; the fruit was sold by auction, under the direction of the court of Areopagus; and the price was paid into the treasury. A third branch of the Athenian revenue consisted in the rents of public lands and houses, mostly acquired from individuals by forfeiture.

But among the little states of Greece, the first purpose of public revenue was generally less wanted to supply public than private necessity: less to support civil and military establishments, than to provide a maintenance for citizens without property, without industry, and, perhaps, without objects for industry. Before the Persian invasion, we find the whole revenue from the silver mines distributed among the people. This extravagance was remedied by the extraordinary address of Themistocles, who, with the advantage of favouring circumstances, persuaded the many to resign that revenue for public purposes, and hence acquired the means to render Athens the greatest maritime power, at that time, in the known world.

We are uninformed by what able statesman, or in what public exigency, the Athenians were persuaded to submit to a tax, in the nature of the modern customs, of a fiftieth of their value upon all goods imported, and upon some exports. Early in the Peloponnesian war, we find it well known, as also a small toll or excise duty, on goods sold in the markets. These two, forming together a very light burden, were the only regular and stated taxes at any time paid by the Athenian people.

The deficiency of a public revenue, arising from sources so scanty, was in some degree supplied by the imposition of a poll tax on the metics, or numerous free residents in Attica, who were not Athenian citizens. This, however, seems not to have been oppressive in its amount, nor in principle unreasonable. It was the consideration for the advantages which a residence in Attica, and the protection of the Athenian government afforded. Through the superior population of that city, the extent of its dominion, and the protection to maritime communication which its naval empire afforded to its subjects, trade could be carried on there upon a greater scale, and with more certain profit, than in any other situation in Greece. The metics were not only Greeks from the various cities, but Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, and other barbarians; and they seem to have formed the greatest portion of the traders and manufacturers of Athens.

Athens, in acquiring extensive dominion, acquired means to make others pay the principal expense of the force which was to maintain her dominion. In the empire which Athens exercised over so many transmarine cities, a vast field for peculation was opened. New and greater objects incited contending factions; and immoderate temptation occurred for those who sought authority, to put forward measures, ultimately the most adverse to the public good, if they tended at the moment to gratify the will of the multitude. Fine and confiscation were looked to, less for the purpose of justice than of revenue. The incentives to peculation, the insecurity of innocence, and the power of crime to escape punishment, became so apparent, that, amid the general depravity of Grecian governments, Athenian corruption grew proverbial; and

it was even made a question, whether it was advantageous for an individual to possess property, or advantageous to the commonwealth to raise a revenue.

From all the remaining writers of the age we may gather, that the spirit of every Grecian government was generally adverse to the increase of citizens. For every citizen having an interest in a certain public capital, increase of citizens was increase of partners, which would diminish the share of every old proprietor. If the Athenian commonwealth had had only two or three thousand citizens, the lands of Attica, cultivated by slaves, with the additional produce of the silver mines, might have made all wealthy. But wealth, so ill protected, would have invited the rapacity of neighbouring states. The combination, therefore, of the means of subsistence and gratification with those of defence, decided the degree of population to be desired in a Grecian republic. But, unless danger was pressing, the general disposition was always adverse to an increase. The poor objected to it, in apprehension of its diminishing their chance of advantage from sacrifices, and from pay for attendance on the tribunals. The idea of a common interest in a common stock, a fundamental principle of every Grecian republic, not only made the aversion to any increase of citizens popular, but induced the ablest politicians (all considering slaves indispensable) to imagine a necessity for limiting the citizens to a very moderate number.

The gross vices of the government and judicature gave birth to that evil, which, under the name of sycophancy, so peculiarly prevailed at Athens. The term originally signified information given of the clandestine exportation of figs. Apparently to gratify the idle populace of the city at the expense of the landholders, some demagogues had procured a law forbidding the exportation of that plentiful production of the Attic soil. The absurdity of the prohibition, however, making the information particularly invidious, the term sycophant grew into use, as a general appellation for all vexatious informers. Such was the encouragement which the Athenian government and judicature afforded to such persons, that sycophancy became a profession, and furnished a livelihood to

many. The sycophant courted the populace, and was the terror and scourge of the rich. Intimation to a wealthy man that he would be denounced as able to equip a trireme, or provide a dramatic entertainment, or give a supper to his ward, often sufficed to obtain money for preventing so serious an evil. But the sycophant's great engine of profit was accusation, whether true or false; though false accusation was often preferred, as generally more lucrative. Those various public functions, which the wealthy were not allowed to decline, magistracies, equipment of ships of war, and presidencies of choral festivals, made opportunities endless. The sycophant was necessarily an Athenian citizen, for no other could denounce; but the evidence of strangers and slaves was admitted, and often preferred, because they might be examined by torture, which was cometimes carried to such inhuman severity that the supporters died under it. But, however little the accusation could be supported, it would always occasion trouble and expense, and any neglect of the fastidious multitude would involve danger. Bribes were necessary to procure dispatch from the officers who directed the business of the courts. At Athens, protection for iniquity might, and justice was obliged to be purchased, and both nearly at the same price.

The spirit of tyranny inherent in the Athenian constitution, and the disregard for the property, convenience, and satisfaction of individuals, are very strikingly marked in a regulation, which, we find, had the force of law. When an expensive office (and particularly when the equipment of a trireme) was forced on any one, he might, for the time, avoid the burden by indicating a richer man; and, if the superior wealth was denied, might offer to exchange estates with him. The person so challenged had no alternative, but to take upon himself the office or accept the exchange. The satisfaction of a citizen of the United States, in considering his house or his field more securely his own under the protection of the law, than a castle defended by its garrison, or a kingdom by armies, was unknown in Attica. The attachment, therefore, of an American citizen to the constitution of his country, by which such blessings are enjoyed; and the common interest of the

people of the United States in defending them, could not, there, readily exist. For men of rank and property, excepting the few who could make popular will the instrument of their own ambition, to be satified with the Athenian government was impossible. It was as dangerous to be rich under the Athenian democracy, as under Turkish despotism; the same subterfuges were used to conceal wealth, the same bribery and flattery to preserve it.

Under such circumstances, the rich and the poor evidently could not live in a state of harmony. An irritation incessantly existing in the minds of the few against the many, would be irremediable; and, in consequence, the many would be excited to an unceasing jealousy of the few. In fact, the checks of Solon's constitution were no sooner gone, and sovereign power placed in the hands of those without property, or rather in the hands of any demagogues who could for a moment lead them, than the interest of all who had property rendered them, necessarily, conspirators against the existing government. Indeed, throughout Greece, the noble and wealthy had little connection with the poorer classes, except to command them in the oligarchical states, and in the democratical, to fear, flatter, solicit, deceive, or submit to them. No common interest united these two descriptions of men. To maintain civil order, and hold the state together, flattery and bribes to the multitude were necessary; and violence was the only alternative when these failed. Hence that impossibility of lasting harmony, and that readiness for extreme discord, which the history of the Grecian republics so strikingly exhibits.

Where the constitution is such, that all ranks have a decided and known interest in its preservation; where every man's house is his castle; where the property of the rich, and the persons and honest earnings of the poor, are equally protected by law; and where the hope of rising to the highest stations is denied to none; the law of treason may be comparatively mild. But no mild law, no common precaution, could give security to a constitution like that of Athens. Accordingly the punishment of treason was dictated by the worst spirit of despotism, and was atrocious.

Before the council hall stood a column, on which was engraved: "Whoever shall overthrow the democracy, or hold any magistracy in Athens, when the democracy shall be overthrown, may be lawfully killed by any one; the person killing him shall be held holy before the gods, and meritorious among men; and shall be rewarded with the whole property of the person slain."

Such was the state of the Athenian government, from the death of Pericles, till it submitted to the victorious arms of the Peloponnesians. The fate of a city fallen and degraded, and allowed merely to exist under the controul of a foreign power, would scarcely seem to invite much of our farther attention. But Athens, after all her losses, and with all her failings, has peculiar claims upon the curiosity and respect of men. In her fallen state, she retained her knowledge of philosophy, of science, and of every liberal art; Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato, still lived within her walls; Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Conon, though in exile, adorned the list of her citizens, and she could still be the prolific mother and the able preceptress of artists, poets, warriors, orators, statesmen, and sages, who made their age the most brilliant in the annals of mankind; and, through whom, when her political importance ceased, Athens continued, and may be said, in some degree, still to continue, to hold an empire among all the civilized nations of the earth. Nor was her political importance so completely destroyed, as to prevent her becoming again a principal object of Grecian history.

After the view we have taken of the Athenian constitution, it will not be thought wonderful, that men of rank and property desired at any rate a change; nor can we impute it to any peculiar depravity, that they bore some antipathy to the lower classes of people, from whom they suffered such oppression. Accordingly, when Athens was invested by the Peloponnesian forces, and no prospect of successful resistance remained, many of those of higher rank saw, or thought they saw, means of improving their condition, in the approaching wreck of the state. Through this opposition of interest among the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians proposed to hold Attica in subjection, without the expence of garri-

sons; and thus they were induced to grant terms, and leave the town its walls and a citadel,—to restore the whole territory—and even, out of the captured fleet, to return twelve ships of war to the vanquished. The Athenian people had never treated a conquered city so mildly. But the Lacedæmonians depended upon the aristocratical party among the Athenians themselves, as a faithful garrison, bound by the most pressing interest, to hold all in subordination to Lacedæmon.

On the surrender of the city, the vicious government which has been described being dissolved, the supreme power of the Athenian state was committed to a council composed of thirty Athenians, chosen by the conquerors out of the aristocratical party. The first measures of this council were moderate and wise. Vested with full powers to new-model the whole fabric of the ancient constitution at their pleasure, provided nothing was done adverse to the superintending authority of Lacedæmon, they avoided any great and hasty changes, which their situation did not indispensably require. The laws remained in force, unless the recent revolution made a change necessary; all the ancient magistracies, care being taken to fill them with friends of the Thirty, were retained; the civil administration, therefore, under the Thirty, instead of the Five Hundred, proceeded in the accustomed course. A new supreme court of judicature was, however, established, with the title of the Council.

The peculiar circumstances of Athens, under the new form of government, gave rise to many inconveniences. The controlling power of Lacedæmon would be necessarily invidious to those for whom they were to legislate. Of the changes which Athens had suffered by the event of the war, some would be favourable to them, but some far otherwise. Private distress, among all ranks, was great. The loss of property in the foreign territories of the commonwealth, had reduced some from affluence to want. The abolition of means by which formerly an interest for money was obtained at home, also annihilated the incomes of many. The advantages of command of course no longer existed for the higher ranks, nor did the reward of service accrue to the lower, nor were the various profits of the equipment of fleets and armies appro-

priated by any body. Public revenue no longer flowed from numerous tributary states. The public treasury, and the wealth of individuals, could not, as formerly, provide gratifications for the people; the citizens of numerous subject republics were no longer amenable to Athenian tribunals; multitudes, accustomed to fight, and to judge, and to feast at sacrifices, and to be amused, but not to work, were without income, without employment, and without food. The attention, the flattery, the pay, and the bribes, to which the Athenian people were accustomed, had all ceased.

Such were the circumstances under which the Council of Thirty entered with absolute authority, upon the administration of the affairs of Athens. Critias presided, a man by every advantage of birth, fortune, connections, education, and talents, fitted for the arduous situation. His paternal great grandfather was brother of the great lawgiver, Solon; and, what might have been of more solid advantage, he had been himself a diligent hearer of Socrates; but he was soured by the banishment which he had suffered from a decree of the people. Thenceforward Critias conceived a vehement aversion to the popular cause, and his pride and ambition were stimulated by indignation and revenge.

Among the members of this council, the man most distinguished in office and in party measures was Theramenes, whom we have already seen a leader in one revolution which abolished, and in another which restored, the sovereignty of the popular assembly. He now engaged in a third, under the patronage of Lacedæmon, with a disposition and views differing widely from those of Critias.—His family, though noble, had been popular. His father, Agnon, founder of Amphipolis, had been a distinguished favourite of the people; and, however Theramenes himself might, with all reasonable men, dislike the sovereignty of the multitude, yet he loved popularity. In reforming the government, therefore, it was not his object to oppress the people. He seems rather to have proposed to restore that mixed government, which, upon the overthrow of the Four Hundred, he had framed, but could not support.

The scheme of Critias, not altogether new in Greece, was, however, such as had not been executed, nor perhaps before

attempted upon so extensive a scale. The habit of having all laborious offices performed by slaves induced him to believe, that the existence of the lower orders of freemen might be dispensed with. Critias would allow no mixture of popular folly and insolence in power. He would abandon all hope of the glory of presiding over a powerful independent state, to have ease and affluence in a subordinate command. He proposed, therefore, under the protecting authority of Lacedæmon, to be lord of Athens; he would make the city, and its whole territory, the private property of himself and a few associates.

With these extravagant and nefarious views, which it was not prudent immediately to declare, Critias courted Theramenes, and there was, for a short time, the appearance of perfect harmony between them. Soon, however, differences arose; but Critias still maintained a show of deference for his colleague. Meanwhile he secured a party among the rest of the Thirty. No eminence of character there excited his envy, no superior talents his apprehension, and no firmness of principle thwarted his purpose. To secure themselves against the effects of the measure it was resolved to solicit an armed force from Lacedæmon. Theramenes in vain remonstrated; the resolution passed, and Æschines and Aristoteles, two of the Thirty, were deputed to Sparta, authorized to engage to pay from the Athenian treasury, the troops they asked for. A force whose object was to hold Athens in subjection, and which was to be paid for that service by Athens herself, was not likely to be denied. A body of Lacedæmonians was sent, and Callibius, their commander, with the title of harmost, or regulator, took up his residence in the citadel of Athens, of which his troops formed the garrison.

Confident now of possessing means to overcome opposition, Critias no longer kept measures with those whom he suspected of inclination to thwart his designs. From the first arrival of the Lacedæmonians, he was sedulous in attention to the harmost, and by the show of much deference obtained complete influence over him. Under pretence that the interest of Lacedæmon required it, Callibius issued orders as Critias instigated, and the Lacedæmonian soldiers were em-

ployed to apprehend, whomsoever the Thirty denounced. Prosecution was no longer confined to sycophants, and men notoriously turbulent or infamous, but extended to characters the most irreproachable. Some forms of legal process were observed, and those of the old constitution were mostly retained; but whomsoever the Thirty accused, the obsequious council never hesitated to condemn, and deliver to the executioner.

Such proceedings excited alarm among all ranks. What could be the motive, and where the end of these abuses of power, were the anxious subjects of general inquiry. Theramenes himself, while Critias yet maintained a decency of exterior towards him, remonstrated among his colleagues on the impolicy of their measures: "Without some party among the people," he said, "no oligarchy could stand; but alarm and offence were now extended to all parties." The admonition was taken, but not as Theramenes intended. Nothing the Thirty dreaded so much as the popularity of Theramenes himself. To obviate its efficacy, they hastened the publication of a catalogue of three thousand citizens of their own selection, who should partake of the sovereign power in common assembly, and be competent to the magistracy. All other Athenians were reduced to the condition of subjects, not to the three thousand only, but to the Thirty, whose sovereignty over them was declared absolute.

An inspection of the arms of the three thousand and of the other citizens, was ordered; it was so contrived that the two bodies should meet at different places. The confidential adherents of the thirty, supported by the Lacedæmonian troops, occupied the avenues leading to the spot where the citizens, not of the catalogue, were assembled. They were disarmed by the soldiers, and their arms being carried to the temple of Minerva, were committed to the care of the Lacedæmonian garrison.

Effectual opposition being thus obviated, the Thirty proceeded with a degree of publicity in crime, which we can scarcely believe upon the express testimony of Xenophon. But we find his account supported by two other cotemporary writers, Lysias and Plato. From them we learn, that the

most abominable policy directed the measures to be pursued. Revenge and avarice had their full sway: many were put to death on account of private enmities, many merely for their wealth. Every eminent man was either to be destroyed, or gained; but as means were wanting to attach a sufficient number by favours, the dreadful expedient was practised, of forcing men into a community of interest, through participation in crime. Driven by terror to execute tyrannical orders, they became involved in guilt, and obnoxious to resentment; and thus driven to make common cause with the Thirty.

Amid numerous enormities, the death of three men, the most eminent of the commonwealth, particularly excited wonder and alarm. These were Niceratus, son of the rich and worthy Nicias, who had perished at Syracuse; the able and powerful orator Antiphon, who had acquired such reputation for public spirit, that he was in favour with all parties; and Leon of Salamis, eminent for his blameless life. A message from the Thirty and Critias required these men to be apprehended and brought to Athens. To be apprehended and to be condemned were nearly the same thing, and Leon, Niceratus, and Antiphon, were all delivered to the executioner.

To these violent proceedings Theramenes was opposed. To get rid of him was an object of consequence to Critias. The council was summoned; a body of men, with concealed arms, surrounded the hall; the Thirty attended, and Theramenes was in his place among them, when Critias rising, in a set speech, accused him of meditating treason against the existing government. Stating no facts amounting to treason, by any known law; and contending, not on the ground of public law, but of convenience to the party, he argued, that the accused should be capitally condemned.

Theramenes adapted his defence to existing circumstances. He addressed himself rather to the fears and feelings than to the conscience and justice of his judges; and he so demonstrated the expediency of the measures which he had always recommended, and not only the iniquity, but the danger of those pursued by Critias, that he disposed a majority of the council in his favour.

The moment was critical. Critias was aware that his own ruin could now scarcely fail to follow the miscarriage of his purpose against Theramenes. He went out, and directed his armed attendants to show themselves. Returning, then, he addressed the council thus: "I esteem it a duty of my station" (he was president of the Thirty) "to prevent those acting under me in the administration from being deceived and misled. I shall therefore take upon myself to do what the present emergency requires. The crowd at your doors have declared, they will not rest under the acquittal of one whose known purpose is the overthrow of the oligarchy. In the new code it is enacted, that the citizens of the catalogue shall be liable to capital punishment only from the judgment of the council; but over all others the authority of the Thirty is absolute. I, therefore, confident of your unanimous approbation, strike the name of Theramenes from the catalogue, and we, the Thirty, condemn him to death."

To Athenians, familiar under their democracy with the most anomalous and tyrannical measures of government, these proceedings were not astonishing. No opposition was made to them, either among the Thirty or by the council. Theramenes saw that his destruction was resolved upon, and instantly had recourse to what alone seemed to afford a chance for safety. He sprang to the altar, and thence claimed the protection of a law lately made. "As for this altar," he said, "I know its sacredness will not protect me, but I will at least show, that the impiety of those men is equal to their injustice. Yet I cannot but wonder, that you, counsellors, men of rank and high worth, will not assert your own cause; for the name of any of you may be erased from the catalogue with as little ceremony as mine."

The herald of the Thirty had been dispatched to command the attendance of those high officers of justice called the Eleven, who were already gained to the views of Critias. They entered the council hall with their usual attendants, while Theramenes was still speaking from the altar. Critias immediately told them, that Theramenes had been condemned to death according to law; and commanded them to

do what, in consequence of this condemnation, became their duty. In vain Therames alleged its illegality and impiety. The council, awed by those around the hall, now known to be armed, was passive; and Satyrus, the most daring of the Eleven, set the example of laying hands on Theramenes, dragged him from the altar, and hurried him away to the prison. Theramenes, with exerted voice, endeavoured to excite the people in his favour. The people, accustomed to fear, and unprepared to resist, made no stir. In the prison, the deadly potion being brought, Theramenes drank it with a serene countenance, and then, tinkling the reversed cup, said, as a remaining drop fell, "This libation is for the worthy Critias."

Bribery was absolutely necessary to the Thirty, for keeping the three thousand of their catalogue firm to their party. To give them the most decided pre-eminence, and, on the other hand, to take the strongest precautions against those, not of the catalogue, was indispensable. But the necessity of bribing high would carry with it the necessity of increased violence and new crimes. The death of Theramenes had been a preparatory step. That able leader being removed, measures the most violent and injurious against the multitude, already deprived of arms, were no longer scrupled. Lands and country houses were seized for the benefit of the Thirty and their adherents; and shortly, an order was issued for all, not of the catalogue, to quit Athens. The greater part took refuge in Piræus, but there the jealousy of their oppressors did not allow them long to remain. The ruling party, in the neighbouring city of Megara, and in the more powerful city of Thebes, was friendly to their cause; Thebes, accordingly, and Megara, became crowded with Athenian fugitives.

Among those whom the tyranny of the Thirty had early driven to seek safety in banishment was Thrasybulus. He resided in Bœotia, and was watching for movements favourable to his views. He quickly decided upon his plans. It was scarcely six months after the establishment of the Thirty, when, with only about seventy heavy-armed soldiers, he

seized upon Phyle, an Attic fortress, near the Bœotian border.

This gave little alarm to the Thirty, who trusted that they could easily prevent depredation on the neighbouring lands, by marching immediately against the little garrison. Phyle was scarcely more than twelve miles from Athens. Reaching it, therefore, early in the day, they directly led their forces to the assault, but with the ill success which, in that age, commonly attended attacks upon fortified places. In their hurry, however, to crush an enemy at so short a distance from the town, and supposed to be so little able to resist them, they had omitted to bring tents and camp equipage. Nevertheless, they resolved to remain before the place, and immediately began a contravallation. That same night a heavy fall of snow so distressed them, that next morning they withdrew hastily to Athens, and with so little order, that much of their baggage was taken by the activity of the pursuing enemy.

The Thirty, even after their miscarriage against Phyle, seemed to have apprehended nothing from its garrison beyond excursions for plunder. To obviate this, they sent the greater part of their Lacedæmonian troops, with a body of their own horse, to a station near the place. But the credit of success having enabled Thrasybulus to increase his forces, he marched with seven hundred men, and surprized the camp of the Thirty at day-break, killed a hundred and twenty of their heavy-armed soldiers, and put the rest to flight.

This unexpected stroke produced an effect on the minds of men far beyond its real importance. The partizans of the Thirty were so alarmed, that the tyrants themselves doubted whether they would be safe even in Athens till assistance might be obtained from Lacedæmon.

At the head of the cavalry, therefore, Critias went to Eleusis. All the Eleusinian people of age to bear arms were summoned, under pretence of a muster for ascertaining their strength, as a garrison for their town. Every man, as his name was enrolled, was ordered to go through the gate leading to the shore. Without the wall the Athenian cavalry

were posted, with some of the Thirty attending. These pointed out the suspected as they passed singly, and the servants of the cavalry seized and bound them. The scrutiny being completed, they were immediately marched to Athens, and delivered into the custody of the Eleven.

These unfortunate men, together with some who, for the same crime of suspected disaffection, had been brought from Salamis, were at the mercy of Critias and his associates. But an infernal policy dictated farther ceremony. To strengthen the tie between himself and his chosen three thousand, Critias determined to make these his accomplices in every crime, and sharers in the consequent enmity and abhorrence of men. On the following day, therefore, the three thousand of the catalogue, together with the cavalry, were assembled in the odeum, or theatre of music, and, lest all should not be sufficiently zealous in the cause, or sufficiently obsequious to the Thirty, the Lacedæmonian garrison attended. Critias addressed the Athenians in these extraordinary terms: "In the government which we have been establishing, your interest has been considered equally with our own. Sharing therefore its advantages, you will not refuse to share with us its dangers. Your common voice must ratify an order for the execution of the prisoners yesterday brought hither; that your security and your peril may rest on the same foundation with ours." Suffrages were given by ballot, but openly, that it might be seen if any were untrue to the cause, and the prisoners from Eleusis and Salamis, in all about three hundred, were condemned by one vote.

So ineffectual was the horrid policy of Critias to secure his command over Attica, that, soon after this massacre, Thrasybulus, with about a thousand heavy-armed infantry, marching by night, entered the town of Piræus, open since it was dismantled by the Lacedæmonians, and took possession of it without opposition. The Thirty led their whole force to attack him. The extent of Piræus being too great for his scanty numbers to defend, he moved to the adjoining suburb of Munychia, which afforded more advantageous ground. The Thirty did not delay their assault. Next to victory, death in battle was the most desirable lot for Critias, and

that he was fortunate enough to obtain. Hippomachus, another of the Thirty, was also killed. Hardly more than seventy of their followers had fallen, when the rest fled, and the victory of Thrasybulus was complete.

When the pursuit ceased, a truce for burial of the slain was in the usual form solicited by the defeated, and granted by the conquerors. Opportunity to communicate being thus had, numbers from both sides assembled and conversed together. Among those from Piræus was Cleocritus, herald of the mysteries, a man respected for his birth, connections, and abilities, as well as for the sacred office which he held. Having procured silence he addressed the throng in a conciliatory speech; in which, professing for himself and his party every disposition to friendly union with the Three Thousand, he imputed to the Thirty alone the evils suffered on both sides. "The Thirty," he said, "merely to gratify an inordinate thirst of wealth and power, had destroyed as many Athenian citizens in eight months, as all the Peloponnesians in ten years; and when no obstacle existed to prevent their establishing a good government in peace, they had forced on this most shameful, cruel, wicked, and, to gods and men, hateful civil war."

This speech gaining anxious attention from the people, alarmed their chiefs, who sedulously hurried them away. Next day the Thirty met, and, with faded hopes, consulted concerning their affairs: while the three thousand were in altercation in various parts of the town, those who had been forward in the late violences were urging opposition to the utmost against Thrasybulus and his adherents, while those who thought themselves less personally obnoxious, insisted on the necessity of an accommodation, unreservedly declaring, they would no longer obey the Thirty. The result of the contention was a resolution passed, in the form of a decree, by which the Thirty were deposed, and a council of ten, one from each ward, appointed in their room, for the express purpose of negociating an accommodation with those in Piræus. No resistance was attempted by the fallen tyrants, nor was violence used against them. Two of their number, Eratosthenes and

Pheidon, were elected members of the council of Ten, the others retired to Eleusis.

Opposition to Critias had recommended Eratosthenes and Pheidon to the choice of the Three Thousand; and a disposition adverse to the Thirty was also the supposed merit of their new colleagues. But no sooner were the Ten invested with supreme authority than they betrayed their trust. Appointed for the express purpose of negociation with Thrasybulus, they resolved not to do what would reduce them to the general level of Athenian citizens. A resolution passed to oppose Thrasybulus; to maintain oligarchy; and, in reliance on support from Lacedæmon, to exert themselves for the present in defensive measures.

Meanwhile the citizens, metics, and former inhabitants of Athens, of all denominations, who had fled from the tyranny of the Thirty, allured by the fame of the successes of Thrasybulus, flocked to join him. The greater part, disarmed, as we have already seen, by the policy of Critias, brought only their personal ability and zeal in the cause; but all were sedulous in providing themselves to the best of their skill and means: some making shields of wood; some of wicker; and, that no visible weakness of the material might encourage the enemy, they whitened them all. Fellowship in adversity, and unity of object, under one able leader, promoted concord among them. About the tenth day from their first occupation of Piræus, they solemnly pledged themselves to fidelity in the common cause; and then came to a resolution, that the rights of citizenship should be common to all who should faithfully do the duty of soldiers, in the war in which they were engaged for the recovery of their country. They were now strong in heavy-armed, their light-armed were still more numerous, and they had about seventy horse. They commanded the country, so that they were at no loss for provisions; and it was resolved, with general approbation, to besiege the city.

Though the projects of the Thirty seem, on a first glance, as unaccountably rash and imprudent as grossly nefarious, yet they were, in reality, not so lightly founded. Critias had proposed, not to establish an independent dominion, but only

to be lord of Attica, under the sovereignty of Lacedæmon; and he confided in the Three Thousand heavy-armed citizens of his catalogue, together with the greatest part of the Athenian cavalry, who were warm in his cause, and were a force sufficient, upon any emergency, till support from Lacedæmon could be obtained. Attica, divided among three or four thousand families, would afford every man a maintenance. Every Athenian thus, like every Lacedæmonian, would be a gentleman; all the offices performed among modern nations by the lower classes of freemen, being executed by slaves. An extraordinary concurrence of favouring incidents with bold and well concerted enterprize, shook this system almost at the outset.

Thrasybulus had chosen his time so well; was so rapid in his measures,—and so favoured by contingencies; that the revolution was on the point of taking place, before his opponents began to think any addition to their own strength was wanting. At length, nearly at the same time, ministers from the Thirty, in Eleusis, and from the Ten, in the name of the Three Thousand in Athens, reached Lacedæmon. The powerful interest of Lysander, whose credit was deeply concerned in the maintenance of the Lacedæmonian authority in Athens, sufficed to obtain for him the appointment of commander in chief in Attica, with the title of harmost, and for Libys, his brother, the command of a squadron to co-operate with him. He procured a loan of a hundred talents for paying troops, which he could easily hire among the other states of Peloponnesus. He passed immediately to Eleusis, where he was soon joined by his mercenaries; and he prepared to blockade Piræus by land and sea.

These arrangements seemed to threaten Thrasybulus and his followers with immediate ruin. Certainly no exertion of prudence and bravery, on their part, could enable their scanty numbers and deficient resources to withstand the power of Lacedæmon. But, with very little bloodshed, the contest terminated in a decree, that fifteen commissioners should be appointed, in conjunction with Pausanias, one of the two kings of Sparta, to settle, with the strictest impartiality and equity, the differences existing among the Athenian people.

This resolution appears to have been faithfully and liberally executed. The Athenians of all parties, the Thirty, and some few who had acted in the most invidious offices under them only excepted, were restored to their rights as Athenian citizens, an oath only being required of them to keep the peace, and preserve a universal amnesty. Eleusis was given to the Thirty for their residence, and to be also a place of refuge for all, who, with them, might fear to live under the restored commonwealth. Matters being so far settled, Pausanias led away the whole of the Peloponnesian forces, leaving the Athenians of the city at perfect liberty with regard to their future civil government.

The retreat of the Lacedæmonian army was the signal for Thrasybulus and his followers to march to Athens. In solemn procession, they ascended into the citadel, and offered a sacrifice to Minerva. A general assembly was then held, to give the sanction of the popular will to the measures which present circumstances might require. Phomisius proposed, that land owners only should have votes in the general assembly, and be competent to the magistracy. Thrasybulus saw, that though the evils of the old government were great, this was not the proper remedy, nor would the times have borne it. By it, if resolved upon, more than five thousand citizens would have sunk into a condition of little more security to their persons and property than was possessed by slaves. In the absence of any just idea of a well regulated government, that portion of the people among the Greeks, which held the sovereign power, was despotic; and the rest were their subjects, more depressed than the subjects of any single despot. Thrasybulus recommended the complete restoration of the constitution, as it stood before the appointment of the Thirty. The assembly decreed as he advised: all the magistracies were filled; and the government resumed its antient form.

Thus, by a course of conduct, as wise and moderate in civil affairs as it had been bold and daring in military operations, Thrasybulus enjoyed the satisfaction while he lived, and through succeeding years has preserved the reputation of being the restorer of the Athenian commonwealth, and the

second founder of Athens. Attica, however, was not yet united under one government: it was divided between a democratical republic, of which Athens, and an oligarchy, of which Eleusis was the capital; an arrangement suiting the policy of Lacedæmon, as it facilitated the means of holding all in subjection. As the Lacedæmonians wrote no books, and foreigners had little access to their city, we are very little acquainted with their domestic affairs. They seem, however, to have been, at this time, so warmly engaged in domestic factions, that they had little leisure for interfering in the affairs of neighbouring states. Meanwhile the people of Athens were alarmed with information, that those in Eleusis were engaging mercenary troops. A vehement jealousy, natural to those who expected no alternative but death or expatriation from the success of the supposed design, instantly possessed the public mind. The service of all able to bear arms was strictly required; and the whole strength of the city marched. The leaders in Eleusis, trusting themselves to a conference, were massacred, but perjury and bloodshed went no farther. Proposals of peace and complete amnesty were offered and accepted; and the refugees, mostly of the noblest and wealthiest families of Attica, were restored to the rights of Athenian citizens. The multitude, who had the power in their hands, remained faithful to their engagements, and the government was carried on with harmony between them.—Thus, at length, the Athenian commonwealth was completely restored, and all Attica re-united as its territory.

Alcibiades seems to have possessed, in the Thracian Chersonese, a large estate, apparently inherited from his ancestors; for avarice, and that low dishonesty which has the accumulation of wealth for its object, were not among his vices. When he was a second time driven from the head of his country's forces to seek safety in exile, his property, in the expectation of a great booty for the treasury, was strictly enquired after. But, though in issues from the treasury, and collections from tributary states, the public money which had come into his hands very greatly exceeded what had ever fallen within the power of any former Athenian general, it

was found, that he had not used the opportunity for private profit.

Though in exile, Alcibiades enjoyed most of the external means of happiness. But, as it often happens in human affairs that circumstances, apparently most desirable, lead to misfortune, so, the very credit of Alcibiades was the occasion that, though in exile, the overthrow of his country involved his ruin. Athens was thought not in secure obedience to the Thirty or to Lacedæmon while Alcibiades lived; and the authority or influence of that sovereign state pervading all the Grecian settlements, it was difficult to find a residence where he could be safe. Perhaps too his disposition did not allow him to rest in quiet security. Finding himself, however, threatened on his estate in the Chersonese, he passed over into Bithynia. He had some confidence in the friendship, as well as in the tried honour of the satrap of that country, Pharnabazus. But, little contented with safety there, he conceived projects, not simply for restoring himself to his country, but for restoring his country to its former pre-eminence in Greece. His hopes were excited, and he proposed to go to Susa. Arrangements seem to have been in some forwardness for his purpose, when, in his residence in Bithynia, he was attacked by an armed multitude, whose provocation, or whose instigators, are not certainly known. Pharnabazus and the Lacedæmonians have been accused; but the many well attested proofs of the satrap's integrity, magnanimity, and honour, should exculpate him. The assailants, though an armed multitude, and opposed only by a few domestics, feared to enter the house; but they set fire to it. Alcibiades then sallying out sword in hand, none durst await his assault; but from a distance he was overwhelmed by a shower of darts and arrows. Nearly thus, according to all remaining accounts, fell that extraordinary man, before he had reached his fortieth year.

On the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, there followed a suspension of the usual turbulence throughout Greece; Attica only remaining, for some time, violently agitated.

Thrasybulus, and those who with him guided the popular will, certainly deserve honour for the political calm which

Athens now enjoyed. Not the public measures only, but the public temper, was marked with a wise moderation and a magnanimous liberality. Sycophancy was discouraged; party was nearly abolished. Several of those who had acted with the thirty; who had served under them in the cavalry, their guard and principal support, were admitted into the council, and allowed to aspire to the highest civil and military offices. Harmony and internal quiet prevailed, such as, since the death of Pericles, had been unknown in Athens.

While sobriety and moderation thus pervaded the public mind, a vain attempt was made, by the patriotic leaders, to put legal restraints upon democratical despotism. A law was proposed and enacted, declaring that no decree, whether of the council or even of the general assembly, should be valid, in opposition to the law as then established. But the restraint of law in an unbalanced democracy was a phantom, which party leaders easily taught their favouring majority in the sovereign assembly to despise. The constitution, therefore, remained unaltered; the former temper of the government soon returned; and all its inherent evils again broke out. Party spirit resumed its violence—tyranny again marked the decrees of the assembly. Even the amnesty, that solemn engagement, to which the whole people had sworn, as the very foundation of order and quiet in the restored commonwealth, was under various subterfuges violated. If the interest of a party required the exclusion of some eminent man from the college of archons, or from the council, nice distinctions were taken to prove the cases of such men exceptions to the general pardon. Success, in such an argument, before the council, encouraged accusation, on similar grounds, in the ordinary courts, or before the assembled people, which might produce confiscation and banishment, or even death. Needy and profligate men caught at the opportunity; and sycophancy revived, with all its public evils and all its private horrors.

In a popular government, the art of public speaking cannot fail to be important. In Athens it was more extensively so; as no man, who possessed any thing, could by the most upright conduct be secure against prosecution; and as,

moreover, it was expected of the prosecuted, though friends or council might assist, that they should, nevertheless, also speak for themselves. The importance of eloquence, in a court of justice, will also bear some proportion to the numbers of which it is composed. Eloquence will often operate powerfully upon a jury of only twelve men; the judge will check deception, inform ignorance, and correct misinformation; the informed and prudent members of the jury, while discussing the merits of the case among themselves, may obviate the fascination of oratory upon the ignorant, the passionate, and the giddy. But in the Athenian courts, consisting of from five hundred to six thousand jurors, no conference could take place; no salutary influence of the wiser few could easily affect the mass; the decision must generally be that of ignorance and passion, operated upon by the powers of contending speakers. Exasperated by eloquence, they often condemned the innocent; moved to pity, or even to favour, they acquitted and even honoured the guilty.

In this state of things at Athens, it was unfortunate to be deficient in eloquence. A wealthy man unable to speak for himself in public, was doubly an object for the sycophants. Hence the profession of the rhetorician, who composed orations to be spoken by others, arose, and gained high credit. Eminent men, of superior abilities, attached themselves to it, whose compositions, as valuable models of an important art, were collected and transmitted to posterity; and much of the works of two of the most eminent, Lysias and Isocrates, fortunately remain to us.

Among the early objects of reviving sycophancy, we find Alcibiades, son of the extraordinary man of that name, by Deinomache, daughter of Megacles, the noblest and wealthiest heiress of her time in Athens. The younger Alcibiades made no figure in public life, proportionate to his father's fame. He inherited his father's fine person and his profligacy, without his talents. He is chiefly known to us through two orations, composed on different occasions by the two celebrated rhetoricians just mentioned, one in his accusation, the other in his defence.

The Athenian people had decreed a military expedition, and the generals were empowered to name the citizens who should serve. Party interest or party resentment prompting, several men of rank and property were called upon to serve as common foot soldiers. Most of them, dreading the consequences of a despot's resentment, obeyed the injurious mandate; but young Alcibiades dared to refuse. Mounting his horse, he joined the cavalry, and said, there he was in his post, there he was ready for the duty, which the constitution and the laws required of him.

The oration composed by Lysias, for the prosecution, gives an unfavourable idea of the rhetorician himself; of the prosecutor, for whom he wrote; of the court, to which the speech was addressed; and of the general administration of law at Athens. Private revenge is a motive of the accuser directly and repeatedly avowed; and not only the most illiberal personal abuse of the accused, but all that faction had ever truly or falsely imputed to his father, was urged to influence the tumultuary tribunal.

In the oration against Alcibiades, we find the penal law against cowardice quoted. By a violent construction, the accuser endeavoured to persuade the court, that Alcibiades was obnoxious to the penalty of this law, though not only his service with the cavalry was admitted, but no battle had taken place. "But this is a case," says the accuser, "that has not occurred before, since the restoration of the democracy. It behoves you, therefore, to act, not merely as judges, but, in some degree, as legislators; not confining yourself to a strict construction of the law as it stands, but rather deciding how the law should ever, hereafter, be understood. Alcibiades, regularly summoned for the infantry, having sought shelter in the less dangerous service of the cavalry, it is a duty you owe to justice and to your country to presume his cowardice, as if a battle had actually been fought, and he had fled, and sentence ought to be pronounced accordingly." The strong contrast between the principle here inculcated, and that which prevails in the United States, requiring the strictest construction of penal laws, cannot fail to strike the American reader.

Alcibiades had the good fortune to escape condemnation; for, in his behalf, the general himself came forward with his nine colleagues, declaring, that, although Alcibiades had been regularly summoned to serve in the infantry, yet he had had their leave to act with the cavalry.

Among the numerous prosecutions of this period, that of Andodices, on a charge of impiety, deserves particular notice. Two orations, pronounced in that remarkable trial, remain to us, one, in accusation, composed by Lysias, the other, in defence, by the accused himself.

Andodices was born of one of the most illustrious families of Athens. His great-great-grandfather, Leogoras, was a leader of the party in opposition to the Pisistratidæ, and commanded the exiled people in a successful battle against the tyrants. His grandfather, Andodices, commanded a fleet, with reputation, in the Corinthian war which preceded the Peloponnesian. His father, Leogoras, was first commissioner in a treaty for peace with Lacedæmon. Andodices himself was familiar, by means of his birth and connexions, with men of the highest rank in the republic, when he became implicated in that accusation of profaning the mysteries, and mutilating the statues of Mercury, which first drove Alcibiades from his country.

The speech in accusation, written by Lysias, remains to us nearly entire. Little solicitous to convince reason, he has applied to the passions, and especially to that of superstitious fear. His great object was to persuade the assembly of the people, that the impiety of Andodices, if not expiated by his death, would implicate the court and the whole commonwealth in his guilt, and that the greatest misfortunes, public and private, might be reasonably apprehended from the consequent anger of the gods.

The speech of Andodices, in his own defence, is a masterly and manly composition. In the conclusion of it, Andodices endeavoured to take advantage of the popularity of his family, and the merit of his ancestors. "If you destroy me," he says, "my family is extinct: and does the family of Andodices and Leogoras deserve so to perish? and is it not a reproach to the commonwealth that their house should be

occupied, as during my exile it was, by Cleophon, the musical instrument maker? that house, which has furnished commanders of your forces, who have won many trophies by land and by sea; magistrates, who have filled all the highest offices of your government, through whose hands the public treasure has passed, and who never turned any to their own profit; a family, who never had cause to complain of the people, nor the people of them, and of whom, from remotest antiquity, whence they trace themselves, never were before brought into a situation to supplicate your mercy.

"If they are now all dead, let not their good deeds be forgotten. Rather let their persons be present to your imagination, soliciting your protection for me. For alas! whom, among the living, can I bring forward to move your commiseration? My father? no, he is no more. Brothers? I never had any. Children? I have none yet born. Be you therefore to me, instead of a father, of brothers, of children. To you I betake myself: you I implore. Be advocates to yourselves in my favour, and while, to supply the deficient population of the city, you are admitting Thessalians and Andrians to its rights, devote not to destruction your true citizens, whom, certainly, more than strangers, it behoves to be good citizens, and who want neither the will nor the ability to be so."

It was usual, in the criminal courts of Athens, to try all expedients for impressing the passions of the numerous tribunal. Pitiable sights were offered to the eyes, and pitiable tones to the ears: aged parents, weeping wives, and helpless children, were brought forward to assist, or to obstruct justice, by the most affecting entreaties. Andodices, after having urged that degrading supplication, which the tyrannous temper of the people made necessary, assumed a more dignified manner of defence.

The decision was against Andodices, but not to the extent that his enemies had proposed. His life was not affected.

What were the real merits or demerits, either of Andodices or his prosecutors and political opponents, is not very clearly indicated by any memorials now remaining. But we gain, from their united testimony, the most undeniable evi-

dence of the evils inherent in the Athenian constitution; its gross tyranny; the immoderate temptation, and the endless opportunities it afforded, for knavish adventurers in politics. We also learn from them, that a strong disposition to religious persecution prevailed among the Greeks of their age; insomuch that, where the supposed interests of religion interfered, all forms of justice were set at nought.

Many, in modern Europe, have spoken in rapturous language of the virtuous ages of Greece, and especially of Athens, as of something not only well known by fame, but undoubtedly once existing. When it existed, nevertheless, even in their imaginations, it seems impossible to ascertain.

During the period upon which we are engaged, the age of Plato, Xenophon, and philosophy, morality seems not only to have been not better practised, but even not better understood, than in Homer's time. That might made right, especially in public transactions, was a tenet very generally avowed. There were those who contended, that in private as in public affairs, whatever was clearly for a man's advantage he might reasonably do; and even sacrifice was performed, and prayer addressed to the gods for success, in wrong.

Yet, while not only morality but politics were defective among the Greeks to a degree to excite wonder, science was in esteem; and had, in some branches, the foundation already laid of all that is now most valued in them. Grecian philosophy is said to have had its origin from Thales; and he is said to have acquired it in Egypt. The circumstances of individuals, in the Grecian commonwealths, were more favourable for the cultivation of science, than a transient view of the political state of the country might lead us to suppose. Few had large incomes; but numbers lived in leisure, mostly maintained by the labour of slaves; and, assembled in towns, each communicated with all. Manners were thus formed; politeness was diffused; genius was invited to display itself. At the same time, minds capacious and active, but less daring, less turbulent, or more honest, avoiding the thorny and miry paths of ambition, would naturally turn themselves to the new modes of employment and of distinction, which the introduction of science offered. A lively imagination was

among the national characteristics of the Greeks, and, from the earliest accounts of the nation, we find, that whenever new knowledge appeared, it was received with eager attention.

From the light acquired by Thales in Egypt, arose what has obtained the name of the Ionian school of philosophy. Thales is said to have been the first among the Greeks, who calculated an eclipse of the sun, and hence, perhaps, we may best conjecture the extent of his science, and the kind of philosophy that he chiefly cultivated. Soon after him Pythagoras, driven by political troubles from his native Ionian island Samos, diffused information nearly similar, and derived from the same source, among the Grecian towns of Italy. Thales, as well as Pythagoras, is said to have mixed some valuable moral precepts with the instruction which he communicated on other sciences. It does not appear that they attempted to reduce morality to a system, and therefore, though they may have deserved highly as moral preachers, they seem hardly to have had any proper claim to the title of moral philosophers.

The calculation of an eclipse of the sun led the mind to more amusing speculation, and left the passions free. The formation of the world, the nature of matter and of spirit, the laws of the heavenly bodies, were, therefore, subjects which, in the intervals of political strife, deeply engaged the minds of the Asiatic Greeks. But books were yet so rare, that few could study in retirement. Knowledge was communicated in discourse, and the gymnasia and public porticoes, built for exercises of the body, became places of meeting for the culture of the mind.

The love of science is universally said to have been first communicated, among the Athenians, under the able and benign administration of the Pisistratidæ. But science itself was then in its infancy, and its immediate growth, in Athens, was checked by the violence of political contest which produced the ensuing revolution, and kept low by the long subsisting fervor of party spirit. The Persian invasions quickly following, absorbed all attention, and the great political objects which afterward engaged the general mind, left little

leisure for speculative pursuits. It was not until the superior talents of Pericles had quieted the storms of war and faction, that science revived at Athens with new vigour. Anaxagoras of Clazomene, the preceptor and friend of Pericles, possessed of all the learning of the Ionian school, is said first to have introduced what might properly be called philosophy. To him is attributed the first conception of one eternal, almighty, and all good Being, or as he is said to have expressed himself, a perfect mind independent of body, as the cause or creator of all things. The gods received in Greece, of course, were low in his estimation; the sun and moon, commonly reported divinities, he held to be mere material substances; the sun a globe of stone, the moon an earth, nearly similar to ours. A doctrine so repugnant to the system on which depended the estimation of all the festivals, processions, sacrifices, and oracles, which so fascinated the vulgar mind, was not likely to be propagated without reprehension. Even the science which enabled him to calculate an eclipse was offensive, inasmuch as it lowered the importance, and interfered with the profits, of priests, augurs, interpreters, and seers. An accusation of impiety was therefore instituted against Anaxagoras; and all that the power and influence of Pericles could do for his valued friend, was to procure him the means of escape from Attica.

To men living in an independent and an imperious democracy, whatever might best enable them to sway the minds of their fellow citizens, and, through such influence, raise themselves to commanding, dignified, and profitable, public situations, would be the most interesting science. He, who, knowing more than others, could also express himself better, would command attention in the public assemblies. That general education therefore, which gave the greatest advantage to talents for public speaking, a knowledge of letters and language, of mathematics, of laws, of history, of men and manners, whatever might contribute to form what we call taste, which enables the possessor to give advantage to every thing, by his manner of speaking and acting, and still more to avoid whatever can excite disgust or contempt, would be in the highest request.

Yet there would be able men, to whom, in the turbulence of the Grecian democracies, public situations would be little inviting. In some of the smaller states, they were beneath a soaring ambition; in the larger, amid the competition of numbers, success would to many be hopeless; some men, possessing high mental faculties, might want strength of body or powers of elocution; and many would be excluded or deterred by unfortunate party connections. From among all these therefore, some, instead of putting themselves forward for public situations, sought the less splendid, but safer advantages, to be derived from communicating to others that science, and that taste, which might enable them to become considerable as public men. Athens was always the great field for acquiring fame and profit in this line, yet those who first attained eminence in it were foreigners. Gorgias, of Leontium, in Sicily, formerly noticed as chief of an embassy from his own city to Athens; Prodicus, of the little island of Ceos; and Hippias, of Elis. All these are said to have acquired very considerable riches by their profession. Their success, therefore, invited numbers to follow their example; and Greece, but especially Athens, shortly abounded with those, who, under the name of sophists or professors of wisdom, undertook to teach every science. The scarcity and dearness of books gave high value to that learning, which a man, with a well stored mind, and a ready and clear elocution, could communicate. None without eloquence could undertake to be instructors, so that the sophists, in giving lessons of eloquence, were themselves the example. They frequented all places of public resort, where they recommended themselves to notice, by an ostentatious display of their abilities in disputation among one another, or with whoever would converse with them.

In the competition thus arising, men of specious, rather than of solid abilities, would often gain the most extensive estimation. Many of them, indeed, would take either side of any question, political or moral, and it was generally their glory to make the worst appear the better cause.

The profession of sophist had not long flourished, when the singular talents, and singular manners and pursuits of

Socrates, son of Sophoniscus, engaged public attention. Inheriting a very scanty fortune, he had a mind wholly intent upon the acquisition and communication of knowledge. The sublime principles of theology taught by Anaxagoras, made an early impression upon his mind. They led him to consider what should be the duty owed by man, to such a being as Anaxagoras described his Creator to be, and it struck him, that if the providence of God interfered in the government of this world, the duty of man to man must be a principal branch of the duty of man to God. It struck him farther, that though the favourite enquiries of the philosophers concerning the nature of the Deity, the formation of the world, the laws of the heavenly bodies, might enlarge and improve the minds of a few speculative men, yet the investigation of the social duties was infinitely more important, and might be infinitely more useful to mankind in general.

We are informed, by his disciple Xenophon, how he passed his time. He was always in public. Early in the morning, he went to the walks and the gymnasia; when the agora filled, he was there; and in the afternoon, wherever he could find most company. Generally, he was the principal speaker. The liveliness of his manner made his conversation amusing as well as instructive; and he denied its advantages to nobody. But he was, nevertheless, a most patient hearer, and preferred being the hearer, whenever others were present, able and disposed to give valuable information to the company. He did not commonly refuse the invitations, which he frequently received to private entertainments; but he would undertake no private instruction, nor could any solicitation induce him to relieve his poverty, by accepting, like the sophists and rhetoricians, a reward for what he gave in public.

If we may believe his own account, reported by his two principal disciples, he believed himself divinely impelled to the employment to which he devoted his life, enquiring and teaching the duty of man to man. A divine spirit, in his idea, constantly attended him; whose voice, distinctly heard, never expressly commanded what he was indisposed to do; but frequently forbad what he had intended. To unveil the

nature of Deity was not among his pretensions. He only insisted on the perfect goodness and perfect wisdom of the Supreme God, the Creator of all things, and the constant superintendence of his providence over the affairs of men. As included in these, he held that every thing said, or merely wished by men, was known to the Deity; and that it was impossible he could be pleased with evil. The unity of God, though implied in many of his reported discourses, he would not in direct terms assert—and carefully avoiding to dispute the existence of the multifarious gods acknowledged in Greece, he strongly denied the weaknesses, vices, and crimes commonly imputed to them. So far, however, from proposing innovation in the forms of worship and religious ceremonies, so various in the Grecian states, he held, that men could not in these matters do wrong, if they followed the laws of their own country, and the institutions of their forefathers. He was therefore regular in sacrifices, both upon the public altars and in his family. He seems to have been persuaded that the Deity, by various signs, revealed the future to men by oracles, dreams, and all the various ways usually acknowledged by those conversant in augury. "Where the wisdom of men cannot avail," he said, "we should endeavour to gain information from the gods, who will not refuse intelligible signs to those to whom they are propitious." Accordingly he consulted oracles himself, and he recommended the same practice to others, in every doubt, on important occasions.

The state of the Athenian government in his time, could not invite a man of Socrates' disposition to offer himself as a candidate for any political situation. He thought he might be infinitely more useful to his country in the singular line which he had chosen for himself. Accordingly he not only refrained from soliciting office, but he took no part in any political contest. In the several revolutions which occurred, he was perfectly passive. But he refused no exertion: on the contrary, he was active in every thing that he thought decidedly the duty of a citizen. When called upon to serve among the heavy-armed, he was exemplary in the duties of a private soldier, and, as such, he fought at Potidæa, Anaphi-

polis, and Delium. We find him also in civil office; at one time president of the general assembly, and, at another, a member of the Council of Five Hundred. In both situations he distinguished himself by his unbending integrity. When president, he resisted the violence of the assembled people, who voted a decree contrary to the constitution. Neither threats nor intreaties could move him to give it the necessary official sanction. As a member of the council, we have already seen him in the office of prytanis at the trial of the six generals, when his persevering resistance to the injustice of popular tyranny was rendered useless, through the want of equal firmness in his colleagues, who yielded to the storm. Under the Thirty we have again seen him, not in office indeed, but daring to refuse an unworthy and illegal office, which the tyranny of the all-powerful Critias would have thrust upon him.

When he was six or seven and forty years of age, he was held up to public scorn upon the stage, by his own name, as one of the dramatis personæ in the comedy of Aristophanes called the Clouds, yet extant. In it, Socrates is exhibited as a flagitious, yet ridiculous, pretender to the occult sciences; conversing with the Clouds as divinities, and teaching the principal youths of Athens to despise the received gods, and to cozen men. The audience, accustomed to look on defamation with carelessness, applauded the wit of the scene, and even gave general approbation to the piece; but the high estimation of the character of Socrates denied complete success to the poet.

Two or three and twenty years had elapsed since the first representation of the Clouds. The storms of conquest, and of four revolutions in the civil government of the country, had passed, when a young man named Melitus, went to the king archon, and, in the usual form, delivered an accusation against Socrates, and pledged himself to prosecute. The information ran thus: "Melitus, son of Melitus, of the borough of Pitthos, declares these upon oath against Socrates, son of Sophoniscus, of the borough of Alopece: Socrates is guilty of reviling the gods whom the city acknowledges, and

of preaching other new gods: moreover, he is guilty of corrupting the youth. Penalty, death."

Though not stated in the indictment, it was urged against Socrates by his prosecutors, before the court, that he was disaffected to the democracy; and, in proof, they affirmed it to be notorious, that he had ridiculed what the Athenian constitution prescribed, the appointment to magistracy by lot.

Socrates was not inclined to deny his disapprobation of the Athenian constitution. His defence itself contains matter, which, under the jealous tyranny of the Athenian democracy, would subject a man to the penalties of high treason. "You well know," he said, "Athenians, that, had I engaged in public business, I should long ago have perished without procuring any advantage either to you or to myself. Let not the truth offend you: it is no peculiarity of your democracy, or of your national character: but, wherever the people is sovereign, no man who shall dare honestly to oppose injustice, frequent and extravagant injustice, can avoid destruction."

Without this proof indeed, we might reasonably believe, that though Socrates was a good and faithful subject, and would promote no sedition or political violence, yet he could not approve of the Athenian constitution. He wished for wholesome changes by gentle means; and it seems even to have been a principal object of the labours to which he dedicated himself, to infuse principles into the rising generation, that might bring about insensibly some desirable change. His scholars were chiefly sons of the wealthiest citizens, whose easy circumstances afforded leisure to attend him, and some of these zealously adopting his tenets, were forward, after his example, to engage in disputation upon all the subjects on which he was accustomed to discourse. Thus employed, and thus followed, those who governed, or desired to govern, the commonwealth, through their influence among the many, might consider him as one who was, or might become, a formidable adversary; nor was it difficult to excite popular jealousy against him.

Melitus, who stood forward as his principal accuser, was, as Plato informs us, in no respect a man of great considera-

tion. He was a poet, and stood forward in the common cause of the poets, who esteemed the doctrine of Socrates injurious to their interest. Unsupported, his accusation would have been nowise formidable. He seems, however, to have been a mere instrument in the business, and was soon joined by Lycon, one of the most powerful speakers of the age. Lycon was the avowed patron of the rhetoricians, who, as well as the poets, thought their interest injured by the philosopher's doctrine. With Lycon, Anytus, a man scarcely second to any in the commonwealth in rank and general estimation, declared himself a supporter of the prosecution. Nothing in the accusation could, by any known law of Athens, affect the life of the accused. In the United States, no man would be put upon his trial on so vague a charge: no grand jury would listen to it. But in Athens, if the party was strong enough, it signified little what was law. When Lycon and Anytus came forward, Socrates saw that his fate was already decided.

The course of his life, however, and the turn of his thoughts for many years, had so prepared him for all events, that, far from being alarmed at the probability of his condemnation, he rather rejoiced, as if, at his age, it were a fortunate occurrence. He was persuaded of the soul's immortality, and of the superintending providence of a beneficent Deity, whose favour he had always been assiduously endeavouring to deserve. Men fear death, he said, as the greatest evil, and yet no man knows that it may not be the greatest good. If, indeed, great joys were in prospect, he might regret the event, but at his years and with his scanty fortune, though he was happy enough at seventy still to preserve both body and mind in vigour, yet even his present gratifications must necessarily soon decay. To avoid, therefore, the evils of age, pain, sickness, decay of sight, decay of hearing, perhaps decay of understanding, by the easiest of deaths, (for such the Athenian mode of execution by a draught of hemlock was reputed,) could not be other than a blessing.

Xenophon says, that, by descending to a little supplication, Socrates might easily have obtained an acquittal. No in-

treaty of his friends, however, could persuade him to an act of unworthiness. On the contrary, in his defence, he told the people, that he did not plead for his own sake, but for theirs; wishing that they might avoid the guilt of an unjust condemnation. It was usual for accused persons to bewail their apprehended lot; with tears to supplicate favour; and, by exhibiting their children upon the bema, to endeavour to excite pity. He thought it, he said, more respectful to the court, as well as more becoming himself, to omit every thing of the kind.

Condemnation wrought no change upon him. He again addressed the court; declared his innocence of the matters laid against him; and observed, that even if every charge had been completely proved, still all together did not, according to any known law, amount to a capital crime. "But," in conclusion he said, "it is time to depart. I to die; you to live: but which for the greater good, God only knows."

It was usual at Athens for execution very soon to follow condemnation. But it happened that the condemnation of Socrates took place on the eve of the day appointed for the sacred ceremony of crowning the galley which carried the annual offerings to the gods worshipped at Delos; and immemorial tradition forbade all executions till the sacred vessel's return. Thus the death of Socrates was respited thirty days; and meanwhile his friends had free access to him in the prison. During all that time he admirably supported his constancy. Means were concerted for his escape; the jailor was bribed; a vessel prepared; and a secure retreat in Thessaly provided. No arguments, no prayers, could persuade him to use the opportunity. He had always taught the duty of obedience to the laws; and he would not furnish an example of their breach. To no purpose was it urged that he had been unjustly condemned: he had always held, that wrong did not justify wrong. He waited with perfect composure the return of the sacred vessel; reasoned on the immortality of the soul; the advantage of virtue; the happiness derived from having made it through life his pursuit; and, with his friends about him, took the fatal cup, and died.

Writers who, after Xenophon and Plato, have related the death of Socrates, seem to have held themselves bound to vie with those who preceded them in giving pathos to the story. The purpose here has been rather to show its connection with the politics of Athens, and to derive from the event some illustration of her history. The magnanimity of Socrates certainly deserves admiration; but it is not that in which he most outshone other men. The singular merit of Socrates lay in the purity and usefulness of his manners and conversation; the clearness with which he saw, and the steadiness with which he practised, in a blind and corrupt age, all moral duties; the disinterestedness and zeal with which he devoted himself to the benefit of others; and the enlarged and warm benevolence, whence his supreme, and almost only, pleasure seems to have consisted in doing good. The purity of christian morality is become so familiar in theory, that it passes almost for obvious, and even congenial to the human mind. Those only will justly estimate the merit of that near approach to it which Socrates made, who take the pains to gather, as they may from the writings of his cotemporaries and predecessors, how little conception was entertained of it before his time; how dull to a just moral sense the human mind has really been—how slow the progress in the investigation of moral duties, even where not only great pains have been taken, but the greatest abilities zealously employed; and, when discovered, how difficult it has been to establish them by proofs, that should be generally admitted by the reason of men. It is through the light which Socrates diffused by his doctrine, and enforced by his practice, that his life forms an era in the history of Athens and of man.

Transactions of the Greeks in Asia and Thrace.

By the event of the Peloponnesian war, the Asiatic Greeks changed the dominion of Athens, not for that of Lacedæmon, the conquering Grecian power, but of the king of Persia, then the ally of Lacedæmon. About the same time, Darius, king of Persia, the second of that name, died. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Artaxerxes.

On the decease of Darius, a jealousy, scarcely separable from a despotic throne, induced the new monarch, Artaxerxes, to imprison his brother Cyrus; but he soon restored him, not only to liberty, but to the great command entrusted to him by his indulgent father. Cyrus, nevertheless, resented highly the indignity he had suffered; and, not long after, sought the throne and life of Artaxerxes, at the instigation, as was said, of their common mother, Parysatis. It is certain that, very soon after his return into Asia Minor, Cyrus began preparations with that criminal view. For a pretence, he seems not to have been totally without what the right of self-defence might afford; yet his principal motives evidently were ambition and revenge. The disjointed, tottering, and crumbling state of that empire favoured his views.

As soon as the design against his brother's throne was decided upon, Cyrus sedulously extended his connections among the Greeks. They alone, among the nations of that time, knew how to train armies, so that thousands of men might act as one machine. To men of character, therefore, from any part of Greece, but especially from Peloponnesus, introduction to Cyrus was easy. Through the long and extensive war lately concluded, Greece abounded with experienced officers, and with men of inferior rank, much practised in arms, and little in any peaceful way of livelihood. Opportunity was thus at hand, for raising a force of Grecian mercenaries, of almost unlimited number.

Among the many Greeks admitted to the conversation and to the table of Cyrus, was Clearchus, a Lacedæmonian, who, after serving in the armies of his own commonwealth through

the Peloponnesian war, still found himself, at the age of fifty, uneasy in a state of rest. Looking all around for opportunity of military employment, an inviting field was offered to his view in the court of Cyrus. Thither he went, and, under a forbidding outside, a surly countenance, a harsh voice, and rough manners, the prince discovering in him the character he wanted, after a short intercourse, made him a present of ten thousand darics, or about $30,000.

Clearchus did not disappoint this magnificent generosity. Military command and military adventure were his supreme delight; and, in the circumstances of the age, a body of men, under his orders, was an estate. Employing therefore, the whole of the prince's present in raising troops, he offered, as an individual adventurer, that protection to the Chersonesites, harassed by incursions of the neighbouring barbarians, which, as a general of the Lacedæmonian forces, he had been commissioned, but which the Lacedæmonian government, though claiming to be the protecting power of the Grecian name, had finally refused to afford. His service was accepted: and his success against the barbarians, together with the uncommon regularity of his troops in the friendly country, so gratified not the Chersonesites only, but all the Hellespontine Greeks, that, while he generally found subsistence at the expence of the enemy, they provided large pay for his army, by voluntary contribution. Hence, with a discipline severe sometimes to excess, he preserved the general attachment of those under him; and thus a body of troops, kept in the highest order, was ready for the service of Cyrus.

The circumstances of Thessaly afforded another opportunity. Aristippus, a Thessalian of eminence, probably banished by faction, had been admitted to the prince's familiarity. Returning afterward to his own country, and becoming head of his party, divisions were still such that civil war followed. Then Aristippus thought he might profit from that claim, which the ancient doctrine of hospitality gave him, upon the generosity of Cyrus. He requested levy-money for two thousand men, with pay for three months. Cyrus granted them for four thousand, and six months. Thus another body of troops unnoticed was maintained for Cyrus.

Proxenus, a Theban, of the first rank and highest connexions, of winning manners, and a character deserving esteem, dissatisfied with the state of things in his own city, passed, at about the age of thirty, to the court of Cyrus, with the direct purpose of seeking employment, honour, and fortune, that he might earn the means of conferring, rather than lie under the necessity of receiving, favours. Recommended by such advantages, Proxenus not only obtained the notice, but won the friendship of Cyrus; who commissioned him to raise forces in Greece, for a purpose which the Persian court could not disapprove—the reduction of the rebellious Pisidians.

It became the care of Proxenus to obtain, in his foreign residence, the society of a friend, of disposition, acquirements, and pursuits congenial to his own. With this view he wrote to a young Athenian, with whom he had long lived in intimacy, Xenophon, son of Gryllus, a scholar of Socrates, warmly urging him to come and partake of the prince's favour, to which he engaged to introduce him. Xenophon accepted his friend's invitation; and to these circumstances we owe his beautiful narrative of the ensuing transactions.

Cyrus desired the co-operation of a Grecian fleet; which, in the existing circumstances of Greece, could be obtained only through favour of the Lacedæmonian government: on application this was granted.

Preparations being at length completed, all the Ionian garrisons were ordered to Sardis, and put under the command of Xenias. The other Grecian troops were directed to unite, some at Sardis, some at places farther eastward. A very large army of Persian subjects, or rather of various Asiatics not Greeks, whom the Greeks called, collectively, *barbarians*, was at the same time assembled. The pretence of these great preparations, was to exterminate the rebellious Pisidians; and, for the moment, it sufficed for the troops. It could however no longer blind Tissaphernes; who, not choosing to trust others to report what he knew or suspected, set off, with an escort of five hundred horse, to communicate personally with the king.

Meanwhile Cyrus marched from Sardis to Celænæ in Phrygia. There he was joined by the last division of his Grecian forces, which now amounted to about eleven thousand heavy armed foot, and two thousand targeteers. His Asiatics, or barbarians, were near a hundred thousand. He proceeded eastward, without any very extraordinary occurrences, for about two months, and until he reached Thapsacus on the Euphrates. There Cyrus declared to the Grecian generals, that his purpose was against his brother, the great king; and desired them to communicate the information to the soldiers, and endeavour to engage their willing service. Long as this had been suspected, the communication, now at length made, was not well received. The soldiers accused their commanders of concealing from them a matter so interesting, which themselves had long known: though in reality Clearchus alone had been intrusted with the secret. Cyrus promised a gratuity of about $65 to every soldier, on their arrival at Babylon, and their full pay besides till they should again reach Ionia.

Some expressed themselves highly satisfied with so liberal a promise; but others hesitated at the prospect of so hazardous an enterprise, at such a distance from their own country.

The Greeks being thus at length clearly engaged in war against the king, the army moved again, and, in nine days, reached the Mesopotamian desert (described by Xenophon under the name of Arabia): level as the sea; not a tree to be seen; every shrub and herb even to the very reeds aromatic; but the principal produce wormwood. Five days this dreary country was traversed to Corsote, a large deserted town on the river Mascas, where provisions were distributed for the formidable march of near three hundred miles, through a still more barren region, to the gate, as it was called, of the fruitful Mesopotamia. Thirteen days were employed in this passage, in which corn failed the men, and forage the cattle; insomuch, that many of the latter died. Some relief was at length obtained, from a large town, on the other side of the Euphrates.

After 93 days of actual marching, besides halting days, they were attacked by Artaxerxes, when they were about

2000 miles from Ephesus, the nearest friendly Grecian town. The Greeks were victorious; but Cyrus was slain. This frustrated the object of the expedition, which was to place him on the throne of Persia.

Depressing as this was to the hopes of those, who had thought fortune already their own, from the bounty of a generous prince, raised by their services to the possession of almost countless wealth, and boundless empire, the Greeks would not immediately give up all their lofty expectations.

On the next day arrived some persons, demanding, in the name of the king and of Tissaphernes, to speak with the generals. Their message imported, that the king required the Greeks to come and surrender their arms at his gate; and that on no other condition would he show them favour or mercy. Highly as their easy victory had made them rate the power of their arms, this message threw a great damp on their spirits. They began to consider their total want of necessaries in their present situation; the length of the hostile continent; the rivers, mountains, and deserts to be crossed, to reach their own country. The extreme difficulty of collecting provisions in an enemy's country, and the danger of retreat, even from an enemy who might not dare to face them. The Arcadian Cleanor, eldest of the generals, could not repress his indignation. He sternly replied, they would die before they would surrender their arms. Some, on the contrary, showed signs of despondency; others cast about for new projects; but every door was shut against them, except a march back to Ionia; which, though hazardous and difficult, was not impossible. Clearchus took upon himself to issue orders for marching that evening.

The Greeks were now near two thousand miles from Ephesus, in Ionia, the nearest Grecian city that could afford them ready means to proceed to their several homes. To return the way the came, seventeen days march through the desert, unprovided as they were, was impossible. A more circuitous road, but through a plentiful country, was proposed. At day-break, the combined armies marched. The villages through which they passed were deserted by their inhabitants, and had been stripped of every thing portable;

so that the Greeks, after having passed the day fasting, were still without food.

No vestige of an army was to be seen; and the sun was scarcely risen, when persons came in the king's name, not as on the preceding day, demanding the surrender of arms, but proposing negociation on equal terms. They said they came empowered to communicate between the king and the Grecian generals. "Go then," said Clearchus, "and tell the king, that we must fight before we treat; for we are without food; and, among the Greeks, it is held, that to propose negociation is mere insult from those who deny them food."

The quick return of the deputies, with an answer to this rough message, proved, that the king, or some great officer authorized to treat in his name, was not distant. They said, that the king allowed the remonstrance of Clearchus to be just, by which apparently was meant, that it was consonant to the laws of hospitality, which made the best part of the ancient law of nations. A truce was then concluded, and guides were appointed, to conduct the Grecian army where it might be refreshed. At length the army reached a village, where its wants were largely supplied. Corn, dates, a wine drawn from the palm tree, and a vinegar prepared from that wine, afforded most comfortable refreshments to those, who, in that sultry climate, during three days, had, some fasted, and the rest eaten only the flesh of animals worn down with the service of the baggage.

While the army halted three days, every thing seemed to promise peace and good faith. Nevertheless, what next followed seemed as if it might have warranted suspicion. Tissaphernes, and four other Persians of high rank, attended by a large train, came to confer with the generals. Tissaphernes said, "he came to demand, in the king's name, why the Greeks made war against him?"

The Grecian generals withdrew awhile for consultation, and then Clearchus reported the answer agreed upon. "In entering into the service of Cyrus," he said, "they had no thought of war against the king; but, on the contrary, supposed themselves serving him, in serving the prince. Vari-

ous policy had been used to allure them on into Assyria, and, when once engaged so far, choice was no longer in their power; not only gratitude for favours received, but the necessity of their situation, bound them to the prince. Yet, whatever doubt might be entertained concerning their past views, it was evident they could now have no view so desirable as to return peacefully home, prepared, however, always to revenge injuries, and always desirous, to the best of their power, to requite kindnesses."

The Persians departed to make their report; and, on the third day, Tissaphernes returned. It was agreed, "that the Greeks should be faithfully conducted home; that a market should be provided for them on the march. That, in failure of the market, they might take their own measures for supplying their reasonable wants; but, as in a friendly country, with the least possible injury to the inhabitants. Oaths were solemnly taken, and right hands mutually given, by both parties, in confirmation of this agreement. Tissaphernes then informed the Greeks, that the king had conferred upon him the great command lately held by Cyrus. His journey would, on this account, he said, require the more preparation; but, with the least possible delay, he would rejoin them, and be himself the conductor of their march.

Though the faithlessness of Tissaphernes had been abundantly proved; yet the Greeks had confidence in his interest to cultivate their friendship, and in the honour of the Persian king; and they flattered themselves that all the dangers of their expedition were ended, and that a secure return to their country and families would be their solace for past labours, perils, and apprehensions.

After more than twenty days had elapsed, Tissaphernes, with Orontas, satrap of Armenia, who had lately married the king's daughter, each commanding a numerous army, arrived. All then again resumed the appearance of friendship and good faith on the part of the principal Persian officers. The united armies immediately moved for Lower Asia; the Grecian market was always regularly and plentifully supplied; and nothing occurred on which to found complaint. Suspicion nevertheless existed among the Greeks, and the

appearance of it among the Asiatics. The Greeks had their peculiar guides allotted for the march; they usually encamped three or four miles from the Asiatics; and all communication between the two nations was managed with the precautions usually taken between avowed enemies.

In three days the armies reached the Median wall, a prodigious fortified line, intended, like those of the Romans against the Picts, in Britain, or the more stupendous work of the Chinese against the Tartars, to defend a whole country. It was built of brick, twenty feet in thickness, a hundred in height, and said to extend seventy miles. Animosity had now grown to such a height between the Greeks and Asiatics, that the foraging parties had more than once come to blows.

In two days more, after crossing two vast canals, the armies arrived at Sitace, a large town within two miles of the Tigris. The Greeks quickly crossed that river, under the guidance of their appointed conductors, on a bridge supported by thirty-seven boats.

Clearchus, with the most attentive observation, could not discover any thing indicating that the Persian generals had any design against the Greeks. But he was uneasy, because he was not without suspicion of treacherous conduct among some within his own army. Some practices for withdrawing the affection and respect of the army from Clearchus were notorious.

Pressed by all these considerations, Clearchus resolved to desire himself a conference with Tissaphernes. The satrap made the most specious profession of a desire, from political motives, to cultivate an interest with the Greeks. Clearchus gave him credit, and was altogether so satisfied with the explanation received, that his only remaining anxiety was to be assured of the secret enemy who had excited the late misunderstanding. Tissaphernes promised, that if all the Grecian generals and lochages would come together to witness what passed, he would declare the calumniator. Clearchus assented: Tissaphernes asked him to supper. The circumstance of eating together was held equally among the Greeks and Persians of old, as by the Arabs of modern times, to

bind friendship by a sacred tie; and the evening passed with every appearance of mutual satisfaction.

Next morning, Clearchus assembled the principal Grecian officers, and related his communication with the satrap. Objections were strongly urged to his proposal of risking all the generals and lochages together in the barbarian camp, on the faith of a man of such experienced perfidy as Tissaphernes. Clearchus, however, so vehemently urged it, expressing such confidence, not in the satrap's character, but in the interest of the Persian court to cultivate the friendship of the Greeks, that at length he prevailed. Four of the generals, Menon, Proxenus, Agras, and Socrates, went with him, and twenty lochages, whom we may reckon of the rank of colonels, or at least of field officers. About two hundred inferior officers and soldiers, incited by curiosity, followed, under pretence of marketing. On their arrival at Tissaphernes's tent, the generals were immediately admitted; the others waited without. A signal was observed, on which the generals were seized; those without the tent, who had followed them, were massacred; and a body of horse, issuing from the camp, extended the slaughter to all belonging to the Grecian army, free and slave, that could be found about the plain.

An Arcadian, of those who had followed the generals, escaping, severely wounded, first gave intelligence of what had passed about the tent of Tissaphernes. All then ran to arms, expecting an immediate assault upon the camp. Fortunately, that was too bold a measure for those who directed the Persian operations. A brother of Tissaphernes, with Ariæus, Artaozus, and Mithridates, three of the most confidential friends of Cyrus, escorted by only three hundred horse, approached, and communicated a requisition for the remaining generals and the lochages to come out, and receive a message from the king. They obeyed the requisition so far as to go out; and Xenophon, anxious for news of his friend Proxenus, accompanied them; but they advanced cautiously, and stopped as soon as within hearing. Ariæus, then addressing them, said, "that Clearchus, having been convicted of violating the treaty, to which he had sworn, had

been justly punished with death: that Proxenus and Menon, who had informed against him, were treated with honour; but that the king required the Greeks to surrender their arms, which were truly his, since they belonged to Cyrus, his subject."

Xenophon, without comment, and without a character in the army but that of the friend of Proxenus, seeing that no person of authority was capable of managing the conference to any advantage, ventured, in such pressing circumstances, to speak. "Proxenus and Menon," he said, "it was observed by Ariæus, had deserved highly of the Persians. Those generals, therefore, should be immediately sent back to the Grecian camp, and their advice would decide what the Greeks should do." The Persians appeared at a loss for a reply to this proposition: they consulted long among themselves, and then, without giving any answer, withdrew to their own camp.

It seems to have been long unknown to the Greeks what was the fate of their generals. According to Xenophon's report, the generals were all conducted alive into the king's presence, and, except Menon, all beheaded. Menon was kept in wretched confinement a full year, and then executed as an ordinary malefactor.

If we seek the motives for conduct so nefarious and so base in the Persian government, we may perhaps find them in the principles of oriental policy, or we may find them in the words attributed by Xenophon to the Greek soldiers. "It is reasonable," they said, "to suppose that our destruction must be, beyond all things, the king's wish. It is impossible he can be pleased, that we should go to relate in Greece, how our small force overcame his immense armies at his very gates, and returned in scorn of his power."

The afflictions of the Greeks seemed completed by the dreadful catastrophe that had befallen their commanders. They were two thousand miles distant from their native land; without friends and without allies; hemmed in by rivers and mountains, which now appeared as so many insurmountable barriers; and threatened by famine, and the resentment of a treacherous and perfidious enemy. They reflected that it

was dangerous to depart, but still more dangerous to remain. Provisions could only be procured at the point of the sword. Every country would be hostile to them, and when they had conquered one enemy, another would be ready to receive them. They had no cavalry to pursue the barbarians in their flight, or to elude their pursuit: victory itself would be almost fruitless, but defeat would be certain ruin.

In the Grecian army, collected from almost all the numerous little republics of the nation, the system of subordination was very incomplete. Every general held the independent command of the troops himself had raised, and no order of succession was established, but vacancies through all the ranks were to be supplied by election. Eight officers had borne the title of general, but Clearchus only had possessed the qualifications. In him alone was united extensive experience with great talents. Diligent in the care of an army in quarters or in camp, and ready in every emergency of the field, he was truly a superior man: the rest were unequal to their situation.

Called then by no positive duty, and diffident of themselves, the generals remaining in the camp took no lead: dejection and dismay pervaded the army. On that evening few attended parade; few fires were lighted; many touched no food; many would not even go to their tents, but threw themselves on the ground to pass a sleepless night. Xenophon had at this time no rank in the army; he was, according to his own phrase, neither officer nor soldier. Having gone, at the invitation of Proxenus, from Athens to Sardis, on his arrival he found the army on the point of marching eastward. He was immediately introduced to Cyrus, who pressed him to accompany them in the expedition then pretended to be against the Pesidians. When at length in Cilicia the real object was no longer doubted, Xenophon was one of the many who wished, but were ashamed, to withdraw themselves, and he proceeded with the army merely as a volunteer, the friend of Proxenus. The duty of a soldier, however, was not new to him. If he had never held command, he had been diligent in study to prepare himself for it; and

he had made a good use of the great opportunities he had had for observation.

Under these circumstances, Xenophon partook largely in the griefs and anxiety excited in the army, by the circumvention of the generals, and by the manifestation of determined hostility on the part of the Persians. His attention was alive to observe what steps would be taken by the remaining generals; and, with deep concern he saw that, instead of increased exertion, their remissness amounted almost to a dereliction of command. An attack was universally expected at daylight; and yet no council was held; no orders given; and preparation of no kind made. Though holding no rank, he was, by no rule of Grecian service, excluded from aspiring to any rank. Circumstances pressed him to come forward: his youth alone deterred him. After much consideration and reconsideration, strongly impressed with the importance of decision, and still doubting, a dream at length determined him. Roused then, according to his own report, by a dream early in the night, he sprang from his bed, and, in pursuance of the supposed admonition from a divine Power, called together the lochages of the troops which had served under Proxenus. On their assembling, he pointed out to them what remissness pervaded the army, not excepting the remaining generals; what imminent and extreme danger threatened; and how urgent the necessity for immediately chusing a successor to their lost commander. For himself, he said, hitherto without a character in the army, in the present emergency he was ready to do his best, in any situation, whether in command or in obedience, in which they might think he would be most useful: but, with regard to the prospect before them, it depended upon themselves to make it good or bad; and that, though they were depressed at present, he was confident that vigour and prudence united might bear them through all opposing difficulties. He then stated the grounds of his confidence; and, at the conclusion of his speech, a general wish was expressed that Xenophon would take the command. One lochage only avowed his dissent, adding his opinion, that they ought at once to throw themselves on the king's mercy, as the only resource afford-

ing a reasonable hope. "The king's mercy!" replied Xenophon indignantly, "you may judge of it from the transactions of yesterday. Your own power to defend yourself has never yet failed you. The man who can make so base a proposal, instead of holding command, should not be allowed even to bear arms: he is fit only to carry the baggage: he is a disgrace to the Grecian name." "He is no Greek," replied immediately an Arcadian lochage, Agasias of Stymphalus; "though his speech is Bœotian, I have seen his ears bored like a Lydian's." The spirit of the meeting was roused; the lochage's ears were examined; they were found to be as Agasias said; and he was immediately deprived of his rank.

The appointment of a head was an important step toward the restoration of order and energy through the whole army. An immediate meeting of all the generals and lochages was desired; and towards midnight they assembled, in number about a hundred. It was Xenophon's part to open the business. He began, after some apology, by observing, that in the situation in which they stood, leaving the soldiers without occupation could not but be in the highest degree dangerous: the animation necessary to carry them through the difficulties before them, could be supported only by active employment. But the election of successors to the lost generals, he proceeded to say, should engage their first attention: till that was done, nothing could go forward with due regularity. He concluded with explaining his ground for hoping, that vigorous exertion, united with prudent caution, would carry them happily and gloriously through the dangers at present so threatening. When he ended, the Lacedæmonian Cherisophus rising, said, "He entirely approved all the sentiments Xenophon had declared, and the propositions he had offered." This decided the meeting; and they proceeded immediately to the election of generals. Timasion, of Dardanium, in Troas, was substituted for Clearchus; Philesius and Xanthicles, Achaians, for Menon and Socrates; the body before under Agias was committed to the orders of Cleanor; and Xenophon was confirmed in the succession to Proxenus.

At day-break the troops were assembled, and Cherisophus,

Cleanor, and Xenophon successively addressed them. An accident, in itself even ridiculous through the importance attributed to it by Grecian superstition, assisted not a little to excite animation. Xenophon was speaking of that favour from the gods, which a righteous cause entitled them to hope for against a perjured enemy: when somebody sneezed. Immediately the general voice addressed ejaculations to protecting Jupiter, whose omen it was supposed to be*. A sacrifice to the god was then proposed; a universal shout declared approbation; and the whole army, in one chorus, sang the pæan.

Thus was a turn fortunately given, throughout the army, from dismay and despondency to hope and cheerfulness. The means of many to profit by that market, which, according to treaty, had been hitherto provided, were nearly exhausted; and all heard with joy, that their swords might supply the deficiency of their purses; that in the rich country they were to traverse, they might thenceforward take as from enemies, whatever they could master. They heard the same young general with careful attention, while he observed, that the enemy had just given them a lesson of the utmost importance, in showing that he dared not openly attack them, till he had deprived them of their generals. Thus he manifested his conviction of the inestimable value of the Grecian discipline, and hence it followed, that it behoved the army to be more strictly obedient than at any former time. It was then unanimously voted, that any disobedience to lawful commands should be instantly punished; and that it should be the bounden duty of all present, to support the commanding officer upon the spot in the infliction of punishment.

It seems not to have been at all in view to appoint a commander in chief. Xenophon evidently felt the ascendancy which eloquence, not the least among his superior talents, gave

* We should scarcely have looked to Greece for the origin of the popular practice of exclaiming "God bless you!" when a person sneezes. Were it worth while, it might perhaps be not difficult, to show a probability, that the ejaculating a blessing on persons sneezing, came, by successive steps, to the United States from Greece.

him in the council of officers, or in the council of the army at large. As youngest among the generals, and still more, perhaps, as an Athenian, he could not aspire to the ostensible command in chief, but by the lead which was conceded to his abilities in council, he could, in a great degree, hold the effectual command. He recommended that the order of march should be a hollow square, with the baggage, now reduced to a small compass, in the centre. This was approved of and ratified.

Order and energy being thus restored to the army, the wagons and tents, with whatever baggage could by any means be spared, were burnt, conformably to a resolution previously taken. All was then arranged for the march; and the army was on the point of moving, when Mithridates, approaching with an escort of only thirty horse, desired to speak with the generals. His discourse began with expressions of apprehension for himself, on account of his known friendship for the Greeks, but the tenor of it soon showed that his purpose was to persuade them, if possible, quietly to surrender themselves to the king. Suspicion being thus excited, and his attendants being carefully observed, there was seen among them a known confident of Tissaphernes, upon which the conference was abruptly ended.

Mithridates soon after appeared at the head of about two hundred horse and four hundred foot, all slingers or bowmen. He approached as if his purpose was friendly; but presently a discharge of arrows and stones demonstrated his perfidy. His cavalry carried bows, which they discharged equally retreating as standing; and the Cretan bows, in the Grecian army, were found so inferior in length of shot, as to be totally inefficacious. A pursuit, attempted by Xenophon, with the whole rear division, was equally unavailing. At the end of three miles the Greeks reached a village, where they halted for the night. The annoyance received in so short a march from so small a force, was such, that despondency again pervaded the army.

The attempt to pursue, which had no other effect than to retard the progress of the army, and prolong the enemy's opportunity, was severely blamed by Cherisophus, and the other

older generals. Xenophon acknowledged his error; "whence however," he said, "advantage may be derived, for it marked the measures necessary for the future quiet of the march. Pursuit with the heavy-armed, and shots from the Cretan bows, had been found equally unavailing. But there were Rhodians in the army, many of them expert slingers, whose slings, formed to throw leaden bullets, would carry twice as far as the Persian, accommodated for stones as large as the hand could grasp. There were also horses employed in carrying the baggage. If the fittest among all these were mounted by men practised in the cavalry service, possibly the enemy might hereafter be less secure in flight." In pursuance of this admonition, a body of two hundred slingers was formed that evening; and next morning fifty horses were equipped, the men selected, and put under the command of Lycius, an Athenian.

Soon after their next change of position, Mithridates appeared on the heights behind them, with about a thousand horse, and four thousand slingers and bowmen. He had passed the bottom, in pursuit of the Greeks, and was already within Persian bow shot, when the newly formed Grecian cavalry advanced against him. They were rendered formidable by the body of the targeteers following them running, and the whole heavy-armed phalanx moving steadily for their support. The Persians took to flight; and much slaughter was made of their infantry. The march was then prosecuted without farther disturbance during that day, and the army took its quarters for the night, in a large deserted town, named Larissa, surrounded by a brick wall, twenty-five feet thick, and a hundred high, raised on a basement of stone.

Next day, by a march of above twenty miles, the army reached another deserted town, surrounded by a still more extraordinary fortification. The wall, fifty feet thick, was a hundred and fifty high, of which the lowest third was faced with square stones, the rest was completed with brick. The circuit was above twenty miles; the name Mespila. Both these Median towns had been depopulated since the transfer of the empire to the Persians.

On the day following appearances seemed to announce, that, as the attempts with a small body to bring the Grecians to surrender had failed, it was resolved to exert against them the united strength of the formidable numbers, which the Persian power could so readily command. A very large army came in sight. They followed the march and plied missile weapons. But the Greeks had the satisfaction to find, that the Rhodian slings carried farther than most of the Persian bows, and that the Greek bowmen could give superior efficacy to their shots. The Persians withdrew hastily to a safe distance, and soon retired.

The circumstances of this day seem to furnish the reason, why the Persian generals chose to send, at first, so small a portion of their numbers to harass the Grecian march. The Persian discipline was so deficient, that increase of numbers did not give proportional increase of force. The thickened shower of missile weapons fell with little effect among the loose order of the Greek light-armed troops, while these turned upon the Persians their own numberless arrows, and, in their crowded multitude, scarcely a shot failed of effect.

In the next day's march, the Greeks were cheered with the sight of mountain tops, rising about the horizon of that, hitherto apparently endless plain, over which they had been urging their wearisome way, under continued threats of attack from a pursuing cavalry, more numerous than their whole army.

A more level country succeeded the first hills, and here the enemy renewed their desultory assaults, so as exceedingly to distress the Greeks, incumbered with their numerous wounded; insomuch, that after a short march, they halted at the first village. Encouraged thus, the Persian generals, who had never yet ventured to attack the Greeks in any station, resolved to attempt it here. They advanced to the attack with missile weapons. In such a feeble mode of attack, their numbers, little availing to themselves, gave greater opportunity to the enemy; and they were repulsed with such loss that the attempt was not repeated.

The Persian generals, though totally indisposed to daring measures, nevertheless retained their anxiety to strike some

blow which might do them credit. They sent forward a considerable force; and on the third day, after the evening march, the Greeks were alarmed with the sight of a body of the enemy, on a height commanding the way they must pass. Quick decision was necessary. A body of targeteers, with three hundred chosen heavy-armed soldiers, under Xenophon, pushed for a summit commanding that occupied by the enemy. The Persian generals, at the same time, sent forward a detachment for the same purpose. Using the utmost exertion the Greeks arrived first. The Persians on the lower height then immediately fled, and the Greeks descended unmolested into a vale washed by the Tigris, rich in pasture, and abounding with villages.

Hitherto the Persian generals had avoided all waste of the country through which the Greeks directed their march.—Here, villages were first seen in flames. The Persian cavalry entered the vale about the same time with the Greeks; cut off some of those who were straggling after plunder; and set fire to the dwellings of the peaceful inhabitants. The Greeks, however, gained and kept possession of the villages at which they arrived first, with all their contents. Various valuable supplies were found in them; and much cattle in the adjoining fields; and the generals took occasion to encourage the troops, by observing, that now the Persians evidently acknowledged their superiority; for they made war, as if the country was no longer their own.

New and pressing difficulties occurred. Hitherto the march had been prosecuted along the great road the principal communication from Babylon to the northern provinces and never far from the course of the Tigris. A new face of country now presented itself; they were arrived at the foot of that vast ridge, which under various names, stretches from the Ægean to the Caspian sea. The great northern road insinuated itself among the mountains. But two other great roads offered: one leading eastward to Ecbatana and Susa, the ordinary spring and summer residences of the great king; the other westward, across the river directly to Lydia and Ionia. This was the desirable road for the Greeks. But the river was so deep, that the longest spear would not reach the

bottom; and could boats have been collected, or rafts formed, a large body of cavalry seen on the farther bank, while the army under Tissaphernes watched their rear, would have made the passage next to impracticable. Mountain precipices overhanging the eastern bank denied even the attempt to seek a passage higher up. Under these circumstances, in a country of which the most slender report had never yet reached Greece, the generals had recourse to their prisoners. They were informed by these, that the mountains before them were held by the Cardoos, a most fierce and warlike people, who though surrounded by the dominions, had never owned the sovereignty, of the great king; that an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men had once been sent to reduce them; and the current report was, that not one of the number had ever returned: that, nevertheless, they sometimes were, by compact, upon good terms with the neighbouring satraps; and that beyond their mountains lay Armenia, an extensive and very plentiful country, where communication was ready to all quarters.

After every inquiry in their power, having weighed all circumstances, the Greek generals resolved to pursue their way into Armenia.

Much, however, as the Greeks had already given up of those conveniences for the long march to the Ionian shore, which they might have preserved had the way been friendly, it became necessary now still farther to lighten their baggage. Slaves, a species of plunder unknown to modern European armies, were much coveted by the Grecian soldier. Unlike other plunder, they required no cattle to transport them; on the contrary, they served like cattle to transport other plunder. Since their breach with the Persians, the Greeks had collected numerous slaves, male and female. For the march over the mountains, it was held requisite to abandon a large proportion of them. Accordingly, the males were mostly dismissed; but discipline was not powerful enough to make the soldiers part with their women.

Advancing then among the mountains, they had the mortification to find every endeavour vain for bringing the fierce Cardoos to any accommodation. Obliged to fight their way,

they encountered, with little remission, during seven days, far greater difficulties and dangers than had been experienced in the plains from the countless cavalry of the great king. Meanwhile from the chill of autumnal rains, frequent and heavy among the highlands, they suffered the more, as it so quickly followed the heats of an Assyrian summer. The roads, always through narrow defiles, frequently steep, were often commanded by precipices, whence, with no other weapons than rolling fragments of rocks, a few men might stop an army. But the Cardoos had other weapons. They gave extraordinary efficacy to their bowshots, by a method of drawing assisted by the foot, by which they discharged arrows three feet long, with such force as to pierce shields and corslets. The Cretan bowmen learned from their enemies to improve their own practice, so as to be highly useful in this passage. But the Cardoo arrows were so much too long for their bows, that they could use them only as darts. Nevertheless, science and discipline, with superior defensive armour, enabled the Greeks every where to overbear opposition; and, when they could reach the towns, which were numerous and all unfortified, they found good houses and abundant provisions; for the Cardoos, though in a rude style, lived well among their mountains.

Compelled thus to fight their way, and to take by violence what they wanted; when, at length, they had completed the laborious and dangerous passage of the mountains, and the Armenian plain came in view, increased difficulty occurred. A deep and rapid river, washing the foot of the mountains, crossed the road. On the farther bank a Persian army appeared, prepared to dispute the passage. It was commanded by the satrap Orontas, who, by another road, had reached his satrapy before them. The Cardoos, with sharpened animosity, having followed their march, were gathered on the heights behind, ready, at the favourable moment, to fall upon their rear.

While the Greek generals were at the greatest loss to chuse among the difficulties before them, a more favourable ford than that lying in the direct course of the great road was by mere accident discovered, at no great distance and un-

guarded. Without hesitation they proceeded to profit by it, and the first division of the army had no sooner passed, than the Persians began to fly. The rear division of the Greeks which the Cardoos attacked, was commanded by Xenophon. Their activity, boldness, and skill, were highly distressing; and, though the loss sustained was not great, they did more execution than all the satrap's army.

The hazardous passage of the mountains and the river being thus fortunately effected, the Greeks prosecuted their march sixteen or eighteen miles uninterrupted over a fine champaign country, of gentle rise and fall, appearing singularly to invite habitation and cultivation, yet without a dwelling to be seen; all was waste, through the inability or neglect of the Persian government to protect its subjects against the inroads of the Cardoos. In the evening they reached a large village, where, to their great advantage, farther proof of Persian supineness occurred. The satrap having a palace there, the place was less likely to be forgotten or neglected; and yet, as if purposely left for their present refreshment, and future supply, they found provisions abounding.

Five days then they proceeded, expecting always opposition, but meeting none. On the sixth, arriving at the river Teleboas, which divides eastern from western Armenia, they saw the farther bank occupied by an army commanded by Teribazus, governor of the latter, who seemed prepared to dispute their entrance into his country. But a messenger of peace soon arrived from Teribazus with a proposal, that, if they would abstain from useless devastation within his government, not only their passage should be unmolested, but they should be allowed to take necessary provisions. Such a proposal was accepted gladly, and a treaty, of which it was the basis, was quickly concluded.

The march of the next three days was then as through a friendly country, though Teribazus followed with his army at no great distance, watching their motions. But in a small variation of latitude, mounting gradually from the burning flats of Mesopotamia, to the lofty plains near which the Tigris and Euphrates have their sources, they experienced a violent change of climate; a change apparently unforeseen,

when on the southern side of the mountains they had burned their tents. While they slept unsheltered on the ground, so heavy a snow fell as to bury men and cattle. Wood fortunately abounded, with which they made large fires. Olive oil, which in Greece was commonly used, equally to relieve the inconveniences of excessive cold and excessive heat, the severe winters of Armenia denied, but oils of bitter almonds, sesame, and turpentine, supplied the deficiency: the abundance of lard was also a resource which the Greeks did not spurn at, for copious unction of their whole bodies. In other points they were plentifully supplied; the Armenian villages abounding not only with necessaries but luxuries; not only with corn and meat, but variety of pulse, dried fruits, and wines old and high flavoured.

All circumstances considered, their condition seemed now even fortunate: when the necessity of dispensing with the regularity of a camp, for the sake of shelter among unfortified villages, produced an untoward change. The authority of the generals could not enforce regular conduct in scattered quarters; and, against the faith of the treaty, some houses were in mere wantonness set on fire, at the time of marching in the morning, by those who had profited by their shelter during the night. This was, probably, among the circumstances which stimulated Teribazus, instead of following the Greeks, to advance before them, and occupy the heights commanding a defile which they must pass. A prisoner, fortunately, gave information of this circumstance; and a disposition was made for driving the Persians from the commanding ground. The Persians, however, fled before the assault reached them, leaving their camp with the pavilion of Teribazus, and all its furniture, the silver-footed bed, the table plate, and many of the household slaves, the easy prey of the victors.

The Greeks now found new and most formidable difficulties to encounter. They approached the head of the Euphrates, and while winter still advanced, and they still gradually ascended to a higher level of ground, a very disadvantageous change of country occurred. For three days march all was desert. The snow, generally six feet deep, had blotted out

all roads: the north wind, always extremely sharp, often blew violently. Guides were procured from the villages without difficulty; but provisions failed, and wood became scarce. The Greeks, unpractised in such climates, seem not to have obtained information from the natives how to manage their fires, or to profit from the shelter which snow itself may afford. In traversing the snowy deserts of America, the first business, where it is proposed to halt for the night, is to clear a space for each fire, sufficient to contain the party that is to sleep around it. The snow then dissolves very slowly, and the party rest on the ground, warmed by the fire and sheltered from all wind. But the Greeks discovered the depth of the snow only by its melting where they made their fires on it; and on the snow itself they laid themselves down to rest, exposed to the bitter blast. In marching, and thus halting, they suffered nearly alike. Some lost their toes; some their eyes; many slaves, and even some of the soldiers, died of cold and hunger. The baggage cattle of course suffered, and many perished.

In this extraordinary country, in the latitude of the finest climates, the rigour of an arctic winter drove the inhabitants to the resources which are familiar in Siberia and Tartary. They formed their houses under ground, where men and cattle herded together. Nevertheless the produce of the soil was not niggardly. The army arriving at length at some villages, found provisions abundant, meat of various kinds, fowls, and wheaten bread. Wine from the grape, either the climate or the want of modern skill denied, but the people consoled themselves with beer, which Xenophon commends under the name of barley wine, and altogether the change of condition was found so advantageous, that he speaks of this as a land of luxury. Fortunately for the Greeks, the inhabitants, secluded from communication, believed their confident assertion, that they were the king's troops, and treated them with the utmost kindness and respect. Here, therefore, they rested eight days to prepare for new fatigue.

During this halt Xenophon resided in the house of the chief officer or magistrate of one of the villages, with whose behaviour he was much satisfied. When the army moved

again, this man was taken as a guide, and his son as a hostage for his fidelity. The march being then prosecuted three days, and no habitation seen, while men and cattle suffered much, Cherisophus, impatient, imputed to the guide the purpose of avoiding the villages; and, refusing credit to his assertion that the country necessary to be traversed was uninhabited, in anger struck him. The man so felt the indignity, that, though his son remained in the hands of the Greeks, he left them the following night, and was seen no more.

Fortunately the river Phasis was not far off; and, for seven days, its course directed the way. Diverging then for two days, the army reached the defiles leading from the lofty plains of Armenia, to the lower country spreading between the Caspian and Euxine seas. Here the warriors of three fierce tribes, the Phasians, Chalybeans, and Taochians, none owning the great king's allegiance, were assembled to dispute the passage. Stratagem, however, with superior arms and superior discipline, enabled the Greeks to force their way with little loss. The defiles being passed, opposition ceased, and, in the plains beyond, villages were found abundantly stored with provisions for present supply. But in a march of five days afterward, no food could be obtained; the Taochians had removed every thing to strong holds on the hills; and the Greeks were reduced to the sad necessity of adding slaughter to robbery for subsistence. One of their strong holds was stormed, and such was the abhorrence among the unfortunate families who held it, of falling into the power of the Greeks, that when resistance was found vain, the women threw their own children down the steeps, and then with the men precipitated themselves. An Arcadian lochage, Æneas of Stymphalus, endeavouring to stop one whose dress seemed to mark superior rank, was dragged down the precipice with him, and they perished together.

The castle thus acquired supported the Greeks in traversing, during seven days, the county of the Chalybeans, a people distinguished among the Asiatics by their superior armour adapted to close fight, and by their courage in using it. This people had removed every thing from the villages, and it was not till after proceeding four days through the more

level territory of the Scythinians, that the Greeks found a supply. After four days' march, they arrived at Gymnias, a large and wealthy city. It is remarkable, that only one town of such a description, has occurred in the whole distance from the border of Mesopotamia, to this place. We read only of villages, meaning, apparently, towns inhabited solely by husbandmen, with the few artificers necessary to husbandry. Here was found a disposition to prefer peaceful accommodation to the chance of war. The chief, or governor, furnished the Greeks with a guide, and, by this measure, relieved his people from guests whom they feared, and revenged them on neighbours whom they hated; for the guide, in pursuance of his instructions, conducted the Greeks through a country which he encouraged them to plunder, and even urged them to burn and destroy.

This man had engaged, at the peril of his life, to lead the army in five days within sight of the Euxine sea; and he made his word good. From a hill in the course of the fifth day's march it was distinctly seen. The leading division immediately gave a shout of joy, which was soon repeated by those next in the line. The rear, pressing forward, presently distinguished the reiteration of the cheerful words "the sea! the sea!" Joy then filled every eye; congratulations flowed from every lip; and, in the tumult of gladness, without waiting for orders or regular permission, all sedulously employed themselves in collecting stones, with which a large barrow was quickly raised, as a monument of the happy event. They for the moment forgot that they were nearly sixty miles from the Euxine sea; and that the intervening territory consisted of trackless forests; of the hostile Macronians; and the abrupt and intricate windings of the Colchian mountains. Want of generous gratitude was not among the national vices of the Greeks. The guide was liberally rewarded. He then pointed out a village at a distance, which would afford commodious quarters, and in the evening took his leave.

After some days the army reached the first great object of its wishes—a Grecian town—Trapesus, now Trebizond, on the shore of the Euxine sea. At this place they found that

friendly reception, which, from those claiming the same ancestry, and speaking the same language, they had promised themselves. Here, therefore, as for their first arrival in a territory intrinsically friendly, they performed sacrifices vowed to the supposed guides of their march, Protecting Jupiter and Hercules. Games in the Grecian manner were added; horse races—foot races—wrestling—boxing—and the pancratium. Thus they proposed at the same time to celebrate their own adventure; to entertain their kind hosts; and to show farther their respect and gratitude to the gods.

It was not easy to persuade the multitude that, when once thus arrived on Grecian ground, any considerable dangers or difficulties could necessarily interfere with their progress to Greece. But their numbers, hitherto so important for their preservation, became now their hindrance. Perhaps a hundred of them might readily have found conveyance by sea. But how, at Trapezus, vessels could be collected for transporting all; and how, in the interval, so large an addition to the population of a town with so small a territory, and so distant from friendly and civilized countries, could be subsisted, were matters apparently not within calculation. On the contrary to pass by land to any point of the connected line of Grecian colonies, for a small party was perhaps impossible; yet their united strength might probably command its way, though far through a hostile country, mountainous and difficult, with a few Grecian settlements only at wide intervals on the coast. The soldiers, however, alive to the impression of past fatigues and perils, were thoughtlessly eager for the passage by sea. "I am tired," says one, "of eternally collecting my necessaries, walking, running, marching in rank and file, mounting guard, and fighting. With the sea before us, why should we not use the advantage, and proceed the rest of our way, like Ulysses, sleeping to Greece?" This improvident speech was received with general applause: and Cherisophus confirmed the impression, by exciting hopes that he could give practicability to the proposal. "Anaxibius," he said, "who now commands the Lacedæmonian fleet, is my friend; if you will commission me, I think I can bring both transports to carry, and triremes to convoy you." This was decisive. It was

immediately voted that Cherisophus should go without delay.

It remained then for Xenophon to provide that the army should have subsistence; and to preserve in it that order and discipline, without which, it would probably become a nuisance to friends, or a prey to enemies. Few had wherewithal to buy necessaries in the Trapezuntine market; nor could the Trapezuntines furnish a market equal to the demand. To rob the neighbouring barbarians seemed the only resource; and, under sanction of the common Grecian tenet, that against those to whom they were bound by no compact, they were by no moral or religious law forbidden any violence, it was put in practice without scruple, at the proposal of Xenophon himself, and under regulations of his proposal. At first this nefarious expedient was successful; but repeated losses taught the barbarians to secure their property, and revenge themselves on the robbers. Nothing was now to be found, within such a distance that the expedition could be completed in a day. Thus, without advancing, the Greeks underwent the fatigues and dangers of a march through an enemy's country. Yet the necessity was urgent for continuing the practice, and giving it, if possible, increased efficacy. Intelligence therefore being obtained of a strong hold in the mountains, where the inhabitants had collected their cattle, Xenophon put himself at the head of half the army, and, not without risk, stormed it, and led off the booty.

The store thus iniquitously acquired, was, however, nearly exhausted; and where to procure another supply no one could tell. Xenophon, always fearing that vessels for transporting so large an army could not be procured, had proposed various expedients; but they were unequal to the exigency. At last it was agreed, that, under the two oldest generals, Philesius and Sophœnetus, all who had passed their fortieth year should be indulged with conveyance by sea, together with the sick, the women and children, and the heavy baggage; and that the rest should march by land. The road, through the precautions taken by Xenophon, was already prepared, the marching and the navigating divisions moved together, and, on the third day, met again at Cerasus, another

settlement of the Sinopians on the Euxine shore, the place to which Europe and America owe the cherry*, the natural produce of the surrounding hills.

On re-assembling at Cerasus, the army was mustered, and the heavy-armed soldiers were found to be still eight thousand six hundred remaining out of about ten thousand. It is certainly matter for wonder, that no greater loss was suffered from the various enemies encountered; but what, with those who have the care of armies, infinitely more deserves consideration, is, that in such a service, without even ordinary conveniences, without tents, without stores, passing through changes of climate the most violent, though some had been frozen to death, scarcely any had perished by sickness†. It ought to be remembered, that, in this age, the world was fortunately ignorant of spiritous liquors.

The delay at Trapezus had given opportunity to dispose advantageously of the slaves taken in the course of the march. It appears to have been a principal object of the traffic of these distant settlements on barbarian shores, to supply Greece with slaves; and there seems too much reason to fear, that opportunity exciting cupidity, cattle and corn were not alone sought in the various excursions from Trapezus; but the wretched barbarians, when they could be taken, were themselves exposed in the Trapezuntine market. The spoil, which must have been mostly collected since the circumvention of the generals, was now of large amount, arising chiefly from the sale or ransom of prisoners. At Cerasus it was

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* This fruit was first carried to Italy by Lucullus the Roman conqueror of the country, above three hundred and thirty years after the expedition of Cyrus, thence, within little more than a century, naturalized in Britain, and still, wherever it has spread, bearing in its name the memorial of its origin.

† Xenophon's summary detail of the loss is remarkable: Οἱ νὲ ἄλλοι ἀπωλοῦτο ὑπὸ τε πολεμίων καὶ χιόνος καὶ ἴσως τινὸς νόσου, as if he was hardly certain that any had died of sickness. The passage may be translated thus: "The rest perished by enemies, and snow, and, possibly, a few by sickness."

divided, and, according to custom, a tenth was committed to the generals, to be disposed of in offerings to the gods, principally to the Delphian Apollo and the Ephesian Diana.

Soon after quitting Cerasus, the marching division entered a country of uncommonly rugged mountains, occupied by an independent horde, the Mosynæcians, with complexions singularly fair, and manners singularly uncouth. The dissentions of this people among themselves principally facilitated the march, which one tribe had no sooner resolved to oppose, than another became disposed to favour. Thus, in a passage of eight days, the Greeks found means to obviate all opposition. Equally unresisted, they crossed the still loftier mountains of the Chalybians, subjects of the Mosynæcians, and employed by them in working steel, the valuable produce of their rugged soil. Descending then into the more champaign country of the Tibarenians, they were met by heralds bearing presents, the pledges of hospitality. But peace here lost its charms. The generals themselves had observed from the heights, with longing eyes, that the villages of the Tibarenians were in assailable situations, and plunder, and gratification to the dishonest desires of their troops, were immediately proposed. The offered presents were therefore rejected; for acceptance would have engaged them in compact with the givers, and this would have engaged the gods in opposition to the robbery, for which, on the contrary, it was hoped to obtain divine approbation and favour. Sacrifice was accordingly resorted to; but the symptoms were adverse: more victims were immolated, but in vain. The augurs were unanimous in declaring that the gods totally disapproved of war with the Tibarenians.

Thucydides, a man evidently of very serious and, generally, just thoughts on religious and moral subjects, never shows any faith in pretensions to prophecy, nor attributes any consequence to a sacrifice. On the contrary, Xenophon is continually holding out the importance of various ceremonies, especially sacrifice, and avowing implicit credit in that science, which pretended, from the symptoms of victims, from dreams, and from various occurrences in nature, to learn the-

will of the gods, and to foretel future events. Some passages in the writings of Xenophon seem to afford ground for supposing, that the strong feelings he had, of the want of some check upon the passions of men, which the religion and morality of his age did not offer, led him to value a superstition which might be employed for the most salutary purposes, and to carry the profession of his belief sometimes rather beyond the reality. On more than one occasion, we find cause to suspect his influence among the prophets and augurs of the Cyrean army: and indeed if ever deceit for preventing evil might be allowed, it would do credit to the scholar of Socrates in the affair of the Tibarenians; for apparently nothing but the advantage made of a salutary superstition could have preserved the property of that unoffending people from plunder, their persons from slavery, and probably many lives from slaughter. The augurs not preaching any purer morality than the army professed; not holding as any general rule, "that unoffending men might not, without offence to the gods, be plundered, enslaved, or murdered;" but merely insisting, "that the gods denied their approbation in the existing circumstances," the presents of the Tibarenians were at length accepted. The army then proceeded peacefully through their country, and, in two days, arrived at Cotyora, a third Grecian colony from Sinope, with a port in the Euxine sea.

They found there something very different from the hospitality expected, and hitherto experienced, from Grecian towns. Admission even for their sick was denied; a market, even without the walls, was refused. Plunder thus became a necessary resource, and the farms of the Cotyorites suffered. But the conduct of those who directed the counsels of the Cotyorites appears to have been as remiss as it was illiberal. Without violence the troops found opportunity to enter the town. Immediately possession was taken of the gates, and quarters were required for the sick, but the rest of the army remained encamped without the walls, and no farther violence was committed. A friendly accommodation followed. It was agreed that the sick should remain in quarters; that a market should be provided; and that

vessels should be furnished for transporting the army to Heraclea, the next Grecian town beyond Sinope.

This arrangement fortunately prevented hostilities between Greeks and Greeks; but did not enable the soldiers, without money, to profit from the market provided. Though the farms of the Cotyorites were spared, plunder was continued among the neighbouring Paphlagonian villages. But this was not tamely borne: not only stragglers from the camp were cut off, but nightly alarm sometimes extended to the camp itself. During the awkward leisure while the transports were waited for, enquiry was made respecting the way by land through Paphlagonia: but accounts were far from encouraging to attempt the march. Westward of Heraclea, a very lofty range of mountains, extending far inland, ends in precipices near the sea. One only practicable road, through most hazardous defiles, traversed this range. Spacious plains followed, but intersected by four large rivers. The country was united under one prince, who, with a hundred thousand men at his orders, his cavalry the best in Asia, had refused obedience to the commands of the great king.

Such being the formidable obstacles to the passage by land, while means for procuring sufficient vessels for the transport by sea were yet doubtful, the successful example of those Greeks, who, from small beginnings, had raised flourishing colonies on the Euxine shores, engaged the consideration of Xenophon. What advantages would not be open for such a force as that of the Cyrean army, for by that name it became now distinguished, could its united exertions be directed to the establishment of a colony? Those whom home invited, might easily find their passage by sea; the far greater number would probably still desire, indeed their wants would urge them, to join in promising adventure; and could they in any other way end so advantageously or so honourably, an expedition of much glory, but hitherto of little profit, as by extending the Grecian name and dominion in a new colony on the Euxine shore? Xenophon communicated his idea to the Ambraciot Silanus, the principal soothsayer of the army. He communicated it to those whom he

thought would most zealously oppose it; and a very mischievous ferment ensued. The project was viewed differently as it respectively affected their present attachments and future prospects. The whole army became divided in party views, and filled with reciprocal jealousies.

The project of colonization was not popular in the army. The soldiers desired to grow rich by a more compendious method than tilling an uncultivated country among barbarians; and, while their generals disagreed among themselves, they grew careless of their generals, and held their own assemblies to consider of putting forward their own projects. Xenophon then took upon himself to call the army together. He explained his conduct and intentions so as to give general satisfaction; and, finding himself so far successful, he proceeded to urge to consideration the dangers and the disgraces already incurred through deficiency of subordination, and related some of their most shameful and impolitic outrages.

Moved by this strong remonstrance, the army resolved, "That all the late transactions should be taken into consideration, and that a better order of things should be enforced by the punishment of past irregularity." The lochages, as the intermediate order between the generals and the soldiers were reckoned fittest to decide on the conduct of both; and the whole body of them was constituted a court martial. After accusations against inferiors had been judged, the generals themselves were called to account, and three of them fined. Accusation was last of all brought against Xenophon, for acting with injurious haughtiness in command, and particularly for beating some soldiers. He acknowledged striking several for disorderly conduct; for quitting their ranks to run forward for plunder; endangering themselves and the whole army, by yielding to the impression of fatigue and cold, while the enemy was pressing on the rear. But he insisted that he had punished none, excepting when the good of all, and even their own good, required: he had given blows to save them from strokes of the enemy's weapons; and he farther added, that while he punished the disorderly, he was always ready, to the utmost of his power, to honour and re-

ward the deserving. It sufficed to mention these things; and Xenophon was honourably acquitted.

Such detached and incidental information is all that remains whence to gather an idea of Grecian military law. We may, perhaps, in Xenophon's account of this expedition, more than any where, discover the general spirit of the military system of the age. What we find principally striking is, that it was at the same time arbitrary and lax. We wonder to find those who, in civil government, were zealots for liberty even to licentiousness, submit so readily, in military, to an undefined command. At the same time we may wonder, in a command so liable to interruption and control, from an unlimited right of resistance to injury, to find regularity and subordination nevertheless generally existing. Two motives, comparatively little felt in modern armies, powerfully, and almost constantly, operated upon the Greeks; the hope of profit from the plunder of the enemy, and the fear of suffering from the enemy's revenge. Wars almost unceasing, within a narrow country, taught every Greek the value of military discipline. Alone, he felt himself weak; in a phalanx, he felt himself powerful: being weak, his lot would be death or slavery from the enemy: being strong, all the enemy's possessions would, in share, be his; a price even for the enemy's person, sold to slavery, would reward him for his submission to discipline. Discipline, in short, was preserved among the Greeks, by a sense of a common interest in it. Strong acts of arbitrary power are congenial and necessary to every simple government. Being therefore familiar to the Greeks in civil administration, they were easily borne in military.

The army waited forty-five days at Cotyora, for a sufficient number of vessels to take their whole number, and then proceeded for Sinope, a flourishing Grecian town very advantageously situated on the Paphlagonian coast, the mother city of Cotyora, Cerasus, and Trapezus, which it held in dependence; itself a colony from Miletus. We cannot here but pay a tribute of admiration to the bold and successful adventure of a few Greeks, who, wandering thus far from the soft climate of Ionia, could wrest from one of the most

powerful vassals of the Persian empire, a sea-port and territory in the middle of his coast, and thence extend the Grecian name, in various settlements on barbarian shores, to such a distance. Arriving at Armene, one of the ports of Sinope, the army had the satisfaction to find Cherisophus, with some triremes, on his way to meet them. They had hoped to have these more amply provided for by Cherisophus, but he brought to them from Anaxibius, the Lacedæmonian admiral, only approbation and applause, with a promise, that, as soon as they reached the shore of the Propontis, they should be taken in pay.

Hitherto, to return home in safety had been the great object. Now, with a nearer view of its accomplishment, they began with more anxiety to consider, how they should live at home, or how, before they yet returned, they might acquire means to live there in some credit and ease. Plunder was the mode which the principles and circumstances of the age so recommended, that they thought they should be wanting to themselves, if, before they separated, they did not use their united strength for the purpose. Where it should be exerted remained to be determined, and they began to consider, that nothing was more necessary to success than unity of command. For a commander in chief then the general view was directed to Xenophon: many officers conferred with him in private, and though he declared his resolution to avoid the invidious honour, yet, when the army assembled to decide on the subject, he was proposed, and the nomination supported by a very large majority. He nevertheless persisted in refusing what, he confesses, very much allured his ambition. The state of Greece, and the umbrage that would be taken by the Lacedæmonian government, deterred him; but the army would not be satisfied with such an excuse, and he was obliged to recur to his common resource, the superstition of the age. He said that he had consulted the deity in sacrifices, whether it would be better for the army and himself, that the command in chief should be conferred upon him, and the divine will was declared in the negative, in so clear a manner, that the most inexperienced in augury could not mistake it.

The army then elected Cherisophus, who appears not to have been of shining talents, but a prudent and worthy man. After a stay of only five days at Sinope, they embarked, and on the morrow reached Heraclea, a colony from Megara, flourishing in population and commerce.

It seems to have been the purpose of Cherisophus to check the project of robbery and plunder which had been cherished, and to conduct the army quietly to Byzantium, where he expected it would be immediately taken into Lacedæmonian pay. This however was not generally satisfactory, and some licentious spirits, foreseeing opposition to their views against the property of barbarians, began to conceive more criminal designs. Discontented with the conduct of their commanders, the troops formed a rash and dangerous project of dividing into separate bodies, and of prosecuting their journey through Bithynia to Byzantium, a distance of two hundred miles.

No sooner had they arrived near it, than the mutinous spirit of the Grecian soldiers was again in ferment, and their behaviour terrified the inhabitants of those countries. The Lacedæmonian garrison in the city feared the assistance of such dangerous allies, and Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap, alarmed for the safety of his province, made proposals to Anaxibius to have them removed into Europe. Allured by the bribes of the satrap, Anaxibius, and his successor Aristarchus, made promises to the Greeks, which they had neither the inclination nor ability to perform. The troops, enraged at this disappointment, and at the treachery of the Spartan commanders, would have attacked and plundered Byzantium, had not the authority and prudence of Xenophon restrained them.

His arguments repressed the mutinous disposition of the Greeks for the present; but nothing could have restrained them long from attempting enterprizes of a similar nature, had not an occasion presented itself of employing their dangerous activity in the service of Seuthes, a bold and successful adventurer of lower Thrace. His object was to regain the possession of his paternal dominions, on the European shores of the Euxine and Propontis, from which his father

Messades had been expelled by his subjects. To accomplish this he offered generous pay to the Cyrean army. They accepted his offers, and the Grecian commanders with their troops set forward for the camp of Seuthes. They arrived there after sunset. He proposed, by marching that night, to surprize the enemy, yet uninformed of his increased strength. Much plunder he hoped might be taken, and many prisoners, which, as the Grecian towns of the neighbourhood afforded a ready market for slaves, might be turned to good account.

The Greeks approved, and at midnight the army marched. Not however till toward noon next day, did they reach the summit of a mountain ridge covered with deep snow, and descending, unlooked for, into the plain beyond, they found the expected prey. About a thousand slaves were taken, with two thousand head of neat, and ten thousand of smaller cattle. Next morning Seuthes burnt all the villages, not leaving a house, proposing to bring the people to submission by the fear of losing their shelter and subsistence in the severity of winter. The booty was sent to be sold at Perinthus, to provide pay for the army.

In this country, in so southern a latitude, and only two days march from the sea, a heavy snow falling, the cold was so intense, that water froze as it was carried from the spring, and even the wine in the vessels became ice. The Greeks suffered severely, and some, frost-bitten, lost ears and noses. They then discovered the advantage of the Thracian military dress, which, at first, had appeared uncouth: fox-skin caps covering the ears, cloaks reaching below the knee, and warm covering for the horsemen's legs, protected Seuthes's troops against the inconveniences of weather, to which their constitutions were by yearly practice more hardened.

In such a season, however, the Thyni, who were driven from their villages to seek refuge among the mountains, could not but be distressed. Finding themselves unable to resist the destruction threatened to all their vallies, they sent proposals of submission, and requested Xenophon's mediation in their favour.

Seuthes, having thus recovered his patrimony, found himself, within the short space of two months, from a wandering freebooter, become a prince of a considerable territory. His army was increased, not only with the strength of the conquered people, but with numerous Odrysians whom success allured to his standard. To the north of Byzantium, bordering on the Euxine sea, lived a Thracian horde, who, having been formerly subdued by Teres, an ancestor of Seuthes, had since asserted independency. Seuthes marched against these, and quickly compelled them to become his tributaries. Turning then southward again, his Thracian numbers now considerably exceeding the Greeks, they together approached the Propontis, and encamped near Selymbria. It is remarkable that in this winter campaign, in so severe a climate, not a Greek was lost.

Seuthes was active and bold; but had no great understanding, and no real honour. Mean deception, however, and gross dishonesty, seem to have been less his own purpose than what he was led to by a profligate Greek, Heraclides, who had acquired his confidence, and was one of his principal counsellors, before the Cyrean army entered into his service. This man instigated the prince, since he no longer wanted the service of the Grecian army, to refuse the arrear of pay, when a small part only, of what by agreement was due, had yet been issued. Discontent grew among the soldiers; while all Xenophon's applications for the pay owing were answered with evasion.

In this state of affairs, while Seuthes was surrounded by his numerous Thracian forces, strong in cavalry, of which the Greeks were destitute, difficulty and danger seemed again accumulating against the unfortunate Cyreans. An unexpected event relieved them. The Lacedæmonian government had resolved upon war with Persia, and thus the Cyrean army, before an object of jealousy, would now be a valuable acquisition. Accordingly two Lacedæmonian officers, Charminus and Polynices, came to Selymbria, authorized to engage them, at the same pay promised by Seuthes, to go to that most inviting of all fields for military services, the rich

satrapy of Tissaphernes. The proposal was joyfully received; and the more, as, beside other advantages, the commanding interference of Lacedæmon, it was now hoped, would obtain the arrear of pay due from the Thracian prince. But Seuthes was governed by a few interested counsellors: and it was not till the army was sent to live at free quarters in some villages, which he had given to one of their chiefs, that an interview desired by Xenophon, and long evaded, was at length obtained. Seuthes excused himself, disavowing knowledge of the circumstances, and laying the blame on his Greek counsellor Heraclides. Payment was then made in the manner of the country. A single talent was all that could be obtained in money; six hundred oxen, four thousand sheep, and a hundred and twenty slaves, were given for the remainder due.

The army then crossed to Lampsacus, where two Lacedæmonian officers arrived soon after with pay, which was immediately issued, for the march to ensue. The plain of Troy, mount Ida, Antandrus, and the vale of Thebe, were then traversed, in the way to Pergamus, in the vale of Caicus. There a circumstance occurred, in itself, and in Xenophon's manner of relating it, strongly characteristic of the times. Generally earnest in inculcating humanity and liberality, the soldier philosopher nevertheless gives, without any apparent compunction, a detailed account of a nocturnal expedition, which he undertook with a few favourite officers, to surprize a wealthy Persian with his family, in a castle at some distance in the vale. The prophet employed to sacrifice on the occasion, declared, from the symptoms of the victims, that the gods approved and would favour the robbery. Resistance nevertheless was found so much more vigorous than expected, that the party was obliged to retreat with many wounded, and considerable risk of being all cut off. A feigned movement with the whole army induced the Persian to leave his castle. The attempt being then renewed, the castle was taken, with his wife, children, slaves, horses, and all his effects. The capture was so considerable, that Xenophon's share enabled him, according to his own phrase, to confer benefits, though before so distressed as to be reduced to sell his

horse. The army returned to Pergamus, there to wait the orders of the Lacedæmonian commander in chief.

After the downfall of Athenian greatness, the Spartans were naturally exposed to the jealousy and resentment of Persia, by their conquests on the coast of Asia; by the pre-eminence of their naval power; and especially, by their open participation in the rebellious designs of Cyrus. The former circumstances rendered their republic the rival of the king of Persia; but their co-operation with an ambitious rebel, rendered them the personal enemies of Artaxerxes. His resolution to chastise their audacity was communicated to Tissaphernes, who was intrusted with executing the vengeance of the great king against the Spartans. Without any formal declaration of war he attacked the Æolian cities.

On this important occasion, the Spartan senate and assembly were not wanting to the hopes of their Æolian allies. They immediately levied a body of five thousand Peloponnesian troops, and demanded a considerable supply from the Athenians. The latter sent them three hundred horsemen. The command of the joint forces was intrusted to the Spartan, Thimbron, who had orders, as soon as he arrived in Æolis, to take into pay the Greeks who had engaged in the expedition of Cyrus. The mean and perfidious behaviour of Seuthes, who, in his new character of prince, still retained his original manners of a Thracian robber, rendered the proposal of joining Thimbron extremely agreeable to Xenophon, who conducted to the Lacedæmonian standard six thousand men, the venerable remains of an army ennobled by unexampled toils and dangers.

Having received this powerful reinforcement, Thimbron opened the campaign against Tissaphernes, the lieutenant of Artaxerxes. The first impression of the Grecian arms were attended with considerable success. Thimbron took or regained the towns of Pergamus, Teuthrania, Halisarnia, Myrina, Cymè, and Grynium. But the walls of Larissa, a strong city in the Troade, defied his assault.

Nothing but continued action, and an uninterrupted career of victory, could restrain the licentious passions of troops composed of a motley assemblage from so many different and

often hostile communities. Their seditious spirit rendered them formidable to each other, and to the Greeks of Asia. Their rapacity spared not the territories of the Lacedæmonian allies, who loudly complained to the senate, ascribing the violence of the troops to the weakness of the general. In consequence of this representation Thimbron was recalled, and the command bestowed on Dercyllidas, a man fertile in resources, who knew when to relax and when to enforce the discipline of the camp, and who, to the talents of an able general, added the reputation of being the best engineer of his times. By a judicious direction of the machines of war which he invented or improved, Dercyllidas overcame Larissa, and, in the space of eight days, reduced eight other cities.

The inhabitants of the Thracian Chersonesus had lately sent to the Spartan general an embassy, requesting assistance against the fierce barbarians who inhabited the adjoining territory, and that, should circumstances permit him to afford protection to those industrious and distressed Greeks, he would perform a signal service to the state. The inactivity of Tissaphernes encouraged the Grecian general to undertake this useful and meritorious enterprize. The Chersonesus was one of the most fertile and best cultivated spots in the ancient world. In an extent of fifty miles in length and fifteen in breadth, it contained eleven rich and flourishing cities, and several commodious harbours. Had this beautiful country enjoyed an insular form, its happiness would have been complete, but a neck of land, thirty-seven furlongs in breadth, joined it to the territories of the fiercest tribes in Thrace. The troops of Dercyllidas could easily have repelled their inroads; but the barbarians would have found a secure refuge in their woods and mountains, and, whenever the army was withdrawn, would have again poured down on the helpless Chersonesites with their native fury. Dercyllidas afforded a more useful assistance to those unhappy Greeks; and employed in their defence, not the courage, but the labour of his soldiers. With incessant toil they formed a strong wall across the isthmus.

Soon after this noble work was completed, Agesilaus was declared successor to the vacant throne of the lately deceased

Agis, king of Sparta, and, at the distance of about two years, commander in chief of the Greek forces in Asia.

In the interval of these successive honours, he approved his attentive vigilance in the service of the republic, the safety of which was endangered by a daring conspiracy. A youth named Cinadon, distinguished above his companions by extraordinary strength, was not less conspicuous for courage and ambition. Descended from an obscure family, Cinadon felt and regretted the mortifying partiality of the government under which he lived. His pride was deeply wounded with the reflection, that whatever abilities he might possess, the unfortunate circumstances of his birth must for ever exclude him from the principal dignities of the state, which circulated among a few Spartan families, without the possibility of extending beyond that very limited sphere. The impetuosity of his passions prompted him to seek justice and revenge: nor was his blind and headlong ferocity alarmed by the means, however atrocious, that must lead to this favourite end. He communicated the horrid design to men of his own and of an inferior condition, exaggerating their cruel treatment by a stern aristocracy. He neglected not to arraign the arrogance and cruelty of particular senators, and to inflame the resentment of individuals against their private and domestic foes; nor did he forget to encourage them all with the certain prospect of success, by contrasting their own strength and numbers with the weakness of an enemy, who might be taken unarmed and cut off by surprize.

The time for action approached, and the author of the conspiracy commanded his associates to stay at home, that they might be ready at a call. Agesilaus, meanwhile, performed the accustomed vows and sacrifices for the safety of the republic; the appearance of the entrails announced some dreadful and concealed danger. Soon afterwards a person denounced Cinadon to the magistrates, as guilty of a treasonable design, of which he had endeavoured to render himself an accomplice. When the informer was desired to explain his declaration more fully, he told them, that Cinadon, having conducted him to the great square of the city, which was the usual place of rendezvous, desired him to count the number

of Spartans whom he saw in that spacious resort: That he counted the king, the ephori, the senators, and about forty others; and then asked Cinadon, for what purpose he had required him to take that seemingly useless trouble? Because, replied the conspirator, I reckon the Spartans to be enemies, and all the rest, whose great numbers you behold in the market place, to be friends. Nor does this proportion apply to Sparta only; in the farms and villages adjacent to the city, we shall in each house and family have one enemy, the master, but all the servants will be our friends. Cinadon then acquainted them with the object and cause of the conspiracy, which had been formed by men of probity and fortitude, and which was soon to be communicated to the slaves, peasants, and the whole body of Lacedæmonian people; and that the greatest part of the conspirators, being trained for war, had arms in their hands.

This alarming intelligence roused the activity of the Spartan magistrates. It would have been imprudent to seize Cinadon in the capital, as they were unacquainted with the extent of his resources, and the number of his associates. On pretence of the public service, they contrived to send him to Aulon, that he might seize in that licentious city, and bring with the reach of justice, several daring violators of the Spartan laws. The senate prepared wagons for conveying the prisoners, and furnished every thing necessary for the journey. A body of chosen horsemen was appointed to accompany Cinadon, who set out without suspecting that this long train of preparation was destined against himself alone. But no sooner had he reached a proper distance from the city, than he was seized as a traitor, and compelled, by the terror of immediate death, to denounce his accomplices. Their names were sent to the senate, who instantly secured their persons. Cinadon, Tesamenes, a priest, and the other leaders of the conspiracy, were scourged through the city, gored with instruments of torture, and finally relieved by death.

About this time, intelligence was conveyed of the formidable preparations of Artaxerxes against the Spartans. The persuasive influence of Lysander encouraged them to employ the great and solid, but, as yet, unknown abilities of their young and warlike prince, in an invasion of Persia, as the

best mode of defending themselves. Since the reign of Agamennon, Agesilaus was the first Grecian king who led the united forces of his country to make war in Asia.

In the spring of the year 396 B. C., he left Sparta, with three thousand Lacedæmonian freedmen, and a body of foreign troops amounting to six thousand, and fixed his head quarters at Ephesus, in Asia Minor. Thither Tissaphernes sent an embassy, demanding the reason of such mighty preparations. Agesilaus replied, "That the Greeks in Asia might enjoy the same liberty with their brethren in Europe." The messengers of Tissaphernes had orders to declare, that the king was inclined to acknowledge the ancient freedom and independence of the Grecian colonies; that the report of his hostile intentions against either them or the mother country was totally void of foundation; and that, in consequence of the recent transactions between Tissaphernes and Dercyllidas, ambassadors might shortly be expected from Susa, empowered to ratify a firm peace between Artaxerxes and the Greeks. Until this desirable work should be completed, Tissaphernes earnestly desired a continuation of the truce, which, on his side, he was ready to seal by whatever formalities Agesilaus thought proper to require. The perfidious satrap swore and deceived for the last time. No sooner had he received the long expected auxiliaries from the east, than he commanded Agesilaus to leave Ephesus, and to evacuate the coast of Asia; if he delayed to comply, the weight of the Persian arms would enforce obedience. The prudent or pious Spartan assumed an unusual gaiety of countenance; observing, that he rejoiced to commence the war under such favourable auspices, since the treachery of Tissaphernes must render the gods his enemies.

Meanwhile, he prepared to encounter the insidious arts of the satrap, with equal, but more innocent, address. It was industriously given out, that he intended to march into the province of Caria, the favourite residence of Tissaphernes, which was adorned by his voluptuous parks and palaces, and strengthened by a fortress, the repository of his treasures. The intervening cities were ordered to mend the roads, to furnish a market, and to prepare every thing most necessary to facilitate the march of the Grecian army. Tissaphernes,

not doubting that Caria was the intended scene of war, encamped, with his own numerous cavalry, in the plains of the Meander, in order to intercept the passage of the enemy. But Agesilaus, having posted a sufficient garrison in Ephesus, left that city, and, turning to the north, advanced by rapid marches into Phrygia, the rich plunder of which rewarded the active diligence of his soldiers. The selfish satrap remained inactive, still suspecting an invasion of the Greeks from Ephesus and the neighbouring seaports. During the greatest part of the summer Agesilaus ravaged Phrygia; the barbarians were shamefully defeated in several rencounters. At length they ceased to resist his arms, and he returned, loaded with spoil, to winter in Ephesus.

In the Phrygian expedition, Agesilaus shared and surpassed the toils of the meanest soldier, from whom he refused to be distinguished by his dress, his food, or his accommodations by day or night. The inactive season of the year was most diligently and usefully employed. Ephesus, and the neighbouring towns, glowed with the ardour of military preparation. The Phrygian wealth was employed to urge the hand of industry. Shields, spears, swords, and helmets, filled every shop and every magazine. The inhabitants of the country were allured by great rewards to form their best horses to the discipline of the field. The veteran soldiers, as well as the new levies, were daily exercised within the walls of Ephesus, in those martial amusements which formed the best school of war. Agesilaus often condescended to dispute the prize of valour or dexterity. His popular manners endeared him to the troops, and the superiority of his talents commanded their willing obedience.

With a view to encourage his soldiers before taking the field, Agesilaus ordered the Phrygian prisoners to be brought forth, stripped, and exposed to sale. The Greeks viewed with contempt the delicate whiteness of their skins, their flaccid muscles, their unwieldy corpulence, and the effeminate softness of their whole persons. Such an enemy they considered as nothing superior to an army of women.

Agesilaus, no longer satisfied with ravaging the extremities, was determined to attack the centre of the Persian do-

minions. He therefore marched towards the royal city of Sardis, and ravaged the adjoining territory without opposition. After several successful skirmishes, he defeated the Persians in a general engagement, on the banks of the Pactolus, surrounded and took their camp, in which, beside other riches, he found seventy talents of silver.

Agesilaus entered Phrygia, attacked, conquered, and pursued Pharnabazus, who, flying from post to post, was successively driven from every part of his valuable province. The inferior satraps, and especially their oppressed subjects, courted the protection of Agesilaus, expecting that the unknown dominion of Greece would be lighter than the yoke of Persia, of which they had long with regret felt the severity. The commotion was so general in Lesser Asia, that Agesilaus, at the head of about twenty thousand Greeks, and innumerable barbarian allies, might entertain a very rational expectation of shaking the throne of Artaxerxes.

The invading army struck such terror into the Persian governors, that they were obliged to have recourse to the meanest arts that fear can suggest, in order to elude that danger which they had not courage to repel. Judging of other men's principles by their own, they first offered a bribe to Agesilaus their conqueror, who rejected it with scorn. They afterwards dispatched Timocrates, a Rhodian, with fifty talents into Greece, which he was instructed to distribute in such a manner among the leading men in the more considerable states, as might engage them in the interests of Persia. This measure was attended with success. The citizens of Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, whom the love of liberty could not inspire with resolution to take up arms, were persuaded to embrace this measure by avarice. These and several minor states of Greece, hostile to Sparta, and the purchased friends of Persia, were in such a situation, that any of them might be drawn into a war, without seeming to intend it. A number of particular associations had weakened the general confederacy, and Greece might be put in motion by the smallest springs. These alone were employed. The Locrians were persuaded to levy contributions upon a small district, the property of which was claimed both by the Phocians and the

Thebans. The former revenged the injury by invading the territory of the Locrians, who applied in their present distress to Thebes their ally. Assistance was decreed them, and the Phocians, unable to contend against the united power of the two states, had recourse in their turn to Sparta. Thus the ferment was excited, all parties prepared for hostilities, and what has been called the Corinthian war, because the first symptom of animosity appeared amidst the jarring factions of that state, began and became general.

The first action deprived the Lacedæmonians of their leader Lysander, who had long acted a principal part in carrying on the ambitious designs of his country. The fatal consequences they dreaded from the loss of this battle, which was fought at Haliartus, as well as from the death of their general, obliged them to recal Agesilaus from pursuing his conquests in Asia. He, though already master of a great part of the coast, and though eager to second his good fortune by penetrating into the heart of Persia, yet obeyed without hesitation the summons of his republic, and returned to fight the battles where her danger called him. He left only four thousand men behind him to maintain possession of the territory which he had acquired, and he intrusted the command of the fleet to his brother-in-law Pisander.

But from this moment the affairs of Lacedæmon began to decline. The Athenians, who as yet had taken no part in the war against that state, were engaged, as usual, in domestic dissentions. After the fatal sea-fight in the river Ægos, Conon, their unfortunate commander, had retired to the isle of Cyprus, where he soothed the rigours of his fate, and watched an opportunity of recovering his lost honour, and retrieving the ruined affairs of his country. The happy moment was now arrived, and a favourable occasion seemed to solicit his activity. Having obtained the command of a small fleet from Evagoras, king of Cyprus, he sailed to the coast of Asia, and thence repaired to the court of Artaxerxes, who was still agitated by the terrors into which the Lacedæmonian victories had thrown him. Conon represented to the trembling monarch the dangerous ambition of that haughty people, and insisted, that if he regarded the security

of his dominions, or the honour of his crown, he ought now, by his utmost efforts, to humble for ever the Spartan pride.

Feeble and irresolute as the measures of the Persians generally were, the ardour of Conon for once inspired them with vigour. A hundred ships were collected and put under his command. With these he set sail in search of the Grecian fleet; fell in with them near Cnidos, a town of Caria, in Asia Minor; and though his ships were less numerous than those of the enemy, obtained a complete victory in the engagement. Pisander, the Spartan admiral, was slain, fighting desperately in defence of the Grecian honour, which had never before been put to so severe a trial. The Persians carried off fifty gallies, and five hundred prisoners.

It was the intelligence of this battle that justly alarmed the patriotic breast of Agesilaus. He assembled the troops, honestly confessed the death of Pisander, but artfully declared that, though the admiral was slain, his fleet had obtained a complete victory, for which it became himself and them to pay the usual tribute of thanks and sacrifices to the protecting gods. He then set the example of performing this pious duty. The devout stratagem was attended with a very salutary effect; for, in a skirmish between the advanced guards, immediately preceding the battle, the Lacedæmonian troops, animated by their imagined victory in the east, defeated and repelled the enemy. Meanwhile the main bodies of either army advanced into the plain of Coronæa; at first in awful silence, but having approached within a furlong of each other, the Thebans raised a universal shout, and rushed on furiously to the charge. The shock was terrible; their shields meeting, clashed; they fought, slew, and were slain. No voice was heard, yet none was silent: the field resounded with the noise of rage and battle. This was tht most desperate and bloody scene of an action, itself the most desperate and bloody of any in that age. The Spartans remained masters of the field. It was covered with steel and blood, with the bodies of friends and foes, heaped promiscuously together; with transfixed bucklers and broken lances, some strewed on the ground, others deeply adhering in the mortal wounds which they had inflicted, and others still

grasped by the cold and insensible hands of the combatants, who had lately fought with such impetuous ardour.

The sea-fight of Cnidus, and the battle of Coronæa, were the most important and decisive actions in the Bœotian or Corinthian war, which lasted eight years. The contending republics seem at once to have put forth their sting, and to have retained only their resentment, after they had lost their power. Petty hostilities, indeed, were carried on by mutual inroads and ravages in the spring and autumn; the Lacedæmonians issuing from Sicyon, and the Thebans from Corinth. The inhabitants of the latter city had eagerly promoted the alliance against Sparta, but when their country was made the seat of war, they began to repent of this rash measure. The noble and wealthy part of the community, who had most to fear, as they had most to lose, talked of a separate peace; and, as they were abetted by a majority of the people, their dependents or clients, they intended to summon an assembly, which might confirm this laudable resolution. But the partisans of Tymolaus and Polyanthes anticipated a design so unfavourable to their interests, by committing one of the most horrid massacres recorded in history. They chose the Eucleian festival for the time of their atrocious barbarity. Many of the citizens were then enjoying themselves in the market-place, or assembled at the dramatic entertainments. The assault was rapid and general. The Corinthians were assassinated in the circles of conversation, some in the public walks, most in the theatre; the judges on the bench, the priests at the altar: nor did those monsters cease from destroying, till they had cut off whosoever they deemed most willing or most able to oppose their measures. The temples and adored images of the gods, whose knees they grasped, afforded no protection to the victims of this impious fury. This abominable massacre infected Corinth with the plague of sedition, which silently lurked, or openly raged, in that unfortunate republic, during the six following years. The Spartans and Argives assisted their respective factions; Corinth was alternately subject to the one and to the other.

After the battle of Cnidus and Coronæa, there was not any general engagement, by land or sea; the partial actions which

happened, on either element, generally followed the bias of those important victories. Success, for the most part, attended the sailors of Athens and the soldiers of Sparta. In general, Agesilaus and the Spartans maintained their superiority in the field, while Conon, Thrasybulus, and Chabrias proved successful against Thimbron, Anaxibius, and the other naval commanders of the enemy.

The respective successes of the contending powers were not accompanied by proportional advantages. The Lacedæmonians derived not any solid or permanent benefit from their victory at Coronæa; but their defeat at Cnidus deprived them, in one day, of the fruit of many laborious campaigns; since, with the assistance of a superior naval force, and with the command of the Persian treasury, Conon found little difficulty in detaching for ever from their dominion the whole western coast of Lesser Asia. The measures taken by the Spartans, either to preserve or to recover their important possessions in the east, scarcely deserve the name of history, if we except their resistance at Abydus. Dercyllidas had obtained the government of this strong and populous town, as the reward of his military services. He assembled the Abydenians, and assured them that one naval defeat had not ruined the power of Sparta. Having confirmed the courage of the Abydenians, he sailed to the town of Sestos, the principal town of the Thracian Chersonesus, the inhabitants of which owed their protection and safety to the useful labours of Dercyllidas, and this claim of merit enabled him to secure their allegiance. The fidelity of these towns, amid the general defection of the coasts of Europe and Asia, prevented the inconveniences and hardships to which the expelled Spartans must have been otherwise exposed; and delivered them from the necessity of undertaking a winter's journey to the Peloponnesus, through the territories of many hostile republics. The unfortunate governors and garrisons who had fled, or who had been driven from the places of their respective command, took refuge within the friendly walls of Sestos and Abydus.

The patiotic Conon employed his favour with Artaxerxes to retrieve the affairs of Athens, the interest of which formed

the honourable motive that retained him in the Persian service. He inflamed the resentment which both Pharnabazus and his master had justly conceived against Sparta, and encouraged them, early in the spring, to send their victorious armament towards Greece, to retaliate the ravages committed in the east by the arms of Agesilaus. But he instructed them, that if they would render their vengeance complete, and humble for ever the Spartan pride, they must raise the fallen rival of that imperious republic. The disbursement of a sum of money, which would be scarcely felt by the treasury of Persia, might suffice to rebuild the walls and harbours of Athens: a measure by which they would inflict the deepest wound on the power, as well as on the pride of their ambitious enemy. The proposal was heard with approbation; the expense was liberally supplied; the Persian fleet set sail; reduced the Cyclades and Cythera; ravaged the coast of Laconia; and after performing, in detached squadrons, whatever seemed most useful for the Persian service, assembled in the long deserted harbours of the Phaleron, Munichia, and Piræus. There, the important task of restoring the ancient ornaments and defence of the city of Minerva, was begun, carried on, and accomplished with extraordinary diligence. The ready service of the crews belonging to the numerous fleet assisted the industry of mercenary workmen, whom the allurement of gain had brought from every quarter of Greece; and the labour of both was seconded and encouraged by the voluntary and eager exertions of the Bœotians and Argives, but, above all, by the zeal of the Athenians themselves, who justly regarded their actual employment as the second foundation of their once glorious capital.

No spectacle could give more uneasiness to Sparta. The antipathy between these rival states was of a nature so virulent and deep-rooted, that, compared with it, all other examples of national animosity seem slight and inconsiderable. Nothing but this permanent hate could have engaged Sparta to pursue the measures which she now thought proper to adopt. Determined to check the growing prosperity of her rival, she betrayed the honour of the whole

Grecian confederacy. Her magistrates were sensible that, while involved in a war with the Persians, they could not chastise, what they affected to call the revolt of the Greeks. They could hope to subject the one nation only by keeping on good terms with the other. As both wars, therefore, could not be successfully carried on at the same time, they resolved to conclude a peace with Persia, that they might henceforth pursue uncontrouled their ambitious career in Greece. For this purpose they dispatched into Asia, as their ambassador, Antalcidas, a man every way qualified for executing a treacherous commission, at the corrupt court of an absolute prince. This man was instructed, not only to negociate a peace between Persia and Lacedæmon, but to cause a general pacification between all the Grecian states to be guaranteed by the Persian monarch. The great king, as the Greeks usually call him, was, according to this plan, admitted to the high rank to which he had always aspired, and acknowledged to be the arbiter of Greece. He found no difficulty, therefore, in sacrificing the interests of the alliance which he had been at such pains to form against Lacedæmon, to what he regarded as his own interest and honour. To him all the Greeks were equally odious; he favoured one party only for the destruction of the other; his own advantage was the sole object which he had in view in all his transactions with them; and though the allies had so eminently promoted it, that he owed to them the safety of his crown, yet, when his affairs no longer required their assistance, he abandoned them without reluctance. A mandate was issued from the Persian court, intimating the sovereign's will, that a general peace should be concluded in Greece on the following terms: That the Greek cities in Asia, with the Peninsula of Clazomenæ, and the island of Cyprus, should be subject to Persia; that Athens should preserve her authority in the isles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which belonged to her by immemorial prescription; that all the other states, small and great, should enjoy the independent government of their own laws; and that such republics as rejected these conditions should be compelled by force of arms to obey them. Dishonourable as these terms were,

another condition, still more dishonourable, was proposed by Antalcidas, and accepted by the Persians. Conon, who had performed such signal services to the latter, was seized by them, thrown into prison, and, as Isocrates asserts, in his panegyric on Athens, ignominiously put to death.

By this treaty the Greeks were placed, with regard to Persia, in a situation very inferior to that which they had formerly maintained. Not only the freedom of the Asiatic cities, in defence of which they had so often baffled all the efforts of the Persians, was shamefully sacrificed, but the dependance of the smaller cities in Greece upon the greater, and that strength which both derived from this connection, was in a great measure weakened or dissolved. While the general interest of Greece, however, suffered by this negociation, that of the Lacedæmonians was promoted. It removed at once the danger hanging over them from a powerful and exasperated enemy. As the Asiatic Greeks were principally attached to Athens, the abandoning of them to the great king brought no considerable disadvantage to Sparta; and, as she expected still to retain in subjection those cities which had submitted to her own authority, it was of no small importance, in enabling her to maintain a pre-eminence over the more powerful states, that the weaker should be declared free and independent.

That such considerations had induced her to conclude a peace, which seemed at first sight to abridge her authority, did not long remain doubtful. Secure on the side of Persia, the Spartans soon discovered their intention to re-establish their tyranny in Greece, and they began by humbling the power of every state that might ever become a match for their own. They compelled the Mantineans to throw down their walls; they obliged the Corinthians to withdraw their garrison from Argos; they reduced the Olynthians to subjection; and, interfering in the domestic quarrels of the Thebans, they placed a garrison of their own in the citadel of Thebes. The Thebans, after submitting to this yoke for four years, at last threw it off.

The Spartans sent an army of nearly twenty thousand men, under Agesilaus, to re-establish their power at Thebes. The

name of the general alone struck terror into the enemy, who were afraid to meet him in the open field, and they therefore took possession of a hill in the neighbourhood of the city. Agesilaus sent a party to provoke them to come down and give him battle, and when he saw they declined this, he drew out his whole army in order to attack them; but Chabrias, who commanded the Theban mercenaries, ordered his men to present themselves, and keep their ranks close together, with their shields laid down at their feet, their spears advanced one leg forward, and the knee upon the half bend. Agesilaus, finding them prepared in this manner to receive him, and that they stood as it were in defiance of him, thought fit to withdraw his army, and contented himself with ravaging the country. This was looked upon as an extraordinary stratagem, and Chabrias valued himself so much upon it, that he procured his statue to be erected in that posture.

The Spartans had hitherto been deemed unequalled in military prowess, but they now began to be rivalled, and even excelled in that noble quality by the Thebans. This particularly appeared in the battle of Tegyra. Pelopidas, the Theban general, had resolved to attack Orchomenus, which was garrisoned by the Spartans, and he therefore marched against it with a small party of three hundred foot and forty horse; but, hearing that a large body of Spartans were hastening to its relief, he thought it best to retire. In his retreat he fell in with this reinforcement near Tegyra, and finding it impossible to avoid a battle, he resolutely prepared to engage. After a violent struggle, which was maintained with equal bravery on both sides, Gorgoleon and Theopompus, the two Spartan generals, fell, and this so intimidated their men, that they immediately retired on either hand, and opened a way for the Thebans to pass. But a safe retreat could not satisfy Pelopidas. Encouraged by his late success he drew up his men afresh, and renewed the battle; and, after committing most terrible havoc among the enemy, he put them to an entire rout.

This was the most signal disgrace the Spartans had ever met with. They had never before been known to yield, even to an equal number: but here they were beaten by a force

not one third of their own. The victors were the flower of the Theban army. They were distinguished by the name of the sacred band. They were as remarkable for their fidelity to each other, as for their strength and courage; they were linked together by the bonds of common friendship, and were sworn to stand by each other to the very last extremity. Thus united they became invincible, and generally turned the scale of victory in their favour for a number of years, till, at length, they were cut down as one man by the Macedonian phalanx under Philip.

Pelopidas was not the only, nor even the greatest general that Thebes produced. Epaminondas, his cotemporary and colleague in command, was every way his equal, and, if possible, his superior. These two great men lived in the strictest intimacy and friendship. Epaminondas had spent the earlier part of his life in the study of philosophy, remote from the management of public affairs, until he was overcome by the importunities of his countrymen, who perceived in him, amidst all his diffidence and self-denial, the seeds of many great and excellent qualities. Nor were they deceived in their opinion, for when he was placed, as it were by force and against his will, at the head of an army, he shewed the world that an application to the polite arts, so far from disqualifying a man for a public station, only renders him capable of filling it with more distinguished lustre.

Under these two able generals, Thebes not only maintained its own independence, but even threatened the rest of Greece with subjection. The Spartans had long considered themselves as the umpires and arbitrators of Greece, and could ill bear a rival in this boasted pre-eminence. They therefore resolved to humble the pride of Thebes, and, with this view, their general Cleombrotus marched towards the frontier of Bœotia with a numerous army. But, in order to give an air of justice to their hostilities, they first sent to demand of the Thebans, "That they should restore the cities they had seized to their liberties;—that they should rebuild those they had demolished;—and make reparation for all the wrongs they had done." To this it was replied, "That the Thebans were acountable to none but Heaven for their conduct." Nothing now remained on either side tbu

to prepare for action. Epiminondas immediately raised all the troops he could, and began his march; his army did not amount to six thousand men, and the enemy had above four times that number. He had wisely taken care to secure a pass, which would have shortened Cleombrotus's march considerably. The latter, after having taken a large compass, arrived at Leuctra. Both parties consulted whether they should give battle, and it was determined to engage.

The two armies were very unequal in number. The Lacedæmonians amounted to twenty-four thousand foot, and sixteen hundred horse. The Thebans had only six thousand foot, and four hundred horse; but all of them were choice troops, animated by the love of glory, and resolved either to conquer or die. The Lacedæmonian cavalry, composed of men picked up by chance, without valour, and ill disciplined, were as much inferior to their enemies in courage, as superior in number. The ability of the generals alone supplied the place of great armies; especially that of the Theban commander, who was the most accomplished soldier of his time, and he was nobly supported by Pelopidas, who was then at the head of the sacred band.

Upon the day of battle, the two armies drew up on a plain. Epaminondas took post on the left of his army, and was opposed to Cleombrotus, whom he was determined to attack, convinced that if once he could break the Lacedæmonian phalanx, the rest of the army would soon be put to flight.

The action began with the cavalry, which was posted in the front of the Theban left wing. As the Thebans were better mounted, and braver troops than the Lacedæmonian horse, the latter were soon broke and driven upon the infantry, which they put into some confusion. Epaminondas availed himself of this momentary confusion, to perform one of those rapid evolutions, which commonly decide the fortune of battles. He formed his bravest, but least numerous division, into a compact wedge, with a sharp point and with spreading flanks, expecting that the Lacedæmonians, as soon as they had recovered their ranks, would attack the weaker and more extended part of his army, which seemed prepared for a retreat. The event answered his expectation. While

the Lacedæmonians advanced against his right wing, where they found little or no resistance, he rushed forward with his left, and darting, like the beak of a galley, on the flank of the enemy, bore down every thing before him, until he arrived near the post occupied by Cleombrotus. The urgency of the danger recalled to their ancient principles the degenerate disciples of Lycurgus. The bravest warriors flew, from every quarter, to the assistance of their prince;—covered him with their shields, and defended him with their swords and lances. Their impetuous valour resisted the intrepid progress of the Thebans, till the Spartan horsemen, who attended the person of Cleombrotus, were totally cut off, and the king himself, pierced with many wounds, fell on the breathless bodies of his generous defenders. The fall of the chief gave new rage to the battle. Anger, resentment, and despair, by turns agitated the Spartans. According to the superstitious ideas of paganism, the death of their king appeared to them a slight misfortune, compared with the disgraceful impiety of leaving his mangled remains to the insults of an enemy. To prevent this abomination, they exerted their utmost valour, and their strenuous efforts were successful. But they could not obtain any farther advantage. They effected their retreat, with the loss of about two thousand men, and the Thebans remained sole masters of the field.

The Lacedæmonians had never received such a terrible blow. The most bloody defeat, till then, had scarce ever cost them more than four or five hundred of their citizens. Here they lost four thousand men. The Thebans had only three hundred men killed.

When the news of this defeat was brought to Sparta, the Ephori would not suffer the public games, which were then celebrating, to be interrupted. Next day the loss of each particular family being known, the fathers and relations of those who had fallen in battle went to the temples to thank the gods, and congratulated each other upon their glory and good fortune, whilst the relations of those who had escaped were overwhelmed with grief and affliction.

These last were by the law to be degraded from all honour and rendered infamous, insomuch that it was a disgrace

to intermarry with them: they were to appear publicly, in mean and dirty habits, with patched and party-coloured garments, and to go half shaved, and whoever met them in the streets might insult and beat them, without their daring to make any resistance. This was so severe a law, and such numbers had on this occasion incurred the penalties of it, many of whom were of great families and interest, that they apprehended the execution of it might excite some public commotion. Under this difficulty, they gave Agesilaus a power even over the laws; to dispense with them; to abrogate them; or, to enact such new ones as the present emergency required. He would not abolish or alter the law. He only made a public declaration that it should lie dormant for that single day, but revive, and be in full force again on the morrow, and, by that expedient, he saved the citizens from infamy.

It was not long before the Spartans felt the consequences of this dreadful overthrow. Numbers of Greek cities, that had hitherto remained neuter, now declared in favour of the Thebans, and increased their army to the amount of seventy thousand men. With this mighty force Epaminondas entered Laconia and overran the open country. He did not, however, attempt any thing against Sparta itself; but he reinstated the Arcadians in all their ancient rights and privileges, of which they had been deprived by the Spartans, and he enabled them to build a new city, which, from the name of the old one, was called Messenia.

So zealous were the ancient Greeks of even the smallest encroachment on their liberty, that no action, however great or meritorious in other respects, was sufficient to atone for it. This was signally exemplified in the case of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, who, upon their return home, instead of being received as heroes and conquerors, were summoned as criminals before a court of justice, to answer for their conduct in having retained their command beyond the time limited by law. The former discovered less courage than might have been expected from his impetuous and daring character. He, who had never feared the sword of an enemy, trembled at the angry voice of his insolent accusers.

But Epaminondas displayed on this occasion the superiority of philosophical firmness seated in the mind, to that constitutional courage which is the result of blood and spirits. The latter is sufficient for a day of battle, but the former, alone, can yield support in every vicissitude of fortune.

Instead of observing the formality of a regular defence, the illustrious Theban undertook the invidious task of pronouncing his own panegyric. After relating his exploits, without amplification and without diminution, he concluded by observing, "that he could submit to death without reluctance, secure of immortal fame, earned in the service of his country." The seditious demagogues were awed by his magnanimity; the anger of the assembly against himself and his colleague dissolved in admiration; and Epaminondas was conducted from the tribunal with as much glory as from the field of Leuctra.

From the invasion of Laconia to the general engagement at Mantinæa, there elapsed six years of indecisive war and tumultuous activity: battles lost and gained; conquests made and abandoned; alliances concluded and broken; treaties of peace proposed, accepted, and violated, by those who felt the unhappy effects of dissentions, which their rancorous animosity was unwilling to terminate.

We pass over several unimportant events that took place in this period, and hasten to one of the last consequence—the battle of Mantinæa. Never had such numerous armies taken the field, during the perpetual wars in which those unhappy republics were engaged, as were assembled and fought at that place between the Thebans and Spartans, in the year 363 B. C. The battle was fierce and bloody, and after their spears were broken, both parties had recourse to their swords. The wedge of Epaminondas at length penetrated the Spartan line; and this advantage encouraged his centre and right wing to attack and repel the corresponding divisions of the enemy. The Theban and Thessalian cavalry were equally successful. In the intervals of their ranks, Epaminondas had placed a body of light infantry, whose missile weapons greatly annoyed the enemy's horse. He had likewise taken the precaution to occupy a rising ground on his right, with a

considerable detachment, which might take the Athenians in flank and rear, should they advance from their post. These prudent dispositions produced a victory, which Epaminondas did not live to complete or improve. In the heat of the battle he received a mortal wound, and was carried to an eminence, that he might the better observe the subsequent operations of the field. But with the departure of their leader, the spirit which animated the Theban army was withdrawn. Having impetuously broke through the hostile ranks, they knew not how to profit by this advantage. The enemy rallied in different parts of the field, and prevailed in several partial encounters. All was confusion and terror. The light infantry, which had been posted amidst the Theban and Thessalian horse, being left behind in the pursuit, were received and cut to pieces by the Athenian cavalry. Elated with this success, the Athenians turned their arms against the detachment placed on the heights, consisting chiefly of Eubœans, whom they routed and put to flight, after a terrible slaughter. With such alternations of victory and defeat, ended this memorable engagement. Both armies as conquerors erected a trophy; both craved their dead as conquered; and this battle, which being certainly the greatest, was expected to have proved the most decisive ever fought among the Greeks, produced no important consequences. Neither gained any advantage. Territory, town, or dominion, was acquired by neither; but indecision, trouble, and confusion, pervaded Greece more than ever.

When the tumult of the action ceased, the most distinguished Thebans assembled around their dying general. His body had been pierced with a javelin, and the surgeons declared that it was impossible for him to survive the extraction of the weapon. He asked whether his shield was safe? which being presented to him, he viewed it with a languid smile of melancholy joy. He then demanded whether the Thebans had obtained the victory? Being answered in the affirmative, (for the Lacedæmonians indeed had first sent to demand the bodies of their slain,) he declared himself ready to quit life without regret, since he left his country triumphant. The spectators lamented, among other objects

of sorrow, that he should die without children, who might inherit the glory of his name, and the fame of his virtues. "You mistake," said he, with a cheerful presence of mind, "I leave two fair daughters, the battles of Leuctra, and Mantinæa, who will transmit my renown to the latest ages." So saying, he ordered the weapon to be extracted, and immediately expired. The awful solemnity of his death corresponded with the dignified splendour of an active and useful life. He was buried in the field of battle, where his monument still existed, after four centuries, with an inscription in elegiac verse, enumerating his exploits. Hadrian, then master of the Roman world, added a second column, and a new inscription. By the death of Epaminondas, Thebes was deprived of her principal ornament and defence; the source of her confidence, and the spring of her activity; and her councils were thenceforth less ambitious, and her arms less enterprizing.

The battle of Mantinæa was followed by a peace, which was ratified by all the states of Greece except Sparta: the conditions of it were, that every state should retain what they possessed, and hold it independent of any other power.

With the battle of Mantinæa ended the bloody struggle for dominion, which had long exhausted Thebes and Sparta. In that, or in the preceding engagements, they had lost their ablest generals, and the flower of their troops. No Theban arose to emulate the magnanimity of Epaminondas, and to complete the designs of that illustrious patriot. Archidamus, who succeeded to the Spartan throne, imperfectly justified the high opinion conceived of his early wisdom and valour.—Weakened by their wounds, and fatigued by exertions long and fruitless, those republics sunk into such weakness, as encouraged pretensions of their neighbours that had long lain dormant.

During the Bœotian war, the Athenians had acted as auxiliaries only, yet their arms had acquired great lustre. Their powerful rivals were humbled and exhausted: experience had taught them the danger of attempting to subdue, and the impossibility of keeping in subjection, the territories of their warlike neighbours: but the numerous islands of the Ægean

and Ionian seas, the remote coasts of Thrace and Asia, invited the activity of their fleet, which they might now employ in foreign conquests, fearless of domestic envy. It appears that, soon after the death of Epaminondas, Eubœa again acknowledged the authority of Athens. The Cyclades and Corcyra courted the friendship of a people capable of interrupting their navigation, and of destroying their commerce. Such multiplied advantages revived the ancient grandeur of Athens, which once more commanded the sea with a fleet of near three hundred sail.

But notwithstanding this tide of prosperity, which flowed with most apparent force immediately after the battle of Mantinæa, it was difficult to correct abuses that seem inherent in the nature of democracy, which left the citizens tyrants in one capacity, and slaves in another. The division of the executive power of government rendered it impossible to perceive or prevent the hand of oppression. Men knew not from what quarter their safety might be assailed; and being called to authority in their turn, they, instead of making united opposition to the injustice of their magistrates, contented themselves with inflicting the same injuries which they had either previously suffered, or still apprehended, from the malice of their enemies. Nor is this inconvenience peculiar to the Greek republics. While human nature remains unchanged, and the passions of men run in their ordinary channel, the right to exercise power will commonly be attended with a strong inclination to abuse it. Unless power therefore be counteracted by liberty, unless an impervious line of separation be drawn between prerogative and privilege; it is of little consequence whether a country be governed by one tyrant or a thousand: in both cases alike, the condition of man is precarious, and force prevails over law.

This radical defect in Grecian politics produced many ruinous consequences both in foreign and domestic affairs, which were oftener directed by the selfish passions of a few, or the fluctuating caprices of the multitude, than by the rational and permanent interest of the community.

In the tumultuary governments of Greece, the sources of dissention were innumerable. Although hereditary distinctions were little known or regarded, the poor and rich formed

two distinct parties, which had their particular views and separate interests. During the intervals of party rage, private quarrels kept the state in perpetual fermentation. Beside the ordinary disputes concerning property; the competitions for civil offices, for military command, for obtaining public honours, or eluding punishments or burdens, opened an ever-flowing source of bitter animosity. Among this litigious people, neighbours were continually at variance. Every man was regarded as a rival and enemy, who had not proved himself a friend. Hereditary resentments were perpetuated from one generation to another; and the seeds of discord being sown in such abundance, yielded a never-failing crop of libels, invectives, and legal prosecutions. The usual employment of six thousand Athenians consisted in deciding lawsuits, the profits of which afforded the principal resource of the poorer citizens.

In the license of democratic freedom, the citizens, poor and rich, thought themselves alike entitled to enjoy every species of festivity. Pericles introduced the practice of exhibiting, not only tragedies, but comedies, at the public expense, and of paying for the admission of the populace. At the period of which we write, a considerable portion of the revenue was appropriated to the theatre; and some years afterwards a law was proposed by the demagogue Eubulus, and enacted by the senate and people, rendering it capital to divert, or even to propose diverting, the theatrical money to any other end or object.

Of all amusements known in polished society, the Grecian theatre was doubtless the most elegant and ingenious; yet several circumstances rendered it peculiarly liable to abuse. In ancient, as well as in modern times, the corrupt taste of the licentious vulgar was ever at variance with the discerning judgment of the wise and virtuous. To gratify the former, in preference to the latter, the Grecian tragedy and comedy was purposely calculated, in the extravagant pieces of Aristophanes and his profligate cotemporaries and successors. These pernicious productions formed the favourite entertainment of the populace.

The Athenian youth are said to have dissipated their fortunes, and melted their vigour of mind and body, in wanton and expensive dalliance with the female performers on the theatre. Weary and fastidious with excess of criminal indulgence, they lost all capacity or relish for solid and manly occupations; and at once deserted the exercises of war and the schools of philosophers. To fill up the vacuities of their listless lives, they, as well as persons more advanced in years, loitered in the shops of musicians and other artists; or sauntered in the forum and public places, idly inquiring after news, in which they took little interest, unless some danger alarmed the insipid uniformity of their pleasures. Dice and other games of chance were carried to a ruinous excess. The people at large were peculiarly addicted to the sensual gratifications of the table; and, if credit can be given to a poet, bestowed the freedom of their city on the sons of Chærephilus, on account of the uncommon merit of their father in the art of cookery.

Idleness, indulgence, and dissipation, had reduced the greater part of the Athenian citizens to extreme indigence. Although landed property was more equally divided in Greece than in any modern country, we are told, that about one fourth of the Athenians were totally destitute of immovable possessions. Their dress was frequently so mean and dirty, that it was difficult by their external appearance to distinguish them from slaves, a circumstance which arose not from slovenliness but from poverty. Justice was sold; riches, virtue, eminence of rank or abilities, always exposed to danger, and often ended in disgrace. For those needy Athenians, who formed the most numerous class in the republic, endeavoured to alleviate their misery by persecuting their superiors; banishing them their country; confiscating their estates; and treating them, on the slightest provocation, and often without any provocation at all, with the utmost injustice and cruelty. Though occasionally directed by the equity of an Aristides, or the magnanimity of a Cimon, they, for the most part, listened to men of an opposite character. He who could best flatter and deceive them, obtained most of their confidence. With such qualifications, the turbulent, licen-

tious, and dissolute, commonly prevailed in the assembly; and specious or hurtful talents usurped the rewards due to real merit.

Notwithstanding the decay of martial spirit, the extravagance of public councils, and the general corruption of manners which prevailed in Athens, and in other cities of Greece, the arts and sciences were still cultivated with ardour and success. The political circumstances of Greece, even the minute divisions of territory, had a tendency to promote the cultivation of science and the fine arts. Eloquence was so all-important in every state, that no study by which it might be improved was indifferent. In democratic governments it was all-powerful, and even in the oligarchical, not only for debate among the few who ruled, but for persuasion, it was of great moment. During the period now under review, the scholars of Hippocrates and Democritus enriched natural philosophy with many important discoveries. The different branches of mathematics, mechanics, and astronomy, received great improvements from Eudoxas, Timæus, Archytas, and Meton.

Statuary was cultivated by Polycletus, Canachus, Naucydes, and by innumerable artists, in other cities of Greece, Italy, and Ionia. The art of Praxiteles gave to stone the softness and sensibility of flesh.

The honour which Polycletus and Praxiteles acquired in sculpture, was, during the same age, attained in painting by Eupompus and Pamphilus, and above all by Zeuxis and Timanthes.

Zeuxis acquired great wealth by his works: at length he refused money, boasting that no price could pay them. The modesty of Penelope was equal to a lesson of morality. He painted Hercules strangling the serpents, in the presence of the astonished Amphitryon and Alcmena. His greatest work was Jupiter sitting on his throne, and surrounded by the gods.

Timanthes reached the highest perfection of his art, but his genius surpassed the art itself. In several of his pieces, Timanthes discovered the power of transporting the mind be-

yond the picture. He painted to the fancy rather than to the eye. In his works more was understood than expressed.

The power of expression was carried to a degree of perfection, which it is not easy to believe, and scarcely possible to comprehend. Aristides, a Theban painter, represented the sacking of a town: among other scenes of horror, a child was painted clinging to the breast of its wounded mother, who "felt and feared" that, after she was dead, the child should suck blood instead of milk. Parrhasius of Ephesus, in an earlier age, personified the people of Athens in a figure that characterised them at once as cruel and compassionate, proud and humble, brave and cowardly, elevated and mean.

Ideal beauty, just proportion, natural and noble attitudes, a uniform greatness of style, are acknowledged to have equally belonged to the ancient painters and statuaries.

Of all the arts cultivated during the period now under review, none attained higher proficiency than composition in prose. In history, Thucydides and Xenophon excelled.

The Cyropædia, or Institutions of the elder Cyrus, by the latter, is a romance intended to exemplify the doctrines taught by Socrates in the Memorabilia; and to prove the success which naturally attends the practice of wisdom and virtue, in the great affairs of war and government. The highest panegyric of this work is, that many learned men have mistaken it for a true history, and, deceived by the narrative, have believed it possible, that, during the various stages of a long life, Cyrus should have invariably followed the dictates of the sublimest philosophy.

The orators Lysias and Isocrates flourished in the period now under review. The former was distinguished by the refined subtilty of his pleadings; the latter, by the polished elegance of his moral and political orations. Isocrates ventured not to speak in public; neither his constitution nor his voice admitting the great exertions necessary for that purpose. His school of oratory and composition was frequented by the noblest youths of Athens, of the neighbouring republics, and even by foreign princes.

But the man of learning, in that age, whose abilities, if properly directed, might have most benefited his cotempora-

ries, was the celebrated Plato. He was descended from the Codridæ, the most illustrious, as well as the most opulent family in Athens. His education was worthy of his birth. The gymnastic exercises formed and invigorated his body, his mind was enlarged and enlightened by the studies of poetry and geometry. In his twentieth year he became acquainted with Socrates, and, having compared his own poetical productions with those of his immortal predecessors in this walk of literature, he committed the former to the flames, and totally addicted himself to philosophy. During eight years he continued an assiduous hearer of Socrates.

Fear or disgust removed the scholar of Socrates from the murderers of his master. Having spent some time in Thebes, Elis, and Megara, he sailed to Cyrene, attracted by the fame of the mathematician Theodorus. Egypt next deserved his curiosity, as the country to which the science of Theodorus owed its birth.

At his return to Athens, Plato could have little inclination to engage in public life. He prudently withdrew himself from a scene which presented nothing but danger or disgust, and purchased a small villa in the suburbs near the academy or gymnasium, that had been so elegantly adorned by Cimon. To this retirement his fame attracted the most illustrious characters in his age: the noblest youths of Athens daily frequented the school of Plato; and here he continued above forty years, with little interruption, except from his voyages into Sicily, instructing his disciples, and composing his Dialogues, to which philosophers in ancient and modern times are greatly indebted.

The capacious mind of Plato embraced the whole circle of science. Plato aimed at nothing less than to reconcile the appearances of the natural and moral world with the wise government of a self-existent, unchangeable Cause; to explain the nature and origin of the human mind, as well as of its various powers of perception, volition, and intellect; and, on principles resulting from these discoveries, to build a system of ethics, which, in proportion as it was followed by mankind, would promote their independence, security, happiness, and perfection.

Plato was the first philosopher who supported the doctrine of a future state by arguments that seemed capable of convincing intelligent and thinking men. From the properties of mind he inferred the simplicity and indestructibility of the substance in which they reside. He described the mental powers with an eloquence that Cicero and Buffon have not been able to surpass. And, since he regarded the soul as the principle of life and motion, he thought it absurd to suppose, that the diseases and death of the body should take from this principle such qualities as it essentially possessed in itself, and accidentally communicated to matter. It was his firm persuasion that, according to the employment of its rational and moral powers, the soul, after its separation from the body, would be raised to a higher, or depressed to a lower state of existence.

His practical morality, which he borrowed from Socrates, is profusely scattered through his dialogues. Plato was no less capable of distinguishing ideas, than of combining images. He united warmth of fancy and acuteness of understanding in an extraordinary degree. Yet, when compared with his master, Socrates, his genius will appear more subtile than sagacious. He wanted that patient spirit of observation which distinguished the illustrious sage, who, in all his reasonings, kept facts ever in his view, and, at every step he made, looked back with wary circumspection on experience. Accompanied by this faithful guide, Socrates trod securely within the bounds of truth and nature; but his adventurous disciple, trusting to the wings of fancy, often expatiated in imaginary worlds of his own creation.

History of Macedon.

FOUR hundred and sixteen years before the Christian æra, Macedon appeared scarcely distinguishable from the barbarous kingdoms of Thrace, Pæonia, and Illyricum, which surrounded it on the north-east and west. Towards the south it was excluded from the sea by a chain of Grecian republics. To this inland district, originally confined to the circumference of about three hundred miles, Caranus, an Argive prince, of the numerous race of Hercules, conducted a small colony of his adventurous and warlike countrymen, and, having conquered the barbarous natives, settled in Edessa, the capital of the province then named Emathia, and afterwards Macedonia. This little principality under Philip grew into a powerful kingdom, and under Alexander swelled into the most extensive empire known in the ancient world.

Caranus, as well as the princes Cænus and Thyrimas, who immediately followed him, had occasion to exercise their prudence still more than their valour. Their feeble colony of Greeks might have fallen an easy prey to the inhospitable ferocity of the barbarous tribes by whom it was on all sides surrounded. But the policy of the first kings of Macedon, instead of vainly attempting to repel or to subdue, endeavoured with more success to gain, by good offices, the ancient inhabitants of Emathia and the neighbouring districts. They communicated to them the knowledge of many useful arts; they gave them the Grecian religion and government. They adopted, in some degree, the language and manners of the barbarous natives; and they, in their turn, imparted to the latter a tincture of the Grecian language and civilization. By this judicious and liberal system, the followers of Caranus gradually associated with the warlike tribes in their neighbourhood, and the same generous policy being embraced by their descendants, deserves to be regarded as the primary cause of Macedonian greatness.

Perdiccas so far eclipsed the fame of his three predecessors, that he is accounted the founder of the monarchy by Herodotus and Thucydides. His history, and that of the five princes who intervened between him and Alexander I, do not merit particular detail. Alexander extended his kingdom to the river Nessus on the east, and to the Axius on the west. His son, Perdiccas II, inherited the abilities of his father, without inheriting his integrity.

Archelaus I, who succeeded to the throne, displayed an enlightened policy very beneficial to his kingdom. He facilitated communication between the principal towns of Macedon, by cutting straight roads through most parts of the country; he built walls and places of strength in the situations most favourable for that purpose; encouraged agriculture and the arts; formed magazines of arms; raised and disciplined a considerable body of cavalry; and added more to the solid grandeur of Macedon than had been done by all his predecessors. Nor was he regardless of the arts of peace. His palace was adorned by the works of Grecian painters. Euripides was long entertained at his court. Men of merit and genius, in all the various walks of literature and science, were invited to reside in Macedon, and treated with distinguished regard, by a monarch duly attentive to promote his own glory and the happiness of his subjects.

By his death, the prosperity of Macedon was interrupted for almost half a century, crowded by a succession of ten princes, or usurpers, whose history is a perpetual series of crimes and calamities. Amidst these disorders, the sceptre still remained in the family of Hercules, but almost every prince of the blood had an ambition to reign. In order to attain their purpose, the different competitors courted the assistance of the Thracians, of the Illyrians, of the Thessalians, of the Olynthian confederacy, of Athens, of Sparta, and of Thebes; and each of those powers endeavoured to turn to their own immediate profit the dissensions in Macedonia.

Passing over this period, we proceed to the reign of Philip. He was declared king of Macedon B. C. 360. His reign is an interesting spectacle to those who are delighted with surveying the active energies and resources of a vigo-

rous and comprehensive mind. From the age of fifteen he had lived chiefly in Thebes, in the family, and under the direction of Epaminondas. He visited the principal republics of Greece, whose institutions, in peace and war, he examined with a sagacity far superior to his years. The tactics of the Lacedæmonians were the first new establishment which he introduced into Macedon. Nor was the improvement of his knowledge the only fruit of his travels. In Athens, Philip acquired the friendship and esteem of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle, and the early connexion which he formed with the principal leaders of Athens, and the neighbouring republics, contributed, in no small degree, to the success of his future designs.

He availed himself of the affectionate admiration of his subjects, to establish such institutions as might maintain and extend his own power, and confirm the solid grandeur of Macedon. The laws and maxims which prevailed in the heroic ages, and which had been early introduced into that kingdom, circumscribed the royal authority within very narrow bounds. The chiefs and nobles, especially in the more remote provinces, regarded themselves as the rivals and equals of their sovereign. In foreign war they followed his standard, but they often shook his throne by domestic sedition; and we may discover several instances in which they disavowed their allegiance, and assumed independent government over considerable districts of the country. The moment of glory and success seemed the most favourable for extinguishing this dangerous spirit, and quashing the proud hopes of the nobles. In this design Philip proceeded with artful policy. From the bravest of the Macedonian youth he chose a select body of companions, who, being distinguished by honourable appellations, and entertained at the royal table, attended the king's person in war and in hunting. Their intimacy with the sovereign obliged them to use superior diligence in all the severe duties of a military life. These noble youths, animated with the hope of glory, vied with each other to gain admission into this distinguished order: and, while on one hand they served as hostages for the allegiance of their families, they formed, on the other,

a useful seminary of future generals, who, after conquering for Philip and Alexander, at length conquered for themselves, and divided the spoils of the ancient world.

The death of Agis, the most warlike chieftain of the Pæonians, drew Philip into the field, to revenge recent injuries, which those barbarians had inflicted on Macedon. He overran their country without resistance, carried off slaves and plunder, imposed a tribute on their chiefs, took hostages, and reduced Pæonia to an absolute dependence on Macedon.

The Pæonians were no sooner reduced, than Philip undertook a winter's campaign against Bardyllis and the Illyrians, the hereditary enemies of his family and kingdom. He marched towards the frontier of Illyria, at the head of ten thousand foot and six hundred horse. Illyria had been extended on the east to the prejudice of Macedon, which it totally excluded from the excellent harbours on the Adriatic. This was an important consideration to a prince who seems to have early meditated the raising of a naval power. Philip proceeded forward, with the caution necessary to be observed in an hostile territory. After a fruitless negociation, Bardyllis met him in the field, with an adequate body of infantry, but with only four hundred horse. The Macedonian phalanx attacked the Illyrian column in front, while the targeteers and light armed troops galled its flanks, and the cavalry harassed its rear. The Illyrians, thus surrounded on every side, were crushed between two opposite assaults, without having an opportunity to exert their full strength. Their resistance must have been vigorous, since seven thousand were left on the field of battle, and with them their gallant leader Bardyllis, who fell at the age of ninety, fighting bravely on horseback. The loss of their experienced chief, and of the flower of their youthful warriors, broke the strength and courage of the Illyrian tribes, who sent a deputation to Philip, humbly craving peace, and submitting their fortune to the will of the conqueror. Philip granted them the same terms which he had lately imposed on the Pæonians. That part of their country which lies east of the lake Lichnidus, he joined to Macedon. The town and lake of Lichnidus were fifty miles distant from the Ionian Sea, but

such was the ascendant that the arms and policy of Philip acquired over his neighbours, that the inhabitants of the intermediate districts soon adopted the language and manners of their conquerors, and their territory, hitherto unconnected with any foreign power, sank into such an absolute dependence on Macedon, that many ancient geographers considered it as a province of that country.

Having settled the affairs of Illyria, Philip returned home to pursue farther conquests. He had secured and extended the northern and western frontier of Macedon, but the rich southern shores, chiefly inhabited by Greeks, presented at once a more tempting prize and a more formidable enemy. The confederacy of Olynthus, having thrown off the yoke of Sparta, had become more powerful than ever. Most of the towns of Chalcidica had become its allies or subjects, and this populous and wealthy province, together with Pangæus on the right, and Pieria on the left, formed a barrier, sufficient, not only to guard the Grecian states against Macedon, but even to threaten the safety of that kingdom. Every motive concurred to direct the active policy of Philip towards acquisitions, immediately necessary in themselves, and essential to the completion of his remote purposes. In the course of twenty years he accomplished his designs, and conquered Greece; often varying his means; never changing his end; and, notwithstanding the circumstances and events that continually thwarted his ambition, we behold the opening and gradual progress of a vast plan, every step in which paved the way for that which followed, till the whole ended in the most signal triumph perhaps ever attained by human prudence over courage and fortune.

The importance of Olynthus and Chalcidica, could not divert the sagacity of Philip from Amphipolis, which he regarded as a more necessary, though less splendid conquest. The possession of Amphipolis, which would connect Macedon with the sea, and secure to that kingdom many commercial advantages, opened a road to the woods and mines of Mount Pangæus, the former of which was essential to the raising of a naval power, and the latter to the forming and keeping on foot a sufficient military force.

Philip marched rapidly towards Amphipolis, and pressed that city with a vigorous siege. The inhabitants, deeply affected by the near prospect of a calamity which they had taken little care to prevent, had recourse in their distress to Athens. Thither they dispatched two of their most distinguished citizens, to represent the danger of an alliance between Philip and Olynthus, and to intreat the Athenians to take Amphipolis under the protection of their fleet.

The Athenians treated the deputies of Amphipolis with little respect. The besieged city was thus deprived of all hopes of relief. Philip pressed the attack with new vigour. A breach was made in the walls, and the Amphipolitans, after an obstinate defence, surrendered at discretion.

The prudent Macedonian always preferred his own profit to the punishment of his enemies. It was his interest to preserve and to aggrandise, not to depopulate Amphipolis. He banished a few daring leaders, whose seditious or patriotic spirit might disturb the measures of his government. The bulk of the citizens were treated with sufficient mildness. Their territory was reunited to Macedon.

Philip, ever vigilant and active, pursued his conquests in Thrace, and penetrated to the town of Crenidæ, situated at the foot of Mount Pangæus, and distant ten miles from the sea. He admired the solitary beauty of the place, which produced the finest and most delicious fruit and flowers. But his attention was attracted by objects more important, by the gold mines in that neighbourhood, formerly wrought by colonies from Thasos and Athens, but totally neglected since the ignorant Thracians had become masters of Crenidæ. Philip expelled those barbarians from a possession which they seemed unworthy to hold. Having descended into the gold mines, he traced, by the help of torches, the decayed labours of the ancient proprietors. By his care the water was drained off, the canals were repaired, and the bosom of the earth was again opened and ransacked with eager avidity, by a prince who well knew the value of the precious metals. A Macedonian colony was planted at Crenidæ, which henceforth assumed the name of Philippi, a name bestowed also

on the golden coins struck by order of Philip, to the annual amount of nearly a thousand talents.

Having effected the main purpose of his Thracian expedition, the prudence of Philip set bounds to his conquests in that country, and carried his arms into Thessaly, which, by the murder of Alexander of Pheræ, was oppressed by three tyrants instead of one. These were Tissiphonus, Pitholaus, and Lycophron, the brothers-in-law, the assassins, and the successors of Alexander. The resentment of the Thessalians, and the valour of the Macedonian troops, totally defeated those oppressors of their country, who were reduced to such humiliating terms, as seemed sufficient to prevent them from being thenceforth formidable, either to their own subjects or to their neighbours. The Thessalians concluded, in the first emotions of their gratitude, an agreement with their deliver, by which they surrendered to him the revenues arising from their fairs and commercial towns, as well as all the conveniences of their harbours and shipping; and, extraordinary as this cession was, Philip found means to render it effectual and permanent.

He immediately contracted an alliance with Arybbas, king of Epirus, a small principality which skirted the western frontier of Thessaly. In his excursions from Thebes, Philip had early seen Olympias, the sister of that prince, whose wit and spirit, joined to the lively graces of her youth and beauty, had made a deep impression on his heart. But the active ambition which employed and engrossed the first years of Philip's reign, suspended his love till his expedition into Thessaly furnished a fresh opportunity for renewing his acquaintance with her. Their first subsequent interview naturally revived his tender passions; and, as the kings of Epirus were lineally descended from Achilles, the match appeared every way suitable. Arybbas readily yielded his consent, and the beautiful princess was conducted into Macedon.

The nuptials of Philip were solemnized at Pella with unusual pomp and splendour. Several months were destined to religious shows and processions, to gymnastic games and exercises, and to musical and dramatic entertainments. The voluptuous inactivity in which Philip seemed sunk, encoura-

ged the hopes of his enemies. The tributary princes of Pæonia and Illyria prepared to rebel; the king of Thrace concurred in their designs. This general conspiracy of neighbouring states might have repressed for a while the fortune of Macedon, if Philip had not been seasonably informed of the danger, by his faithful emissaries in those countries.

Early in the ensuing spring he took the field with the flower of the Macedonian troops. Parmenio, the general in whom he had most confidence, crushed the rebellion in Illyria. Philip was equally successful in Pæonia and Thrace. While he returned from the latter he was informed of the victory of Parmenio. A second messenger acquainted him, that his horses had gained the prize in the chariot races at the Olympic games; a victory which he regarded as far more honourable, and which he carefully commemorated by impressing a chariot on his coins. Almost at the same time, a third messenger arrived to tell him that Olympias had brought forth a prince at Pella, to whom, as born amidst such auspicious circumstances, the diviners announced the greatest prosperity and glory.

Such a rapid tide of good fortune did not overset the wisdom of Philip, if we may judge by the first authentic transaction which immediately followed. This was the correspondence with Aristotle. His first letter to the philosopher is written with a brevity which marks the king and the man of genius. "Know that a son is born to us. We thank the gods, not so much for their gift, as for bestowing it at a time when Aristotle lives. We assure ourselves that you will form him a prince, worthy of his father, and worthy of Macedon."—Aristotle commenced this illustrious employment about thirteen years afterwards, when the opening mind of Alexander might be supposed capable of receiving the benefit of his instructions. The success of his labours will be explained in the sequel. The fortune of Alexander surpassed that of all other conquerors. Yet the fame of the philosopher far surpassed that of his royal pupil. Sixteen centuries after the destruction of Alexander's empire, the writings of Aristotle continued to maintain an unexampled ascendancy over the opinions, and even over the actions of men.

Philip had now reigned almost five years. He had greatly enlarged the boundaries, he had still more augmented the revenues, of his kingdom. Pæonia, no longer the rival, was become an obsequious province of Macedon. At the expence of Thrace and Illyria, he had extended his frontier on the east to the sea of Thasos; on the west to the lake Lychnidus. He was master of Thessaly without having the trouble to govern it. He secured many commercial advantages by the possession of Amphipolis. His troops were numerous and well disciplined, his large finances were regulated with economy, and the mines of Philippi furnished him with an annual resource, alike useful to all his designs.

The first and most natural object of his desire was the territory of Olynthus, the most populous and fertile portion of the Macedonian coast. His second, and far more arduous purpose, was to obtain the sovereignty of Greece. But, instead of discovering these designs, he had hitherto carefully cultivated the friendship of the Olynthians, and had deserved their gratitude by many solid and important services. Philip was sensible, that by snatching too eagerly at this glorious prize, he might destroy for ever his prospect of obtaining it. While the Athenians were occupied by the destructive war with their confederates, he had, indeed, embraced the opportunity to gain possession of several of their dependent settlements in Thrace and Macedon, colouring, however, these proceedings by the pretence of justice or necessity; and tempering even his hostilities, by many partial acts of kindness and respect. Before the social war was ended, the seeds of dissension, so profusely scattered in Greece, were likely to ripen into a new quarrel far more general and important. Philip patiently waited their maturity. His hopes were founded on the domestic animosities of Greece; but the too early discovery of his system might have united a hundred thousand warriors against their common enemy; whereas, by the secret refinements of a slow and steady policy, he effected his vast purposes, without being obliged, on any one occasion, to fight against thirty thousand men.

About this time was kindled the sacred war, which lasted ten years, and cost the Phocians ten thousand talents. The

Amphictyons alleged, that the rights of religion had been materially violated by the Phocians, who had ploughed lands consecrated to Apollo, and therefore withdrawn from agriculture. The crime of the Phocians (if their useful labours deserve the name of crime) was neither great nor unprecedented. But the proud tyranny of the Amphictyons, careless of such distinctions, fulminated an angry decree against Phocis, commanding the sacred lands to be laid waste, and imposing a heavy fine on that community.

The Phocians were deeply affected by their danger. To pay the money demanded of them exceeded their power. It would be grievous to desolate the fields which their own hands had cultivated with so much toil. The commands of the Amphictyons were indeed peremptory; but that council had not any sufficient force to render them effectual, should the devoted objects of their vengeance venture to dispute their authority. This measure was strongly recommended by Philomelus, whose popular eloquence and valour gave him a powerful ascendant in Phocis. He possessed great hereditary wealth, contemned the national superstition, and, being endowed with a bold ambitious spirit, expected to rise, amidst the tumult of action and danger, to pre-eminence in his republic. After repeated deliberations, in which he flattered the vanity and tempted the avarice of his countrymen, by proving that to them of right belonged the guardianship of the Delphian temple, and the immense treasures contained within its sacred walls, he brought the majority of the senate and assembly into his opinion. As the properest instrument to execute his own measures, Philomelus was named general: the Phocian youth flocked to his standard; and his private fortune, as well as the public revenue, was consumed in purchasing the mercenary aid of those needy adventurers, who abounded in every province of Greece.

The following year was employed by Philomelus in providing arms, in exercising his troops, and in an embassy, which he undertook in person to Sparta. But Archidamus was unwilling to take a principal part in the first dangerous experiment, and to post himself in the front of battle, against

the revered decrees of an assembly, considered as the legal guardian of national religion and liberty. He assured Philomelus, that both himself and the Spartans fully approved his cause; that reasons of a temporary nature hindered their declaring themselves openly; but that he might depend on secret supplies of men and money.

Encouraged by this assurance, and by a considerable sum immediately put into his hands, Philomelus, at his return, ventured on a measure not less audacious than unexpected. The temple of Delphi, so awfully guarded by superstition, was scarcely defended by any military force. Philomelus, having prepared the imagination of his followers for this bold enterprise, immediately conducted them towards Delphi, defeated the feeble resistance of the Thracidæ, who inhabited the neighbouring district, and entered the sacred city with the calm intrepidity of a conqueror. The Delphians, who expected no mercy from a man devoid of respect for religion, prepared themselves, in silent horror, for beholding the complicated guilt of sacrilege and murder. But Philomelus dispelled their ill-grounded fears. He declared that he had come to Delphi with no hostile disposition against the inhabitants, with no sacrilegious designs against the temple. His principal motive was to emancipate them both from the arbitrary proceedings of the Amphictyons. To the same purpose he scattered declarations through the different republics of Greece. The Spartans and Athenians came to the resolution of supporting the measures of Philomelus.

The Thebans, on the other hand, determined to take the field in defence of their insulted religion and violated laws. Their operations were conducted with that extreme slowness natural to confederacies. Philomelus acted with more vigour: by imposing a heavy tax on the Delphians, who had been enriched by the devotion of Greece, and then by taking very uncommon liberties with the treasure of Apollo, he collected above ten thousand mercenaries, who sacrificed all scruples of religion to the hopes of dividing a rich spoil. Such at least was the general character of his followers. To the few who had more piety or less avarice, he endeavoured to justify his measures by the authority of an oracle. The pythia

at first refused to mount the sacred tripod. Philomelus sternly commanded her. She obeyed with reluctance; observing, that being already master of Delphi, he might act without sanction or control. Philomelus waited for no other answer, but gladly interpreted the words as an acknowledgement of his absolute authority.

Philomelus proceeded to fortify the temple and city of Delphi, in which he placed a strong garrison, and, with the remainder of his forces, boldly marched forth to repel the incursions of the enemy. During two years, hostilities were carried on with various fortune against the Locrians and Thebans. Victory for the most part inclined to the Phocians; but there happened not any decisive action, nor was the war memorable on any other account but that of the excessive cruelty mutually inflicted and suffered. The Phocian prisoners were uniformly condemned to death, as wretches convicted of the most abominable sacrilege and impiety; and the resentment of their countrymen retaliated with equal severity on the unhappy captives whom the chance of war frequently put into their hands.

As both armies anxiously expected reinforcements, they were unwilling to risk a general engagement, till at last chance rendered that measure unavoidable. Entangled among the woods and mountains of Phocis, the conveniency of forage attracted them towards the same point. The van-guards met unexpectedly near the town of Neon, and began to skirmish. A general and fierce action followed, in which the Phocians were repelled by superior numbers. Pathless woods, abrupt rocks and precipices, obstructed their retreat. In vain Philomelus strove, with his voice and arm, to rally the fugitives. He himself was carried along by the torrent to the brow of a precipice, afflicted with wounds, and still more with despair. The enemy advanced; it seemed impossible to escape their vengeance. The resolution of Philomelus was prompt and terrible: with a vigorous bound he sprang from the rock, thus eluding the resentment of his pursuers.

It appears extraordinary that the Thebans, after the defeat and death of Philomelus, should not have pursued their good fortune, without allowing the enemy time to recover strength.

They probably imagined, that the fatal exit of that daring chief would deter a successor; and that the Phocians would crave peace. Such indeed was the resolution of the more respectable part of the Phocians. But the bold, impious, and needy, who composed the most numerous description of that people, were bent on continuing the war. An assembly was convened, when Onomarchus, in a set speech, encouraged them to persevere. His opinion prevailed; he was named general; and his conduct soon proved, that he equalled his brother in boldness and ambition, and surpassed him in activity and enterprise. None better knew the power of gold, or had more address in employing it. With the Delphic treasure he coined such a quantity of money, as, perhaps, had never before circulated in Greece. The Phocian army was restored and augmented; their allies were rendered more hearty in their cause; even their enemies were not proof against the temptations which continually assailed their fidelity. By seasonable bribes Onomarchus distracted the councils of Thebes, and kept their arms inactive. The neighbouring states were persuaded to observe a neutrality, while the Thessalians, a people at all times noted for avarice and fraud, openly embraced the cause of Phocis.

These multiplied advantages were not allowed to languish in the hands of Onomarchus. At the head of a numerous and well-appointed army, he poured down on Locris and Doris; ravaged the country; took Thronium by storm; laid several cities under contribution; pierced into Bœotia; and made himself master of Orchomenus. The Thebans assembled their forces to stem the torrent. Onomarchus first met with a repulse before the walls of Chæronæa, and he ventured not to renew the engagement.

In Thessaly, the intrigues of Philip had counteracted the gold of Onomarchus. But Lycophron, who was the chief partisan of the latter, had again established himself in Pheræ. Pegasæ, Magnesia, and several places of less note, declared for the tyrant and for Phocis. The Macedonian interest prevailed elsewhere; and the factions were equally balanced, when Philip, with his usual diligence, entered Thessaly, defeated Phayllus, besieged and took Pegasæ, and drove the

enemy with disgrace towards the frontier of Phocis. The fear of losing his newly-acquired interest among the Thessalians made Onomarchus evacuate Bœotia, and advance against Philip with his whole army. The Macedonians, though less numerous, did not decline the engagement. At the first charge the Phocians gave way, and retreated towards the neighbouring mountains. Philip ordered his men to pursue in their ranks. Onomarchus, foreseeing that the Macedonians would follow in close order, had posted a detachment on the summit of a precipice, who were ready, on a given signal, to roll down fragments of rocks, and stones of an enormous size, on the embattled phalanx. The line of march, in which the moment before they proceeded with such firmness and confidence, was converted into a dreadful scene of carnage and ruin. Before they recovered from their consternation, the flying Phocians returned to the charge. Philip, however, rallied his men, and, while Onomarchus hesitated to advance, drew them off in good order, saying, that they did not retreat through fear, but retired like rams, in order to strike with the more impetuous vigour.

This saying was finally justified, although the Phocians and Lycophron first enjoyed a short triumph. The tyrant established himself, as he thought, securely, in his native city; the Phocians, reinforced by their Thessalian allies, again invaded Bœotia, assaulted and took Coronæa, and dreadfully alarmed the Thebans. But Philip, having recruited his army, returned into Thessaly. A considerable portion of the Thessalians received the king of Macedon as their deliverer.—Onomarchus, therefore, was obliged to withdraw his forces from Bœotia. At the head of twenty thousand foot, and five hundred horse, he marched to the defence of Lycophron, and was met by the enemy, still more numerous, on the level coast of Magnesia. To remind his soldiers that they fought in the cause of Delphi and of Heaven, Philip crowned their heads with the laurel, consecrated to Apollo, and adorned his ensigns and standards with the emblems and attributes of that divinity. Their onset was impetuous and fierce, and their valour, animated by enthusiasm, rendered them irresistible, though the enemy fought with the fury of despair. Three

thousand Thessalian cavalry rendered the pursuit bloody and destructive. Above six thousand perished in the battle, or in the pursuit. The body of Onomarchus was found among the slain: Philip ordered it to be hung on a gibbet, as a mark of peculiar infamy. The rest were thrown into the sea, as unworthy, by their impious sacrilege, of the rites of sepulture. Three thousand were taken alive; but it is not absolutely certain whether they were drowned or carried into captivity.

It might have been expected that such a decisive blow would have proved fatal to the Phocians. But Philip, who had conquered them in Thessaly, durst not pursue his advantage by invading Phocis; well knowing, that an attempt to pass the straits of Thermopylæ would alarm not only his enemies but his allies. It was his interest to perpetuate dissension in Greece. For that reason he fomented the discord that reigned among the states of Peloponnesus; and, though he had punished the obnoxious Phocians, he was unwilling to terminate a war, which diverted the public attention from watching his own ambitious designs. His victory over an odious enemy extended his just renown. He secured the dominion of Thessaly, by planting garrisons in Pheræ, Pegasæ, and Magnesia. His army was ready to march towards Greece, on the first favourable opportunity; but, till that should arrive, he rejoiced to see both divisions of that country involved in war, which allowed him to accomplish the subordinate purposes of his reign. He had long deceived the Olynthians by good offices and promises, but now began to throw off the mask, and to show that he meant to be their master. He actually applied to Kersobleptes, whom he detached from the interest of Athens; and, having raised him on the ruins of the neighbouring chieftains of Thrace, thereby obtained his confidence, and waited an occasion to destroy him with security. The dominions of that prince opened the way to Byzantium, the possession of which must have early tempted the ambition of Philip. He began to discover his designs against Byzantium by attacking the fortress of Heræum, which formed its principal ornament. The town of Heræum was small, and in itself unimportant; its harbour was dangerous and deceitful; but being situate contiguous to Byzan-

tium, it served as an outwork and defence to that rich and populous city.

The Athenians had sufficient penetration to discern the drift of those enterprizes. They formed an alliance with the republic of Olynthus; they warned Kersobleptes of his danger; and they voted a numerous fleet to sail to the defence of Heræum, or rather of Byzantium, with which they carried on a lucrative commerce. But these spirited exertions were not of long continuance. Philip's wound at Methone threw him into a dangerous malady. The report of his sickness was, before it reached Athens, magnified into his death. The Athenians rejoiced in so seasonable a deliverance, and, laying aside their naval preparations, bent their principal attention to the sacred war.

That unhappy contest was renewed by Phayllus, the brother of Philomelus, and Onomarchus. Phayllus availed himself to the utmost of the only resource which was left him. Having converted into ready money the most precious dedications of Delphi, he doubled the pay of his mercenaries. This extraordinary encouragement brought new adventurers to his standard, and soon rendered his army equal to that of either of his predecessors. The fugitive Thessalians, assembled in a body by Lycophron, entered into his pay. By means of the Delphic treasure, he acquired, likewise, the public assistance of a thousand Lacedæmonians, two thousand Achæans, five thousand Athenian foot, with four hundred cavalry. These powerful reinforcements enabled the Phocians to take the field with a good prospect of success.

Philip, meanwhile, had recovered from his indisposition. The votes and preparations of the Athenians had taught him that his designs could no longer be concealed. He was acquainted with the alliance formed between that republic and Olynthus. His emissaries gave him intelligence of the actual commotions in Greece, where the countenance and assistance of so many powerful states abetted the sacrilege of the Phocians. The occasion required that he should appear in favour of his allies, and in defence of the pious cause which he had formerly maintained with so much glory. His trophies were still fresh and blooming; and not only the

Thebans, Dorians, and Locrians, who were principals in the war, but the sincere votaries of Apollo in every quarter of Greece, secretly expected him as their deliverer: while his enemies admired his piety, and trembled at his valour; and, as they had been lately amused with the news of his sickness and death, they would now view with religious terror his unexpected appearance at Thermopylæ, to assert the violated rights of the Delphian temple. Such were the hopes and motives on which Philip, at the head of a numerous army, directed his march towards those celebrated straits.

But the event showed that on this occasion he had made a false estimate of the superstition or timidity of the Greeks, and particularly of the Athenians. That people penetrated his designs, and determined to oppose them. Under the veil of religious zeal, they doubted not that he concealed a desire to invade and conquer their country; and, on the first intelligence of this expedition, their foresight and patriotism represented the Macedonians, Thessalians, and Thebans pouring down like a destructive inundation on Attica and Peloponnesus. With an alacrity and ardour of which there was no recent example in their councils, they flew to arms, launched their fleet, sailed to Thermopylæ, and took possession of the straits.

Never did Philip meet with a more cruel disappointment, than in being thus anticipated by a people whom he had so often deceived. He retired with deep regret, leaving the Phocian war to be carried on by the Thebans and their allies. Meanwhile, the Athenians placed a guard at Thermopylæ; and called an assembly to deliberate on measures proper to restrain his ambition.

This assembly is rendered memorable by the first appearance of Demosthenes against Philip. Two years had elapsed since this illustrious orator began to appear on the theatre of public life. The Athenians were then involved in the sacred war; their northern possessions were continually insulted, plundered, or conquered by Philip; yet, in this situation of affairs, the mercenary partisans of that prince, in order to divert the public attention from his too aspiring designs, affected to extend their views to Asia, and to be alarmed by

the motions of Artaxerxes Ochus, who was preparing to reduce the rebels of Cyprus, Egypt, and Phœnicia. In every assembly of the people, the creatures of Philip dwelt, with exaggerated terror, on the naval and military preparations of the great king, which they represented as certainly destined to revenge the recent injuries committed by the Athenian troops on the coast of Asia; and the Athenians were exhorted to imitate the memorable exploits of their ancestors in the Persian war, which shed a lustre on all the succeeding periods of their history.

Isocrates the orator joined in this popular enthusiasm, together with the statesman and general, Phocion, two men whose talents and virtues would have done honour to the most illustrious age of the republic. The unblemished integrity of Isocrates, the disinterested poverty of Phocion, afford sufficient proof that neither of these great men were corrupted by Macedonian gold. But they both perceived that the indolence and unsteadiness of Athens were incapable of contending with the unceasing activity of Philip, and both exhorted their countrymen to gain and cultivate the friendship of a prince, against whom they could not make war with any reasonable prospect of success.

Isocrates, from the most accurate and extensive survey of the political history of Greece, discovered that a foreign war alone could heal the domestic dissensions which reigned in every quarter of that divided country; and, from a thorough knowledge of the inherent defects in the government of Thebes, Athens, and Sparta, he regarded Macedon as the state, and Philip as the general, best entitled, and best qualified, to assume the command of a military expedition into Asia, to revenge ancient wrongs, and to deliver the Grecian colonies from the actual oppression of barbarians. On this important subject he addressed a discourse to Philip; and he repeatedly insisted on the same topic with the Athenians.

The sentiments and views of Demosthenes were equally different from those of Isocrates and Phocion on the one hand, and from those of the infamous hirelings of Philip on the other. None knew better than he the corruption and degeneracy of his countrymen; but he hoped to rouse them

from their lethargy by his eloquence. His imagination was filled with the ancient glory of the republic; in the ardour of patriotism he forgot the moderation of philosophy; and he would rather have seen Athens defeated at the head of her allies, than victorious under the standard of the Macedonians, or any standard but her own. With such sentiments and character he was naturally a favourite of the people, and a warm partisan of popular government; while Phocion preferred a moderate aristocracy, and Isocrates was inclined to regard a well-regulated monarchy, as the best of all governments.

In his first speeches before the assembly, Demosthenes announces himself as the minister of the people at large, whom he exhorted to awaken from their indolence, and at length to assume the direction of their own affairs. From considerations of their present circumstances, and of the designs and commotions of neighbouring powers, he advised them to forsake all distant and romantic schemes of ambition: and to prepare for repelling the attacks that might be made against their own dominions. He insisted earnestly on a better regulation of their finances, on the retrenching of many superfluous branches of expence, and especially on a more equitable repartition of public burdens.

Subsequent events justified the opinions and enforced the counsels of Demosthenes. The Athenians were delivered from their ill-grounded fears of Artaxerxes Ochus, when they beheld the preparations of that monarch directed against his rebellious subjects. The encroachments of Philip became continually more daring and more formidable; and his recent attempts to seize the straits of Thermopylæ shewed the necessity of opposing him with vigour.

In this juncture, Demosthenes mounted the rostrum, and, after a short introduction, proceeded to observe—"Athenians, you ought not to despair. For the same circumstance which is the cause of your past misfortunes, ought to furnish the source of your present hope. What is that? Your own negligence and sloth, not the power of your enemies, have disordered the state. Had your distress arisen notwithstanding your utmost care to prevent it, there would then be

little hope of relief. But, since it is occasioned by your own misconduct, you need only repair your errors in order to retrieve your affairs. In the infancy of his fortune, had Philip reasoned timidly as we do now, 'How shall I, destitute of allies, attack the Athenians, whose garrisons command my frontier?' he would not have engaged in those enterprises which have been crowned with such signal success, nor raised his kingdom to such an unexampled pitch of grandeur. No, Athenians! he knew well, that towns and fortresses belong of right to the conqueror. Guided by these principles, he has subdued and governs all; holding some communities by right of conquest, and others under the titles of allies. But should you, Athenians! imitate the example of Philip, and apply seriously to your interest, you would speedily recover those advantages which your negligence only has lost. Favourable occasions will yet occur; for you must not imagine that Philip, like a god, enjoys his prosperity for ever fixed and immutable. No, Athenians! there are those who hate him, who fear him, who envy him, even among those who appear to be the most devoted to his cause. These are universal passions, from which the allies of Macedon are not exempted. They have hitherto concealed them, finding no resource in you; but it depends on your councils to call them into action. When, therefore, O my countrymen! when will you exert your vigour? What can be more urgent than the present juncture? To freemen, the most necessary of all motives is the shame of misconduct. Or, say, will it still be your sole business to saunter in the public places, enquiring after news? What can be more new, than that a Macedonian should conquer Athens, and enslave Greece? Is Philip dead? No, but in great danger. What matters it to you whether he is sick or dead, since, if you thus manage your affairs, your folly will soon raise up another Philip?"

After this animated remonstrance, Demosthenes proposed a plan of operations calculated chiefly for defence. The Athenians, he observed, were not yet prepared to meet Philip in the field. They must begin by protecting Olynthus and the Chersonesus from his incursions. Meanwhile preparations could be made at home for carrying on the war, in due time,

with more numerous forces and with greater vigour. Demosthenes required, that only the fourth part of the troops should consist of Athenian citizens; and the immediate supplies were only to amount to ninety talents. He knew that higher demands would alarm their indolence and love of pleasure. But so fatally were they sunk in the dissipated amusements of the city, that his good advice was in vain, and no preparations were made adequate to the public service.

The profound policy of Philip fostered the supine negligence of his enemies. For more than two years after his retreat from Thermopylæ, that crafty prince confined himself chiefly to his capital, anxious to dissipate the clamour occasioned by his too great precipitation to seize the gates of Greece. The greatest part of his time was spent at Pella in encouraging the arts of peace, which he munificently cherished. That favourite city was adorned with temples, theatres, and porticoes. The most ingenious artists of Greece were summmoned by liberal rewards to the court of Macedon; and men of talents and genius were received with open arms by a prince, who, amidst the tumult of war, assiduously cultivated the studies of literature and eloquence. In his domestic government, Philip administered justice with impartiality, listened with condescension to the complaints of his meanest subjects, and, disdaining the forbidden pomp of tyranny, maintained an intercourse of visits and entertainments with his courtiers and generals.

In a prince so respectably employed, it is difficult to conceive the odious and detestable vices with which Philip is upbraided by Demosthenes; but the charges are supported by the testimony of Theopompus, a writer who flourished in the age of Alexander, by whom we are informed, that Philip sullied his great actions by the most enormous and detestable crimes. Alike avaricious and prodigal, the wealth which he had amassed by injustice and rapacity, he dissipated in the most flagitious gratifications. His companions were chosen promiscuously from Macedonians and Greeks, and especially from Thessalians, the most profligate of the Greeks, and were admitted to his familiarity and friendship

in proportion to their proficiency in the most odious and unnatural abominations. We must, doubtless, make allowances for the gall of a writer noted to a proverb for severity. Yet there is sufficient collateral evidence, that Philip's strong propensity to low wit, obscenity, and drunkenness, rendered him a prey to buffoons, parasites, and flatterers, and all the worthless retinue of intemperance and folly. These disgraceful associates of the prince formed, in time of war, a regiment of about eight hundred men, whose gradual waste was continually recruited by new members, who either were, or soon became, worthy of the old; for the whole band were alike cowardly and profligate.

But in whatever manner Philip employed his private hours, he at no time lost sight of those great principles of policy which regulated his public administration. Under pretence of wanting money to supply the expense of his public works, he employed an expedient, which, in latter times, has been carried to such excess as threatens the safety of those governments which it was intended to uphold. The letting loose of the Delphic treasures had diffused near a million sterling over Greece. From the rich and avaricious, Philip employed proper agents to take up money at high interest, which procured him two advantages of a very important kind, the attaching to his government and person a numerous and powerful band of creditors; and the enabling him to pay, under the title of debts, and therefore without suspicion, the various pensions and gratuities by which he maintained his influence among the orators and leading men in the several republics.

The Athenians, deceived by the inactivity of the king of Macedon, indulged themselves without reserve in their favourite amusements. Magistrates and people seemed only attentive to regulate public festivals and processions, and to ascertain the respective merit of dramatic poets and performers. The fund originally intended for the exigencies of war had already been appropriated to the theatre, and a law was now enacted, on the motion of Eubulus, an artful flatterer of the multitude, rendering it a capital crime to propose altering this unexampled destination. It was in vain

for Demosthenes to resist the popular torrent. He was opposed and overcome by Eubulus and Demades, the latter of whom, with talents that might have adorned his country, condescended to sell its interests to the public enemy.

Born in the lowest condition of life, Demades retained the vices of his birth; and always discovered that sordid spirit, and weltered in those brutal excesses, which betray the want of early culture. Yet the acuteness of his apprehension, the strength of his reason and memory, and, above all, the bold and copious flow of his unpremeditated eloquence, raised him to a conspicuous rank in the assembly; and it being his business, as the hireling of Philip, to sail along with the stream of popular frenzy, he enjoyed a free and ample scope for exercising his abilities.

The people of Athens triumphed in the victory of perfidious demagogues over the wisest and best of their fellow citizens, when Philip began to play those batteries which he had patiently raised with such skill and secrecy. The island of Eubœa was the first object of his attack. Since the expulsion of the Thebans, the Athenians had preserved their interest in the island, where they maintained a small body of troops. The different cities, however, enjoyed the independent government of their own laws; they appointed their own magistrates; they sometimes made war against each other; and separately assumed the prerogatives of free and sovereign states, while they all collectively acknowledged their dependence on Athens. Such political arrangements made room for the intrigues of Philip. He fomented their civil discord; gained partisans in each city; and, at length, under colour of protecting his allies, landed several Macedonian battalions in the island.

Matters were soon disposed to his wish. The Macedonians were allowed to occupy the most advantageous posts. The Athenian party exclaimed and threatened; but Plutarch, the leader of that party, was gained to the interests of Philip, and demanded auxiliaries from Athens, only to betray them into the hands of their enemies. Demosthenes, who alone penetrated this dark scheme of villainy, entreated and conjured his countrymen to put no confidence in Plutarch.

But he was single in his opinion. The emissaries of Philip were true to their master, and therefore urged the expedition. The friends of their country were eager to save the isle of Eubœa. The promptitude and vigour of their preparations much exceeded the expectation, and even alarmed the fears of the Macedonian faction. The Athenians, in fact, obtained a decisive victory, not by the strength of their arms, which was inferior to the enemy's, but by the wise choice of a general.

The consummate prudence of Phocion, who, on his arrival in Eubœa found things in a worse state than had been represented, risked no chance of defeat, and lost no opportunity of advantage. Having chosen a favourable post, he despised the clamours of his men, and the insults of the enemy. The treacherous Plutarch was quickly defeated in a mock battle, in which he fell back on the Athenian cavalry, who fled in disorder to the camp of Phocion. The Eubœans and Macedonians pursued with a rash and intemperate ardour; and, elated with victory, and confident in their superior numbers, prepared to assail the camp. Phocion, meanwhile, performed a sacrifice, which he studiously prolonged until he beheld the disorder of the assailants embarrassed by their own rashness. He then commanded his men to stand to their arms, and sallying from his entrenchments, increased the confusion of the enemy, who were repelled with great slaughter, towards the plain which they had at first occupied. The remains of the vanquished took refuge in the fortress of Zeratra, in the northern corner of the island, which, being attacked, made a feeble resistance. The garrison surrendered; but Phocion restored all the Eubœans to liberty. Having spent a few weeks in settling the affairs of the island, he returned in triumph to Athens. His fellow citizens received him with acclamations of joy; but their imprudence did not allow them to reap the fruits of his success. Molossus, an obscure stranger, was appointed by cabal to command the troops left in the island; and Philip, having renewed his intrigues, met with far better success.

Philip's disappointment in Eubœa only stimulated his activity. His toils were spread so widely all around him, that

when one part failed he could catch his prey in another. The Olynthians were astonished to observe that several of their citizens grew rich and great in a manner equally sudden and unaccountable. The unexpected invasion of Philip revealed the mystery. A considerable party had grown wealthy by betraying the secrets, and fostering the ill-timed security of their country. Their influence at home had recommended them to Philip, and the wages of their iniquity had increased that influence. It would not probably have been difficult to prove their treason, but it seemed dangerous to punish it; and the Olynthians were more immediately concerned to repel the open ravagers of their territory. In this emergency, they sent an embassy to Athens, inveighing in the strongest terms against Philip, who had first courted, then deceived, and at last invaded and attacked them; and craving assistance from the Athenians.

Had the people of Athens heartily undertaken the cause of Olynthus, Philip would have been exposed a second time to great danger. But Philip possessed strenuous abettors of his power within the walls of Athens and Olynthus. Above all, the indolence and vices of his enemies were most favourable to his cause. The late success in Eubœa, which should have animated a brave and generous people to new exertions and dangers, only served to replunge the Athenians into a slothful security. While they enjoyed their theatrical entertainments, their shows, and festivals, and all the ease and luxury of a city life, they were little inclined to engage in any enterprize that might disturb the tranquil course of their pleasures. In this disposition they were encouraged by their perfidious orators, who strongly exhorted them to beware of involving themselves in the danger of Olynthus. The orator Demades particularly distinguished his zeal in the Macedonian interest; advising an absolute and total rejection of the demands of the Olynthian ambassadors.

Demosthenes at length arose, and, as the design of calling the assembly had been already explained, entered immediately on the question under deliberation. "I am of opinion," said he, "that, fearless of consequences, you ought to assist Olynthus with the utmost celerity and vigour. But take

care, Athenians! that your ardour evaporate not in resolutions and decrees. Be ready to pay your contributions; prepare to take the field; show yourselves in earnest; and you will soon discover the internal and concealed infirmity of Macedon itself. That kingdom has emerged from obscurity amidst the contests of neighbouring states, during which the smallest weight put into either scale is sufficient to incline the balance. But in itself Macedon is inconsiderable and weak, and its real weakness is increased by the splendid but ruinous expeditions of Philip. For the king and his subjects are actuated by very different sentiments. Governed by ambition, he disregards ease and safety; but his subjects, who individually have little share in the glory of his conquests, are indignant, that, for the sake of one man, they should be harassed by continual warfare, and withdrawn from those occupations and pursuits, which afford the comforts and happiness of private life. On the great body of his people, Philip, therefore, can have no reliance, nor can he depend more on his mercenaries. None of Philip's guards, even those whom he treats with the affectionate, but deceitful names of companions and fellow soldiers, can merit his esteem. The odious vices of this monster drive from his presence, all who are disgusted at the most unnatural enormities; and his court is continually crowded by buffoons, parasites, obscene poets, and drunkards. The dangerous defects of his character, are hid in the blaze of prosperity; but when misfortune happens, his native deformity will appear. The glory of foreign conquest conceals the vices and defects of republics and monarchies; but let calamity happen, let the war be carried to their frontiers, and those hitherto latent evils immediately become manifest.

"If there is a man among you, Athenians! who thinks that Philip is a formidable enemy because he is fortunate, I agree with that man. Fortune has a mighty influence, or rather fortune alone domineers in human affairs. Yet could you be persuaded to do but the smallest part of your duty, I would greatly prefer your fortune to Philip's: for *you*, surely, have better reason to trust in the assistance of Heaven. But we remain inactive, hesitating, delaying, and delibe-

rating, while our enemy takes the field, braving seasons and dangers, and neglecting no opportunity of advantage. And if the indolent and careless are abandoned by their best friends, can we expect that the gods, however favourable, should assist us, if we will not help ourselves?"

The people of Athens, animated to their duty on the one hand by Demosthenes, and seduced on the other by the hirelings of Philip and their own passions, imprudently started a middle course, which in public affairs is often the most dangerous. Convinced that the preservation of Olynthus was the best safeguard of Attica, yet unwilling to tear themselves from their beloved pleasures, they determined to send Chares, with a fleet and two thousand mercenaries, to the assistance of their allies. This commander, who was the idol of the multitude, but the disgrace of his country, shewed no solicitude to protect the dependencies of Olynthus, which successively submitted to the Macedonian arms. To gratify the rapacity of his troops, he made a descent on the fertile coast of Pallené, where, falling in with eight hundred men commanded by Audæus, called the friends of Philip, he obtained an easy and ludicrous victory, which served to employ the comic poets of the times. Having gained this advantage, Chares became unwilling to try his fortune in any severer conflict, returned home, and celebrated his triumph over the vain, boastful, and voluptuous Audæus.

The thoughtless multitude, who judged of the expedition of Chares by the expensive pomp with which he entertained them at his return, talked extravagantly of invading Macedon, and chastising the insolence of Philip, when a second embassy arrived from Olynthus. The inhabitants of this place had been shut up within their walls; they had lost Stagyra, Miciberna, Toroné, cities of considerable strength, besides many inferior towns, which, on the first appearance of Philip, were forward to receive his bribes, and to open their gates. This shameful venality, in places well provided for defence, made the king of Macedon observe to his generals, that he would thenceforth consider no fortress as impregnable, which could admit a mule laden with money. Dejected by continual losses, the Olynthians turned their thoughts to

negociation, that they might at least amuse the invader till the arrival of the Athenian succours. Philip penetrated their design, and dexterously turned their arts against them; affecting to lend an ear to their proposals, but meanwhile continuing his approaches, till having got within forty stadia of their walls, he declared that of two things one was necessary, either *they* must leave Olynthus, or *he* Macedon. This explicit declaration from an enemy, who often flattered to destroy, but who might always be believed when he threatened, convinced the Olynthians of what they had long suspected, that their utter ruin was at hand. They endeavoured to retard the fatal moment by a vigorous sally, but were repulsed, and obliged to take refuge in the city.

In this posture of affairs, the ambassadors sailed for Athens, and having arrived there, found, to their utter astonishment, the multitude still enjoying the imaginary triumph of Chares.

Demosthenes again undertook to second the demands of Olynthus. But the assembly remained insensible to the motives of interest and honour. Instead of taking the field in person, they sent to Olynthus four thousand foreign infantry, with a hundred and fifty horse, under the command of Charidemus. This unworthy general gratified the rapacity of his troops by ravaging the Macedonian province of Bottiæa, on the confines of Chalcis. At length, however, he threw his forces into Olynthus; and the besieged, encouraged by this reinforcement, hazarded another sally, in which they were defeated and repelled with considerable loss. The Athenian mercenaries were rendered every day more contemptible by their cowardice, and more dangerous by their licentiousness. The beastly Charidemus had neither inclination nor ability to restrain their irregularities. According to his custom, he drank at every meal to a scandalous excess; and such was his impudent and abandoned profligacy, that he demanded of the senate, as a reward for his pretended services, a beautiful Macedonian youth, then captive in the city.

In this state of affairs, the Olynthians a third time applied to Athens. Demosthenes again exhorted and conjured his countrymen to send to Olynthus an army of citizens, and at

the same time to make a diversion by invading the Macedonian coast.

The arguments of Demosthenes prevailed; and it was determined to assist the Olynthians with an army of Athenian citizens. But before this resolution could be carried into effect Olynthus was no more. The conqueror entered in triumph, plundered and demolished the city, and dragged the inhabitants into servitude.

The conquest of Olynthus put Philip in possession of the region of Chalcis and the northern coast of the Ægean sea; an acquisition of territory which rendered his dominions on that side round and complete. His kingdom was now bounded on the north by the Thracian possessions of Kersobleptes, and on the south by the territory of Phocis, a province comprehending the straits of Thermopylæ, which had formerly belonged to a different division of Greece. Besides the general motives of interest which prompted him to extend his dominions, he discerned the peculiar importance of acquiring the Thermopylæ and the Hellespont, since the former was emphatically styled the Gates of Greece, and the latter formed the only communication between that country and the fertile shores of the Euxine.

After the destruction of Olynthus, Philip celebrated a public festival of gratitude and joy, at the neighbouring town of Dium; to which, as at the Olympian and other Grecian games, all the republics were promiscuously invited, whether friends or enemies. The magnificent entertainments lasted nine days, in honour of the nine muses, and wanted no object of elegance or splendour that art could produce or wealth could purchase. The politeness and condescending affability of Philip obliterated the remembrance of his recent severity to Olynthus; and his liberal distribution of the spoils of that unfortunate city gained him new friends, and confirmed the attachment of his old partizans.

Amidst the scenes of rejoicing and festivity, Philip seems not to have forgotten one moment the immediate object of his policy. He began to attack the Athenians on their favourite element. His fleet ravaged their tributary islands of Lemnos and Imbros; surprised and took a squadron of

Athenian vessels stationed on the southern coast of Eubœa,—and, encouraged by these advantages, boldly sailed to Attica, made a descent on the shores of Marathon, repelled the Athenian cavalry, ravaged the territory, and carried off the Salaminian galley. Thence they proceeded to the isle of Salamis, and defeated a considerable detachment commanded by Charidemus.

The activity of Philip seconded his good fortune. His intrigues were renewed in Eubœa. Under pretence of delivering the island from the tyranny and extortions of Molossus, the Athenian commander, he landed such a body of troops there, as proved sufficient, with the assistance of his adherents, to expel the Athenians. At this juncture, secret but zealous partizans of Macedon arrived at Athens, as ambassadors from Eubœa, commissioned to settle amicably all differences between the two countries. They observed that Philip had left the island absolutely free and independent; and that he was sincerely desirous of making peace with the Athenians. The representations of the Eubœan ambassadors were enforced by the influence of two Athenians, Aristodemus and Neoptolemus, the first distinguished as a player, the second as a player and poet, who, having acquired fortunes in Macedon, returned to their own country to forward the measures of their liberal protector. They affirmed that the king of Macedon earnestly wished to live on good terms with the republic; and the Athenians paid much regard to men whose talents were then highly esteemed, and who had remitted the riches amassed in a foreign country to purchase lands in Attica, and to supply with alacrity the exigencies of the public service.

Demosthenes saw through these dark and deep artifices. The Greeks had full warning of their danger. The miserable fate of Olynthus was brought before their view. An eye-witness reported, that he had seen thirty young Olynthians, of both sexes, driven like a herd of cattle, as a present from Philip to some of the unworthy instruments of his ambition.

The susceptible and ever varying temper of the multitude was deeply affected. War and revenge again echoed through

the assembly. The Athenian youth were assembled to swear irreconcilable hatred against Philip and the Macedonians; and the most awful imprecations were denounced against the mercenary traitors who co-operated with the public enemy. Had Philip possessed only an ordinary degree of vigilance, a confederacy might have been yet formed in Greece, sufficient so repel the Macedonian arms. But that consummate politician thought nothing done while any thing was neglected; and, as he allowed not the slightest opportunity to pass unimproved, he often derived very important benefits from seemingly inconsiderable causes.

At the sack of Olynthus, Stratocles and Eucrates, two Athenians of distinction, had been seized and carried into Macedon. By some accident these men had not been released with the other prisoners. Their relations were uneasy for their safety, and therefore applied to the Athenians, that a proper person might be sent to treat for their ransom. Aristodemus was employed in this commission, but was more attentive to paying his court than performing his duty; and at his return home, neglected to give an account of his negociation. Philip, meanwhile, whose vigilance never slept, and who well knew the hostile resolutions in agitation against him at Athens, released the prisoners without ransom, and dismissed them with the highest expressions of regard. Moved by gratitude, Stratocles appeared in the assembly, blazed forth the praises of the king of Macedon, expatiated on the candour and benevolence of Philip, and especially on his profound respect for the republic, with which, he assured them, the king of Macedon was earnest to conclude a peace, and even to enter into an alliance, on the most honourable and advantageous terms. The calamities of the war had long inclined to peace the more moderate and judicious portion of the assembly. The artificial generosity of Philip in his treatment of Phrynon and Strotocles, blazoned by the eloquence of Aristodemus, fixed the wavering irresolution of the multitude. The military preparations were suspended. Even Demosthenes and Æschines yielded to the torrent; and imagining that a bad peace was better than a bad war, supported a decree of Philocrates for sending a herald and am-

bassadors to discover the real intentions of Philip, and to sift those terms of accommodation with which he had so long amused them.

The ministers appointed to this commission seem to have been purposely chosen among men of opposite principles, who might mutually be checks on each other. They were ten in number; among them was Demosthenes, and also Æschines. In describing the events which followed the departure of these ambassadors, all is inconsistency and contradiction. The quarrel that arose between Æschines and Demosthenes, the former of whom was impeached by the latter, furnishes us, in the accusation and defence, with the fullest and most diffuse materials that present themselves in any passage of Grecian history. The whole train of the negociation, as well as the events connected with it, are represented in colours the most discordant: facts are asserted and denied; while both parties appeal to the memory of the assembly before which they spoke, to the testimony of witnesses, and even to the evidence of public decrees and records; circumstances that must appear very extraordinary, unless we consider that suborning of witnesses, perjury and even the falsifying of laws and records, were crimes not unusual at Athens. Amidst this confusion, the discerning eye of criticism would vainly endeavour to penetrate the truth.

Upon their return home, though the ambassadors differed in almost every thing else, they all expatiated on the politeness, condescension, eloquence, and abilities of the prince, with whom their republic was ready, not only to negociate a peace, but to contract an alliance. Demosthenes at length arose, and offered a decree for convening an extraordinary assembly to deliberate on the peace and the alliance.

The decree was proposed on the eighth of March, and the assembly was fixed for the seventeenth of the same month. In the interval, three ambassadors arrived from Philip. They were received with great distinction by the senate. Having been introduced on the appointed day into the assembly, they declared the object of their commission: to conclude in the name of their master a peace and alliance with the people of Athens. Demosthenes urged the expediency of listening

to their demands, but without neglecting the interest of the Athenian allies. Æschines delivered the same opinion.

Demosthenes and the assembly in general saw the necessity of immediately ratifying the peace with Philip. A decree was proposed for this purpose, and ambassadors were named, who might, with all convenient speed, repair to Philip, in order mutually to give and receive the oaths and ratifications of the treaty just concluded at Athens. The ambassadors were Eubulus, Æschines, Clesiphon, Democrates, and Cleon, the principal of whom, being entirely devoted to the Macedonian interest, contrived under various pretences to delay their departure. Other subsequent delays were interposed, and nothing beneficial to Athens was practically effected. By bribery, deception, and crafty policy, Philip carried all his schemes with the different states for his own aggrandisement.

The sacred war, for more than two years, had been carried on between the Phocians on one side, and the Thebans and Locrians on the other, by such petty incursions and ravages, as indicated the inveterate rancour of combatants, who still retained the desire of hurting, after they had lost the power. The treasures of Delphi, immense as they were, at length began to fail. The Phocians, thus abandoned and exhausted, reflected with terror and remorse on their past conduct; and, in order to make atonement for their sacrilegious violation of the temple, instituted a judicial inquiry against Phaleucus, their general, and his accomplices in plundering the dedications to Apollo. Several were condemned to death; Phaleucus was deposed, and the Phocians, having performed these substantial acts of justice, which tended to remove the odium that had long adhered to their cause, solicited the assistance of Sparta and Athens, but were disappointed. Their fate was finally determined by the Amphictyonic council, to the decisions of which that credulous people consented to submit, well knowing that Philip, who had entered Greece at the head of a numerous army, might easily control the resolutions of the Amphictyons; and fondly believing that prince to be their friend, for he had promised to plead their cause before that body. The Locrians, Thebans, and Thes-

sadians alone composed the assembly that was to decide the fate of Phocis, a country which they had persecuted, with unrelenting hostility, in a war of ten years. The sentence was such as might be expected from the cruel resentment of the judges. It was decreed that the Phocians should be excluded from the general confederacy of Greece, and for ever deprived of the right to send representatives to the council of Amphictyons; that their arms and horses should be sold for the benefit of Apollo; that they should be allowed to keep possession of their lands, but compelled to pay annually from their produce, the value of sixty thousand talents, till they had completely indemnified the temple; that their cities should be dismantled, and reduced to distinct villages, containing no more than sixty houses each, at the distance of a furlong from each other; and that the Corinthians, who had recently given them some assistance, should therefore be deprived of the presidency at the pythian games, which important prerogative, together with the superintendance of the temple of Delphi, as well as the right of suffrage in the Amphictyonic council, lost by the Phocians, should thenceforward be transferred to the king of Macedon.

This extraordinary decree, when communicated to the Phocians, filled that miserable people with such terror and dismay, as rendered them totally incapable of acting with vigour or with union. They took no common measures for repelling the invader; a few cities only, more daring than the rest, endeavoured with unequal strength to defend their walls, their temples, and the revered tombs of their ancestors. Their feeble resistance was soon overcome; all opposition ceased; and the Macedonians proceeded to execute the will of the Amphictyonic council with inflexible cruelty. The wretched Phocians beheld the destruction of their ancient monuments and trophies; their proud walls levelled with the ground; the fertile banks of the divine Cephissus covered with ruin and desolation; and the venerable cities of Daulis, Penopeus, Silæa, and Hyampolis, which had flourished above nine centuries in splendour and prosperity, and which will ever flourish in the song of Homer, so totally burned or demolished, as scarcely to leave a vestige of their existence,

After this terrible havoc, the inhabitants were driven, like herds of cattle, to the settlements allotted for them, and compelled to cultivate their paternal fields for the benefit of stern and unrelenting masters.

The unexpected news of these melancholy events reached Athens in five days. The dreadful intelligence filled them with consternation. They imagined that they already beheld the destructive armies of Macedon and Thessaly poured in upon their northern frontier, and overwhelming the whole country with havoc and desolation. A decree immediately passed, which marked the utmost danger and dismay. It was resolved, "that the Athenians who usually resided in the country, should be summoned to the defence of the city; that those within the distance of twelve miles round, should, along with their persons, transport their most valuable effects into the city or the Piræus; that those at a greater distance should respectively convey themselves and their property to the nearest fortresses."

Reluctantly cooped up within their walls, they called aloud for arms; levies were prepared for the relief of Phocis, and their admiral, Proxenus, was ordered again to direct his course towards that country. The king of Macedon was duly attentive to those transactions. He therefore wrote a letter to the Athenians, in that style of superiority which the success of his policy and of his arms entitled him to assume. After acquainting them with his treatment of the Phocians, he mentions his being informed of their preparations for supporting that impious people. He exhorts them to lay aside this unwarrantable design; and informs them, that if they persisted, he was prepared to repel their hostilities with equal firmness and vigour.

This letter was received at the same time that the Athenian ambassadors brought such accounts of the destruction of the Phocians, that it appeared scarcely possible to afford them any relief. All that remained was to save from the unrelenting vengeance of their enemies the miserable wreck of that unfortunate community. The Athenians passed a decree for receiving the fugitives with kindness, and for providing them with settlements in Attica, or in the foreign de-

pendencies of the republic; a resolution, which, though it was founded on the most evident duties of gratitude and humanity towards ancient and faithful allies, gave great offence to the inexorable cruelty of the Thessalians and Thebans.

Having finished the sacred war in a manner so favourable to his own interest and ambition, Philip convened the members of the Amphictyonic council, and assisted in the hymns, prayers, and sacrifices, offered to Apollo in acknowledgement of his divine protection of their councils and arms. The name of the pious king of Macedon, who had been the principal instrument of their success, resounded in the sacred pæans sung in honour of the god. The Amphictyons ratified all the transactions of that prince, erected his statue in the temple of Delphi, and acknowledged, by a solemn decree, the kingdom of Macedon as the principal member of the Hellenic body. Philip at the same time appointed deputies to preside at the pythian games, the celebration of which was nearly approaching, and to which most of the Grecian states had already sent their representatives. The Athenians, stung with indignation and regret, abstained from this festival. An embassy was therefore despatched to them, in the name of the Amphictyons, requiring their concurrence with the measures recently embraced by the general council of Greece.

The deliberations of the Athenian assembly on this occasion showed the full extent of their folly, and evinced the consummate policy of Philip. They acknowledged that the time of acting with vigour and boldness was now no more; that the cause of Greece was an empty name, since the Greeks surrendered their dignity to the king of Macedon; and that it became their own republic to consult rather its safety than its honour, and to maintain peace with a monarch against whom they were by no means prepared to wage war. Even Demosthenes recommended this resolution: "lest," says he, "we should offend those now assembled, who call themselves the Amphictyons, and thus excite a general war against ourselves. If we refuse the demands of Philip and the Amphictyons, they may assault us with their combined arms, which we are totally unable to resist." This opinion was universally

approved; Macedon was acknowledged a member of the Grecian confederacy; and Isocrates addressed a discourse to Philip, in which he exhorted him to disdain inglorious victories over his countrymen and friends, and to direct the united efforts of that country, of which Macedon now formed a part, against the wealth and effeminacy of Persia, its ancient and natural enemy.

Whether these exhortations, which it was hoped would prevent the hostile projects of Macedon, proceeded from simplicity or from policy, the measures of Philip were taken with too much care, and his plans founded too deep, to be shaken by the specious eloquence of a rhetorician. He had long meditated the invasion of Asia; the conquest of the Persian empire was an object that might well tempt his ambition; but neither his own passions nor the arguments of other men could hasten, retard, or vary his undeviating progress in a system, which could only be completed by consolidating his ancient, before he attempted new conquests.

Philip had obtained more important advantages by his intrigues, than he could have gained by a long series of victories. The conquest of Greece was his object, he had taken many preliminary measures towards effecting this purpose, while his conduct, so far from exciting the jealousy of those fierce republics, acquired their admiration and gratitude. It seemed high time, therefore, to withdraw his army, and set bounds for the present to his own triumphs. Before evacuating Greece, he took care to place a strong garrison in Nicæa, which might thenceforth secure his free passage through the straits of Thermopylæ. Macedonian troops occupied the principal cities of Thessaly, and the strongest posts of Phocis. He conducted with him into Macedon eleven thousand Phocian captives, an acquisition which he regarded as not the least valuable fruits of his success.

The warlike tribes of Thrace, though often vanquished, had never been thoroughly subdued. In order to bridle the dangerous fury of those northern barbarians, Philip built two cities, Philippopolis and Cabyla, above a hundred and fifty miles distant from each other, and almost equally remote from the Macedonian capital. The Phocian captives, blend-

ed with a due proportion of Macedonian subjects, were sent to people and cultivate those new settlements, whose flourishing condition soon exceeded the expectation of their founder. At the same time Philip planted a colony in the isle of Thasos.

In such occupations Philip employed the first year of the peace. The year following, he made an expedition into Illyria, and, at the expense of that country, extended his dominions from the lake Lichnidus to the Ionian Sea. This district, about sixty miles in breadth, was barbarous and uncultivated, but contained valuable salt mines, which had occasioned a bloody war between two neighbouring tribes. While Philip was absent in Illyria, an embassy arrived from Ochus, king of Persia, who, alarmed by the magnificent reports of the growing greatness of Macedon, sent the most trusty of his ministers, who, under pretence of offering to Philip the friendship and alliance of the great king, might examine with their own eyes the strength and resources of a monarch which were represented as so formidable.

In the absence of his father, the young Alexander did the honours of the court; and it is said, that, during an entertainment given to the Persian ambassadors, the prince, who had not yet reached his twelfth year, discovered such manly and premature wisdom, as already announced the dawn of a very extraordinary character.

Philip had no sooner returned from Illyria than he made an excursion to Thessaly, and finally settled the affairs of that distracted country, having taken on himself the whole management of the revenue, and having divided the territory into four separate governments in order to render the whole province more patient and submissive under the dominion of Macedon. While Philip was thus employed in Thessaly, his agents were not less active in confirming the Macedonian authority in the isle of Eubœa. Nor was he satisfied with securing his former acquisitions; he aspired also to new conquests. The barren and rocky territory of Megara divided, by an extent of only ten miles, the frontier of Bœotia from the isthmus of Corinth. The industrious and frugal simplicity of this little republic could not defend its virtue against the corrupt influence of the Macedonian. Philip

gained a party in Megara, which he cultivated with peculiar care; because, being already master of Bœotia, Phocis, and Thessaly, the narrow territory of the Megarians formed the chief obstacle to his free passage into the Peloponnesus, the affairs of which, at this juncture, particularly deserved his attention.

The Lacedæmonians, for some time past, had confined their politics and their arms within the narrow circle of their own peninsula. For almost two years, Archidamus had laboured to extend the pretensions and the power of Sparta over the territories of Messené, Argos, and Arcadia. His measures were attended with success: though the inhabitants of the dependent provinces impatiently bore the yoke of a republic which they had formerly spurned as oppressive and intolerable. Their murmurs and discontents were inflamed into hostility by the Thebans, the eternal enemies of Sparta, and at that time closely allied with the king of Macedon. To this monarch the Thebans applied, requesting him not to permit the destruction of their confederates in the Peloponnesus. The intrigues and money of Philip had already gained him a considerable influence in that country, which he was glad of an opportunity to increase. To justify his proceedings, for this purpose, he procured a decree of the Amphictyonic council, requiring him to check the insolence of Sparta, and to protect the defenceless communities which had so often been the victims of their tyranny and cruelty. Encouraged by this decree, and impelled by his own ambition, Philip sent troops and money into the Peloponnesus, and prepared to march thither in person at the head of a powerful army.

These transactions excited new alarms throughout most countries of Greece. The Corinthians, jealous of the power of a prince who had recently taken possession of Leucas and of Ambracia, both colonies of Corinth, determined to oppose his passage into the Peloponnesus. Weapons and defensive armour were provided; the walls and fortifications were repaired; and the whole republic glowed with the ardour of military preparation.

The Lacedæmonians, meanwhile, not less alarmed, but always better prepared for war, solicited the assistance of Athens. The Lacedæmonians represented the league formed against themselves, as alike dangerous to Athens and to Sparta; that the ambition of Philip would not rest satisfied with a partial conquest, his imagination already grasped the dominion of Greece; and now was the only time for the two leading republics to make a firm stand. The Thebans joined with the ministers of Philip, in calling on the Athenians to adhere strictly to their treaty of peace recently concluded with that prince, and laboured with the utmost assiduity to separate the views and interests of Athens and Lacedæmon on this important emergency. The ambassadors of the inferior states of Peloponnesus loudly complained that the Athenians, who affected to be the patrons of liberty, should favour the views of Sparta, which had so long been the scourge of Greece.

The Athenian orators, many of them creatures of Philip, exhorted their countrymen not to renew a bloody and destructive war, out of which they had been lately extricated with so much difficulty. Their remarks received great force from the indolent disposition of the people, who were averse to employ either their money or their personal service in such active measures as could alone set bounds to the Macedonian encroachments.

Demosthenes arose last, and pronounced a discourse, which the king of Macedon is said to have read with a mixture of terror and admiration. "The cause of our difficulty," said he, "is that the encroachments of ambition must be repelled, not by words but by deeds. If speeches and reasonings sufficed, we should long ere now have prevailed over our adversary. But Philip excels in actions as much as we do in arguments; and both of us obtain the superiority in that which forms respectively the chief object of our study and concern: we in our assemblies; Philip in the field.

"Immediately after the peace, the king of Macedon became master of Phocis and Thermopylæ; and made such a use of these acquisitions as suited the interest of Thebes, not

of Athens. Upon what principle did he act thus? Because, governed in all his proceedings, not by the love of peace or justice, but by an insatiable lust of power, he saw the impossibility of bending the Athenians to his selfish and tyrannical purposes. He knew that the loftiness of their character would never stoop to any private consideration, but prefer to any advantage that he might offer them the dictates of justice and of honour. The Thebans, he judged (and he judged aright) to be more assailable: he knew their folly and their meanness to be such, that, provided he heaped benefits on themselves, they would assist him to enslave their neighbours. A circumstance, Athenians! which highly redounds to your honour: since Philip thus declares his persuasion, that you alone have wisdom to understand, and virtue to oppose his designs: that you foresee the drift of all his negociations and wars, and are determined to be the incorruptible defenders of the common cause."

"His present transactions sufficiently explain the motives of his past conduct. It is evident that he acts from system, and that his principal batteries are erected against Athens itself. How can it be otherwise? He is ambitious to rule Greece: you alone are capable to thwart his measures. He has long treated you unworthily; and he is conscious of his injustice. He is actually contriving your destruction; and he is sensible that you see through his designs. For all these reasons he knows that you detest him; and that, should he not anticipate your hostility, he mut fall a victim to your just vengeance. Hence he is ever active and alert, watching a favourable moment of assault, and practising on the stupidity and selfishness of the Thebans and Peloponnesians; for, if they were not stupid and blind, they might perceive the fatal aim of the Macedonian policy. Various are the contrivances which communities have discovered for their defence: walls, ramparts, battlements, all of which are raised by the toil of man, and supported by continual expence and toil. But there is one common bulwark which the prudent only employ, though alike useful to all, especially to free cities against tyrants. What is that? Distrust. Of this be mindful; to

this adhere; preserve this carefully; and no calamity can befal you."

Demosthenes then read to the assembly the schedule of an answer, which he advised to be given to the ambassadors, and which was favourable to the Lacedæmonians. At the same time, he exhorted his countrymen to deliberate with firmness, but with temper, on the means by which they might resist the common enemy: "an enemy with whom he had exhorted them to maintain peace, as long as that seemed possible, but peace was no longer in their power. Philip gradually carried on a vast system of hostile ambition; dismembering their possessions; debauching their allies; paring their dominions all around; that he might at length attack the centre unguarded and defenceless." Had the orator stopped here, his advice might have been followed with some useful consequences. But, in declaiming against the encroachments of Macedon, his resentment was naturally inflamed against Philocrates, Æschines, and their associates, whose perfidious intrigues and machinations had produced the public danger and disgrace. He strongly recommended to the injured people to impeach, condemn, and consign to due punishment, those detestable traitors. This counsel was not given in vain to the litigious Athenians, who were better pleased to attend the courts of justice at home, than to march into the Peloponnesus. The city resounded with the noise of trials and accusations. Philocrates was banished, and Æschines narrowly escaped the same fate.

Philip, meanwhile, unobserved by his enemies, was sailing with a powerful armament towards cape Tenarus, the most southern promontory of Laconia. Having landed there, he was joined by the Messenians, Arcadians, and Argives. The united army, after ravaging the most valuable part of the Lacedæmonian territories, besieged and took Trinasus, a maritime city of considerable strength and importance. The terror occasioned among the Spartans by these misfortunes was great. The alarm was general. Unable to meet the invader in the field, they sent Agis, the son of king Archidamus, to propose terms of accommodation, or rather to submit their whole fortune to the disposal of the Macedoni-

ans. The young prince coming alone and unattended, Philip expressed his surprize. "What! have the Spartans sent but one?" "Am I not sent to one?" was the manly reply of Agis. This was the expiring voice of Spartan pride; for the king of Macedon compelled them to resign their pretended authority over Argos, Messene, and Arcadia, and settled the boundaries of those republics in a manner highly agreeable to the wishes of his confederates. Before leaving the Peloponnesus, he solemnly renewed his engagements to protect them; and, in return, only required on their part, that the magistracy in Argos should be intrusted to men of his nomination.

Having settled the affairs of Peloponnesus, the king of Macedon marched through that country amidst the acclamations of the people, who vied with each other in bestowing crowns and statues on a prince, who had generously rescued them from the cruel yoke of Sparta. At Corinth he passed some days in the house of Demeratus, a man totally devoted to his service. The turbulent Corinthians, who had particular causes of animosity against Philip, profited of the liberty of the place and of the occasion, to testify their rooted aversion to the king of Macedon, and their unwillingness to owe their freedom and their safety to the interposition of a foreign tyrant. Philip was strongly urged by his courtiers to punish their ingratitude; but he knew how to swallow an affront when forgiveness was more useful than vengeance.

Philip proceeded from Corinth by the nearest route into Macedon, where he continued the remainder of that year, directing the improvements that were carrying on in his kingdom, and inspecting with particular care the education of his son Alexander. But these useful occupations did not divert his attention from the politics of neighbouring states. He extended the boundaries of Epirus, then governed by his brother in law Alexander, the most faithful and devoted of his vassals, by adding to that little principality the province of Cassiopæa, which was chiefly inhabited by Elian colonies. At the same time he exercised his fleet by wresting Halonnesus, an island near the coast of Thessaly, from the hands of corsairs, and kept possession of his conquest without pay-

ing any regard to the claim of the Athenians, the ancient and lawful proprietors of the island.

Next day Philip was summoned into Upper Thrace, by a rebellion of the petty princes in that country, fomented by Amadocus, king of the Odrysians. The warlike tribes of that great nation, acting with little concert or union, were successively subdued; and the dexterity of the king of Macedon seconding his usual good fortune, he soon ranked the most obstinate of his enemies in the number of his vassals or courtiers. At his return from the inhospitable wilds of Thrace, he took under his protection the city and republic of Cardia, occupying the neck of land which joins the Thracian Chersonesus to the continent.

The seizing of Halonnesus, the conquering of Grecian colonies for the tyrant of Epirus, above all, the open assistance given to their inveterate enemies, the Cardians, once more roused the Athenians from their lethargy. These fresh insults brought back to their recollection the ancient grounds of animosity, and the manifold injuries which they had suffered since the conclusion of the peace with Macedon. But, instead of opposing Philip with arms, the only means by which he might yet be resisted with any hope of success, they employed the impotent defence of speeches, resolutions, and embassies. Their complaints were loud and violent in every country of Greece. They called the attention of the whole confederacy to the formidable encroachments of a barbarian, to which there seemed no end, and exhorted the Greeks to unite in repressing his insolent usurpation.

Philip, who then agitated schemes from which he wished not to be diverted by a war with the Athenians, sent proper agents throughout Greece to counteract the inflammatory remonstrances of that people; and dispatched to Athens itself, Python, of Byzantium, who concealed, under that passionate vehemence of language which seems to arise from conviction and sincerity, a mercenary spirit and a perfidious heart. Python had long ago sold himself and the interest of his country to the king of Macedon, from whom he now conveyed a letter to the senate and people of Athens, written with that specious moderation and artful plausibility,

which Philip knew so well how to assume in all his transactions. "He offered to make a present to the Athenians of the island of Halonnesus; and invited them to join with him in purging the sea of pirates. He entreated them to refer to impartial arbitrators all the differences that had long subsisted between the two nations; and to concert amicably together such commercial regulations as would tend greatly to the advantage of both. He denied that they could produce any proof of that duplicity on his part, of which they so loudly complained."

The subtle artifices of Philip, though supported on this occasion by the impetuous eloquence of Python, were overcome by Hegesippus and Demosthenes, who refuted the various articles of the letter with great strength and perspicuity, and unveiled the injustice of Philip with such force of evidence, that the Athenians resolved to send a considerable armament to the Chersonesus to protect their subjects in that peninsula. Diopeithes, who commanded the expedition, was a determined enemy to the Macedonians, and a man of courage and enterprise. Before he arrived in the Chersonesus, Philip, trusting to the effect of his letter and intrigues, had returned into Upper Thrace. Diopeithes availed himself of this opportunity to act with vigour: having provided for the defence of the Athenian settlements in Thrace, he made an incursion into the neighbouring country; stormed the Macedonian settlements at Crobyle and Tiristasis; and, having carried off many prisoners, lodged them in the safe retreat of the Chersonesus. On this emergency, Amphilocus, a Macedonian of rank, was sent as ambassador to treat of the ransom of prisoners; but Diopeithes, regardless of this character, ever held sacred in Greece, cast him into prison, the more surely to widen the breach between Athens and Macedon, and, if possible, to render it irreparable.

The king of Macedon, when informed of these hostilities and insults, gave free scope to his complaints. His emissaries had an easier game at Athens, as Diopeithes had not only violated the peace with Macedon, but, in order to maintain his troops, levied considerable contributions from the Greek settlements in Asia. The partisans of Macedon in-

veighed against this commander as a robber and pirate, the common enemy of Greeks and barbarians. Philip's letters demanded vengeance from the justice of Athens; if not, he would be his own avenger. The personal enemies of Diopeithes joined in the outcry, and insisted that such a daring offender ought immediately to be recalled, and punished for his misconduct.

On this occasion Demosthenes undertook to defend the accused general, whose measures he warmly approved. The impeachment of Diopeithes he ascribed entirely to malice or perfidy, which had been too successfully employed to withdraw the attention of the Athenians from the continual encroachments of Philip, to unjust complaints and calumnies against their fellow-citizens. "Philip," said he, "though an enemy to your city, your soil, and your people, is chiefly hostile to your government, which is admirably adapted to repel usurpation and to humble tyrants. To your democracy, therefore, Philip is an unrelenting foe; a truth of which you ought to be deeply persuaded; and next, that wherever you repress his encroachments, you act for the safety of Athens, against which, chiefly, all his batteries are erected. For who can be so foolish as to believe, that the cottages of Thrace should form an object worthy of his ambition; that in order to acquire them he should submit to toils and dangers; that for the sake of the rye and millet of Thrace, he should consent to spend so many months amidst winter snows and tempests, while, at the same time, he disregarded the riches and splendour of Athens, your harbours, arsenals, galleys, mines, and revenues? No, Athenians! It is to get possession of Athens that he makes war in Thrace and elsewhere. What then ought we to do? Tear ourselves from our indolence; not only support, but augment the troops which are on foot: that, as Philip has an army ever ready to attack and conquer the Greeks, you also may be ready to succour and to save them.

"Rash, imprudent, and audacious, I neither am, Athenians, nor wish ever to become; yet I possess more true fortitude than the boldest of your demagogues, who have a sure pledge of impunity, in the flattery and artifices by which they

have long seduced the public. The courage of that minister is put to an easy trial, who is ever ready to sacrifice your permanent interest to your present pleasure. But he is truly courageous, who, for the sake of your safety and and glory, opposes your most favourite inclinations; rouses you from your dream of pleasure; disdains to flatter you; and, having the good of his country ever in view, assumes that post in the administration in which fortune often prevails over policy, knowing himself responsible for the issue. Such a minister am I, whose unpopular counsels tend to render, not myself, but my country great."

The arguments and remonstrances of Demosthenes not only saved Diopeithes, but animated the Athenians with a degree of vigour which they had been long unaccustomed to exert. A fleet was fitted out under the command of Callias, who seized all Macedonian ships as lawful prize, and made a descent on the coast of Thessaly. A considerable body of forces was sent into Acarnania, to repel the incursions of Philip, assisted by his kinsman and ally, Alexander of Epirus. The inhabitants of the islands of Peperathus, trusting to the protection of Athens, expelled the Macedonian garrison from Halonnesus. Repeated embassies were dispatched to the Peloponnesians and Eubœans, exhorting them to throw off the ignominious yoke of Macedon, and to unite with their Grecian brethren against the public enemy. Philip was not inattentive to these commotions; but, his designs against the valuable cities on the Propontis and Thracian Bosphorus being ripe for execution, he was unwilling to allow any secondary consideration to divert him from that important enterprize.

His intrigues and bribery had gained a considerable party in Byzantium, at the head of which was the perfidious Python, whose vehement eloquence gave him great influence with the multitude. A conspiracy was formed to surrender one of the gates of the city; the Macedonian army of thirty thousand men hovered round; but the design was suspected or discovered, and Philip, to screen his partisans from public vengeance, seasonably withdrew his army, and invested

the neighbouring city of Perinthus. The news of these transactions not only increased the activity of Athens, but alarmed Ochus king of Persia, who, being no stranger to Philip's design of invading his dominions, trembled at beholding that ambitious prince gradually approach his frontier. To prevent this danger, Ochus adopted the same policy which, in similar circumstances, had been successfully employed by his predecessors. The Persian gold was profusely scattered among the most eminent of the Grecian demagogues. Demosthenes, whose patriotism was not always proof against an unworthy alliance with interest, rejoiced at being paid for doing what he considered as his duty. At Athens his invectives were louder than ever against the king of Macedon; and the affairs of Eubœa gave him an opportunity of exerting himself with equal zeal in that island.

The factious spirit of the Eubœans rendered them alike incapable of independence, and of remaining quietly under the government either of Athens or Macedon. The recent prevalence of the Macedonian party had been marked by many acts of violence and oppression. The cities of Chalcis, Oreum, and Eretria prepared to rebel, having previously solicited assistance from Peloponnesus, Acarnania, Attica, and every province of Greece which they had any reason to deem favourable to their views. From Athens they obtained, chiefly by the influence of Demosthenes, a considerable body of troops, commanded by the brave and virtuous Phocion. The orator accompanied the expedition; and, being allowed to address the popular assemblies in most of the cities of Eubœa, he inflamed them with such animosity against Philip and his partisans, that little remained to be done by the valour of the Athenian general. The Eubœans every where took arms in defence of their freedom; and the Macedonian garrisons were expelled from the principal cities, and driven from one post to another, till they were compelled entirely to evacuate the island. This event occasioned great joy at Athens; and the principal merit was ascribed to Demosthenes, who was crowned by the senate and people with a golden crown.

In conducting the military operations against Perinthus, Philip found an enemy worthy of his courage and perseve-

rance. The town was situated on the sloping ridge of an isthmus, and strongly fortified both by art and nature, the houses and streets rising one above another, like the seats of an amphitheatre, so that the higher edifices overlooked and defended the lower. Philip exhausted in the siege of Perinthus all the military skill known to the ancients. He raised towers forty cubits high, which enabled his men to fight on equal ground with the besieged; his miners were busy at the foundation; at length the battering rams advanced to the wall, in which a considerable breach was made. The superior discharge of darts, arrows, and every kind of missile weapon, from the Macedonian towers, had dislodged the Perinthians from those parts of the wall and battlements against which the principal attack had been directed. But, with incessant toil, the besieged built a new wall within the former, on which they appeared in battle array, prepared to repel the enemy who entered the breach. The Macedonians were infinitely mortified to find that their work must be begun anew. Philip employed all the resources of his mind, fertile in expedients, to animate their activity. The siege recommenced with fresh ardour; and the Perinthians were thrice reduced to extremity, when they were unexpectedly saved, first by a large supply of arms and provisions from Byzantium, next by a strong reinforcement of men in Persian pay, and lastly by the advantageous situation of the town, which, being built in a conical form, presenting its apex or narrow point to the besiegers, gradually arose and widened towards the remoter parts, from which it was easy to overwhelm the enemy with missile weapons as they advanced to the charge. Philip, ever sparing of the lives of his men, was deterred, by this circumstance, from venturing an assault, though his machines had effected a breach in the new wall: he therefore determined to change the siege into a blockade. Perinthus was shut up as closely as possible by sea and land; part of the Macedonian troops, who had become mutinous for want of pay, were indulged in plundering the rich territory of Byzantium, while the remainder were conducted to the siege of Selymbria, and soon after of Byzantium itself; the taking of

which places, it was hoped, might compensate their lost labour at Perinthus.

During the military operations against the cities of the Propontis, Demosthenes did not cease exhorting his countrymen to undertake their defence, as essential to their own safety. The hostilities and devastations of Philip, he represented as the periodical returns of the pestilence and other contagious disorders, in which all men were alike threatened with their respective shares of calamity. The Macedonians now besieged Selymbria and Byzantium; if successful in these enterprises, they would soon appear before Sparta, Thebes, and Athens. Yet he knew not by what fatality the Greeks looked on the successive encroachments of Philip, not as events which their vigorous and united opposition might ward off and repel, but as disasters inflicted by the hand of Providence; as a tempestuous cloud of hail, so destructive to the vines in autumn, which all beheld with horror hovering over them, but no one took any other means to prevent, than by deprecating the gods that it might not fall on his own fields. These animated and just representations of the common distress or danger, engaged the Athenians to enter into a close correspondence with the besieged cities.

Philip, meanwhile, ceased not to assure the Athenians, by his letters and emissaries, that he was extremely desirous of maintaining peace with the republic, and gently chid them for their evident marks of partiality towards his enemies; but took care to ascribe this, not to the general temper and disposition of the people, but to the prevalence of a dangerous faction, inflamed by seditious and selfish demagogues. By a rapid march, he had recently surprised an Athenian detachment ravaging the territory of Cardia. Diopeithes, the Athenian general in the Chersonesus, commanded this predatory band, who, after a slight skirmish, were repelled with the loss of their leader, slain by a dart while he rallied his men with his voice and arm. Philip failed not by letter to excuse this act of hostility, to which, he assured the Athenians, he had been compelled much against his inclination: he affected to consider Diopeithes as the instrument of a malignant faction, headed by Demosthenes, rather than as

the general of the republic; and, as that commander had acted unwarrantably in plundering the Cardians, a people strictly allied with Macedon, Philip assured himself, that the senate and people would not take it amiss, that, provoked by repeated injuries, he had, at length, repelled violence, and defended the lives and fortunes of his long-injured confederates.

While the Athenians and Philip were on this footing of correspondence, the former sent twenty vessels laden with corn to the relief of the Selymbrians. Leodæmas, who commanded this convoy, seems to have imagined, that the treaty formerly subsisting between the two powers would protect him from injury. But in this he was disappointed. His fleet was surrounded and taken by Amyntas, who commanded the naval force of Macedon.

The news of the capture of their ships occasioned much tumult and uneasiness among the Athenians. After frequent deliberations on this subject, a decree was framed for sending ambassadors to Philip, in order to redemand their property, and to require that Amyntas, if he had exceeded his instructions, should be punished with due severity. Cephisophon, Democritus, and Polycrates, who were named for this commission, repaired without delay to Philip in the Hellespont, who, at their request, immediately released the captured vessels, and dismissed the Athenians with the following letter. "Philip king of Macedon to the senate and people of Athens, health. I have received three of your citizens in quality of ambassadors, who have conferred with me about the release of certain ships commanded by Leodæmas. I cannot but admire their simplicity in thinking to persuade me, that these ships were intended to convey corn from the Chersonesus to the isle of Lemnos; and not destined for the relief of the Selymbrians actually besieged by me, and nowise included in the treaty of pacification between Athens and Macedon. This unjust commission Leodæmas received, not from the people of Athens, but from certain magistrates and others, now in private stations, who are too busy in urging you to violate your engagements, and to commence hostilities against me. Deeply persuaded that our

mutual interest requires us to frustrate their wicked schemes, I have given orders to release the captured vessels; and do you, in return, remove such pernicious counsellors from the administration of your affairs, and let them feel the severity of your justice. On my part, I shall endeavour to preserve inviolate the treaty by which we stand mutually engaged."

The moderate and friendly sentiments expressed in this letter, afforded great advantage to the Macedonian partizans at Athens. But Demosthenes and Leon of Byzantium spared no pains to detect and expose the artifices and duplicity of Philip, who employed this humble and peaceful tone during his operations against the cities of the Propontis, in order to stifle the resentment of the Athenians at a crisis when they might act against him with peculiar advantage. In elaborate and powerful orations, in which Demosthenes condensed and enlivened his former observations and reasonings, he convinced his countrymen of the expediency of being, for once, beforehand with their enemy; and of anticipating his designs against themselves, by a speedy and effectual assistance to their distressed brethren of Perinthus, Selymbria, and Byzantium. By his convincing eloquence, the public councils were animated with a degree of energy and enthusiasm, which had not appeared in them during many years; and which produced the last transitory glimpse of success and splendour, before the glory of Athens was extinguished for ever.

It was decreed, by the senate and people, that a fleet of a hundred and twenty gallies should be fitted out; but unfortunately the command was given to Chares, whose character was contemptible. The Byzantines excluded him from their harbour, and he was defeated by Amyntas, the Macedonian admiral, off the opposite shore of Chalcedon. This disaster made the Athenians cast their eyes on Phocion, who, though ever ready to serve his country, was most frequently called for in times of danger and calamity.

Before Phocion reached the Propontis, Philip, flushed with his naval success, made an attempt to storm Byzantium.—That city was environed on three sides by the sea, and defended on the fourth by a strong wall, and a large and deep trench covered by lofty towers. The inhabitants of Byzan-

tium allowed Philip to carry on his works, and gradually to make his approaches to their walls. During this inaction of the townsmen, Philip carefully advanced his battering engines.

His perseverance must finally have prevailed over the obstinacy of the besieged, had not the Athenian fleet under Phocion arrived in the Thracian Bosphorus. The Byzantines received him with open arms, and with anticipations of brilliant success. Nor were their hopes disappointed: the arms of Philip were foiled in every rencounter; his artifices were met and eluded by similar address. The king of Macedon, who had as much flexibility in varying his measures as firmness in adhering to his purposes, was unwilling any farther to press his bad fortune. In the actual state of his affairs, he judged it necessary to raise the siege of Byzantium,—to withdraw his forces from Selymbria and Perinthus,—and to leave the Athenians in possession of the northern shore of the Propontis.

Phocion sailed from Byzantium, amidst the grateful vows and acclamations of innumerable spectators. In his voyage to the Chersonesus he captured a fleet of victuallers and transports, carrying arms and provisions for the enemy.—When he arrived in that peninsula he repressed the insolence of the Cardians. He recovered several places on the coast of Thrace, which had reluctantly submitted to the dominion of the Macedonians. Instead of burdening the confederates with the maintenance of his army, he plentifully supplied all the wants of his soldiers from the enemy's country. He commanded in person the parties that went out to forage and plunder; and spread the terror of the Athenian name, by ravaging with fire and sword the hereditary dominions of Philip.

The meritorious services of Phocion were deeply felt and acknowledged by the communities whom he had protected and relieved. The deliverance and gratitude of the Chersonesus, of Perinthus, and of Byzantium, were testified by crowns, statues, inscriptions, and altars, and are still recorded in an oration of Demosthenes, which has survived those solid and authentic monuments of gold and marble.

Beyond the confines of Thrace dwelt a powerful Scythian tribe, in the peninsula contained between the Euxine and the Danube. The roving and unsettled life of the Scythians had led them into this country, which, in ancient times, had the name of Little Scythia, and is still called Little Tartary. With an excess of joy beyond the bounds of sound policy, Philip received an invitation from Atheas, who styled himself king of the Scythians, to march to his assistance, and to defend his dominions, situated in the peninsula above mentioned, against an invasion of the Istrians, which the domestic forces of Atheas were totally unable to resist. To this proposal was added a condition extremely alluring to the king of Macedon: that, if his auxiliary arms enabled Atheas to vanquish and expel the invaders, Philip should be named heir to the kingdom of Scythia: for, according to the fashion of ancient times, Atheas dignified with the name of kingdom, a territory considerably less than North Carolina.

In greedily snatching this bait laid for his ambition, Philip was not enough on his guard against the usual perfidy and levity of barbarians. With an ardour too rapid for reflection, he eagerly closed with the propositions of Atheas; sent a great body of forces to the north, and promised to assist them, in person, at the head of his whole army, should they encounter any difficulty in the execution of their purpose. Meanwhile, the warlike chief of the Istrians was cut off by sudden death; the dispirited Istrians were attacked, defeated, and repelled; and, without the assistance of Macedon, Atheas regained possession of his kingdom. This unexpected revolution served to display the crafty and faithless barbarian in his genuine deformity. The Macedonian troops were received coldly, treated with contempt, and absolutely denied their stipulated pay and subsistence. Their just remonstrances and complaints Atheas heard with scorn, and totally disavowed the propositions and promises of those who styled themselves his ambassadors, observing, "how unlikely it was, that he should have solicited the assistance of the Macedonians, who, brave as they were, could fight only with men, while the Scythians could combat cold and famine; and that it would have been still more unnatural to appoint Phi-

lip his successor, since he had a son of his own, worthy to inherit his crown and dignity."

Upon receiving an account of the insolent behaviour of a prince who had so recently solicited his alliance, Philip sent an embassy to Scythia, requiring Atheas to satisfy the just demands of the Macedonian troops, and to indemnify himself for the expence incurred in his defence. The ambassadors found the king of Scythia in his stable, currying his horse. When they expressed surprize at seeing him engaged in such an occupation, he asked them, "Whether their master did not often employ himself in the same manner?" adding, that, for his own part, in time of peace, he made not any distinction between himself and his groom. When they opened their commission, and explained the demands of Philip, the subtle barbarian told them, that the poverty of Scythia could not furnish a present becoming the greatness of their master; and that, therefore, it seemed more eligible to offer nothing at all, than a present totally unworthy of his acceptance.

This evasive answer being brought to the king of Macedon when foiled and harassed by his unprosperous expedition against Byzantium, furnished him with a very honourable pretence for raising the siege of that place, and conducting a powerful army into Scythia, that he might chastise the treacherous ingratitude of a prince, who, after having overreached him by a policy, now mocked him with insolence. Having advanced to the frontier of Atheas's dominions, Philip had recourse to his usual arts, and sent a herald, with the ensigns of peace and friendship, to announce his arrival in Scythia, in order to perform a solemn vow which he had made during the siege of Byzantium, of erecting a brazen statue to Hercules on the banks of the Danube. The cunning Atheas was not the dupe of this artifice. Without praising or blaming the pious intention of the king, he coolly desired him to forward the statue, which he himself would take care to erect in the appointed place: that, should it be set up with *his* concurrence and direction, it would, probably, be allowed to stand; otherwise, he could give no assurance that the

Scythians would not pull it down, and melt it to make points for their weapons.

The return of the Macedonian herald was the signal for hostility. Philip entered the country with fire and sword, destroying the forests and pasture grounds, and seizing the slaves and cattle, which formed the principal wealth of the Scythians. Countries in a pastoral state are but thinly peopled; and Philip was obliged to divide his forces, in order to vanquish with greater rapidity the wandering hordes, separate from each other by wide intervals. A party of Macedonian soldiers beat up the quarters of a numerous and warlike clan, by which they were repelled, with the loss of several slain or taken. Among the latter was Ismenias, an eminent musician, who had been invited, by liberal rewards, to reside at the court of Philip, after being long admired in Greece for his performance on the flute. This distinguished captive was sent as a present to Atheas, who was so little delighted with his accomplishments, that, having heard him perform, he acknowledged the neighing of his horse to be, to his ear, far more agreeable music. The skirmish in which Ismenias was taken, seems to have been the principal advantage obtained by the barbarians. They were every where overcome by the disciplined valour of the Macedonian phalanx.

Philip reaped such fruits from this expedition as might be expected from a victory over a people who had no king but their general; no god but their sword; and no cities but the ground on which they occasionally encamped with their herds and families. The spoil consisted in arms, chariots, twenty thousand robust captives, and a great number of mares destined to replenish the studs of Pella.

While Philip was returning homeward, at the head of an army encumbered with baggage and spoil, a very unexpected event threatened to blast his laurels, and to terminate at once his glory and his life. Allured by the hopes of sharing the warlike plunder of the Scythians, the barbarous Triballi, who had been often conquered but never thoroughly subdued, beset by ambush, and vigorously assaulted the Macedonians,

entangled amidst the intricate windings of the mountains of Mæsia, hoping to cut off, by one stroke, the flower of a nation, whose authority their own fierce spirit of independence had very reluctantly condescended to obey. The confusion and the danger was increased by a mercenary band of Greeks, who, harassed by the fatigues of war, and clamorous for pay, seized the present opportunity to desert the standard of Philip, and to reinforce the arms of the Triballi.

The king of Macedon never acquired by valour what might be obtained by stratagem: but, when a necessary occasion solicited his courage, he knew how to assume the hero. The urgency of the present emergence summoned all the firmness of his mind. With his voice and example he encouraged the Macedonians, and fought with unexampled bravery, till the same weapon which pierced his horse laid the rider senseless on the ground. The young Alexander, who fought near him, derived peculiar glory from saving the life of his father, whom he covered with his shield, and defended with his sword, until his attendants conveyed him to a place of safety; the son succeeding to the command, the tumult was appeased, and the barbarians put to flight. Philip's wound was attended with an incurable lameness, which he bore with much impatience. His magnanimous son endeavoured to remove his chagrin, by asking, how he could be chagrined at an accident that continually reminded him of his valour.

To repair the effects of this unforeseen delay, the Macedonians hastened through Thrace, where Philip, as he had reason to expect, was met by deputies from the Amphictyonic council, appointing him general of their forces, and requesting him to march into Greece with all convenient speed. The secret practices and intrigues which had been ripening during the Scythian expedition produced this extraordinary message; the remote as well immediate causes of which deserve to be distinctly unravelled, being the last knot of a tragedy which involves the fate of Greece.

The spirited resistance of Selymbria and Byzantium, the successful expeditions of Phocion in the Hellespont and Propontis, the dread of Ochus king of Persia, and, above all, the

continual expostulations and remonstrances of Demosthenes, conspired to rouse the Athenians from their lethargy, and animated them with a desire to carry on the war with activity against the common enemy of Greece. In order to save the state, they consented to abolish the very popular law, or rather abuse, introduced by Eubulus. The theatrical amusements, so passionately idolised by the multitude, were celebrated with less pomp; and the military fund was thenceforth applied to its original and proper destination. A fleet was equipped far superior to the naval strength of Macedon. The troops and partizans of that kingdom were driven from their ambushes in Megara and in the neighbouring territories. Demosthenes, and Hyperides, an orator second only to Demosthenes, were dispatched into the several republics, to persuade the several republics to second the generous ardour of the Athenians.

Philip was accurately informed of all those transactions. Highly provoked against the Athenians, he was unable to retaliate their injuries. If he attacked them by land, he must march through the territories of the Thebans and Thessalians, who would be ready to forsake him with his good fortune. His disgraceful expedition against the cities of the Propontis rendered the present juncture extremely unfavourable to such a hazardous design. Nor could he attempt, with any prospect of success, to attack the enemy by sea, since the Athenian fleet far exceeded his own.

Amidst this complication of difficulties, Philip shewed how well he understood the unsteady temper of the Greeks, by raising the siege of Byzantium, and burying himself in the wilds of Scythia, till the fuming animosity of his adversaries had time to evaporate. Not venturing on open hostility, he, meanwhile, employed two secret engines, which were at work during his absence, and from which he had reason to expect very signal advantages before his return. There lived at Athens a man of the name of Antiphon, bold, loud, and loquacious in the popular assembly, in which, however, he had not a title to vote, much less to speak, his name not being recorded in the public register of the city. This defect passed long unobserved. At length the treason of

Antiphon (for the Athenians regarded an unqualified voter in the assembly as an usurper of sovereign power) was discovered, and he was arraigned by one of the many citizens to whom his insolence and calumny had justly rendered him obnoxious; in consequence of which impeachment, the supposititious Athenian was divested of his borrowed character, and driven with ignominy from a country, whose most august rights and honours he had usurped and disgraced. Stung with disappointment and rage, Antiphon had recourse to the king of Macedon, and offered himself for any enterprize, however bloody or desperate, by which, in serving the interest of Philip, he might gratify his own thirst for vengeance. The ambitious Macedonian was not very delicate in choosing the means by which he might distress his adversaries. He greedily closed, therefore, with the proposal of Antiphon, in whom he rejoiced to find an instrument so fit for his service.

The superiority of the Athenians by sea formed the chief obstacle to the grandeur of Macedon. It was agreed between Philip and Antiphon, therefore, that the latter should return to Athens in disguise, insinuate himself into the Piræus, and lie there in concealment, until he found an opportunity to set fire to the Athenian docks, and thus destroy at once the main hope of the republic. While the artful king of Macedon eluded the storm of his enemies by wandering in the woods of Scythia, his perfidious accomplice lodged without suspicion in the harbour which glowed with the ardour of naval preparation, and into which were daily accumulated new masses of tar, timber, and other materials, alike proper for a fleet and for the purpose of Antiphon.

But the vigilance of Demosthenes discovered this desperate design, when on the point of execution. He immediately flew to the Piræus, dragged Antiphon from his concealment, divested him of his disguise, and produced him at the bar of the assembly. The capricious multitude, alike prone to anger and to compassion, were on this occasion very differently affected from what might be conjectured. They beheld with pity, a man, once regarded as their fellow citizen, brought before them, after a long absence, and accused,

perhaps on vain presumptions, of such a horrid crime. They knew besides the wicked artifices of their orators, who, to increase their own importance, often terrified the public with false alarms and imaginary dangers. Æschines and other partizans of Philip were at hand to strengthen these impressions. They represented the whole transaction of Demosthenes as a complication of fraud and cruelty; loudly inveighed against his insolent triumph over the calamities of the unfortunate; and reproached his entering by force into the house where Antiphon was concealed, as a violation of freedom, and as trampling on the respected maxim of the Athenian law and religion, that every man's house was his sanctuary. Such was the effect of these claims, that Antiphon was dismissed without the formality of a trial, and might, perhaps, have resumed his purpose with more security than before, had not the senate of the Areopagus more carefully examined the information of Demosthenes. By the authority of that court, the traitor was again seized and tried. Torture, which the institution of domestic slavery introduced and rendered familiar in Greece, extorted from him a reluctant confession; and his enormous guilt was punished with as enormous severity.

Had the enterprise of Antiphon been crowned with success, Philip would have attained his purpose of ruining Athens, by a rude stroke of vulgar perfidy. But the engines which he set in motion for gaining the same end, at a time when he was obliged to fly the awakened resentment of Greece, will not be easily matched by any parallel transactions in history.

The time approached for convening at Delphi the vernal assembly of the Amphictyons. It was evidently the interest of the Athenians, and might have been expected from their just resentment against Philip, that they should send such deputies to the city of Apollo as were most hostile to the Macedonian, and most zealous in the cause of liberty and their country. But intrigue and cabal prevailed over every motive of public utility; and the multitude were persuaded, at a crisis which demanded the most faithful and incorrupt ministers, to employ, as their representatives in the Amphic-

tyonic council, Æschines and Midias, who were not only the declared enemies of Demosthenes, but the warm and active partisans of the king of Macedon. The Amphictyons were employed in repairing the the temples; the sacred offerings which had been removed and sold by the Phocians, were collected from every quarter of Greece; and new presents were made by several states to supply the place of the old, which could not be recovered.

The Athenians particularly signalised their pious munificence, and sent, among other dedications, several golden shields, with the following inscription: "Taken from the Medes and Thebans, when they fought against Greece." This offering, highly offensive to the Theban deputies, was prematurely suspended in the temple. The Thebans murmured, the Amphictyons listened to their complaints, and it was whispered in the council, that the Athenians deserved punishment for presenting their gift to the god, before it had been regularly consecrated. Pretending high indignation at these murmurs, Æschines rushed into the assembly, and began a formal, yet spirited defence of his countrymen; when he was rudely interrupted by a Locrian of Amphissa, a city eight miles distant from Delphi, which, growing populous and powerful on the ruins of Crissa and Cirrha, had ventured to cultivate the Cirrhean plain, which, near three centuries before, had been desolated by the Amphictyons, solemnly consecrated to Apollo, and devoted to perpetual sterility.

The artful Locrian clamorously interrupted that orator, calling aloud in the assembly, that it ill became the dignity of the Amphictyons to hear with patience the justification of Athens, a city which, in defiance of human and divine laws, had so recently abetted the execrable sacrilege of the Phocians; that if the Amphictyons consulted the dictates of duty and honour, they would not allow the detested name of the Athenians to be mentioned in that august council.

Æschines thus obtained an opportunity of exciting such tumults in the assembly as suited the views of Philip. In the ardour of patriotic indignation, he poured forth a torrent of impetuous invective against the insolent Locrian, and his city Amphissa; and then addressed the Amphicty-

ons: "Say, ye Grecians! shall men who never knew the exalted pleasures of virtue and renown, be suffered to tear from us the inestimable rewards of glory so justly earned? Shall men, themselves polluted by sacrilege, and already devoted to destruction by the most awful imprecations, presume to call the Athenians profane and impious? Look down, ye reverend guardians of religion! look down on that plain, (pointing to the Cirrhean plain, which might be seen from the temple,) behold these lands anciently devoted to the god, but now appropriated and cultivated by the Amphisseans; behold the numerous buildings which they have erected there, and that accursed port of Cirrha, justly demolished by our ancestors, now rebuilt and fortified." Æschines here read the oracle of Apollo, which condemned that harbour and those lands to perpetuul desolation. Then proceeding with increased vehemence: "For myself, ye Grecians! I swear that I, my children, and my country, will discharge our duty to Heaven; and, with all the powers and faculties of mind and body, avenge the abominable violation of the consecrated territory. Do you, Amphictyons! determine as wisdom shall direct. Your offerings are prepared, your victims are brought to the altar, you are ready to offer solemn prayers for blessings on yourselves, and on the republics which you represent. But consider with what voice, with what heart, with what confidence, you can breathe out your petitions, while you suffer the profanation of the Amphisseans to pass unrevenged. Hear the words of the imprecation not only against those who cultivate the consecrated ground, but against those who neglect to punish them: 'May they never present an acceptable offering to Apollo, Diana, Latona, or Minerva the provident, but may all their sacrifices and religi us rites be for ever rejected and abhorred.'"

The warmth of Æschines occasioned the utmost tumult in the assembly. The golden shields irregularly dedicated by the Athenians were no longer the subject of discourse. This slight impropriety disappeared amidst the enormous impieties of the Amphisseans, which had been so forcibly painted to the superstitious fancies of the terrified multitude. It was determined, after violent contentions between those who ac-

cused and those who defended this unhappy people, that the Amphictyons, with the assistance of the citizens of Delphi, should next day repair to the Cirrhean plain, in order to burn, cut down, and destroy the houses and plantations, which had so long adorned and defiled that devoted territory. The ravagers met with little opposition in performing this pious devastation; but, as they returned towards the temple, they were overtaken and assaulted by a numerous party of Amphisseans, who threw them into disorder, made several prisoners, and pursued the rest to Delphi. The signal of war was now raised; the insulted Amphictyons, in whose persons the sanctity of religion had been violated, complained to their respective republics, while the recent audacity of the Amphisseans aggravated their ancient crimes and enormities. But the measures of the Amphictyons were extremely slow and irresolute; and their operations were ill conducted and unsuccessful.

Affairs were thus brought to the issue which had been expected by Æschines, and the accomplices who assisted him in promoting the interest of the king of Macedon. They loudly declaimed in the council against the lukewarm indifference of the Grecian states in a war which so deeply concerned the national religion. "It became the Amphictyons, therefore, as the ministers of Apollo, and the guardians of his temple, to seek out and employ some more powerful instrument of the divine vengeance. Philip of Macedon had formerly given proof of his pious zeal in the Phocian war. That prince was now returning in triumph from his Scythian expedition. His assistance must again be demanded to defend the cause of Apollo and the sacred shrine." This proposal being approved, a deputation of the Amphictyons met Philip in Thrace. He received their welcome message with well affected surprize, but declared his veneration for the commands of the council, which he should be ever ready to obey.

The vigilant prince had already taken proper measures for acting as general of the Amphictyons, and provided a sufficient number of transports to convey his army into Greece. He understood that, notwithstanding the intrigues of Æs-

chines and his associates, the Athenians had been persuaded by Demosthenes to oppose his design, and that their admirals, Chares and Proxenus, prepared to intercept his passage with a superior naval force. To baffle this opposition Philip employed a stratagem. A light brigantine was dispatched to Macedon with letters of such import as gave reason to believe that he purposed immediately returning into Thrace. Besides writing to Antipater, he took care to mask his artifice, by sending letters to his queen Olympias. The brigantine purposely fell into the hands of the Athenians. The dispatches were seized and read; but the letter of the queen was politely forwarded to its destination. The Athenian admirals quitted their station, and Philip arrived without opposition on the coast of Locris, from whence he proceeded to Delphi.

Though the Macedonians alone were far more numerous than seemed necessary for the reduction of Amphissa, Philip dispatched circular letters through most parts of Greece, requiring from the Thebans, Peloponnesians, and other states, the assistance of their combined arms to maintain the cause of the Amphictyons and Apollo. The Thebans sent a small body of infantry to join the standard of Philip. The Lacedæmonians beheld all recent transactions with a contemptuous disregard, and seemed firm in their purpose of preserving a sullen neutrality. The Athenians opposed Philip with ten thousand mercenaries, despising the threats of the oracles against those who took part with the impious Amphisseans. The orator boldly accused the pythian priestess and her ministers of being bribed to Philippise, or to prophecy as might best suit the interest of Philip; while Æschines, on the other hand, accused his adversary of having received a large sum of money, and an annual pension, to abet the impiety of Amphissa. The king of Macedon besieged, took, and garrisoned that unfortunate city; and, having routed and put to flight the Athenian mercenaries, spread the terror of his arms round all the neighbouring territory.

The news of these events occasioned dreadful consternation in Athens. The terrified citizens believed the moment approaching when they must defend their own walls against

the victorious invader. They sent an embassy to Philip craving a suspension of hostilities, and at the same time dispatched their ablest orators to rouse the Greeks from their supine negligence, and to animate and unite them against a barbarian, who, under pretence of avenging the offended divinity of Apollo, meditated the subjugation of their common country. Megara, Eubœa, Leucas, Corinth, Corcyra, and Achaia, favourably received the ambassadors, and readily entered into a league against Macedon. Thebes fluctuated with uncertainty, hating the Athenians as rivals, and dreading Philip as a tyrant. The situation of the Theban territory, through which Philip must march before he could invade Attica, rendered the decision of that people peculiarly important. To gain or to retain their friendship, the intrigues of Philip on the one side, and the eloquence of Athens on the other, had been employed with unwearied assiduity. The Thebans temporised, deliberated, resolved, and changed their resolutions. The partisans of Athens were most numerous, those of Macedon most active, while the great body of the Theban people heard the clamours and arguments of both parties with that stupid indifference, and took their measures with that lethargic slowness, which disgraced even the heavy character of the *Bœotians*.

To fix their wavering irresolution, Philip at length had recourse to the strong impression of terror. From the general wreck of Phocis, his foresight and policy had spared the walls of Elatæa, a city important by its situation between two ranges of mountains which opened into Phocis and Bœotia. The citadel was built on an eminence washed by the river Cephissus, which flowed through Bœotia into the lake Copais; a broad expanse of water, which, by several navigable streams, communicated with Attica. This valuable post, conveniently situated for commanding the passage into Bœotia, distant only two days march from Attica, and which, being garrisoned by a powerful army, might continually alarm the safety of Thebes and Athens, Philip seized with equal boldness and celerity, drew the greater part of his troops thither, repaired and strengthened the walls of the place, and

having thus secured himself from surprise, watched a favourable opportunity of inflicting punishment on the Athenians.

It was late in the evening when a courier arrived at Athens with the melancholy tidings that Philip had taken possession of Elatæa. The people had retired to their houses, but in a moment all were abroad. Some hastened to the generals; others went in quest of the officer whose business it was to summon the citizens to council; most flocked to the market place. Before dawn the confusion ceased, the citizens were all assembled, the senators took their places, and the president reported to them the alarming intelligence that had been received. The herald then proclaimed, with a loud voice, "That he who had any thing to offer on the present emergence, should mount the rostrum, and propose his advice." The invitation, though frequently repeated, was received with silence and dismay. The magistrates, the generals, the demagogues, were all present; but none obeyed the summons of the herald.

At length Demosthenes arose, and obtained the noblest triumph of patriotism. He began by darting a ray of hope into the desponding citizens, and assuring them that were not the Thebans hostile to Philip, that prince would not be actually posted at Elatæa, but on the Athenian frontier. He exhorted his countrymen to shake off the unmanly terror which had surprised them; and, instead of fearing for themselves, to fear only for their neighbours. "Let your forces," continued he, "immediately march to Eleusis, in order to show the Thebans and all Greece, that as those who have sold their country are supported by the Macedonian's forces at Elatæa, so you are ready to defend with your hereditary courage and fortune those who fight for liberty. Let ambassadors at the same time be sent to Thebes, to remind that republic of the good offices conferred by your ancestors; to assure the Thebans that you do not consider them as aliens; that the people of Athens have forgot all recent hostilities with the citizens of Greece, and will never forsake the cause of their common country. To this community, therefore, offer your most disinterested services. To make any demand for yourselves

would be highly improper in the present juncture. Assure them that you are deeply affected by their danger, and prepared generously to defend them to the utmost of your power."

These proposals being received with general approbation, Demosthenes drew up a formal decree for carrying them into execution; a decree which may be considered as the expiring voice of an illustrious people. Having painted in the most odious colours the perfidy and violence of Philip, and having stigmatised with due severity the recent instances of his injustice and lust of power, the orator concludes, "For such reasons, the senate and people of Athens, emulating the glory of their ancestors, to whom the liberty of Greece was ever dearer than the interest of their particular republic, have resolved to send to the coast of Bœotia a fleet of two hundred sail, to march to Eleusis with their whole military strength, to dispatch ambassadors to the several states of Greece, and particularly to the Thebans, encouraging them to remain unterrified amidst the dangers which threaten them, and to exert themselves manfully in defence of the common cause, with assurance that the people of Athens are determined and ready to support them with all their faculties, their treasures, their navies, and their arms; well knowing that to contend for pre-eminence with the Greeks is an honourable contest; but to be commanded by a foreigner, and to suffer a barbarian to wrest the sovereignty from their hands, would tarnish their hereditary glory, and disgrace their country for ever."

The same undaunted spirit which dictated this decree, attended the exertions of Demosthenes in his embassy to Thebes, in which he triumphed over the intrigues of Amyntas and Clearchus, and over the eloquence of Philon of Byzantium, the emissaries employed by Philip on this important occasion. The Thebans passed a decree for receiving with gratitude the proffered assistance of Athens, and the Athenian army, having soon after taken the field, were admitted within the Theban walls, and treated with all the flattering distinctions of ancient hospitality.

Meanwhile Philip having advanced towards the Bœotian frontier, his detached parties were foiled in two rencounters

with the confederates. Regardless of these losses, to which, perhaps, he purposely submitted, as necessary stratagems to draw the enemy from their walls, he proceeded with his main body, thirty-two thousand strong, to the plain of Chæronæa. This place was considered by Philip as well adapted to the operations of the Macedonian phalanx; and the ground for his encampment, and afterwards the field of battle, were chosen with equal sagacity; having in view on one side a temple of Hercules, whom the Macedonians regarded as the high protector of their fortune; and on the other the banks of the Thermodon, a small river flowing into the Cephisus, announced by the oracles of Greece as the destined scene of desolation and wo to their unhappy country. The generals of the confederate Greeks had been much less careful to avail themselves of the powerful sanctions of superstition. Unrestrained by inauspicious sacrifices, the Athenians had left their city to wait no other omen but the cause of their country. Regardless of oracles, they afterwards advanced to the ill-fated Thermodon, accompanied by the Thebans, and the scanty reinforcements which had joined their alliance. Their army amounted to thirty thousand men, animated by the noblest cause for which men can fight; but commanded by the Athenians, Lysicles and Chares, and by Theagenes the Theban, all three creatures of cabal and tools of faction, slaves of interest or voluptuousnes, whose characters are alone sufficient to prove that Greece was ripe for ruin.

When the day approached for abolishing the tottering independence of those turbulent republics, which their own internal vices and the arms and intrigues of Philip had been gradually undermining for twenty-two years, both armies formed in battle array before the rising of the sun. The right wing of the Macedonians was headed by Philip, who judged proper to oppose in person the dangerous fury of the Athenians. His son Alexander, only nineteen years of age, but surrounded by experienced officers, commanded the left wing, which faced the Sacred Band of the Thebans. The auxiliaries of either army were posted in the centre. In the beginning of the action the Athenians charged with impetuosity, and repelled the opposing divisions of the enemy; but

the youthful ardour of Alexander obliged the Thebans to retire, the Sacred Band being cut down to a man. The activity of the young prince completed their disorder, and pursued the scattered multitude with his Thessalian cavalry.

Meantime the Athenian generals, having repelled the centre and left wing of the Macedonians, except the phalanx, pressed forward against the fugitives, the insolent Lysicles exclaiming, in vain triumph, "Pursue, my brave countrymen! let us drive the cowards to Macedon." Philip observed this rash folly with contempt, and saying to those around him, "our enemies know not how to conquer," commanded his phalanx, by a rapid evolution, to gain an adjacent eminence, from which they poured down, firm and collected, on the advancing Athenians, whose confidence of success had rendered them totally insensible to danger. Above a thousand fell, and two thousand were taken prisoners; the rest escaped by a precipitate and shameful flight. Philip, perceiving his victory to be complete, gave orders to spare the vanquished, with a clemency unusual in that age, and not less honourable to his understanding than his heart; since his humanity thus subdued the minds, and gained the affections, of his conquered enemies.

According to the Grecian custom, the battle was followed by an entertainment, at which the king, presiding in person, received the congratulations of his friends, and the humble supplications of the Athenian deputies, who craved the bodies of their slain. Their request, which served as an acknowledgment of their defeat, was readily granted.

Philip's subsequent conduct was moderate, being founded on wise and humane policy. He restored without ransom the Athenian prisoners, and permitted them to take with them their baggage. Soon afterwards he dispatched his son Alexander and Antipater to offer them peace, on such favourable terms as they had little reason to expect. They were required to send deputies to the isthmus of Corinth, where, to adjust their respective contingents of troops for the Persian expedition, Philip purposed assembling, early in the spring, a general convention of all the Grecian states; they

were ordered to surrender the isle of Samos, which actually formed the principal station of their fleet, and the main bulwark and defence of all their maritime or insular possessions; but they were allowed to enjoy unmolested the Attic territory, with their hereditary form of government, and flattered by the acquisition of Oropus. The Thebans experienced the indignation of the conqueror. Philip thought himself entitled to treat that people, not as open and generous enemies, but as faithless and insidious rebels who merited all the severity of his justice. He punished the republican party with unrelenting vigour; restored the traitors whom they had banished to the first honours of the republic; and, in order to support their government, placed a Macedonian garrison in the Theban citadel.

In his opposite treatment of the two republics, Philip was swayed neither by affection nor hatred; his generosity and his rigour were alike artificial, and both directed by his interest.

The first news of the defeat filled Athens with tumult or consternation. But when the disorder ceased, the people shewed themselves disposed to place their whole confidence in arms, none in the mercy of Philip. A decree passed for sending to the Piræus their wives, children, and most valuable effects. By the same decree, the rights and freedom of the city were bestowed on strangers and slaves, and restored to persons declared infamous, on this one condition, that they exerted themselves in the public defence. Demosthenes, with equal success, proposed a decree for repairing the walls and fortifications, a work which, being himself appointed to superintend, he generously accomplished at the expence of his private fortune. The orator Lycurgus undertook the more easy task of impeaching the worthless Lysicles, whose misconduct in the day of battle had been the immediate cause of the late fatal disaster. In a discourse calculated to revive the spirit of military enthusiasm which had anciently animated the Athenians, the speaker thus warmly apostrophised the conscious guilt of the mute and trembling general: "The Athenians have been totally defeated in an engagement; the enemy have erected a trophy to the eternal dishonour of

Athens; and Greece is now prepared to receive the detested yoke of servitude. You were our commander on that inglorious day; and still *you* breathe the vital air, enjoy the light of the sun, and appear in our public places, a living monument of the disgrace and ruin of your country!" The quick resentment of the hearers supplied the consequence, and Lysicles was dragged to execution.

Neither the inflammatory decrees nor the hostile preparations of Athens could shake the moderation of Philip, or determine him to alter the favourable terms of accommodation which he had already proposed by his ambassadors. The patriotic or republican party, headed by the orators just mentioned, breathed hatred and revenge; but, at the intercession of the Areopagus, the prudent and virtuous Phocion was appointed to the chief command. The discernment of this statesman and general might easily perceive the vanity of attempting to recover the honour of a people, who, antecedently to their defeat by Philip, had been still more fatally subdued by their own vices. Amidst the dreadful misfortunes which hung over their country, a set of Athenian citizens, distinguished by their rank and fortune, and known by the appellation of the Sixty, from the accidental number of their original institution, daily assembled into a club, where all serious transactions were treated with levity, and the time totally dedicated to feasting, gaming, and the sprightly exercises of wit and pleasantry. This detestable society saw without emotion their countrymen arming for battle; with the most careful indifference they received accounts of their captivity or death; nor did the public calamities in any degree disturb their festivity, or interrupt for a moment the tranquil course of their pleasures. Their fame having reached Macedon, Philip sent them a sum of money, to support the expence of an institution so favourable to his views. But what opinion must Phocion have formed of such an establishment; or how was it possible for any man of ordinary prudence to expect, that a republic which fostered such wretches within its bosom could successfully wage war against a vigilant and enterprising enemy?

The arguments of the wisest portion of the community for accepting the peace offered by Philip were strengthened and

confirmed by the return of Demades with the Athenian prisoners taken at Chæronæa, who unanimously blazed forth the praises of their generous conqueror. Ambassadors were accordingly dispatched to the king of Macedon, to accept and ratify the treaty of peace, upon the terms which he had condescended to offer; and the only marks of deference shewn to the violent party, who still clamoured for war, were that Demochares, who ostentatiously affected a rude boldness of speech against Philip, was named among the ambassadors; and that Demosthenes, the irreconcilable enemy of that prince, was appointed to pronounce the funeral oration in honour of those slain at Chæronæa.

Demochares acquitted himself of his commission with that ridiculous petulance which naturally flowed from his character. At their audience of leave, Philip, with less sincerity than politeness, lavished on the ambassadors his usual professions of friendship, and obligingly asked them, if there was any thing farther in which he could gratify the Athenians? "Yes," said Demochares, "hang thyself." The just indignation of all present broke forth against this unprovoked insolence; when Philip, with admirable coolness, silenced the clamour, by saying, "Let this ridiculous brawler depart unmolested;" and then, turning to the other ambassadors, "Go, tell your countrymen, that those who can utter such outrages, are less just and moderate than he who can pardon them."

The honourable employment conferred on Demosthenes might have been expected to elevate his sentiments and language to the highest strain of eloquence. But the complexion of the times no longer admitted those daring flights to which he had been accustomed to soar; and the genius of the orator seems to have fallen with the fortune of his country. He avoids the mention of all recent transactions, and dwells with tiresome minuteness on the ancient, and even fabulous, parts of the Athenian story. One transient flash of light breaks forth towards the end of his discourse, when, commemorating the glory of the slain, he says, that the removal of those zealous republicans from their country, was like taking the sun from the world; a figure bold, yet just; since after the battle of Chæronæa, there remained no further hopes of re-

sisting the conqueror—the dignity of freedom was for ever lost, and the gloom of night and tyranny descended and thickened over Greece.

The Greeks acknowledged, that by the decisive victory of Chæronæa, Philip became master of their country. But we should form a very erroneous notion of the Macedonian government, if we compared it with the despotism of the East. The authority of Philip, even in his hereditary realm, was modelled on that admirable system of power and liberty, which distinguished and ennobled the policies of the heroic ages. He administered the religion, decided the differences, and commanded the valour of soldiers and freemen. Personal merit entitled him to hold the sceptre, which could not long be swayed by unworthy hands. The superiority of his abilities, the vigilant and impartial justice of his administration, formed the main pillars of his prerogative; since, according to the principles and feelings of the Macedonians, he who infringed the rights of his subjects, ceased from that moment to be a king.

Having effected the conquest of Greece, Philip affected to preserve inviolate the ancient forms of the republican constitution, and determined to govern the Greeks by the same policy with which he had subdued them. While Macedonian garrisons kept possession of Thermopylæ and the other strong holds of Greece, the faithful and active partizans of Philip controlled the resolutions, and directed the measures, of each particular republic. The superintendence of the sacred games, as well as of the Delphic temple, rendered him the only visible head of the national religion: in consequence of the double right of presiding and voting in the Amphictyonic council, he appeared in the character of supreme civil magistrate of Greece; and his illustrious victory at Chæronæa pointed him out as the general best entitled to conduct the military force of Greece and Macedon in the long-projected attack on Persia; an office which, as he might have assumed it without blame, he therefore solicited with applause from the impartial suffrages of the people.

This condescension was highly flattering to the vanity of the Greeks. In the year following the battle of Chæronæa,

Philip assembled a general convention of the Amphictyonic states. To it he proposed an invasion of Persia. The general voice of the assembly approved the project. The expedition was determined on with universal consent, and Philip was appointed general of the confederacy. When the several states came to ascertain the contingent of troops which they could respectively raise, the whole, exclusive of the Macedonians, amounted to two hundred and twenty thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse. On no former occasion had the several republics appeared so thoroughly united in one common cause; never had they testified such general alacrity to take the field, or such unlimited confidence in the abilities of their commanders.

Philip, having dispatched Parmenio with a body of troops to protect the Asiatic colonies, was prevented from immediately following that commander by an insurrection of the Illyrian tribes. This unseasonable diversion was rendered more formidable by the domestic discord which shook the palace of Philip. A spirit less proud and jealous than that of Olympias, mother of Alexander, might have been justly provoked by the continual infidelities of her husband, who, whether at home or abroad, in peace or in war, never ceased to augment the number of his wives or concubines. The generous mind of Alexander must naturally have espoused the cause of his mother. The young prince defended the rights of Olympias and his own with the impetuosity natural to his character. At the nuptials of Philip with Cassandra, the niece of Attalus, one of his generals and favourites, an open rupture broke out between the imperious father and his more haughty son; and the latter sought refuge among the rebellious Illyrians, who were already in arms against their sovereign.

The dexterity of Philip extricated him from these difficulties. Having conquered the Illyrians, he softened Alexander by assuring him, that his illustrious merit, which was alike admired in Greece and Macedon, had not escaped the anxious vigilance of a parent, who, by giving him many rivals to the throne, had only given him an opportunity of surpassing them all in glory, and in the merited affection of the

Macedonians. Soothed by this condescension, Olympias and her son again appeared at court with the distinction due to their rank; and to announce and confirm this happy reconcilement with his family, Philip married his beloved daughter Cleopatra to the king of Epirus, maternal uncle of Alexander, and celebrated the nuptials by a magnificent festival which lasted several days.

Amidst the tumultuous amusements of the festivity, Philip often appeared in public with unguarded confidence in the fidelity and attachment of all his subjects: but proceeding one day from the palace to the theatre, he was stabbed to the heart by Pausanias, a Macedonian. It is not certainly known whether the assassin was stimulated merely by private resentment, or prompted by the ill-appeased rage of Olympias, or instigated to commit this atrocity by the Persian satraps; which last is asserted by Alexander, who alleged the assassination of his father among his reasons for invading the Persian empire.

Thus fell Philip of Macedon, in the forty-seventh year of his age, and twenty-fourth of his reign; the first prince whose life and actions history hath described with such accuracy and circumstantial fulness as render his administration a matter of instruction to succeeding ages. With a reach of foresight and sagacity peculiar to himself, he united valour, eloquence, address, flexibility to vary his conduct without changing his purpose, with the most extraordinary powers of application and perseverance, of cool combination, and ardent execution.

The different, and apparently inconsistent, descriptions which historians have transmitted of this prince's character, may be reconciled by attending to that great ruling passion, the love of glory and power, which possessed the mind of Philip. All his other passions, his inclinations, his natural endowments, the sentiments he had imbibed, the graces, the qualifications, the accomplishments he had acquired, were all subservient to this. If terror and severity were necessary for the establishment of his power, his sentiments of humanity easily yielded to the dictates of his ambition; and the distresses in which whole states and countries were involved he

regarded with indifference and unconcern. If dissimulation and artifice were required, his perfect knowledge of mankind, joined to his obliging and insinuating deportment, enabled him to practise these with the most consummate address; and thus candour and ingenuousness were frequently sacrificed to his schemes of greatness. If corruption was necessary, he knew its power, and was perfect in the art of covering it by the fairest and most plausible pretences; and he never scrupled to make it his instrument to destroy his rivals, or accomplish his purposes. Hence we find him sometimes represented as a cruel, crafty, and perfidious prince, who laid it down as his favourite maxim, that it was a folly, when he had killed the father, to leave any of his family to revenge his death; who professed to amuse men with oaths, as children are cheated with toys; and who was rather the purchaser, than the conqueror of Greece. If, on the other hand, the specious appearances of generosity, condescension, and benevolence, were required to serve his great purposes, no man was more capable of assuming them, no man could display them more naturally and gracefully. If his reputation was to be exalted, or the number of his partizans to be increased, he could confer favours with an air of the utmost cordiality and affection; he could listen to reproof with patience, and acknowledge his errors with the most specious semblance of humanity; he could conquer his enemies and revilers by his good offices, and reconcile their affections by unexpected and unmerited liberalities. Hence again we find him emblazoned by all the pomp of praise, as humane, and benevolent, merciful, and placable in the midst of all the insolence of victory, careful to exercise the virtues of humanity, and gaining a second and more glorious triumph, by the kindness and clemency with which he reconciled and commanded the affections of those whom his arms had subdued.

His virtues and vices were directed and proportioned to his great designs of power: his most shining and exalted qualities influenced by his ambition: and, even to the most exceptionable parts of his conduct, he was principally determined by their conveniency and expediency. If he was unjust, he was, like Cæsar, unjust for the sake of empire.

Had not his days been shortened by a premature death, there is reason to believe, that he would have subdued the Persian empire; an enterprize more dazzling, but less difficult, than the exploits which he had already achieved. Had that event taken place, Philip, in the opinion of posterity, would perhaps have surpassed the glory of all kings and conquerors, who either preceded, or followed him. Yet, even on this supposition, there is not a man of sense and probity who would purchase the imagined grandeur and prosperity of the king of Macedon at the price of his artifices and crimes; and, to a philosopher, who considered the means by which he had obtained his triumphs, the busy ambition of this mighty conqueror would appear but a deceitful scene of splendid misery.

A prince, who is almost the sole depository of his own secrets, commonly leaves an arduous task for his successor. This difficulty presented itself to Alexander; but it was not the only circumstance that rendered his situation difficult. The regular order of succession had never been clearly established in Macedon, and was, in some measure, incompatible with the spirit of royal government, which, as then generally understood, required such qualities and accomplishments in the first magistrate, as could not be expected from a promiscuous line of hereditary princes. Alexander had not much to apprehend from the rivalship of his brothers, since Ptolemy, born of Arsinoë, and afterwards king of Egypt, was reputed to be the son of Lagus to whom Philip had married Arsinoë while she was with child by himself; and Aridæus, the son of Philina, possessed too feeble an understanding to dispute the succession. But Alexander's title was contested by his cousin Amyntas. Philip so little feared his pretensions to the throne, that he had given him his daughter Cyna in marriage. This new advantage strengthened the claim of Amyntas. Alexander privately took measures with his friends for crushing those dangerous enemies; and, being acknowledged king of Macedon, hastened into Greece to reap the fruits of his father's labours.

In his journey thither he experienced the perfidious inconstancy of the Thessalians, whom he chastised with proper severity; and, having assembled the deputies of the states at Corinth, he was invested with the same honours which had been conferred on his predecessor. During his residence in that city, there happened an incident which more clearly displays the character of Alexander than can be done by the most elaborate description. Curiosity led him to visit Diogenes the cynic. He found him basking in the sun, and having made himself known as the master of Macedon and Greece, asked the philosopher what he could do to oblige him? "Stand from between me and the sun," was the answer of the cynic: upon which the king observed to his attendants, that he would choose to be Diogenes, if he were not Alexander. The observation was natural and sublime; since, under the most dissimilar veils of external circumstances and pursuits, their characters concealed a real resemblance. Both possessed that proud, erect spirit, which disdains authority, spurns controul, and aspires to domineer over fortune. But, by diminishing the number of his wants, Diogenes found, in his tub, that independence of mind, which Alexander, by the unbounded gratification of his desires, could not attain on the imperial throne of Persia.

Alexander, having returned to Macedon, prepared for his eastern expedition by diffusing the terror of his name among the northern barbarians. The Illyrians and Triballi, mindful of the injuries of Philip, had hastily taken arms to oppose his son. The young prince, with a well appointed army, marched from Amphipolis, and arrived in ten days at the principal pass of Mount Hæmus, which led into the territory of the Triballi. There he found a new, and not less formidable enemy. The independent tribes of Thrace, having embraced the cause of the Triballi, had seized an eminence commanding the pass; and, instead of a breastwork, had fortified themselves with their carriages or wagons, which they purposed to roll down on the Macedonians. To elude this unusual battery, Alexander commanded such of his troops as could not conveniently open their ranks, and allow free issue to the intended violence, to fall flat on the ground, and care-

fully close their shields, that the descending wagons might harmlessly bound over them. In consequence of this contrivance, the hostile artillery was exhausted in vain. Alexander then attacked the Thracians with admirable order. Fifteen hundred fell; their swiftness and knowledge of the country saved the greater number. The prisoners, women, and booty, were sent for sale to the maritime cities on the Euxine.

Alexander passed the mountains and pursued the Triballi. By galling them with his bowmen and slingers, he gradually forced them from their fastnesses, and defeated a powerful body of their warriors encamped on the woody banks of the Lagynus. The remainder of the nation took refuge in Peucé, an island in the Danube. Alexander judged it too hazardous to assault the island; and the hostile appearance of the Getæ, on the northern bank, furnished him with an honourable pretence for declining the siege of Peucé. On the margin of the Danube that audacious people had drawn up four thousand horse, and above ten thousand foot, showing a determined resolution to oppose the landing of an enemy. Provoked by those signs of defiance, and animated by the glory of passing the greatest of all European rivers, Alexander filled the hides used in encampment with straw and other buoyant materials, and collected all the boats employed by the natives of those parts. Amidst the darkness of the ensuing night he thus transported fifteen hundred cavalry, and four thousand infantry, to that part of the opposite bank which was covered with high and thick corn. At the dawn of day, he commanded his foot to march through those rich fields with traversed spears; and while the infantry remained concealed in the corn, the cavalry followed them; but as soon as they emerged into the naked plain, the horse advanced to the front, and both suddenly presenting an irresistible object of terror, the Getæ abandoned their post and fled to their city, which was four miles distant. There they at first proposed to make a vigorous defence, but beholding the impenetrable firmness of the phalanx, and the irresistible impetuosity of Alexander's cavalry, they forsook their habitations, and retired precipi-

tately with their wives and children, into the northern desert.

The Macedonians entered and sacked the town. Alexander, mindful of so many favours, returned sacrifices of thanks to Jupiter, Hercules, and the god of the Danube, and received very submissive embassies from the surrounding nations.

Necessity alone compelled Alexander to carry his arms into those inhospitable regions. Animated by an ambition to subdue the Asiatic plains, he turned with contempt from bleak heaths and barren mountains, not deigning to chastise the boastful arrogance of the Celtæ.

In his return towards Pella, Alexander marched through the friendly country of the Pæonians, where he received the unpleasant intelligence, that the Illyrian tribes were in arms, headed by Clitus, son of Bardyllis, the hereditary foe of Macedon. Glaucias, king of the Taulantii, prepared to join the arms of Clitus; the Autariadæ, likewise an Illyrian nation, had determined to obstruct the march of Alexander. Amidst these difficulties, he was encouraged by Langarus, chief of the Agrians, a warlike tribe inhabiting the ridges of Mount Hæmus. Conducted by the activity of Langarus, the Agrian targeteers invaded the country of the Autariadæ. Their ravages were equally rapid and destructive; the Autariadæ, alarmed by private danger, abandoned the design of co-operating with the enemies of Alexander. That prince thus advanced without opposition to Pellion, the principal strong hold of the Illyrians. The enemy were posted on the adjacent mountains, and concealed among thick woods, purposing to attack the Macedonians by a sudden and united assault. But their courage failed them in the moment of execution. Not daring to wait the approach of the phalanx, they precipitately retreated to their city, leaving behind them the horrid vestiges of their bloody superstition, three boys, three maids, and as many black rams, which, having just sacrificed, they wanted time to remove.

Meanwhile Glaucias, king of the Taulantii, approached with a great force to relieve Pellion and assist his ally.

Alexander had dispatched Philotas to forage at the head of a strong body of cavalry. Glaucias attempted to intercept and cut off this detachment. Alexander marched to the assistance of Philotas; Clitus reinforced Glaucias; a decisive action thus seemed inevitable, but, from the thickness of lofty forests, and the intricacies of winding mountains, there was no proper scene for a general engagement. The barbarians excelled in knowledge of the country; the Macedonians in skill and courage. The war was widely diffused and ably supported. But the discipline of Alexander finally prevailed. By surprise, by stratagems, by the terror of his military engines, which destroyed at a distance, and by such prompt and skilful manœuvres as had never been before seen on the banks of the Apsus and Erigone, he totally dispersed this immense cloud of barbarians. Many were slain, and many made captive; a remnant, having burnt their city, sought refuge among the Taulantian mountains.

Meanwhile a report circulated in Greece, that Alexander had perished in Illyria; and, as men readily believe that which their interest makes them wish, this vague rumour was greedily embraced by the partisans of Grecian independence. The Athenian demagogues resumed their usual boldness; the Lacedæmonians already fancied themselves at the head of revolt; but the firt acts of rebellion were committed by the Thebans, who murdered Amyntas and Timolaus, commanders of the Cadmæa, and prepared to expel the Macedonian garrison from that fortress.

Alexander, when apprised of these proceedings, relinquished the pursuit of the barbarians, descended by rapid marches along the western frontier of Macedon, traversed Thessaly, entered Bœotia, and, in the space of fourteen days after his receiving the first news of the rebellion, besieged and demolished Thebes. The decisive boldness of this measure has been highly extolled by historians; because nothing could have a more direct tendency to quash the seditious spirit of the Greeks than the rapid punishment of Thebes. But it appears that the destruction of Thebes was the effect not of policy, but of obstinacy and accident. In approaching that unfortunate city, Alexander repeatedly halted, to allow the

insurgents time to repent of their rashness. But the exiles and authors of the sedition encouraged the multitude to persevere. They seemed bent on their own destruction; for they sallied out, and assaulted and slew several of the Macedonian out-guards.

Alexander repelled the attack, and his final assault was irresistible: The Thebans fled amain; and such was their trepidation, that having entered their gates, they neglected to shut them against the pursuers. The Macedonians and their Greek auxiliaries thus rushed tumultuously into the place. A dreadful slaughter ensued. The Phocians, Orchomenians, and Platæans rejoiced at gaining an opportunity to gratify their resentment against Thebes. The greater part of the citizens, exceeding thirty thousand in number, were either put to the sword or dragged into captivity. A feeble remnant escaped to Athens.

The severities exercised against Thebes were reluctantly permitted by Alexander, at the instigation of his Grecian auxiliaries. The few acts of forbearance or mercy, in this lamentable transaction, flowed from the humanity of his own nature. By his particular orders, the house and family of Pindar were saved from the general desolation. He commanded, likewise, that the sacred families, and those connected with Macedon by the ties of hospitality, should be spared. Alexander is the only great conqueror who built many more towns than he destroyed: accordingly he took care that the demolition of Thebes should be immediately followed by the restoration of Orchomenus and Platæa. Even the gloomiest events of his reign were distinguished by some flashes of light that displayed his magnanimity. It happened in the sack of Thebes that a band of fierce Thracians broke into the house of Timoclea, an illustrious Theban matron. The soldiers plundered her house, and their brutal commander violated her person. He was next stimulated by avarice, and demanded her gold and silver. She conducted him to a garden, and shewed him a well, into which she pretended to have thrown her most valuable treasure. With blind avidity he stooped to grasp it, while the woman, being behind, pushed him headlong into the cistern, and co-

vered him with stones. Timoclea was seized by the soldiers, and carried in chains to Alexander. Her firm gait and intrepid aspect commanded the attention of the conqueror. Having learned her crime, Alexander asked her, "Who she was that could venture to commit so bold a deed?" "I am," replied she, "the sister of Theagenes, who fell at Charonæa, fighting against Philip, in defence of Grecian freedom." Alexander admired both her action and her answer, and desired her to depart free with her children.

While Alexander returned towards Macedon, he received many congratulatory embassies from the Greeks. Those affected most friendship in their speeches who had most enmity in their hearts. The Athenians sent to deprecate his wrath against themselves. Alexander demanded the persons of Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Hyperides, and five other orators, to whose inflammatory speeches he ascribed the seditious spirit that had recently prevailed in Athens. A decree was unanimously passed for trying the orators accused by Alexander, and for inflicting on them such punishment as their offences should appear to merit. This pretended forwardness in the Athenians to avenge his quarrel was highly agreeable to Alexander. Amidst the various embassies to the king, the Spartans alone preserved a sullen or magnanimous silence. Alexander treated them with real or well-affected contempt; and, without deigning to require their assistance, departed early in the spring at the head of above five thousand horse, and somewhat more than thirty thousand infantry, on the greatest enterprise that ever was undertaken by any Grecian general. In twenty days march he arrived at Sestos, on the Hellespont. Thence the army was conveyed to Asia. The armament landed without opposition, the Persians having totally neglected the defence of their western frontier.

The causes of this negligence resulted in some degree from the character of the prince, but still more from that of the nation. Codomannus had been raised by assassinations and intrigues to the throne of Persia about the same time that Alexander succeeded his father Philip. This prince assumed the appellation of Darius; but could not retal the principles

or manners which distinguished his countrymen during the reign of the first monarch of that name. In the space of about two hundred and thirty years, the Persians had been continually degenerating from the virtues which characterise a poor and warlike nation, without acquiring any of those arts and improvements which usually attend peace and opulence. Their empire, as extended by Darius Hystaspes, still embraced the most valuable portion of Asia and Africa. The revenue paid in money was still estimated at fourteen thousand five hundred and sixty Eubœic talents. The revenue paid in kind cannot be appreciated; but, such was the extraordinary opulence of this great monarchy, that the conquests of Alexander are supposed to have given him an annual income of sixty millions sterling, a sum which will admit allowance for exaggeration and still appear sufficiently great.

The Persians were prepared for destruction, rather by their ignorance of the arts of peace and war, than by their effeminacy and luxury. The provinces had ceased to maintain any regular communication with the capital or with each other. The standing military force proved insufficient to keep in awe the distant satraps or viceroys. The ties of a common religion and language, or the sense of a public interest had never united into one system this discordant mass of nations, which was ready to crumble into pieces at the touch of an invader. On the other hand, Darius was deemed a brave and generous prince, beloved by his Persian subjects, and assisted by the valour of fifty thousand Greek mercenaries.

The Persians had neglected to oppose the invasion by their superior fleet; they had allowed the enemy to encamp unmolested on their coasts; fear now compelled them to reluctant union; but jealousy made them reject the best plan of defence.

This was proposed by Memnon, the Rhodian, the ablest general in the service of Darius. He observed the danger of resisting the Macedonian infantry, who were superior in number, and encouraged by the presence of their king.—That the invaders, fiery and impetuous, were now animated

by hope, but would lose courage on the first disappointment. Destitute of magazines and resources, their safety depended on sudden victory. It was the interest of the Persians, on the other hand, to protract the war; above all, to avoid a general engagement. For this purpose, they ought to trample down the corn with their numerous cavalry, and desolate the whole country, without sparing the towns and villages. Some rejected this advice as unbecoming the dignity of Persia. Arsites, governor of Lesser Phrygia, declared, with indignation, that he would never permit the property of his subjects to be ravaged with impunity. It was determined, therefore, by this council of princes, to assemble their respective forces with all possible expedition, and to encamp on the eastern bank of the Granicus, a river which, issuing from Mount Ida, falls into the Propontis.

The scouts of Alexander having brought him intelligence of the enemy's design, he immediately advanced to give them battle. The advanced guard were detached to examine the fords of the Granicus, and to observe the disposition of the enemy. They returned with great celerity to acquaint Alexander that the Persians were advantageously posted on the opposite bank; their horse amounting to twenty thousand, and their foreign mercenaries scarcely less numerous. Notwithstanding this alarming intelligence, the young prince determined to pass the river.

The cautious Parmenio remonstrated against passing the Granicus in the face of an enemy. The river, he observed, was deep and full of eddies; its banks abrupt and craggy. These prudential considerations prevailed not with Alexander, who declared, that in the first conflict the Macedonians must act with equal promptitude and vigour, and perform something worthy of the terror which they inspired. Saying this, he sprung on his horse, assumed the command of the right wing, and committed the left to Parmenio.

Alexander distributed his orders; a dreadful silence ensued, the hostile armies beheld each other with resentment or terror. This solemn pause was interrupted by the Macedonian trumpet, which, on a signal given by Alexander, resounded from every part of the line. His brother Ptolemy, as had

been previously regulated, then rode forth at the head of a squadron of cuirassiers, followed by two bodies of light dragoons, and a battalion of infantry commanded by Amyntas. While these troops boldly entered the Granicus, Alexander likewise advanced with the chosen cavalry on the right wing, followed by the archers and Agrians. In passing the river both Alexander and Ptolemy led their troops obliquely down the current, to prevent as much as possible the Persians from attacking them in flank, as they successively reached the shore. The Persian cavalry behaved with courage: the first squadrons of the Macedonians were driven back into the stream. But Alexander, who animated the troops with his voice and arm, maintained his ground on the bank, and thought he had gained the battle when he obtained an opportunity of fighting. In the equestrian engagements which followed, the Macedonians owed much to their skilful evolutions and discipline; still more to their strength and courage; and not a little to the excellence of their weapons, which being made of the cornel tree, far surpassed the brittle javelins of the enemy.

Meanwhile Parmenio crossed the Granicus, at the head of the left wing, with equal success. Alexander, after performing all the duties of a great general, displayed such personal acts of prowess, as will be more readily admired than believed by the modern reader. He was easily distinguished by the brightness of his armour. The bravest of the Persian nobles impatiently waited his approach. He darted into the midst of them, and fought till he broke his spear. Having demanded a new weapon from Arctes, his master of horse, Arctes shewed him his own spear, which was likewise broken. Demaratus, the Corinthian, supplied the king with a weapon. Thus armed, he rode up and assaulted Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius. While Alexander beat him to the ground, he was himself struck by Ræsaces with a hatchet.—His helmet saved his life. He pierced the breast of Ræsaces, but a new danger threatened him from the scimitar of Spithridates. The instrument of death already descended on his head, when Clitus cut off the arm of Spithridates, which fell with the grasped weapon.

The heroism of Alexander animated the valour of the *companions*, who formed eight squadrons of select cavalry, and the enemy first fled where the king commanded in person.—In the left wing, the Persians had begun on every side to give way, before the Macedonian infantry had completely passed the river. The stern aspect of the phalanx, shining in steel, and bristling with spears, confirmed the victory.—Above a thousand Persian horse were slain in the pursuit. The foot, consisting chiefly of Greek mercenaries, still continued in their first position, not firm, but inactive, petrified by astonishment, not steady through resolution. While the phalanx attacked them in front, the victorious cavalry assailed their flanks. Surrounded on all sides, they fell an easy prey; two thousand surrendered prisoners:—the rest perished, unless, perhaps, a few stragglers lurked among the slain.

The battle of the Granicus proved fatal to most of the Persian commanders. Arsites, the chief adviser of the engagement, died in despair by his own hand. The generals, Niphates, and Petenes, Omares, leader of the mercenaries, Spithridates, satrap of Lydia, Mithridates, son-in-law of Darius, and Arlupales, son of Artaxerxes, were numbered among the slain. It is scarcely to be believed, that, in such an important engagement, Alexander should have lost only eighty-five horsemen, and thirty light infantry. Of the former, twenty-five belonged to the royal band of Companions. By command of Alexander, their statues in bronze were formed by the art of his admired Lysippus, and erected in the Macedonian city of Dium.

This important victory enabled Alexander to display both his humanity and his prudence. He declared the parents and children of the deceased thenceforth exempted from every species of tribute. He carefully visited the wounded, attentively asked how each of them had received harm, and heard with patience and commendation their much boasted exploits. The Persian commanders were interred, and the Greeks, both officers and soldiers. The Grecian captives were condemned to work in the Thracian mines, as a punishment for bearing arms against the cause of their country. Immediately after the battle, he sent three hundred suits of Persian armour, as

dedications to Minerva in the citadel. This magnificent present was inscribed with the following words, "Gained by Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks, (except the Lacedæmonians,) from the Barbarians of Asia."

The battle of Granicus opened to Alexander the conquest of Ionia, Caria, and all the Asiatic provinces west of the river Halys, which had anciently formed the powerful monarchy of the Lydians. Many of the walled towns surrendered at his approach. Sardis, the splendid capital of Cræsus, opened its gates to a deliverer, and once more obtained the privilege of being governed by its ancient laws, after reluctantly enduring above two centuries the cruel yoke of Persia. The Grecian cities on the coast were delivered from the burden of tribute and the oppression of garrisons, and resumed the enjoyment of their hereditary freedom.

Miletus and Halicarnassus alone retarded the progress of the conqueror. The latter place, commanded by Memnon the Rhodian, made a memorable defence. Alexander had scarcely sat down before it, when the garrison, consisting of Greeks and Persians, sallied forth and maintained a desperate conflict. Having repelled them with much difficulty, he undertook the laborious work of filling up a ditch thirty cubits broad and fifteen deep, which the besieged had drawn round their wall. This being effected, he advanced wooden towers, on which the Macedonians erected their battering engines, and prepared to assault the enemy on equal grounds. But the besieged, in a nocturnal sally, attacked these preparations; a second engagement was fought with still greater fury than the first; three hundred Macedonians were wounded, darkness preventing their usual precaution in guarding their bodies.

Alexander continued to ply the walls with new vigour. The defence was obstinate. Two desperate sallies were made and repelled with consummate bravery. Alexander's tenderness for the Halicarnassians prevented him from entering the place with an enraged and licentious soldiery. He therefore recalled his troops in the moment of victory, hoping that the besieged would finally surrender, and thus save their lives and properties. From the various breaches in the walls,

Memnon and his colleagues perceived, that much longer resistance was impossible. In this emergency they set fire to a wooden tower, as well as to their arsenal and magazines, and escaped to two neighbouring castles of great strength. Halicarnassus was completely demolished.

The inactive season of the year was employed by Alexander in securing and improving his advantages. The king in person visited his more important conquests; and few places were honoured with his presence without experiencing his bounty.

Alexander pursued his journey through the southern provinces of the Asiatic peninsula, while Parmenio traversed the central countries of Lydia and Phrygia. At the same time, Cleander was dispatched into Greece to raise new levies; and such soldiers as had married shortly before the expedition, were sent home to winter with their wives; a measure which extremely endeared Alexander to the army, and ensured the utmost alacrity of his European subjects, in furnishing supplies towards the ensuing campaign.

Accompanied by such winning arts, the valour and prudence of Alexander seemed worthy to govern the world. His conduct, perhaps, often proceeded from the immediate impulse of sentiment; but it could not have been more subservient to his ambition, had it been invariably directed by the deepest policy. After the decisive battle of the Granicus, he experienced little obstinacy of resistance from the numerous forts and garrisons in Lower Asia. The tributary princes and satraps readily submitted to a milder and more magnanimous master; and the Grecian colonies on the coast eagerly espoused the interest of a prince, who on all occasions avowed his partiality for their favourite institutions. In every province or city which he conquered, he restored to the Asiatics their hereditary laws, to the Greeks their beloved democracy. Into whatever country he marched, he encouraged useful industry, and alleviated public burdens. His taste and his piety alike prompted him to repair the sacred and venerable remains of antiquity. He considered the barbarians, not as slaves but as subjects; the Greeks, not as subjects, but allies; and both perceived in his government such mo-

deration and equity, as they had never experienced, either from the despotism of Persia, or from the domineering ambition of Athens and Sparta.

Having received the submission of Xanthus, Patara, Phaselis, and above thirty other towns or seaports in Lycia, Alexander divided the corps under his immediate command. A considerable detachment traversed the Lycian and Pamphilian mountains, while the king, in person, pursued the still more dangerous track leading along the sea coast from Phaselis to Perga.

In proceeding eastward from Perga, Alexander was met by ambassadors from Aspendus, the principal city and seaport of Pamphylia. The Aspendians offered to surrender their city, but entreated that they might not be burdened with a garrison. Alexander granted their request, on condition of their raising fifty talents to pay his soldiers, and delivering to him the horses which they reared as a tribute for Darius. The ambassadors accepted these terms, but their countrymen discovered no inclination to fulfil them. Alexander was informed of their treachery. He immediately marched towards Aspendus, part of which was situated on a steep rock or mountain, entered the place, aud encamped within the walls. The Aspendians had previously retreated to the mountain, and, alarmed by the apprehension of a siege, intreated him to accept the former conditions. He commanded them to deliver the horses as agreed on; to pay, instead of fifty, a hundred talents; and to surrender their principal citizens as securities, that they would thenceforth obey the governor set over them; and to pay an annual tribute to Macedon.

Having chastised the insolence and treachery of Aspendus, Alexander determined to march into Phrygia, that he might join forces with Parmenio, whom he had commanded to meet him in that country. The new levies from Greece and Macedon were likewise ordered to assemble in the same province, from which it was intended, early in the spring, to proceed eastward, and achieve still more important conquests. To reach the southern frontier of Phrygia, Alexander was under a necessity of traversing the inhospitable mountains of the warlike Pisidians. Amidst those rocks and

fastnesses the Macedonians lost several brave men: but the undisciplined fury and unarmed courage of the Pisidians was unable to check the progress of Alexander. The city of Gordium, in Phrygia, was appointed for the general rendezvous. Here he was desirous of seeing the famous chariot, to which the Gordian knot was tied. This knot, which fastened the yoke to the beam, was tied with so much intricacy, that it was impossible to discover where the involutions began, or where the cords terminated. According to an ancient tradition of the country, an oracle had declared, that the man who could untie it, should shortly possess the empire of Asia. Whether Alexander untied, or cut the knot, is left uncertain by historians*; but all agree, that his followers retired with complete conviction that he had fulfilled the oracle. A seasonable storm of thunder confirmed their credulity; and the belief that their master was destined to be lord of Asia could not fail to facilitate that event.

The rapid progress of Alexander tends to heighten our surprize at the inactivity of Darius, who had signalized his valour against the fiercest nations of Asia. But Darius, instead of opposing the invader in the field, hoped to destroy him by the arm of an assassin. Many traitors were suborned for this infamous purpose, but none with greater prospect of success than Alexander, the son of Æropus. He had recently been intrusted with the command of the Thessalian cavalry; but the promise of ten thousand talents and of the kingdom of Macedon obliterated his gratitude and seduced his allegiance. His treason being discovered, he was seized and committed to safe custody.

Darius, without desisting from his intrigues, finally had recourse to arms. His troops were assembled in the plains of Babylon. They consisted of a hundred thousand Persians, of whom thirty thousand were cavalry. The Medes supplied almost half that number, and the Armenians almost as many as the Medes. The Barcani, the Hyrcanians, the inhabitants of the Caspian shores, and nations more obscure or

* Curtius, l. iii. c. i. says, he cut it with his sword. Plutarch says he untied it. Vit. Alexan. p. 1236.

more remote, sent their due proportion of cavalry and infantry for this immense army; which, including thirty thousand Greek mercenaries in the Persian service, is said to have amounted to six hundred thousand men. The magnificence of the Persians had not diminished since the days of Xerxes; neither had their military knowledge increased. Nothing could exceed the splendour that surrounded Darius. The dress and even the armour of his guards were adorned with gold, silver, and precious stones. He was attended by his family, his treasures, and his concubines, all escorted by numerous bands of horse and foot. His courtiers and generals copied too faithfully the effeminate manners of their master.

While Darius slowly advanced towards Lower Asia, Alexander left Gordium, and marched to Ancyra, a city of Galatia. In that place he received an embassy from the Paphlagonians, who surrendered to him the sovereignty of their province, but intreated that his army might not enter their borders. He granted their request, and commanded them to obey Cœlas, satrap of Phrygia. Alexander then marched victorious through Cappadocia; and Sabictas being appointed to the administration of that extensive province, the army encamped at the distance of six miles from the Cilician frontier, at a place long before known by the name of Cyrus's camp. Arsames, governor of that country, had sent a body of troops to guard a post called the Gates, and the only pass which leads from Cappadocia into Cilicia. Apprised of this measure, Alexander left Parmenio and the heavy-armed troops in the camp of Cyrus. At the first watch of the night he led the targeteers, archers, and Agrians, to surprize the Persian forces stationed at the northern gate of Cilicia. The barbarians fled on his approach; and the pusillanimous Arsames, to whom the whole province was entrusted by Darius, prepared to plunder, and then abandoned his own capital of Tarsus. But he had only time to save his person. The rapidity of Alexander prevented the destruction of that city, where the inhabitants received him as their deliverer.

At Tarsus, Alexander was detained by a malady occasioned by excessive fatigue; or, as others say, by imprudently bathing, when heated, in the cold waters of the Cydnus.

But his sickness interrupted not the operations of the army. Parmenio was dispatched to seize the only pass on Mount Amanus, which divides Cilicia from Assyria. The king soon followed, having in one day's march reached Anchialos, an ancient city of vast extent, and surrounded with walls of prodigious thickness.

Having arrived at Mallos, Alexander learned that Darius lay with his army in the extensive plain of Sochos, distant only two days march from the Cilician frontier. The hostile armies were separated by the mountains which divide Cilicia and Syria. Alexander hastened to pass the straits, called the Syrian Gates, and encamped before the city Mariandrus. At this place he received a very extraordinary piece of intelligence. His delay in Cilicia, which had been occasioned by sickness, was ascribed to very different motives by Darius and his flatterers. That perfidious race, the eternal bane of kings, easily persuaded the vain credulity of their master, that Alexander shunned his approach. The resentment of Darius was exasperated by the imagined fears of his adversary. With the impatience of a despot he longed to come to action; and, not suspecting that Alexander would traverse the Syrian Gates in search of the enemy, he hastily determined to pass in an opposite direction in quest of Alexander. This fatal measure was carried into immediate execution, in opposition to the advice of Amyntas the Macedonian, and of all Darius's Grecian counsellors, who unanimously exhorted him to wait the enemy in his present advantageous position. In the language of antiquity, an irresistible fate, which had determined that the Greeks should conquer the Persians, as the Persians had the Medes, and the Medes the Assyrians, impelled Darius to his ruin. He directed his march to the bay of Issus, and took the city of that name, which contained, under a feeble guard, the sick and wounded Macedonians, who had not been able to follow the army in its expeditious march across the mountains. The Persians put these unhappy men to death with shocking circumstances of cruelty, little thinking that Alexander was now behind, prepared to avenge their fate.

That enlightened prince speedily received the agreeable news that his enemies were now at hand. Having summoned an assembly, the king forgot none of those topics of encouragement which the occasion so naturally suggested, since the meanest Macedonian soldier could discern the injudicious movements of the Persians, who had quitted a spacious plain, to entangle themselves among intricate mountains, where their numerous cavalry, in which they chiefly excelled, could render no essential service. The army of Alexander had lately increased, by many voluntary accessions of the Asiatics, who admired his courage, mildness, and uninterrupted good fortune; and the soldiers, who the preceding year had been sent to winter in Europe, had not only rejoined the camp, but brought with them numerous levies. By men thus disposed to indulge the most sanguine hopes, the military harangue of their prince was received with a joyous ardour. They embraced each other; they embraced their admired commander; and his countenance confirming their alacrity, they entreated to be led to battle.

Alexander commanded them first to refresh their bodies; but immediately dispatched some horse and archers to clear the road to Issus. In the evening, he followed with his whole army, and, about midnight, took possession of the Syrian straits. The soldiers were then allowed a short repose. At dawn, the army was in motion. Before reaching the river Pinarus, on the opposite bank of which the enemy were encamped, the Macedonians had formed in order of battle, Alexander leading the right wing and Parmenio the left. Darius detached a body of fifty thousand cavalry and light infantry across the Pinarus, that the remainder might have room to form without confusion. His Greek mercenaries, amounting to thirty thousand, he posted directly opposite to the Macedonian phalanx. The nature of the ground admitted not more troops to be ranged in front, but as the mountain, on Alexander's left, sloped inwards, Darius placed on that sinuosity twenty thousand men, who could see the enemy's rear. Behind the first line the rest of the barbarians were ranged, in close and unserviceable ranks; Darius being

every where encumbered by the vastness of a machine which he had not skill to wield.

His pusillanimity was more fatal than his ignorance. When he perceived the Macedonians advancing, he commanded his men to maintain their post on the Pinarus, the bank of which was in some places high and steep; where the access seemed easier he gave orders to raise a rampart, precautions which shewed the enemy, that even before the battle began, the mind of Darius was already conquered. Alexander, meanwhile, rode along the ranks, exhorting, by name, not only the commanders, of the several brigades, but the tribunes, and such inferior officers as were distinguished by rank or ennobled by merit. He commanded his forces to advance with a regular and slow step. Their motion quickened as they proceeded within reach of the enemy's darts. Alexander, with those around him, then sprung into the river. Their impetuosity frightened the barbarians, who scarcely waited the first shock. But the Greek mercenaries, perceiving that, by the rapidity and success of Alexander's assault, the Macedonians were bent towards the right wing, seized the decisive moment of rushing into the interval where the phalanx was disjointed. A fierce engagement ensued. This desperate action proved fatal to Ptolemy, the son of Seleucas, and other officers of distinction, to the number of a hundred and twenty. Meanwhile the Macedonian right wing, having repelled the enemy with great slaughter, wheeled to the left, and finally prevailed. A body of Persian horse still maintained the battle against the Thessalian cavalry, nor did they quit the field till informed that Darius had betaken himself to flight.

The overthrow of the Persians was now manifest on all sides. Their cavalry and infantry suffered equally in the rout. The number of the slain was computed at a hundred and ten thousand, among whom where many satraps and nobles.

The great king had discovered little obstinacy in defending the important objects at stake. His left wing was no sooner repelled by Alexander, than he drove away in his chariot, accompanied by his courtiers. When the road

grew rough and mountainous, he continued his flight on horseback, leaving his shield, his mantle, and his bow, which were found by the Macedonians.

The Persian camp afforded abundant proof of Asiatic luxury and opulence. Among other things of value, in the tent of Darius was found a casket of exquisite workmanship, adorned with jewels. It was employed to hold Darius's perfumes. Alexander said, "I use no perfumes, but shall put into it something more precious." This was the Iliad of Homer, corrected by Aristotle, and often mentioned by ancient writers ἡ ἐν τῇ κιβωτῷ, "the Iliad of the casket." The camp contained however in money but three thousand talents; the magnificent treasures which accompanied the great king being deposited, previous to the battle, in the neighbouring city of Damascus. This inestimable booty was afterwards seized by order of Alexander, who found in the camp a booty more precious, the wife and daughters of Darius, his mother Sysigambis, and his infant son. In an age when prisoners of war were synonymous with slaves, Alexander behaved to his royal captives with the tenderness of a parent, blended with the respect of a son. In his chaste attention to Statira, the fairest beauty of the east, his conduct forms a remarkable contrast with that of his admired Achilles, whom he equalled in valour, but far surpassed in humanity. These illustrious princesses bore their own misfortunes with patience, but burst into dreadful lamentations, when informed by a eunuch, that he had seen the mantle of Darius in the hands of a Macedonian soldier. Alexander sent to assure them that Darius yet lived; and next day visited them in person.

The virtues of Alexander long continued to expand with his prosperity, but he was never greater than after the battle of Issus. The city of Soli, in Cilicia, though inhabited by a Grecian colony, had discovered uncommon zeal in the cause of Darius. To punish this unnatural apostacy from Greece, Alexander demanded a heavy contribution from Soli; but, after the victory, he remitted this fine. Impelled by the same generous magnanimity, he released the Athenian captives taken at the battle of the Granicus. In Damascus, several

Grecian ambassadors were found among the captives. Alexander ordered them to be brought into his presence. Thessaliscus and Dionysodorus, the Thebans, he instantly declared free, observing, that the misfortunes of their country justly entitled the Thebans to apply to Darius, and to every prince from whom they might derive relief. Iphicrates, the Athenian, he treated with the respect which appeared due both to his country and to his father. Euthycles, the Spartan, alone he detained in safe custody; because Sparta sullenly rejected the friendship of Macedon. But, as his forgiveness still increased with his power, he afterwards released Euthycles.

In his precipitate flight, Darius was gradually joined by about four thousand men, chiefly Greeks. Under this feeble escort, he departed hastily from Sochos, pursued his march eastward, and crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus, eager to interpose that deep and rapid stream between himself and the conqueror. In a council of his friends, Alexander declared his opinion, that it would be highly imprudent to attempt the conquest of Babylon, until he had thóroughly subdued the maritime provinces; because, should he be carried by an unseasonable celerity into Upper Asia, while the enemy commanded the sea, the war might be removed to Europe, where the Lacedæmonians were open enemies, and the Athenians suspicious friends. He therefore directed his march southward along the Phenician coast. Aradus, Marathus, and Sidon, readily opened their gates. The Tyrians sent a submissive embassy of their most illustrious citizens. They humbly informed Alexander, that the community from which they came was prepared to obey his commands. Having complimented the city and the ambassadors, he desired them to acquaint their countrymen, that he intended shortly to enter Tyre, and to perform sacrifice there to Hercules.

Upon this alarming intelligence, the Tyrians discovered equal firmness and prudence. A second embassy assured Alexander of their unalterable respect, but, at the same time, communicated to him their determined resolution, that neither the Persians, nor the Macedonians, should ever enter their walls. This boldness appears remarkable in a nation

of merchants, long unaccustomed to war. But the resources of their wealth and commerce seem to have elevated the courage, instead of softening the character, of the Tyrians. Their city, which, in the language of the East, was styled "the eldest daughter of Sidon," had long reigned queen of the sea. The purple shell-fish, which is found in great abundance on their coast, early gave them possession of that lucrative trade; and confined chiefly to the Tyrians the advantage of clothing the princes and nobles in most countries of antiquity. Tyre was separated from the continent by a frith half a mile broad, its walls exceeded a hundred feet in height, and extended eighteen miles in circumference. The conveniences of its situation, the capaciousness of its harbours, and the industrious ingenuity of its inhabitants, rendered it the commercial capital of the world. Its magazines were plentifully provided with military and naval stores, and it was peopled by numerous and skilful artificers in stone, wood, and iron.

Notwithstanding the strength of the city, Alexander determined to form the siege of Tyre. The difficulty of an undertaking, which seemed essential to the success of still more important enterprizes, only stimulated the activity of a prince, who knew that, on many emergencies, boldness is the greatest prudence. The first operation which he directed, was to run a mole from the continent to the walls of Tyre, where the sea was about three fathom deep. The necessity of this measure arose from the imperfection of the battering engines of antiquity, which had little power, except at small distances. On the side of the continent, the work was carried on with great alacrity, but when the Macedonians approached the city, they were exceedingly galled by darts, and missile weapons from the battlements, and incommoded by the depth of water. The Tyrians, likewise, having the command of the sea, annoyed the workmen from their galleys, and retarded the completion of their labours. To resist these assaults, Alexander erected, on the farthest projection of the mole, two wooden towers, on which he placed his engines, and which he covered with leather and raw hides to resist the ignited darts and fire ships of the enemy. This con-

trivance, however, the ingenuity of his adversaries soon rendered ineffectual. Having procured a huge hulk, they filled it with dry twigs, pitch, sulphur, and other combustibles. Toward the prow they raised two masts, each of which was armed with a double yard, from whose extremities were suspended vast caldrons, filled with whatever might add to the violence of the conflagration. Having prepared this uncommon instrument of destruction, they patiently waited a favourable wind. The hulk was then towed into the sea by two galleys. As she approached the mole, the rowers set her on fire, and escaped by swimming. The works of the Macedonians were soon in a blaze. The enemy, sailing forth in boats, prevented them from extinguishing the flames; and the labour of many weeks was thus in one day reduced to ruin.

The perseverance of Alexander was proof against such accidents. He immediately commanded new engines to be made, and a new mole to be raised, stronger and broader than the preceding. The orders of a prince, who directed every operation in person, and whose bodily toils exceeded those of the meanest soldiers, were always obeyed with alacrity. The ruins of old Tyre afforded abundance of stone; wood was brought from Anti-Libanus. By incredible exertions the mole was at length built, and the battering engines were erected. The arrival of four thousand Peloponnesian forces seasonably reinforced Alexander, and revived the courage of his troops, exhausted by fatigue and dejected by defeat. At the same time the fleets of the maritime provinces which he had subdued came to offer their assistance. The squadrons of Lower Asia were joined by the naval force of Rhodes and Cyprus. The whole armament of Alexander amounted to two hundred and twenty-four vessels. The Tyrians, who hitherto confided in their fleet, now retired behind the defences of their posts for safety.

But these persevering islanders, though they prudently declined an unequal combat, were forsaken neither by their activity nor their courage. The hulk and gallies, destined to advance the battering engines against their walls, were assailed with continual showers of ignited arrows, and other

missile weapons. This distant hostility retarded, but could not prevent the approaches of the enemy. The purpose of the Tyrians was better effected, by casting down huge stones into the sea, which hindered access to the walls. To clear these incumbrances required the perseverance of the Macedonians, and the animating presence of Alexander. Before the work could be accomplished, the enemy advanced in covered vessels, and cut the cables of the hulks employed in that laborious service. Alexander commanded a squadron to advance and repel the Tyrians. Yet even this did not facilitate the removal of the bar; for the islanders, being expert divers, plunged under water, and again cutting the cables, set the Macedonian vessels adrift. It thus became necessary to prepare chains, which were used instead of ropes, by which contrivance the hulks were secured in firm anchorage, the bank of stones was removed, and the battering engines advanced to the walls.

In this extremity the Tyrians, still trusting to their courage, determined to attack the Cyprian squadron, stationed at the mouth of the harbour which looked towards Sidon. The boldness of this design could only be surpassed by the deliberate valour with which it was carried into execution. The mouth of the haven they had previously covered with spread sails, to conceal their operations from the enemy. The hour of attack was fixed at mid-day, at which time the Greeks and Macedonians were usually employed in private affairs, or the cares of their bodies, and Alexander commonly retired to his pavilion. The best sailing vessels were carefully selected from the whole fleet, and manned with the most expert rowers and the most resolute soldiers, all inured to the sea and well armed for fight. At first they came forth in a line, slowly and silently; but, having proceeded within sight of the Cyprians, they at once clashed their oars, raised a shout, and advanced abreast of each other to the attack. Several of the enemy's ships were sunk at the first shock; others were dashed in pieces against the shore. Alexander was no sooner informed of this desperate sally, than, with admirable presence of mind, he immediately ordered such vessels as were ready to block up the mouth of the haven,

and thereby prevent the remainder of the Tyrian fleet from joining their victorious companions. Meanwhile, with several quinquereme, and five trireme galleys, hastily prepared, he sailed round to attack the Tyrians. The besieged, observing from their walls the approach of Alexander, endeavoured by shouts and signals to recal their ships. They had scarcely changed their course when the enemy assailed, and soon rendered them unserviceable. The men saved themselves by swimming; few vessels escaped; two were taken at the very entrance of the harbour.

The issue of these naval operations decided the fate of Tyre. Unawed by the hostile fleet, the Macedonians now fearlessly advanced their engines on all sides. Amidst repeated assaults, during two days, the besiegers displayed the ardour of enthusiasm*; the besieged the fury of despair. From towers equal in height to the walls, the Greeks and Macedonians fought hand to hand with the enemy. By throwing pontons across, the bravest sometimes passed over even to the battlements. In other parts the Tyrians successfully employed hooks and grappling irons to remove the assailants. On those who attempted the walls with scaling ladders, they poured vessels of burning sand, which penetrated to the bone. The vigour of the attack was opposed by as vigorous a resistance. The shock of the battering engines was deadened by green hides and coverlets of wool, and, whenever an opening was effected, the bravest combatants advanced to defend the breach. But time and fatigue, which exhausted the vigour of the enemy, only confirmed the perseverance of Alexander. On the third day the engines assailed the walls, and the fleet, divided into two squadrons, attacked the opposite harbour. A wide breach being effected, Alexander commanded the hulks which carried the engines to retire, and others, bearing scaling ladders, to advance, that his soldiers might enter the town over the ruins. The tar-

* Alexander dreamed that a satyr, playing before him, long eluded his grasp; but finally allowed himself to be caught. The augurs divided the word Σατυρος, a satyr, into two words, Σα Τυρος. Tyre is thine. By such coarse artifices did Alexander conquer the world.

geteers, headed by Admetus, first mounted the breach. This gallant commander was slain by a spear, but Alexander, who was present wherever danger called, immediately followed with the royal band of Companions. At the same time, the Phenician fleet broke into the harbour of Egypt, and the Cyprians into that of Sidon. After their walls were taken, the townsmen still rallied, and prepared for defence. The length of the siege, and still more the cruelty of the Tyrians, who, having taken some Grecian vessels from Sidon, butchered their crews on the top of their wall, and threw their bodies into the sea in sight of the whole Macedonian army, provoked the indignation of Alexander, and exasperated the fury of the victors. Eight thousand Tyrians were slain; thirty thousand were reduced to servitude. The principal magistrates, together with some Carthaginians who had come to worship the gods of their mother country, took refuge in the temple of Tyrian Hercules. They were saved by the clemency or piety of Alexander, who had lost four hundred men in this obstinate siege of seven months.

The conquest of Phœnicia was followed by the submission of the neighbouring province of Judæa. But in the road leading to Egypt, the progress of the conqueror was interrupted by the strong city of Gaza, near the confines of the Arabian desert. This place, distant about two miles from the sea, and surrounded by marshes, or a deep sand, which rendered it extremely difficult of access, was held for Darius by the loyalty of Batis, a eunuch, who had prepared to resist Alexander, by hiring Arabian troops, and by providing copious magazines. The Macedonian engineers declared their opinion that Gaza was impregnable. But Alexander, unwilling to incur the disgrace and danger of leaving a strong fortress behind him, commanded a rampart to be raised on the south side of the wall, which seemed least secure against an attack. His engines were scarcely erected, when the garrison made a furious sally and threw them into flames. Soon afterwards, the engines which had been used in the siege of Tyre arrived by sea. A wall of incredible height and breadth was run entirely round the city; the Macedonians raised their batteries; the miners were busy at the foundation;

breaches were effected; and, after repeated assaults, the city was taken by storm. When their wall was undermined, and their gates in possession of the enemy, the inhabitants still fought desperately, and, without losing ground, perished to a man. Their wives and children were enslaved.

The obstinate resistance of the obscure fortress of Gaza, was contrasted by the ready submission of the celebrated kingdom of Egypt. In seven days march Alexander reached the maritime city of Pelusium. His decisive victory at Issus, the shameful flight of Darius, the recent subjugation of Syria and Phœnicia, together with the actually defenceless state of Egypt, opened a ready passage to the wealthy capital of Memphis. There Alexander was received as sovereign, and immediately afterwards acknowledged by the whole nation; a nation long accustomed to fluctuate between one servitude and another, always ready to obey the first summons of an invader, and ever willing to betray him for a new master. Having placed sufficient garrisons both in Memphis and Pelusium, he embarked with the remainder of his forces, and sailed down the Nile to Canopus.

At this place, Alexander found abundant occupation for his policy, in a country where there was no opportunity for exercising his valour. Continually occupied with the thoughts, not only of extending, but of improving his conquests, the first glance of his discerning eye perceived what the boasted wisdom of Egypt had never been able to discover. The inspection of the Mediterranean coast, of the Red Sea, of the lake Marœotis, and of the various branches of the Nile, suggested the design of founding a city, which should derive from nature only, more permanent advantages than the favour of the greatest princes can bestow. Fired with this idea, he not only fixed the situation, but traced the plan of his intended capital. Such was the sagacity of his choice, that within the space of twenty years, Alexandria rose to distinguished eminence among the cities of Egypt and the east, and continued, through all subsequent ages of antiquity, the principal bond of union, the seat of correspondence and commerce, among the civilized nations of the earth.

In Egypt, an inclination seized Alexander to traverse the southern coast of the Mediterranean, that he might visit the revered temple and oracle of Jupiter Ammon. This venerable shrine was situate in a cultivated spot of five miles in diameter, distant about fifty leagues from the sea, and rising with the most attractive beauty amidst the sandy deserts of Lybia. Guided by prudence, or impelled by curiosity, he first proceeded two hundred miles westward. He then boldly penetrated towards the south into the midland territory, despising the danger of traversing an ocean of sand, unmarked by trees, mountains, or any other object that might direct his course, or vary this gloomy scene of uniform sterility. The superstition of the ancients believed him to have been conducted by ravens or serpents, which, without supposing a miracle, may, agreeably to the natural instinct of animals, have sometimes bent their course through the desert, towards a well-watered and fertile spot, covered with palm and olives. The fountain, which was the source of this fertility, formed not the least curiosity of the place. It was exceedingly cool at mid-day, and warm at midnight, and in the intervening time, regularly, every day, underwent all the intermediate degrees of temperature. The adjacent territory produced a fossil salt, which was often dug out in large oblong pieces, clear as crystal.

Alexander admired the nature of the place, consulted the oracle concerning the success of his expedition, and received, as was universally reported, a very favourable answer*. Having thus effected his purpose at the temple of Ammon, he returned to Memphis, finally to settle the affairs of Egypt. The inhabitants of that country were re-instated in the enjoyment of their ancient religion and laws. Two Egyptians were appointed to administer the civil government; but the principal garrisons Alexander prudently entrusted to the command of his most confidential friends.

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* The priest or prophet meant to address Alexander by the affectionate title of παιδιον, child, son; but, not being sufficiently acquainted with the Greek tongue, he said παι Διος, son of Jupiter. On this wretched blunder were founded Alexander's pretensions to divinity.

The Macedonians had now extended their arms over Anatolia, Carmania, Syria, and Egypt, countries which actually compose the strength and centre of the Turkish power. But Darius still found resources in his eastern provinces, Schirvan, Gilan, Korosan, and the wide extent of territory between the Caspian and the Jaxartes. Not only the subjects of the empire, but the independent tribes in those remote regions, which, in ancient and modern times, have ever been the abode of courage and barbarity, rejoiced in an opportunity to signalise their restless valour. At the first summons, they poured down into the fertile plains of Assyria, and increased the army of Darius far beyond any proportion of force which he had hitherto collected.

Meanwhile, Alexander, having received considerable reinforcements from Greece, Macedon, and Thrace, pursued his journey eastward from Phœnicia, passed the Euphrates at Thapsacus, boldly stemmed the rapid stream of the Tigris, and hastened to meet the enemy in Assyria. Darius had pitched his tents on the banks of the Bumadus, near the obscure village of Gaugamela; but the famous battle, which finally decided the empire of the East, derived its name from Arbela, a town in the same province, sixty miles distant from the former.

The fourth day after passing the Tigris, Alexander was informed by his scouts, that they had seen some bodies of the enemy's horse, but could not discover their numbers. Upon this intelligence he marched forward in order of battle, but had not proceeded far, when other scouts acquainted him, that the hostile cavalry scarcely exceeded a thousand. This news made him alter his measures. The heavy-armed troops were commanded to slacken their pace. At the head of the royal cohort, the Paeonians, and auxiliaries, Alexander advanced with such celerity, that several of the barbarians fell into his hands. These prisoners gave him very alarming accounts of the strength of Darius, who was encamped within a few hours march. Some made it amount to a million of foot, forty thousand horse, two hundred armed chariots, and fifteen elephants from the eastern bank of the Indus. Others reduced the infantry to six hundred thousand, and raised the cavalry

to a hundred and forty-five thousand. But all agreed, that the present army was much more numerous, and composed of more warlike nations, than that which had fought at Issus.

Alexander received this information without testifying the smallest surprise. Having commanded a halt, he encamped four days to give his men rest and refreshment. On the evening of the fourth day, he prepared to march against the enemy, with the effective part of his army, which was said to consist of forty thousand infantry, and seven thousand horse, unincumbered with any thing but their provisions and armour. The march was undertaken at the second watch of the night, that the Macedonians, by joining battle in the morning, might enjoy the important advantage of having an entire day before them, to reap the fruits of their expected victory. Having ascended the rising ground, Alexander first beheld the barbarians drawn up in battle array. Their appearance immediately determined him to change his first resolution. He again commanded a halt, summoned a council of war, and, different measures being proposed, acceded to the single opinion of Parmenio, who advised that the foot should remain stationary, until a detachment of horse had explored the field of battle, and carefully examined the disposition of the enemy. Alexander, whose conduct was equalled by his courage, and both surpassed by his activity, performed those important duties in person, at the head of his light horse and royal cohort. Having returned with unexampled celerity, he again assembled his captains, and encouraged them by a short speech. Their ardour corresponded with his own; and the soldiers, confident of victory, were commanded to take rest and refreshment.

Meanwhile, Darius, perceiving the enemy's approach, kept his men prepared for action. Notwithstanding the great length of the plain, he was obliged to contract his front, and form in two lines, each of which was extremely deep. According to the Persian custom, the king occupied the centre of the first line, surrounded by the princes of the blood, and the great officers of his court, and defended by his horse and foot guards, amounting to fifteen thousand chosen men.—These splendid troops, who seemed fitter for parade than battle, were flanked on either side by the Greek mercenaries and

other warlike battalions, carefully selected from the whole army. The right wing consisted of the Medes, Parthians, Hyrcanians, and Sacæ; the left was chiefly occupied by the Bactrians, Persians, and Cardusians. The various nations composing this immense host were differently armed, with swords, spears, clubs, and hatchets. The armed chariots fronted the first line, whose centre was farther defended by the elephants. Chosen squadrons of Scythian, Bactrian, and Cappadocian cavalry, advanced before either wing, prepared to bring on the action, or, after it began, to attack the enemy in flank and rear.

Darius dreading a nocturnal assault from enemies who often veiled their designs in darkness, commanded his men to remain all night under arms. This unusual measure, the gloomy silence, the long and anxious expectation, together with the fatigue of a restless night, discouraged the whole army.

At day-break, Alexander disposed his troops in a manner suggested by the superior numbers and deep order of the enemy. His main body consisted of two heavy-armed phalanxes, each amounting to above sixteen thousand men. Of these, the greater part formed into one line, behind which he placed the remainder of the phalangites, reinforced by his targeteers, with orders, that when the out-spreading wings of the enemy prepared to attack the flanks and rear of his first line, the second should immediately wheel to receive them. The cavalry and light infantry were so disposed on the wings, that while one part resisted the shock of the Persians in front, another, by only facing to the right or left, might take them in flank. Skilful archers and darters were posted at proper intervals, as affording the best defence against the armed chariots, which must immediately become useless, whenever their conductors or horses were wounded.

Alexander led the whole in an oblique direction towards the enemy's left; a manœuvre which enabled the Macedonians to avoid contending at once with superior numbers. When his advanced battalions, notwithstanding their nearness to the enemy, still stretched towards the right, Darius also extended his left, till fearing, that by continuing this

movement, his men should be drawn gradually off the plain, he commanded the Scythian squadrons to advance, and prevent the further extension of the hostile line. Alexander immediately detached a body of horse to oppose them. An equestrian combat ensued, in which both parties were reinforced, and the barbarians finally repulsed. The armed chariots then issued forth with impetuous violence, but the precautions taken by Alexander rendered their assault harmless. Darius next moved his main body, but with so little order, that the horse, mixed with the infantry, advanced, and left a vacuity in the line, which his generals wanted time or vigilance to supply. Alexander seized the decisive moment, and penetrated into the void with a wedge of squadrons. He was followed by the nearest sections of the phalanx, who rushed forward with loud shouts, as if they had already pursued the enemy. In this part of the field the victory was not long doubtful: after a feeble resistance, the barbarians gave way, and the pusillanimous Darius was foremost in the flight.

The battle, however, was not yet decided. The more remote divisions of the phalanx, upon receiving intelligence that the left wing was in danger, had not immediately followed Alexander. A vacant space was thus left in the Macedonian line, through which some squadrons of Persian and Indian horse penetrated with celerity, and advanced to the hostile camp. It was then that Alexander derived signal and well-earned advantages from his judicious order of battle. The heavy-armed troops and targeteers, which he had skilfully posted behind the phalanx, speedily faced about, advanced with a rapid step, and attacked the barbarian cavalry, already entangled among the baggage. The enemy thus surprised were destroyed or put to flight. Meanwhile, the danger of the left wing recalled Alexander from the pursuit of Darius. In advancing against the enemy's right, he was met by the Parthian, Indian, and Persian horse, who maintained a sharp conflict. Sixty of the Companions fell; Hephæstion, Cænus and Menidas, were wounded. Having at length dissipated this cloud of cavalry, Alexander prepared to attack the foot in that wing. But the business was

already done, chiefly by the Thessalian horse, and nothing remained for Alexander but to pursue the fugitives, and to render the victory as decisive as possible*.

According to the least extravagant accounts, with the loss of five hundred men, he destroyed forty thousand of the barbarians†, who never thenceforth assembled in sufficient numbers to dispute his dominion in the east. The invaluable provinces of Babylonia, Susiana, and Persis, with their respective capitals of Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis‡, formed

* Soldiers, better acquainted with the practice than with the theory of their art, have often testified a just surprise, that the battles of the ancients should be described with an order, perspicuity, and circumstantial minuteness, which are not to be found in the military writers of modern times. The difficulty will be best solved, by reflecting on the changes of arms, which, in military operations, form the pivot on which the whole turns. 1. From the nature of fire-arms, modern battles are involved in smoke and confusion. 2. From the same cause, modern armies occupy a much greater extent of ground, and begin to act at much greater distances, which renders it more difficult to observe, and ascertain their manœuvres. 3. The immense train of artillery, ammunition, &c. required in the practice of modern war, gives a certain immobility to our armies, which renders it impossible to perform, without great danger, those rapid evolutions in sight of an enemy, which so often decided the battles of the ancients.

† In the battles of the Greeks and Romans, the extraordinary disproportion between the numbers slain on the side of the victors, and of the vanquished, necessarily resulted from the nature of their arms. Their principal weapons being not missile, but manual, the armies could not begin to act till they had approached so nearly to each other, that the conquered found themselves cut off from all possibility of retreat. In modern times the use of fire-arms (which often renders the action more bloody) furnishes the defeated party with various means of retreating with considerable safety. The sphere of military action is so widely extended in modern times, that, before the victors can run over the space which separates them from the vanquished, the latter may fall back, and proceed with little loss beyond their reach; and, should any village, hedge, ravine, &c. be found in the way, may often check the ardour of the pursuers. Upon these considerations, the invention of gunpowder may be said to have saved the effusion of human blood. Equestrian engagements (since the principles on which cavalry act remain nearly the same in every age) are still distinguished by similar circumstances to those which appear so extraordinary in the battles of antiquity.

‡ The gold and silver found in those cities amounted to thirty millions sterling; the jewels, and other precious spoil belonging to Darius, suf-

the prize of his skill and valour. Alexander had not yet attained the summit of his fortune; but he had already reached the height of his renown. The burning of the royal palace of Persepolis, to retaliate the ravages of Xerxes in Greece, afforded the first indication of his being overcome by too much prosperity. An undistinguishing resentment made him forget that he destroyed his own palace, not that of his adversary.

The settlement of his important and extensive conquests, and the reduction of the warlike Uxii, who had ever defied the Persian power, restrained Alexander from urging the pursuit of Darius. After his defeat, that unfortunate prince escaped by an obscure flight across the Armenian mountains into Media. Being gradually joined by the scattered remnant of his army, he purposed to establish his court in Media, should Alexander remain at Susa or Babylon; but, in case he were still pursued by the conqueror, his resolution was to proceed eastward, through Parthia, and Hyrcania, into the valuable province of Bactria. In this design, he dispatched his women, wagons, and such instruments of convenience and luxury as still remained to him in his misfortunes, to the Caspian Gates, and remained in person at Ecbatana with his army. Alexander, when apprised of these measures, hastened into Media. In his way he subdued the Parætacaeni; and having reached within three days march of the Median capital, he was informed that Darius had fled thence five days before, attended by three thousand horsemen and six thousand foot.

Alexander proceeded to Ecbatana, in which place he left his treasures and posted a strong garrison. In this city he likewise dismissed the Thessalian cavalry, and several auxiliary squadrons, paying them, besides their arrears, a gratuity of two thousand talents. Such as preferred the glory of accompanying his standard to the joy of revisiting their respective countries were allowed again to enlist; a permis-

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ficed, according to Plutarch, to load twenty thousand mules, and five thousand camels. *Plut. in Alexand.*

sion which many embraced. A strong detachment under Parmenio was sent into Hyrcania; Cœnus was commanded to march with all convenient speed into Parthia; while the king, with a well appointed army, advanced with incredible expedition in pursuit of Darius. Having passed the Caspian straits, he was met by Bagistanes, a Babylonian of distinction, who acquainted him that Bessus, governor of Bactria, in conjunction with Nabarzanes, an officer in Darius's cavalry, and Barzaentes, satrap of the barbarous Drangæ and Arachoti, had thrown aside all respect for a prince who was no longer an object of fear. Upon this intelligence, Alexander declared expedition to be more necessary than ever. He, therefore, hastened forward with a few select bands, carrying with them only arms and two days provisions. In that space of time he reached the camp from which Bagistanes had deserted, and finding some parties of the enemy there, learned that Darius, being seized and bound, was actually carried prisoner in his chariot; that Bessus, in whose provinces this treason had been committed, had assumed the imperial title; that all the barbarians (Artabazus only and his sons excepted) already acknowledged the usurper; that the Greek mercenaries preserved their fidelity inviolate; but, finding themselves unable to prevent the flagitious scenes that were transacting, had quitted the public road, and retired to the mountains, disdaining not only to participate in the designs, but even to share the same camp with the traitors. Alexander farther learned, that should he pursue Bessus and his associates, it was their intention to make peace with him by delivering up Darius; but, should he cease from the pursuit, that they had determined to collect forces, and to divide the eastern provinces of the empire.

Having received this information, Alexander marched all night, and next day till noon, with the utmost speed, but without overtaking the enemy. He therefore dismounted five hundred of his cavalry, placed the bravest of his foot, completely armed, on horseback, and, commanding Attalus and Nicanor to pursue the great road which Bessus had followed, advanced in person with his chosen band by a nearer

way, which was almost desert, and entirely destitute of water. The natives of the country were his guides. From the close of evening till day-break, he had rode near fifty miles, when he first discovered the enemy, flying in disorder and unarmed. Probably to facilitate their own escape, Satibarzanes and Barzaentes stabbed Darius, and then rode away with Bessus, accompanied by six hundred horse. Notwithstanding the celerity of Alexander, the unhappy Darius expired before the conqueror beheld him.

In this important stage of his fortune, Alexander displayed tender sympathy with affliction, warm esteem of fidelity, and just hatred of treason. He gave orders that the body of Darius should be transported to Persia, and interred in the royal mausoleum. The children of the deceased prince were uniformly treated with those distinctions which belonged to their birth; and Statira, his eldest daughter, was finally espoused by Alexander. The pardon of the Greek mercenaries, who were admitted into the Macedonian service, and the honourable reception of Artabazus and his sons, well became the character of a prince who could discern and reward the merit of his enemies. Alexander then pursued the murderers of Darius through the inhospitable territories of the Arii, and Zarangæi, and in two days accomplished a journey of six hundred furlongs. Having received the submission of Aornos and Bactra, he passed the deep and rapid Oxus, and learned, on the eastern banks of this river, that Bessus, who had betrayed his master, had been betrayed in his turn by Spitamenes. The former was surprised by the Macedonians, and treated with a barbarity better merited by his own crimes, than becoming the character of Alexander.

Spitamenes succeeded to his ambition and danger. In pursuit of this daring rebel, the resentment of Alexander hurried him through the vast but undescribed provinces of Aria, Bactria, Sogdiana, and other less considerable divisions of the southern regions of Tartary. The more northern and independent tribes of that immense country, whose pastoral life formed an admirable preparation for war, ventured to take arms against a conqueror, who hovered on the frontier of their plains, and whose camp tempted them with the

prospect of a rich plunder. The policy of Spitamenes inflamed their courage and animated their hopes. These rude nations and this obscure leader, proved the most dangerous enemies with whom Alexander ever had to contend. Sometimes they faced him in the field, and, after obstinately resisting, retreated skilfully. Though never vanquished, Alexander obtained many dear-bought victories. The Scythians, on several occasions, surprised his advanced parties, and interrupted his convoys. The abruptness of their attack was only equalled by the quickness of their retreat; their numbers, their courage, and their stratagems, all rendered them formidable. But the intrepidity and inimitable discipline of the Greeks and Macedonians, finally prevailed over barbarian craft and desultory fury. Not contented with repelling his enemies, Alexander crossed the Jaxartes, and defeated the Scythians* on the northern bank of that river. This victory was sufficient for his renown, and the exigency of his affairs soon recalled him from an inhospitable desert.

The provinces between the Caspian and the Jaxartes twice rebelled, and twice were reduced to submission. The barbarians fighting singly were successively subdued; their bravest troops were gradually intermixed in the Macedonian ranks; and Alexander, thus continually reinforced by new numbers, was enabled to overrun those extensive countries by dividing his army into five formidable brigades, commanded by Hephæstion, Ptolemy, Perdiccas, Cœnus and himself. The Sogdians and Bactrians deserted their unfortunate general, and surrendered their arms to the conqueror. The Massagetæ and

* Before Alexander passed the Jaxartes, he received an embassy from the *Abian* Scythians. In this they are represented as saying, "Great trees require long time to grow: the labour of a few hours levels them with the ground. Take care, lest, in climbing to the top, you should fall with the branches which you have seized. Grasp fortune with both your hands; she is slippery, and cannot be confined. Our countrymen describe her without feet, with hands only, and wings. Those to whom she stretches out her hand, she allows not to touch her wings. Rein your prosperity, that you may more easily manage it. Our poverty will be swifter than your army loaded with spoil. We range the plain and the forest, we disdain to serve, and desire not to command."

other Scythians, having plundered the camp of their allies, fled with Spitamenes to the desert, but being apprized that the Macedonians prepared to pursue them, they slew this active and daring chief, whose courage deserved a better fate, and, in hopes of making their own peace, sent his head to the conqueror.

After the death of Spitamenes, the enemy feebly resisted Alexander in the open country, but in the provinces of Sogdiana and Parætacaene, two important fortresses, long deemed impregnable, still bade defiance to the invaders. Into the former, Oxyartes, who headed the Bactrians, had placed his wife and children. The rock was steep, rugged, almost inaccessible, and provided with corn for a long siege. The deep snow by which it was surrounded, increased the difficulty of assaulting it, and supplied the garrison with water. Alexander, having summoned the Bactrians to surrender, was asked in derision, Whether he had furnished himself with winged soldiers? This insolence piqued his pride; and he determined to make himself master of the place. This resolution was consonant to his character. His success in arms sometimes encouraged him to enterprizes neither justified by necessity nor warranted by prudence. Fond of war, not only as an instrument of ambition, but as an art in which he gloried to excel, he began to regard the means as more valuable than the end, and sacrificed the lives of his men to military experiments alike hazardous and useless: yet, on the present occasion, sound policy seems to have directed his measures. Having determined soon to depart from those provinces, he might judge it imprudent to leave an enemy behind: it might seem necessary to destroy the seeds of future rebellion; and, by exploits unexampled, and almost incredible, to impress such terror of his name, as would astonish and overawe his most distant and warlike dependencies.

Alexander carefully examined the Sogdian fortress, and proposed a reward of twelve talents to the man who should first mount the top of the rock on which it was situated. The second and third were to be proportionably rewarded, and even the last of ten was to be gratified with the sum of three hundred darics. The hopes of this recompence stimulated

the love of adventure. Three hundred men, selected from the whole army, were furnished with ropes made of the strongest flax, and with iron pins used in pitching tents. They were likewise provided with small pieces of linen, which, being joined together, might serve as a signal. By driving the iron pins into congealed snow, and then fastening to them the ropes, they gradually hoisted themselves up the mountain. In this extraordinary enterprise, thirty men perished, whose bodies were so buried in the snow, that notwithstanding the most diligent search, they could never afterwards be recovered. By this simple contrivance, those daring adventurers gained the summit of the rock which overlooked the fortress, and waving their signal in the morning, were discovered by Alexander. At this joyous sight, he summoned the besieged to surrender to his winged soldiers. The barbarians beheld and trembled; terror multiplied the numbers of their enemies, and represented them as completely armed; Alexander was invited to take possession of the fortress.

This nameless castle contained Roxana, daughter of Oxyartes, and deemed, next to the spouse of Darius, the greatest beauty in the east. Alexander admired her form and her accomplishments; but, even in the fervour of youth and the intoxication of prosperity, his generous mind disdained the cruel right of a conqueror, as justified by the maxims and examples of his age and country. With a moderation and self command worthy the scholar of Aristotle, he declined the embraces of his captive till his condescending affection raised her to the throne.

In Bactria, Alexander learned that the Paratacaeni were in arms, and that many of his most dangerous enemies had shut themselves up in the fortress or rock of Chorienes. Upon this intelligence he hastened to the Paratacaeni. The height of the rock, which was every where steep and craggy, he found to be near three miles, and its circumference above seven. It was surrounded by a broad and deep ditch, at such distance from the base as placed the garrison beyond the reach of missile weapons. Alexander gave orders that the fir trees of extraordinary height, which surrounded the

mountain, should be cut down and formed into ladders, by means of which his men descending the ditch, drove huge piles into the bottom. These being placed at proper distances, were covered with hurdles of ozier consolidated with earth. In this occupation his whole army were employed by turns, night and day. The barbarians at first derided this seemingly useless labour. But their insults were soon answered by Macedonian arrows. By these and other missile weapons, the Macedonians, who were carefully protected by their coverings, so much annoyed the besieged, that the latter became desirous to capitulate. For this purpose Chorienes, from whom the place derived its name, desired to converse with Oxyartes, the Bactrian, who, since the taking of his wife and children, had submitted to Alexander. His request being granted, Oxyartes strongly exhorted him to surrender his fortress and himself, assuring him of Alexander's goodness, of which his own treatment furnished an eminent example, and declaring that no place was impregnable to such troops, and such a general. Chorienes prudently followed this advice, and by his speedy submission not only obtained pardon but gained the friendship of Alexander, who again entrusted him with the command of his fortress and the government of his province. The vast magazines of corn, meat, and wine, collected by the Parætacaeni for a long siege, afforded a reasonable supply to the Macedonian army, especially during the severity of winter, in a country covered with snow many feet deep.

By such memorable achievements, Alexander subdued the nations between the Caspian sea, the river Jaxartes, and the lofty chain of mountains which supply the sources of the Indus and the Ganges. His example taught the troops to despise hunger, fatigue, cold, and danger; neither rugged mountains, nor deep and rapid rivers, nor wounds nor sickness, could interrupt his progress or abate his activity: his courage exposed him to difficulties, from which he was extricated by new efforts of courage, which, in any other commander, would have passed for temerity. Amidst the hardships of a military life, obstinate sieges, bloody battles, and dear-bought victories, he still practised the mild virtues of

humanity. The conquered nations enjoyed their ancient laws and privileges; the rigours of despotism were softened; arts and industry encouraged; and the proudest Macedonian governor compelled by the authority and example of Alexander to observe the rules of justice towards their meanest subjects. To bridle the fierce inhabitants of the Scythian plains, he founded cities and established colonies on the banks of the Jaxartes and the Oxas. These improvements appeared to the discernment of this extraordinary man, not only essential to the security of the conquests which he had already made, but necessary preparations for more remote and splendid expeditions which he still purposed to undertake.

During the three first years that the invincible heroism of Alexander triumphed in the east, the firm vigilance of Antipater repressed rebellion in Greece. But the attention of that general being diverted by a revolt in Thrace, the Lacedæmonians, instigated by the warlike ambition of their king Agis, ventured to exert that hostility against Macedon which they had long felt. Reinforced by some communities of the Peloponnesus, the allied army amounted to twenty-two thousand men. Antipater, having checked the insurrection in Thrace, hastened into the Grecian peninsula with a superior force, and defeated the confederates in a battle, which proved fatal to king Agis, and three thousand Peloponnesian troops. The vanquished were allowed to send ambassadors to implore the clemency of Alexander. From that generous prince the rebellious republics received promise of pardon, on condition that they punished with due severity the authors of an unprovoked and ill-judged revolt.

While Alexander pursued the murderers of Darius, Athens was crowded with spectators from the neighbouring republics, to behold an intellectual conflict between Æschines and Demosthenes. In consequence of a decree proposed by Ctesiphon, Demosthenes had been honoured with a golden crown, as the reward of his political merit. His adversary had denounced the author of this decree, as a violator of the laws of his country, because the boasted services of Demosthenes had ended in public disgrace and ruin; and that, in-

stead of being rewarded with a crown, he ought to be punished as a traitor. By a stroke aimed at Ctesiphon, Æschines meant chiefly to wound Demosthenes.

In the oration of Æschines we find the united powers of reason and argument combined with the most splendid eloquence. Yet the persuasive vehemence of Demosthenes prevailed in the contest. The unexampled exertions* by which he obtained this victory will be admired to the latest ages of the world. To what an exalted pitch of enthusiasm must the orator have raised himself and his audience, when, to justify his advising the fatal battle of Chæronæa, he exclaimed, "No, my fellow citizens, you have not erred; No! I swear it by the manes of those heroes who fought in the same cause at Marathon and Platæa." What sublime art was required to arrive, by just degrees, at this extraordinary sentiment, which, in any other light than the inimitable blaze of eloquence with which it was surrounded, would appear altogether excessive and gigantic.

The orator not only justified Ctesiphon and himself, but procured the banishment of his adversary, as the author of a malignant and calumnious accusation. Honourable as this triumph was, Demosthenes derived more solid glory from the generous treatment of his vanquished rival. Before Æschines set sail, he carried to him a purse of money, which he kindly compelled him to accept; a generosity which made the banished man affectingly observe, "How deeply must I regret the loss of a country in which enemies are more generous than friends elsewhere!" Æschines retired to the isle of Rhodes, and instituted a school of eloquence, which flourished several centuries.

Demosthenes survived Alexander. But this illustrious Athenian patriot fell a prey to the suspicious policy of Antipater. At the desire of that prince, he was banished Athens, and, being pursued by Macedonian assassins, he ended his life by poison.

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* See the Orat. de Coron. throughout.

From the period of Alexander's brilliant success till his death, Greece enjoyed above eight years an unusual degree of tranquillity and happiness. The suspicious and severe temper of Antipater was restrained by the commands of his master, who, provided the several republics sent him their appointed contingents of men to reinforce his armies, was unwilling to exact from them any farther mark of submission. Under the protection of this indulgent sovereign, to the glory of whose conquests they were associated, the Greeks still preserved the forms, and displayed the image of that free constitution of government, whose spirit had animated their ancestors.

Deprived indeed of the honour, but also delivered from the cares of independent sovereignty, and undisturbed by those continual and often bloody dissentions, which deform the annals of their tumultuous liberty, the Greeks indulged their natural propensity to the social embellishments of life, a propensity by which they were distinguished above all other nations of antiquity. Their innumerable shows, festivals, and dramatic entertainments, were exhibited with more pomp that at any former period. The schools of philosophers and rhetoricians were frequented by all descriptions of men. Painting and statuary were cultivated with equal ardour and success. Many improvements were made in the sciences, and the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, still rivalled the taste and genius, though not the spirit and virtue, of their ancestors. Yet, even in this degenerate state, when patriotism and true valour were extinct, and those vanquished republicans had neither liberties to lose, nor country to defend, their martial honours were revived and brightened by an association with the renown of their conqueror. Under Alexander, their exploits, though directed to very different purposes, equalled, perhaps excelled, the boasted trophies of Marathon and Platæa. By a singularity peculiar to their fortune, the æra of their political disgrace coincides with the most splendid period of their military glory. Alexander was himself a Greek; his kingdom had been founded by a Grecian colony; and, to revenge the wrongs of his na-

tion, he undertook and accomplished the most extraordinary enterprises recorded in the history of the world.

By views of policy, rather than the madness of ambition, Alexander was carried to the rugged banks of the Oxus and the Jaxartes. The fierce nations of those inhospitable regions, had, in ancient times, repeatedly overrun the more wealthy, and more civilized provinces of Asia. Without diffusing through the Scythian plains the terrors of his name, the conqueror would not have securely enjoyed the splendour of Susa and Babylon; nor, without the assistance of numerous and warlike levies, raised in those barbarous countries, could he have prudently undertaken his Indian expedition. For this remote and dangerous enterprize he prepared early in the spring; Amyntas being appointed governor of Bactria, and entrusted with a sufficient force to overawe the surrounding provinces.

With the remainder of his forces, Alexander hastened southwards, and in ten days march traversed the Paromisus, a link of that immense chain of mountains, reaching from the coast of Cilicia to the sea of China.

The rugged nature of the country was not the only difficulty with which the Macedonians had to struggle. The northern regions of India were inhabited, in ancient, as they are still in modern times, by men of superior strength and courage; and the vigorous resistance made by the natives of those parts, rendered it as difficult for Alexander to penetrate into the Indian peninsula by land, as it has always been found easy by the maritime powers of Europe to invade and subdue the unwarlike inhabitants of its coasts.

This experienced leader seems to have conducted his army by the route of Candahar, well known to the caravans of Agra and Ispahan. After many severe conflicts, Alexander subdued the Aspii, Thyræi, Arasaci, and Asaceni; scoured the banks of the Choas and Cophenes; expelled the barbarians from their fastnesses; and drove them towards the northern mountains, which supply the sources of the Oxus and the Indus.

Near the western margin of the latter, one place, defended by the Baziri, still defied his assaults. This place, called

by the Greeks Aornos, afforded refuge not only to the Baziri, but to the most warlike of their neighbours, after their other strong holds had surrendered. It was admirably adapted to the purpose of a long and vigorous defence. Alexander, with his usual diligence, raised a mount, erected his engines, and prepared to annoy the enemy. But, before he had an opportunity to employ the resources of his genius, by which he had taken places still stronger than Aornos, the garrison sent a herald, under pretence of surrendering on terms, but in reality with a view to spin out the negociation during the whole day, and in the night to effect their escape. Alexander, who suspected this intention, met their art with similar address. Patiently waiting till the Indians descended the mountain, he took possession of the strong hold which they had abandoned, having previously posted a proper detachment to intercept the fugitives and punish their perfidy.

The Macedonians proceeded southward from Aornos, into the country between the Cophenes and the Indus. On the eastern bank of the latter, Alexander received the submission of the neighbouring princes. Of these, Taxiles, who was the most considerable, brought, besides other valuable presents, the assistance of seven thousand Indian horse, and surrendered his capital Truxila, the most wealthy and populous city between the Indus and Hydaspes. But the king, who never allowed himself to be outdone in generosity, restored and augmented the dominions of Taxiles.

It was about the summer solstice when Alexander reached the Hydaspes, and consequently the waters of the rivers were swollen at that season by the melted snow which descends in torrents from Paropamissus, as well as by the periodical rains. Trusting to this circumstance, Porus, a powerful and warlike prince, had encamped on the opposite bank of the Hydaspes with thirty thousand foot, four thousand horse, three hundred armed chariots, and two hundred elephants. Alexander found it impossible to practise upon this prince as he had done upon others, and to pass the river in view of so numerous an army. He therefore collected provisions, and pretended that he intended to remain in his pre-

sent position until the water in the river should decrease; but Porus was not to be duped by this artifice.

The king, therefore, alarmed the enemy for many nights successively, until he perceived that Porus considered it as only a feint to harass his troops, and no longer drew out his forces as usual. This false security of the Indian king enabled Alexander to accomplish his purpose.

As soon as it was known that Alexander's troops were passing the river, the Indian king immediately dispatched his son with two thousand horse and one hundred and twenty armed chariots to oppose the landing of the Macedonians. These troops, however, came too late to defend the bank, and being attacked by the forces of Alexander, were speedily broken and put to flight. Their leader and four hundred horsemen were slain, and most of the chariots taken.

The discomfiture of these troops deeply afflicted Porus; but his own immediate danger would not admit of much reflection. A bloody battle took place between the two armies. Porus behaved with the greatest intrepidity and the most excellent conduct. He gave his orders and directed every thing as long as his forces could resist the enemy; even after they were broken he rallied them in different parties, and continued the fight until every corps of Indians was put to the route. The pursuit was peculiarly destructive. The unfortunate Porus lost both his sons, all his captains, twenty thousand foot, and three thousand horse. The elephants, spent with fatigue, were slain or taken; even the armed chariots were hacked in pieces, having proved less formidable in reality than appearance; could we believe that little more than three hundred men perished on the side of Alexander.

The Indian king behaved with great gallantry in the engagement, and was the last to leave the field. His flight being retarded by his wounds, he was overtaken by Taxiles, whom Alexander entrusted with the care of seizing him alive. But Porus, perceiving the approach of a man who was his ancient and inveterate enemy, turned his elephant and prepared to renew the combat. Alexander then dispatched to him Mervé, an Indian of distinction, who, he understood, had formerly lived with Porus in habits of friend-

ship. By the entreaties of Mervé, the high-minded prince, spent with thirst and fatigue, was finally persuaded to surrender; and, being refreshed with drink and repose, was conducted to the presence of the conqueror. Alexander admired his stature (for he was above seven feet high) and the majesty of his person; but he admired still more his courage and magnanimity. Having asked in what he could oblige him? Porus answered, "By acting like a king." "That," said Alexander, with a smile, "I should do for my own sake; but, what shall I do for yours?" Porus replied, "All my wishes are contained in that one request." None ever admired virtue more than Alexander. Struck with the firmness of Porus, he declared him reinstated on his throne; acknowledged him for his ally and his friend; and, having soon afterwards received the submission of the Glaussæ, who possessed thirty-seven cities on his eastern frontier, the least of which contained five thousand inhabitants, he added this populous province to the dominions of his new confederate. Before he left the Hydaspes, Alexander founded two cities Nicæa and Bucephalia; the former was so called, to commemorate the victory gained near the place where it stood; the latter, situate on the opposite bank, was named in honour of his horse Bucephalus.

In promoting the success of Alexander, the fame of his generosity conspired with the power of his arms. Without encountering any memorable resistance, he reduced the dominions of another prince named Porus, and the valuable country between the Acesines and the Hydraortes. In effecting this conquest, the obstacles of nature were the principal, or rather the only enemies with whom he had to contend. The river Acesines is deep and rapid; many parts of its channel are filled with large and sharp rocks, which occasion loud and foaming billows, mixed with boiling eddies and whirlpools, equally formidable, and still more dangerous. Of the Macedonians who attempted to pass in boats, many drove against the rocks and perished; but such as employed hides, reached the opposite shore in safety. On the eastern bank of the Hydraortes, Alexander learned that the Cathæi, Malli, and other independent Indian tribes, prepared to resist his

progress. They had encamped on the side of the hill; and instead of a breastwork, had fortified themselves with a triple row of carriages. Alexander advanced with his cavalry; the Indians, mounting their carriages, poured forth a shower of missile weapons. Alexander, perceiving the cavalry unfit for such an attack, immediately dismounted, and conducted a battalion of foot against the enemy. The lines were attacked where weakest; some passages were opened; the Macedonians rushed in, and the Indians fled in precipitation to Sangala.

The walls of that place were too extensive to be completely invested. On one side, the town was skirted by a lake, long and broad, but not deep. Alexander invested the greatest part of the town with a rampart and a ditch, and prepared to advance his engines to batter the walls, when he was informed by some deserters, that the enemy resolved that very night to steal, if possible, through the lake; if not, to force their way with their whole strength. They made the attempt, but failed, after leaving five hundred men on the place.—Meanwhile, Porus, Alexander's principal ally in those parts, arrived in the camp with five thousand Indians, and a considerable number of elephants. Encouraged by this reinforcement, the Macedonians prepared to terminate the siege. The engines were got ready; the wall, built of brick, was undermined; the scaling ladders were fixed; several breaches were made; and the town was taken by assault. Seventeen thousand Indians are said to have perished in the sack of Sangala; above seventy thousand were taken prisoners; Sangala was razed; its confederates submitted or fled. Above a hundred Macedonians fell in the siege or assault; twelve hundred were wounded.

The persevering intrepidity of Alexander thus rendered him master of the valuable country now called the Punjab, watered by the five great streams whose confluence forms the Indus. The banks of the Hyphalis, the most eastern of these rivers which he actually intended to cross, were adorned by twelve Macedonian altars, equal in height, and exceeding in bulk, the greatest towers in that country. These monuments marked the extremity of Alexander's empire, an em-

pire thus limited, not by the difficulties of the country, or the opposition of enemies, but by the immoveable and unanimous resolution of his European troops.

Invincible by his enemies, Alexander submitted to his friends, at whose desire he set bounds to his trophies in the east. But his restless curiosity prepared new toils and dangers for the army and himself. Having returned to the cities Nicæa and Bucephalia, he divided his forces, for the sake of exploring more carefully the unknown regions of India. Two divisions, respectively commanded by Craterus and Hephæstion, had orders to march southward along the opposite banks of the Hydaspes. Philip, to whom he had committed the government of the provinces adjacent to Bactria, was recalled, and the whole Macedonian conquests in India, including seven nations, and above two thousand cities, were subjected to the dominion of Porus. Meanwhile the Ionians, Cyprians, Phœnicians, and other maritime nations who followed the standard of Alexander, industriously built or collected above two thousand vessels, for sailing down the Hydaspes to its junction with the Indus, and thence along that majestic stream to the Indian ocean. On board this fleet the king embarked in person with the third division of his forces.—His navigation employed several months, being frequently retarded by hostilities with the natives, particularly the warlike tribes of the Malli. These barbarians were driven from the open country; their cities were successively besieged and taken; but at the storm of their capital, a scene was transacted, which would have indicated madness in any other general, and which betrayed temerity even in Alexander.

When their streets were filled with the enemy, the Malli took refuge in their citadel. This fortress was defended by a thick wall, which was extremely lofty without, but inwards of an inconsiderable height. Alexander commanded the scaling ladders to be applied, but this service being performed more tardily than usual, the king snatched a ladder from one who carried it, and, having fastened it to the wall, mounted with rapidity, in defiance of the enemy's weapons. The Macedonians, alarmed by the danger of their general, followed in such numbers, that the ladder broke as Alexander reached

the summit. The same accident happened to other ladders, which were hastily applied, and injudiciously crowded. For some moments, the king thus remained alone on the wall, exposed to thick vollies of hostile darts from the adjacent towers. His resolution was more than daring. At one bound he sprung into the place, and, posting himself at the wall, slew the chief of the Malli, and three others who ventured to assault him. Meanwhile, Abreas, Leonnatus, and Peucestes, the only Macedonians who had got safe to the top of the wall, imitated the example of Alexander. Abreas was wounded and fell; his companions, regardless of their own safety, defended the king, whose breast had been pierced with an arrow. They were soon covered with wounds, and Alexander seemed ready to expire. By this time, the Macedonians had burst through the gates of the place. Their first concern was to carry off the king, the second to revenge his death, for they believed the wound to be mortal, as breath issued forth with his blood. Some report, that the weapon was extracted by Critodemus, of Cos; others, that no surgeon being near, Perdiccas opened the wound with his sword, by Alexander's command. The great effusion of blood threatened his immediate dissolution; but a seasonable fainting fit, suspending the circulation, stopped the discharge of blood, and saved his life.

Having performed his intended voyage to the ocean, Alexander determined to proceed towards Persepolis, through the barren solitudes of Gedrosia. This arduous design was prompted by the necessity of supplying with water the first European fleet which navigated the Indian sea, explored the Persian gulph, and examined the mouths of the Euphrates and the Tigris. This important voyage was performed, and afterwards related, by Nearchus. In discovering the sea and the land, the fleet and army of Alexander mutually assisted each other. By the example of the king both were taught to despise toil and danger. On foot, and encumbered with his armour, he traversed the tempestuous sands of the Persian coast, sharing the hunger, thirst, and fatigue of the meanest soldier; nor was it till after a march of two months,

distinguished by unexampled hardships, that the army emerged into the cultivated province of Carmania.

In this country Alexander was met by a division of his forces, which he had sent, under the command of Craterus, through the territories of the Arii and Drangæ. Stasanor and Phrataphernes, governors of those warlike nations, and of the more northern provinces of Parthia and Hyrcania, brought a seasonable supply of camels, and other beasts of burden, to relieve the exigencies of an army enfeebled by disease, and exhausted by fatigue. The waste of men occasioned by this destructive expedition was repaired by the arrival of numerous battalions from Media. Cleander and Sitalus, the commanders of those forces, were accused by the Medes of despoiling their temples, and committing other detestable deeds of avarice and cruelty. Their own soldiers confirmed the accusation; and their crimes were punished with death. This prompt justice gave immediate satisfaction, and served as a salutary example in future; for, of all the rules of government practised by this illustrious conqueror, none had a stronger tendency to confirm his authority, than his vigilance to restrain the rapacity of his lieutenants, and to defend his subjects from oppression.

Encouraged by the long absence of their master, Harpalus, Orsines, and Abulites, who were respectively governors of Babylon, Persepolis, and Susa, began to act as independent princes, rather than accountable ministers. In such emergencies, Alexander knew by experience the advantage of celerity. He therefore divided his army. The greater part of the heavy-armed troops were entrusted to Hephæstion, with orders to proceed along the sea coast, and to attend the motions of the fleet commanded by Nearchus. With the remainder, the king hastened to Pasargadæ. Orsines was convicted of many enormous crimes, which were punished with as enormous severity. Baryaxes, a Mede, who had assumed the royal tiara, suffered death; his numerous adherents shared the same fate. The return of Alexander from the east proved fatal to Abulites and his son Oxathres, who, during the absence of their master, had cruelly oppressed the wealthy province of Susiana, and particularly the inhabitants

of the capital. Harpalus, whose conduct at Babylon had been no less flagitious, escaped with his treasures to Athens: the avarice of the Athenians engaged them to receive this wealthy fugitive; but their fears forbade them to harbour the enemy of Alexander. By a decree of the people, he was expelled from Attica; and this traitor seems himself to have been soon afterwards treacherously slain. The brave Peucestas, who had saved Alexander's life at the assault of the Mallian fortress, was promoted to the government of Persia. In this important command, he proved his wisdom to be equal to his valour.

In the central provinces of his empire, which, from time immemorial, had been the seat of Asiatic pomp and luxury, Alexander spent the last, and not the least glorious year of his reign. The world was silent in his presence, and his only remaining care was to improve and consolidate his conquests. For these important purposes, he carefully examined the course of the Eulæus, the Tigris, and the Euphrates; and the indefatigable industry of his troops was judiciously employed in removing the weirs, or dams, by which the timid ignorance of the Assyrian and Persian kings, obstructed the navigation of those great rivers. The harbours were repaired; arsenals were constructed; and a bason was formed at Babylon sufficient to contain a thousand galleys. By these and similar improvements, he expected to facilitate internal intercourse among his central provinces, while, by opening new channels of communication, he hoped to unite the wealthy countries of Egypt and the east, with the most remote regions of the earth. His ships were sent to explore the Persian and Arabian gulphs. Archias brought him such accounts of the former, that he determined to plant its shores with Grecian colonies.

From war, the mother of arts, Alexander learned to improve the benefits of peace. While preparations were making for more distant expeditions, he sailed down the Euphrates; carefully examined the nature of the soil; and, having discovered near the inosculation of the Euphrates and Pallacopas a hard and rocky bottom, he commanded a canal to be cut there, which served to moderate the inundations at one

season, without too much draining the waters at another. Having performed this essential service to Assyria, he followed the course of the Pallacopas, and surveyed the lakes and marshes which guard the Arabian frontiers. In the neighbourhood of his new canal, he observed a convenient situation for a city, which being built and fortified, was peopled with those superannuated Greeks, who seemed no longer capable of military service, and with such others of their countrymen as thought proper to settle in this fertile, though remote country.

Alexander thus traversed the populous provinces of the East, and successively visited the imperial cities of Persepolis, Susa, Ecbatana, and Babylon. These places, and others of inferior note, were adorned with signal marks of his taste, and respectively distinguished by transactions which discover the boldest, yet most enlightened views of policy. The important design of uniting by laws and manners the subjects of his extensive monarchy was ever present to his mind. For this purpose, he took care to incorporate in his barbarian armies the Greeks and Macedonians. In each division of sixteen, he joined four Europeans to twelve Asiatics. In the Macedonian squadrons and battalions, he intermixed, on the other hand, such of the barbarians as were most distinguished by their strength, their activity, and their merit. Soon after the battle of Arbela, he had given orders to raise new levies in the conquered provinces. The barbarian youth delighted in the Grecian exercise and discipline, and rejoiced at being associated to the glory of their victors. On the banks of the Tigris, Alexander was joined by a powerful body of those recruits, whose improvements in arts and arms fully answered his expectations, and justly rewarded his foresight. The arrival of such numerous auxiliaries enabled him to discharge at Opis, a city on the Tigris, such Greeks and Macedonians as were tired of the service, worn out with age, or enfeebled by success. He dismissed those respectable veterans loaded with wealth and honours.

At Susa, Alexander learned that his soldiers, indulging the extravagance too natural to their profession, had contracted immense debts, which they had neither ability nor inclina-

tion to pay. Upon this intelligence, he issued orders that each man should give an exact account of what he owed, with the names of his creditors, declaring that he was determined to satisfy them at his own expense. The troops suspected an intention merely to discover their characters, and to learn their economy or profusion. At first, therefore, many denied, and all diminished their debts. But Alexander issued a second declaration, "That it became not a prince to deceive his people, nor a people to suppose their prince capable of deceit." Faithful lists were immediately presented, and the whole debts discharged, to the amount, it is said, of four millions sterling.

A transaction of a different kind discovers the same spirit, and equally endeared Alexander to his Asiatic subjects. In the royal palace of Susa, he publicly espoused Barcine, the daughter of Darius; and bestowed her sister Drypetis on his friend Hephæstion, saying, that he wished their children to be kinsmen. By the advice of their master, Perdiccas, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and other generals, intermarried with the most illustrious of the vanquished barbarians. The soldiers were encouraged by presents, and by the hope of royal favour, to follow the example of their leaders, and it appears that above ten thousand Greeks and Macedonians married Asiatic women.

In all the cities which he visited, Alexander was careful to celebrate the musical and gymnastic games, those distinguishing fruits of Grecian culture, which being adopted to gratify the senses, as well as to please the fancy, were beheld with delight by the most ignorant barbarians. Alexander also determined to introduce and diffuse the amusements of the theatre. For this purpose, above three thousand players and musicians, collected from all parts of Greece, assembled in Ecbatana, the capital of Media, which was chosen for the scene of those theatrical exhibitions. But the sickness and death of Hephæstion changed this magnificent spectacle into melancholy obsequies. In the moment of his triumph, the king was deprived of his dearest friend. This irreparable loss he felt and expressed with an affectionate ardour congenial to his character. During three days and nights after the death

of Hephæstion, Alexander neither changed his apparel nor tasted food. A public mourning was observed throughout the empire; funeral games were celebrated in the great cities; and the lofty genius of Stasicrates erected at Ecbatana a monument worthy of *him*, whom the obsequious oracle of Ammon declared deserving of *heroic* worship.

To moderate and divert his sorrow, Alexander undertook an expedition in person. The Cossæans, a fierce and untractable nation, inhabited the southern frontier of Media. Secure amidst their rocks and fastnesses, they had ever defied the arms of the Persians; and the degenerate successors of Cyrus had judged it more prudent to purchase their friendship, than to repel their hostility. In their annual journey from Babylon to Ecbatana, the pride of these magnificent but pusilanimous princes condescended to bestow presents on the Cossæans, that they might procure an undisturbed passage for themselves and their train. This impolitic meanness only increased the audacity of the mountaineers, who often ravaged the Susian plains, and often retired to their fastnesses, loaded with the richest spoils of Media. Alexander was not of a temper patiently to endure the repetition of such indignities. In forty days he attacked, defeated, and totally subdued this rapacious and warlike tribe. The Cossæans were driven from their last retreats, and compelled to surrender their territory. After obtaining sufficient pledges of their fidelity, the conqueror allowed them to ransom their prisoners, and, at his departure from their country, took care to erect such fortresses as seemed necessary for bridling in future the dangerous fury of this headstrong people.

In returning from this successful expedition, towards the banks of the Euphrates, Alexander was met by ambassadors from Carthage, Spain, and Italy, as well as from many inland countries of Asia and Africa. It was then, that he appeared master of the world, both to his followers and to himself; and, as if the known parts of it had been insufficient to satisfy his ambition, he gave orders to cut timber in the Hyrcanian forest, with a design to build ships and explore the undiscovered shores of the Caspian and Arabian seas. But neither these lofty designs, nor the glory of war, nor the

pomp of royalty, could appease his grief for the loss of Hephæstion. The death of his beloved friend is said, by Arrian, to have hastened his own. It certainly tinged his character with a deep melancholy.

He who had so often employed superstition as an instrument of policy, began himself to fall a prey to that miserable passion. Apollodorus, a citizen of Amphipolis, who had been intrusted with the government of Babylon, practised with his brother Pythagoras, a diviner. The latter, ambitious to promote the greatness of his family, pretended to perceive in the victims evident marks of divine displeasure against the king, should he enter the gates of Babylon. Notwithstanding this menace, Alexander, after reducing the Cossæans, approached towards that city with his army. He was met by a long train of Chaldæan priests, who conjured him to change his resolution, because they had received an oracle from Belus, declaring that the journey thither would prove fatal. The interest of the Chaldæans conspired with the views of Apollodorus. The temple of Belus, situate in the heart of Babylon, had been very richly endowed by the Assyrian kings. But the produce of the consecrated ground, instead of being applied to its original destination, had, ever since the impious reign of Xerxes, been appropriated to their own use by the Chaldean priests. Alexander intended to reform this abuse; he discerned their interested motives, and answered them by a verse of Euripides, "He's the best prophet that conjectures best."

During his short stay at Babylon, his mind was disturbed by superstitious fears, awakened by the intrigues of Apollodorus, or the artifices of the Chaldæans; but they seem to have been diverted by the voyage down the Euphrates, and by directing the improvements in the canal of Pallacopas. Having resumed his courage, he ventured to return to Babylon, gave audience to some Grecian ambassadors, who presented him with golden crowns from the submissive flattery of their several republics; and, having reviewed his troops and galleys, prepared the execute the enterprizes which he had so long meditated. But his designs and his life were now drawing to a close. Whether to conquer his melan-

choly, or to triumph in the victory which he had already gained over it, he indulged without moderation in that banqueting, and festivity, to which, after the fatigues of war, he had often shewn himself too much addicted. A fever, occasioned, or at least increased by an excessive abuse of wine, put a period to his life in the thirty-third year of his age, and in the thirteenth of his reign. During his illness he spoke but little, and that only concerning his intended expedition. The temples were crowded by his friends; the generals waited in the hall; the soldiers surrounded the gates. Such was the grief of many, and the respectful admiration of all, that none ventured to announce to him his approaching dissolution; none ventured to demand his last orders. When all hopes of recovery had vanished, his favourite troops were admitted to behold him. He was speechless, but had still strength to stretch forth his hand.

Alexander was of a low stature, and somewhat deformed, but the activity and elevation of his mind animated and ennobled his frame. By a life of continual labour, and by an early and habitual practice of the gymnastic exercises, he had hardened his body against the impressions of cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and prepared his robust constitution for bearing such exertions of strength and activity, as have appeared incredible to the undisciplined softness of modern times. His superior skill in war gave uninterrupted success to his arms, and his natural humanity, enlightened by the philosophy of Greece, taught him to improve his conquests to the best interests of mankind. In his extensive dominions, he built or founded not less than seventy cities, the situation of which, being chosen with consummate wisdom, tended to facilitate communication, to promote commerce, and to diffuse civility through the greatest nations of the earth. It may be suspected, indeed, that he mistook the extent of human power, when, in the course of one reign, he undertook to change the face of the world; and that he miscalculated the stubbornness of ignorance and the force of habit, when he attempted to enlighten barbarism, to soften servitude, and to transplant the improvements of Greece into an African and Asiatic soil, where they have never

been seen to flourish. Whoever seriously considers what he actually performed before his thirty-third year, will be cautious of determining what he might have accomplished, had he reached the ordinary term of human life. His resources were peculiar to himself; and such views, as well as actions, become him, as would have become none besides. He seems to have been given to the world by a peculiar dispensation of Providence, being a man like to none other of the human kind.

From the part which his father Philip and himself acted in the affairs of Greece, his history has been transmitted through the impure channels of exaggerated flattery or malignant envy. Impartial posterity acknowledges, that several of Alexander's actions were highly culpable, yet declares that his faults were few in number, and resulted from his situation, rather than from his character.

From the first years of his reign he experienced the crimes of disaffection and treachery, which multiplied and became more dangerous with the extent of his dominions, and the difficulty to govern them. Several of his lieutenants early aspired at independence; then formed conspiracies against the life of their master. The first criminals were treated with a lenity becoming the generous spirit of Alexander. But when the Macedonian youths, who guarded the royal pavilion, prepared to murder their sovereign, he found it necessary to depart from his lenient system, and to hold with a firmer hand the reins of government. With his friends, he maintained an equal intercourse of visits and entertainments, indulged a liberal flow of unguarded conversation, and often in the excessive use of wine.

On such occasions, his companions enjoyed and abused the indecent familiarity to which they had been accustomed, but which the temper of Alexander, corrupted by prosperity and flattery, was no longer able to endure. A scene of drunken debauchery proved fatal to Clitus, who, emboldened by wine, daringly insulted his prince, vilified his noblest actions, and derided his pretensions to divinity. The king, being likewise intoxicated, was no longer master of himself, when Clitus, who had been once carried from his presence,

returned a second time to the charge, and behaved more insolently than before. In an unhappy moment, Alexander thrust a spear into the breast of his friend, but, instantly repenting his fury, would have destroyed himself by the same weapon, had he not been prevented by his attendants. The bitterness of his repentance, and the pungency of his remorse, rendered his life burdensome, and his actions inconsistent. At times he assumed the Persian dress and ornaments, displayed the pomp of oriental despotism, employed, and often preferred the barbarians, and, in several passages of his reign, this successful, but unhappy conqueror, appears to have been beset with flatterers; surrounded by conspirators; adored by the passive submission of his eastern subjects; and insulted by the licentious petulance of the Greeks and Macedonians.

The indignation or jealousy of the latter tinged the fairest of his actions with dark and odious colours. About a year before his death, a scene was transacted at Opis, on the Tigris, which shews the difficulties of his situation, and the magnanimity by which he overcame them. Having assembled the Macedonian troops, he declared to them his pleasure, that such as felt themelves unable to undergo the fatigues of war, should be honourably discharged from the service, and safely conducted to their respective provinces. This proposal, which ought to have been accepted with gratitude, was heard with disgust. The soldiers reflected that the army had recently been increased by an accession of thirty thousand barbarians; and they inferred, that Alexander no longer cared for the service of his veterans. The spirit of sedition seized the camp; the Macedonians unanimously demanded their discharge; some adding, with scoffs, "That he had no farther use for *them;* his father Ammon could fight his battles." At these words the king sprang from the rostrum on which he stood, and commanded the most audacious to be seized by his targeteers, and conducted to immediate execution. This prompt severity appeased the rising tumult. The soldiers remained motionless and silent, doubtful or terrified. Alexander again mounted the rostrum, and spoke as follows: "It is not my design,

Macedonians, to change your resolution. Return home without hindrance from me. But, before leaving the camp, first learn to know your king and yourselves. My father Philip found you, at his arrival in Macedon, miserable and hopeless fugitives, covered with skins of sheep, feeding among the mountains some wretched herds, which you had neither strength nor courage to defend against the Thracians, Illyrians, and Treballi. Having repelled the ravagers of your country, he brought you from the mountains to the plains, and taught you to confide, not in your fastnesses, but in your valour. By his wisdom and discipline he trained you to art and civility; enriched you with mines of gold; instructed you in navigation and commerce; and rendered you a terror to those nations, at whose names you used to tremble. Need I mention his conquests in Upper Thrace, or those still more valuable, in the maritime provinces of that country? Having opened the gates of Greece, he chastised the Phocians, reduced the Thessalians, and, while I shared the command, defeated and humbled the Athenians and Thebans, to whom you had been successively tributaries, subjects, and slaves. But my father rendered you their masters; and, having entered the Peloponnesus, and regulated at discretion the affairs of that peninsula, he was appointed, by universal consent, general of combined Greece. At my accession to the throne, I found a debt of five hundred talents, and scarce sixty in the treasury. I contracted a fresh debt of eight hundred, and, conducting you from Macedon, safely crossed the Hellespont, though the Persians still commanded the sea. By one victory we gained Ionia, Æolia, both Phrygias, and Lydia. By our courage and activity, the provinces of Cilicia and Syria, the strength of Palestine, the antiquity of Egypt, and the renown of Persia, were added to your empire. Yours now are Bactria and Aria, the productions of India, the fertility of Assyria, the wealth of Susa, and the wonders of Babylon. You are generals, princes, satraps. What have I reserved for myself but this purple and diadem, which mark my pre-eminence in toil and danger? Where are my private treasures? Or why should I collect them? Are my pleasures expensive? You know that I fare worse than many

of yourselves; and have in nothing spared my person. Let him who dares compare with me. Let him bare his breast, and I will bare mine. My body, the fore part of my body, is covered with honourable wounds from every sort of weapon. I often watch that you may enjoy repose; and, to testify my unremitting attention to your happiness, had determined to send home the aged and infirm among you, loaded with wealth and honour. But, since you are all desirous to leave me, go! Report to your countrymen that, unmindful of the signal bounty of your king, you entrusted him to the vanquished barbarians. The report, doubtless, will bespeak your gratitude and piety."

Having thus spoken, he sprang from the rostrum, and hastened to the palace, accompanied only by his guards. During two days, none were admitted to his presence. On the third, he called the Persian nobles of distinction, and distributed among them the principal departments of military command. He then issued orders that certain bodies of the barbarian infantry and cavalry should be called the royal battalion and royal cohort, and by such other names as commanded greatest respect. Apprised of these innovations, the Macedonians, who had long remained in confusion before the tribunal, afraid to follow Alexander, and afraid to allow his retiring unattended, flocked around the palace, and deposited their arms at the gate, humbly requesting to see their king, and declaring, that they would never stir from the place till their tears had moved his compassion. Alexander came forth, beheld their abasement, and wept. The affecting silence was at length broke by Callines, a man highly esteemed in the cavalry: "Thy Macedonians, O king! are grieved that the Persians alone should be called thy kindred, and entitled, as such, to embrace thee, while none of themselves are allowed to taste that honour." Alexander replied, "From this moment you are all my kindred." Callines then stepped forward and embraced him; and, several others having followed the example, they all took up their arms, and returned to the camp, with shouts of joy and songs.

To thank Heaven for the happy issue of this transaction, Alexander celebrated a solemn sacrifice; and, after the sa-

crifice, gave an entertainment for the principal of his European and Asiatic subjects. The Macedonians were next to his person, the Persians next; the Macedonians, the Grecian priests, and Persian magi, joined in common libations, invoking perpetual concord, and eternal union of empire, to the Macedonians and Persians. Soon afterwards, the invalids, whose dismission had produced the mutiny, gladly returned home. Alexander discharged their arrears, allowed them full pay until their arrival in Macedon, and granted each soldier a gratuity of two hundred pounds sterling. He again shed tears at parting with upwards of ten thousand men, who had served him in so many glorious campaigns; and appointed Craterus, whom he loved as his own life, to be their conductor.

Such was the life of this extraordinary man, whose genius might have changed and improved the state of the ancient world. It seems at first sight to be a cause of regret, that by neglecting to provide for the succession to his throne, he left the field open for those bloody wars among his captains, which long desolated the earth. The principles of royal succession were never accurately ascertained in Macedon, and the camp of a conqueror could not be expected to prove a good school of moderation or justice. The first measure adopted by his generals, was to set aside the natural claim of Hercules, born of the daughter of Darius, and to appoint Aridæus, together with the fruit of Roxana's pregnancy, if she brought forth a son, to be joint heirs of the monarchy. This whimsical destination announced little union or stability. Perdiccas, in virtue of possessing the ring or seal of his deceased master, assumed the regency: the troops and provinces were divided among Antigonus, Ptolemy, Craterus, and other chiefs, who, having been formerly the equals, disdained to remain the inferiors of Perdiccas. Each general trusted in his sword for an independent establishment; new troops were raised and disciplined; leagues formed and broken; the children and relations of Alexander, who became successively prisoners in different hands, all perished miserably; nor was there any cessation of crimes and calamities, nor any permanent settlement of the provinces, until the battle of Issus, in Phry-

gia, confirmed Ptolemy in the possession of Egypt, and Seleucus in that of Upper Asia. The issue of the same battle gave Macedon and Greece to Cassander, and Thrace, with several provinces of Lower Asia, to Lysimachus.

The great kingdoms of Syria and Egypt, which continued thenceforward, till subdued by the Romans, to be governed by the respective families of Seleucus and Ptolemy, never generally adopted the language or manners of their Grecian sovereigns. In Egypt, the first successors of Alexander accomplished the commercial improvements planned by that prince; and the kings, both of Egypt and of Syria, affected, in their magnificent courts, to join the arts and elegance of Greece, to the pomp and luxury of the east. But their ostentation was greater than their taste; their liberal characters were effaced by the continual contact of servitude; they sank into the softness and insignificance of hereditary despots, whose reigns are neither busy nor instructive; nor could the intrigues of women and eunuchs, or ministers equally effeminate, form a subject sufficiently interesting to succeed the memorable transactions of the Grecian republics.

In the history of these kingdoms, the most important event is their conquest by the Romans, who gradually seized all the western spoils of the empire of Alexander, comprehended between the Euphrates and the Hadriatic sea; and successively reduced them into the form of provinces. Greece, which came to be distinguished by the name of Achaia, imparted its literature, its arts, and its vices to Italy. The conquest of Macedon freed Rome from the weight of taxes. The acquisition of Syria doubled the revenues of that republic. The subjugation of Egypt doubled the price of commodities in Italy. Yet, whatever might be the wealth of those nations, they are entitled to little regard from posterity; since, from the death of Alexander, they were not distinguished by any invention that either improved the practice of war, or increased the enjoyments of peace.

The feeble mixture of Grecian colonization diffused through the East, was sufficient indeed to tinge, but too inconsiderable to alter and assimilate, the vast mass of barbarism. But as the principle of degeneracy is often stronger than that of

improvement, the sloth and servility of Asia gradually crept into Greece. Reluctantly compelled to submit to a master, they lost the elevation of character, and that enthusiasm of valour, which had been produced by freedom, nourished by victory, and confirmed by the just sense of national pre-eminence. Their domestic dissensions, by carrying them in great numbers into the service of foreign princes, thereby diffused the knowledge of their tactics and discipline, through countries far more extensive and populous than their own; and, amidst all their personal animosities, the captains of Alexander, uniformly embracing the maxims of despotism which their master magnanimously disdained, unitedly resisted and crushed the rising rebellions of the Greeks, whose feeble and ill-conducted efforts for regaining their liberty only plunged them deeper into servitude. Destitute of immediate and important objects to rouse their activity, the example of their ancestors at length ceased to animate and inspire them. The rewards of merit being withdrawn, men no longer aspired at excellence. The spirit of patriotism evaporated, the fire of genius was extinguished, exertion perished with hope, and, exclusively of the Achæan League, Greece, from the age of Alexander, offers not any series of transactions highly memorable in the history of arts or arms.

The expedition of Alexander contributed to the improvement of the sciences both natural and moral. His marches were carefully measured by Diognetes and Beton. Other geometers were employed to survey the more remote parts of the countries which he traversed; and, the exact description of his conquests, which, from these and other materials, he took care to have compiled by men of approved integrity and abilities, gave a new form to the science of geography.

After the conquest of Babylon, Alexander eagerly demanded the astronomical observations, which had been carefully preserved in that ancient capital above nineteen centuries. They remounted twenty-two hundred and thirty-four years beyond the Christian æra. By order of Alexander they were faithfully transcribed, and transmitted to Aristotle, who was probably prevented by his infirm state of health from accompanying his pupil to the east; or who, perhaps,

voluntarily preferred a philosophical retirement in Athens, to the glory of attending the conqueror of the world.

Nor was this the only present to his preceptor, by which Alexander displayed at once his gratitude and love of science. Natural history was peculiarly indebted to his curiosity and munificence. At the expence of near two hundred thousand talents, a sum equivalent to two millions sterling in the present age, he collected many rare productions of nature in different countries of Asia.

But whatever obligations natural knowledge owed to Alexander, it would seem that the moral sciences were not less benefited by his discoveries and conquests. The study of human nature must have been greatly enlarged by such a wide survey of manners, institutions, and usages. The moral and political treatises of Aristotle discover not only more method in his reasonings, but a more copious fund of facts on which to reason, than the writings of all his predecessors together. It is more than probable that Alexander's expedition was the source from which a knowledge of many of his facts proceeded.

Aristotle aspired to embrace the whole circle of the arts and sciences, and professed to explain whatever can be known concerning the moral as well as the material world. Not satisfied with extending his empire to the utmost verge of intellect, he boldly attempts questions beyond all human knowledge, with the same confidence that his pupil entered on a battle.

In his abstract or metaphysical philosophy, we can only lament vast efforts mispent, and great genius misapplied. But in his critical and moral, and, above all, in his political works, we find the same penetrating and comprehensive mind, the same subtlety of reasoning and vigour of intellect, directed to objects of great importance, and extensive utility. The condition of the times in which he lived, and the opportunities peculiar to himself, conspired with the gifts of nature and the habits of industry to raise him to that eminence, which was acknowledged by his cotemporaries, and admired by posterity.

He was born, B. C. 368, at Stagira, a provincial city of Macedon, and educated at the court of Pella, where his father was king's physician. In his early youth he was sent to Athens, and remained there twenty years, an assiduous scholar of Plato, in a city where the philosophic spirit, though often improperly directed, flourished in the utmost vigour. Selected, by the discernment of Philip, to guide and confirm the promising dispositions of his admired son, he returned to his native country, and continued eight years at the Macedonian court. Whatever benefit accrued to Alexander from the instructions of Aristotle, it is certain that the latter derived great advantages from the gratitude of his royal pupil. It may be ascribed to the munificence of Alexander that his preceptor was enabled to form a library; a work of prodigious expence in that age, and in which he could only be rivalled by the Egyptian and Pergamenian kings.

The last fourteen years of his life he spent mostly at Athens, surrounded with every assistance which men and books could afford him, for prosecuting his philosophical inquiries. The glory of Alexander's name, which then filled the world, ensured tranquillity and respect to the man whom he distinguished as his friend, but, after the premature death of that illustrious protector, the invidious jealousy of priests and sophists inflamed the malignant and superstitious fury of the Athenian populace, and the same odious passions which proved fatal to the offensive virtue of Socrates, fiercely assailed the fame and merit of Aristotle. To avoid the cruelty of persecution, he secretly withdrew himself to Chalcis, in Eubœa. This measure was sufficiently justified by a prudent regard to his personal safety; but, lest his conduct should appear unmanly, when contrasted with the firmness of Socrates in a similar situation, he condescended to apologise for his flight, by saying, that he was unwilling to afford the Athenians a second opportunity "to sin against philosophy." He seems to have survived his retreat from Athens only a few months; vexation and regret probably shortened his days.

It is commonly observed, that Aristotle attained the same authority over the opinions of men, which his pupil Alexan-

der acquired over their persons. But the empire of Alexander was established in his life-time, and perished with himself. That of Aristotle did not commence till more than a thousand years after his decease, and continued several centuries. When philosophy was transplanted to a more splendid theatre in Rome, men of speculation and science generally preferred Plato to Aristotle, while many of the most celebrated characters of the republic enlisted themselves under the banners of Zeno, or Epicurus. With the fall of Roman liberty, philosophy, as well as literature and the fine arts, slowly declined. During the succeeding centuries, the doctrines of Aristotle slowly gained the ascendant, but the most frivolous of Aristotle's philosophy was the highest in esteem, during the darkness of the middle ages. The decisive boldness of his logic, physics, and metaphysics, suited the genius of the age, and, while the useful and practical works of Aristotle were neglected, his speculative philosophy, being thus incorporated with the prevailing superstitions, they long conspired with astonishing success, to enthral the human mind.

GREEK ISLANDS.

The History of Rhodes.

THIS island lies in the Mediterranean, opposite the coast of Lycia and Caria, from which it is distant about twenty miles. It is about a hundred and twenty miles in compass, and blessed with a most fruitful soil. It formerly produced, in great plenty, all sorts of delicious fruits and wines. The air is so serene, that no day ever passes without sunshine.

The island of Rhodes had, in Homer's time three cities, viz. Lindus, Camirus, Jalysus, to which, in after ages, was added a fourth bearing the name of the island. The city of Rhodes, built during the Peloponnesian war, soon eclipsed the other three, and became the metropolis of the whole island. No city, if we believe Strabo, was, in ancient times, preferable to it, whether we consider the stateliness of its buildings, or the excellent laws by which it was governed. In the Roman times it was famous for the study of all sciences, and resorted to by such of the Romans as were desirous of improving themselves in literature; being, by many of the ancients, equalled to Athens itself. It had a very convenient haven, at the entrance of which were two rocks, and on those rocks, though fifty feet asunder, the famous colossus is supposed to have stood. It was a huge statue of brass, erected in honour of the sun, or Apollo, the tutelary god of the island, and for its size accounted one of the seven wonders of the world, being seventy cubits, or a hundred and five feet high; insomuch, that ships, in entering the harbour, sailed between its legs. Demetrius Poliorcetes having for a whole year besieged the city of Rhodes, without being able to take it, at last was reconciled to the Rhodians, and, on his departure,

presented them with all the engines of war he had employed against their city. These the Rhodians sold for three hundred talents, and with that money, and other additional sums of their own, raised this famous colossus. The artificer they employed was Chares of Lindus, who was twelve years in completing the work. After it had stood sixty years, it was thrown down by an earthquake, which did great damage in the east, especially in Caria and Rhodes. On this occasion, the Rhodians sent ambassadors to all the princes and states of Greek origin, to represent the losses they had sustained, and solicit sums for repairing them, especially from the kings of Egypt, Macedon, Syria, Pontus, and Bithynia. The money they collected is said to have exceeded the value of the damages five times; but they, instead of setting up the colossus again, for which end most of it was given, pretended that the oracle of Delphi forbade it, and converted the money to other purposes. The colossus lay where it fell, for the space of eight hundred and ninety-four years, till at length Moanias the sixth, caliph, or emperor, of the Saracens, having taken Rhodes, sold the brass to a Jew, who loaded with it nine hundred camels; so that, allowing eight hundred pounds weight to every camel's load, the brass of the colossus, after the waste of so many years, amounted to seven hundred and twenty thousand pounds weight.

The city of Rhodes is still a place of considerable note, being pleasantly situated on the side of a hill, three miles in compass, and well fortified with a treble wall. The streets are wide, strait, and well paved, and the houses built after the Italian taste. The chief haven is convenient, safe, and well fortified. The city is well peopled, and the inhabitants as wealthy as the Turkish tyranny will permit. Diodorus Siculus tells us, this island was first peopled by the Telchinæ from Crete.

Not long before the Trojan war, Hepolemus, the son of Hercules, having accidently killed one Licymnius, fled from Argos, and having consulted an oracle about planting a colony, was advised to pass over into Rhodes, and settle there. He was afterwards created king of the whole island, which he governed with great justice and equity.

After the Trojan war, the Dorians took possession of the best part of this island, after having driven out the ancient proprietors; and hence it is, that both Strabo and Pausanias call the Rhodians, Dorians.

The Rhodians succeeded the Cretans in maritime power, and called themselves sons of the sea. They applied with great success to maritime affairs, became famous for building ships, and took great care to keep the art to themselves. For many ages they were sovereigns of the sea, and extended their dominions even to Phros, near Egypt. Their laws were the standard by which all controversies relating to maritime affairs were decided. These laws and institutions were so just, that they were afterwards incorporated into the Roman pandects, and followed in all the provinces of the Roman empire. The Rhodians long maintained their credit in maritime affairs, gave their assistance to the unfortunate, curbed the oppressor, and, in 1308, enlisted themselves in defence of Christianity against the infidels, and gallantly defended their island against the Ottoman forces for two hundred years.

The government of Rhodes was originally monarchical, and several kings are said to have reigned there long before the Trojan war. The names of the princes who reigned in the time of the Trojan war, and after that epoch, are Hepolemus, Dorillas, Damagetes, Diagoras, Evagoras, Cleobulus, Erastides, Damagetes II, Diagoras II. Cleobulus travelled into Egypt, where he studied philosophy, and, on his return to Rhodes was so highly esteemed, that he was counted among the seven wise men of Greece. His daughter, Cleolylina, was a woman of great learning, well versed in philosophy, astrology, and poetry. Cleobulus died in the seventieth year of his age, leaving the kingdom, as he had no male issue, to his daughter, who resigned it to Erastides. The history of the other eight is unimportant.

After the death or expulsion of the last king, the republican government prevailed all over the island, during which the Rhodians engaged in trade and navigation, became very powerful by sea, and planted several colonies in distant countries. They were at this time masters of the Balearic

islands. During the Peloponnesian war, the Rhodians first joined the Athenians; but, after their great overthrow in Sicily, revolted from them, and united with the Lacedæmonians, whom they likewise abandoned, and renewed their ancient alliance with the Athenians. In the time of the Peloponnesian war, the republic of Rhodes was rent into two factions; the people favouring the Athenians, and the nobles the Lacedæmonians; but the latter at last prevailed, the democracy was abolished, and an aristocracy introduced in its room. Under this form of government the state enjoyed a profound tranquillity till the social war broke out, which, after it had lasted five years, was concluded by a treaty. By this treaty, Rhodes, Chios, Cos, and Byzantium, were to enjoy full liberty, and be quite independent of Athens.

The peace did not procure for all of them the tranquillity they had reason to expect. The people of Cos and Rhodes who had been declared free by the treaty, seemed only to have changed their master. Mausolus, king of Caria, who had assisted them in throwing off the Athenian yoke, declared for an aristocracy, and having oppressed the people, came by degrees to be absolute master of both islands, the nobility not daring, as they were hated by the people, to oppose him. But Mausolus dying two years after the treaty of peace with Athens, the people and nobility uniting, drove out the garrisons of Mausolus, and recovered their ancient liberties. Soon afterwards, Artemesia possessed herself of the city of Rhodes. The Rhodians, being thus reduced by a woman, and unable to bear any longer so shameful a servitude, had recourse to the Athenians, and implored their protection. Demosthenes took upon him to support their ambassadors, and harangue the people in their favour. The Rhodians were soon after delivered from the yoke under which they groaned.

From this period, the Rhodians enjoyed profound tranquillity till the reign of Alexander the Great, to whom they peaceably delivered up their cities and harbours, and were, on that account, highly favoured by that prince. However, they no sooner heard the news of his death, than, taking up arms, they drove out the Macedonian garrison, and once

more became a free people. About this time happened a dreadful inundation at Rhodes, which, being accompanied with violent storms of rain and hail-stones of an extraordinary size, demolished many houses, and killed great numbers of the inhabitants. As the city was built in the form of an amphitheatre, and no care had been taken to clear the pipes and conduits which conveyed the water into the sea, the lower parts of the town were in an instant laid under water; several houses quite covered; and the inhabitants drowned before they could reach the higher places. As the deluge increased, and the violent showers continued, some of the people retired to their ships, and abandoned the place; while others, attempting to avoid the evil, miserably perished in the waters. The city being thus threatened with utter destruction, the wall suddenly burst asunder, and the water discharging itself with a violent current into the sea, unexpectedly delivered the inhabitants from all danger.

The Rhodians suffered greatly by this misfortune, but soon repaired their losses, by applying themselves more closely than ever to trade and navigation, the only sources of their wealth and power. As the city of Rhodes was, at this time, very powerful at sea, and the best governed of any city among the Greeks, all the princes who were at variance with each other courted her friendship. But the Rhodians carefully declined favouring one against another; and, by thus observing a strict neutrality in the wars that were kindled in those times, became one of the most opulent states of all Asia; insomuch that for the common good of Greece, they undertook to suppress the pirates, who had for many years infested the coasts, both of Europe and Asia. Though they were in amity with the neighbouring princes, yet their inclination, as well as interest, secretly attached them to Ptolemy; for the most advantageous branches of their commerce sprung from Egypt. Wherefore, when Antigonus engaged in a war against Ptolemy for the island of Cyprus, and demanded succours of them, they earnestly entreated him not to compel them to declare against their ancient friend and ally. This answer drew upon them the displeasure of Antigonus, who immediately ordered one of his admirals to sail

with his fleet to Rhodes, and seize all the ships that sailed out of the harbour for Egypt. The Rhodians, finding their harbour blocked up by the fleet of Antigonus, equipped a great number of galleys, attacked the enemy, and obliged him, with the loss of many ships, to quit his station. Antigonus, now charging them as the aggressors and beginners of an unjust war, threatened to besiege their city with the strength of his whole army. The Rhodians endeavoured to appease his wrath, representing to him, that, not they, but his admiral had begun hostilities. But all their remonstrances served rather to exasperate, than allay his resentment, and the only terms upon which he would listen to any accommodation, were, that the Rhodians should declare war against Ptolemy; that they should admit his fleet into their harbour; and that a hundred of the chief citizens should be delivered up to him, as hostages for the performance of these articles. The Rhodians sent ambassadors to all their allies, and to Ptolemy in particular, imploring their assistance, and representing to the latter, that their attachment to his interest had drawn upon them the danger to which they were exposed. The preparations on both sides were immense. As Antigonus was nearly eighty years of age at that time, he committed the whole management of the expedition to his son Demetrius, who appeared before the city of Rhodes, with two hundred ships of war, a hundred and seventy transports, having on board forty thousand men, and a thousand other vessels, laden with provisions and all sorts of warlike engines. As Rhodes had enjoyed for many years a profound tranquillity, and had been free from all devastations, the expectation of booty, in the plunder of so wealthy a city, allured multitudes of pirates and mercenaries to join Demetrius in this expedition; insomuch, that the whole sea, between the continent and the island, was covered with ships. Demetrius, having landed his troops without the reach of the enemy's machines, detached several small bodies to lay waste the country round the city.

The Rhodians, on their part, prepared for a vigorous defence. Many defenders, who had signalized themselves on other occasions, threw themselves into the city, desirous to

try their skill in military affairs against Demetrius, who was reputed one of the most experienced captains in the conduct of sieges that antiquity had produced. The besieged dismissed from the city all such persons as were useless, and, then taking an account of those who were capable of bearing arms, they found that the citizens amounted to six thousand, and the foreigners to a thousand. Liberty was promised to all the slaves who should distinguish themselves by any glorious action, and the public engaged to pay the masters their full ransom. A proclamation was likewise made, declaring, that whoever died in the defence of his country, should be buried at the charge of the public, and that his parents and children should be maintained out of the treasury; that fortunes should be given to his daughters; and his sons, when they were grown up, should be crowned, and presented with a complete suit of armour at the great solemnity of Bacchus. This decree kindled an incredible ardour in all ranks of men. The rich came in crowds, with money to defray the expence of the war, and the artificers applied themselves with indefatigable industry to the forging of arms, making of engines, and contriving new sorts of warlike machines, which did great execution against the enemy.

The besieged first sent out three light vessels, against a small fleet of merchant ships that supplied the enemy with provisions. These falling upon them, sunk some, took others, and burnt the greatest part of them, carrying back to Rhodes a great number of prisoners. By this first expedition the Rhodians gained a considerable sum of money, for it had been mutually agreed between them and Demetrius, that a thousand drachmas should be paid for the ransom of every freeman, and five hundred for each slave.

Demetrius, having constructed his engines, began to batter, with incredible fury, the walls on the side of the harbour; but was, for eight days successively, repulsed by the besieged, who set fire to most of his warlike machines, and thereby obtained some respite, which they employed in repairing the breaches, and building new walls where the old ones were either weak or low. When Demetrius had repaired his engines, he ordered a general assault to be made,

commanding his troops to advance with loud shouts. But the besieged were so far from being intimidated, that they repulsed the assailants with great slaughter, and performed the most astonishing feats of bravery. Demetrius returned to the assault the next day, but was in the same manner forced to retire, after having lost a great number of men. He had seized, at his first landing, an eminence at a small distance from the city, and, having fortified this advantageous post, he caused several batteries to be erected there, with engines which incessantly discharged against the walls stones of a hundred and fifty pounds weight. The towers, being thus furiously battered night and day, began to give way, and several breaches were made in the walls. Then the Rhodians, unexpectedly sallying out, drove the enemy from their post, overturned their machines, and made a most dreadful havoc; insomuch, that some of them retired on board their vessels, and were not, without much difficulty, prevailed upon to return to the siege.

The ardour of Demetrius was not diminished by this loss; he ordered a scalade by sea and land at the same time; and so employed the besieged, that they were at a loss what place they should chiefly defend. The attack was carried on with the utmost fury on all sides, and the besieged defended themselves with the greatest intrepidity. Such of the enemy as had advanced first were thrown down from the ladders and miserably bruised. Several of the chief officers, having mounted the walls to encourage the soldiers by their example, were either killed, or taken prisoners. After the combat had continued many hours, with great slaughter on both sides, Demetrius, notwithstanding all his valour, thought it necessary to retire, in order to repair his engines, and give his men some days rest.

Demetrius, being sensible that he could not reduce the city till he was master of the port, after having refreshed his men, returned with new vigour against the fortifications which defended the mouth of the harbour. He caused a vast quantity of burning torches and firebrands to be thrown into the Rhodian ships, which were riding there, and, at the same time, galled with dreadful showers of darts, arrows, and

stones, such as endeavoured to extinguish the flames. However, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, the Rhodians put a stop to the fire; and, having with great expedition manned three of their strongest ships, drove with such violence against the vessels on which the enemy's machines were planted, that they were shattered in pieces, and the engines dismounted and thrown into the sea. Excestus, the Rhodian admiral, being encouraged by this success, attacked the enemy's fleet with his three ships, and sank a great many vessels, but was himself at last taken prisoner; the other two vessels made their escape, and regained the port.

As unfortunate as this last attack had proved to Demetrius, he determined to hazard another; and, in order to succeed in his attempt, he ordered a machine of a new invention to be built, which was thrice the height and breadth of those he had lately lost. But as it was upon the point of entering the harbour, a dreadful storm arising drove it against the shore, with the vessels on which it had been reared. The besieged, who were attentive to improve every favourable conjuncture, while the tempest was still raging, made a sally against those who defended the eminence mentioned above, and, though repulsed several times, carried it at last, obliging the besiegers, to the number of four hundred, to throw down their arms and submit.

Demetrius, being extremely mortified to see all his batteries against the harbour rendered ineffectual, resolved to employ them by land, in hopes of at least reducing it to the necessity of capitulating. With this view, having got together a great quantity of timber and other materials, he framed the famous engine called helepolis, which was by many degrees larger than any that had ever been invented before. Its basis was square, each side being in length near fifty cubits, made up of square pieces of timber fastened together with plates of iron. This huge machine was moved forward by three thousand of the strongest men of the whole army; but the art with which it was built greatly facilitated the motion. Demetrius caused likewise several *testudoes*, or pent houses, to be erected, covering his men while they advanced to fill up the trenches and ditches, and invented a new sort

of gallery, through which those who were employed at the siege might pass and repass at their pleasure without the least danger. He employed all his seamen in levelling the ground over which the machines were to be brought, to the space of four furlongs. The number of workmen who were employed on this occasion amounted to thirty thousand.

In the mean time the Rhodians, observing these formidable preparations, were busy in raising a new wall, within that which the enemy intended to batter with the helepolis. In order to accomplish this work, they pulled down the wall which surrounded the theatre, some neighbouring houses, and even some temples, after having solemnly vowed to build more magnificent structures in honour of the gods, if the city should be preserved. At the same time they sent out nine of their largest ships, to seize such of the enemy's vessels as they could meet with, and thereby distress them for want of provisions. As these vessels were commanded by their bravest sea officers, they soon returned with an immense booty, and a great many prisoners.

Demetrius caused the walls to be secretly undermined; but when they were ready to fall, a deserter gave notice of the whole to the townsmen, who, having with the greatest expedition drawn a deep trench all along the wall, began to countermine, and meeting the enemy under ground, obliged them to abandon the works. While both parties guarded the mines, one Athenagoras promised to betray the city to Demetrius, and admit them through the mines in the night time. But this offer was made only to ensnare them; for Alexander, a noble Macedonian, whom Demetrius had sent with a choice body of troops to take possession of a post agreed on, no sooner appeared, than he was taken prisoner by the Rhodians, who were waiting to surprise him. Athenagoras was crowned by the senate with a crown of gold, and presented with five talents of silver.

Demetrius now abandoned all thoughts of undermining the walls, and placed all his hopes of reducing the city, in the battering engines which he had contrived. Having, therefore, levelled the ground under the walls, he brought up his helepolis, with four testudoes on each side of it. Two other

testudoes, of an extraordinary size, bearing battering rams, were likewise moved forward by a thousand men. Each story of the helepolis was filled with all sorts of engines for discharging stones, arrows, and darts. When things were thus prepared, Demetrius ordered the signal to be given, when his men, setting up a loud shout, assaulted the city on all sides, both by sea and land. This feint had all the success the prince could expect; for the troops having set up a shout from all quarters, as if they were advancing to a general assault, the detachment commanded by Alcimas and Mancius entered the breach, and attacked those who defended the ditch and the wall that covered it, with such vigour, that, having slain the most part of them, they advanced to the theatre, and seized on the post adjoining to it; but the commanding officers put themselves at the head of a chosen body of their own troops, and of those lately come from Egypt, and with these charged the enemy's detachment. The darkness of the night prevented them from dislodging the enemy, and regaining the advantageous posts they had seized. But day no sooner appeared than they renewed their attack. Sensible that their fortunes, liberties, and all that was dear to them, lay at stake, they fought like men in the utmost despair, the enemy defending their posts for several hours without giving way in the least. At length the Rhodians, animated by the example of their leaders, made a last effort, and, breaking into the very centre of the enemy's battalion, killed both their commanders. After their death the rest were easily put in disorder, and all, to a man, either killed or taken prisoner.

Demetrius, not discouraged by this check, was preparing for a fresh assault, when he received letters from his father, Antigonus, enjoining him to conclude a peace with the Rhodians upon the best terms he could procure, lest he should lose his whole army in the siege of a single town. From this time Demetrius wanted only some plausible pretence for raising the siege.

An accident which happened to Demetrius, in this conjuncture, did not a little contribute towards the wished-for pacification. This prince was preparing to advance his hele-

polis against the city, when a Rhodian engineer found means to render it entirely useless. He undermined the tract of ground over which the helepolis was to pass the next day in order to approach the walls. Demetrius, not suspecting any stratagem of this nature, caused the engine to be moved forward, which, coming to the place that was undermined, sank so deep into the ground, that it was impossible to draw it out again. This misfortune determined Demetrius to conclude a peace, upon the following conditions: that the republic of Rhodes should be maintained in the full enjoyment of their ancient rights, privileges, and liberties, without any foreign garrison; that they should renew their ancient alliance with Antigonus, and assist him in his wars against all states and princes, except Ptolemy, king of Egypt; and that, for the effectual performance of the articles stipulated between them, they should deliver a hundred hostages, such as Demetrius should make choice of, except those who bore any public employment.

Thus the siege was raised, B. C. 303, after it had continued a whole year; and the Rhodians amply rewarded all those who had distinguished themselves in the defence of their country. The slaves were set free, and admitted to the rights and privileges of citizens; and many of the freemen received crowns of gold, and were honoured with rich presents out of the public treasury. They likewise erected statues to Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus, who had greatly contributed to the preservation of the place.

Demetrius, being now reconciled to the Rhodians, at his departure presented them with the helepolis, and all the other machines he had employed in the siege; they sold them, and, with the money accruing from the sale, and with some additional sums of their own, erected the famous colossus.

Rhodes was, at the time of the siege, the residence of a celebrated painter, named Protogenes. The house in which he resided was in the suburbs, without the city, when Demetrius besieged it. But neither the presence of the enemy who surrounded him, nor the noise of the arms that perpetually rang in his ears, could induce him to quit his habitation, or interrupt his work. The prince, surprised at this resolution, ask-

ed him, "Why he did not, like the other inhabitants, save himself within the walls." Protogenes replied, that he was under no apprehension, since he was sensible, that Demetrius had declared war against the Rhodians, and not against the arts. The prince was so pleased with this answer, that, from that time, he took him under his protection, and placed a guard round his house to protect him from the insults of the soldiery.

The Rhodians, having concluded a peace upon very honourable and advantageous terms, applied themselves entirely to trade and navigation, by which they not only became masters of the sea, but the most opulent and flourishing state of all Greece. They endeavoured to maintain, as much as possible, a strict neutrality in the wars that broke out in the east; but they could not help being involved in one with the Byzantines, which lasted but a short time, and did not prove very expensive. The ground of this war is thus related by Polybius: the Byzantines, being obliged to pay a yearly tribute of eighty talents to the Goths, in order to raise this sum, levied a toll on all the ships that traded to the Pontic sea. This imposition fell heavier upon the Rhodians than other nations. They, therefore, immediately dispatched ambassadors to the Byzantines, complaining of this new tax; but, as the Byzantines had no other means of raising money to satisfy the avarice of the Goths, and redeem their country from the rapine of those barbarians, they persisted in their former resolution. The Rhodians then declared war against them, 224 B. C. A peace was soon concluded between them, on condition that the Byzantines should forbear exacting toll on ships trading to the Pontic sea, thus yielding the point which the Rhodians had in view in declaring war.

About this time the Rhodians were forced into a war against Philip, king of Macedon, which cost them immense treasures. In this, and other wars, the Rhodians became implicated with the Romans; first as friends, and afterwards as allies, in 156 B. C.

From this period to the breaking out of the Mithridatic war in Asia, the Rhodians performed nothing which historians have thought worth transmitting to posterity. They

enjoyed their liberties, while all the other states and colonies of Greece were brought under the Roman yoke, and became provinces of that republic. They continued to maintain an inviolable attachment to Rome, and gave a remarkable instance of their fidelity, in the above mentioned war; for the Rhodians, and the little country of Lydia, near Mount Sipylus, were the only allies who remained faithful to the Romans on all the coasts of Asia, after Mithridates had declared war against the republic. Rhodes, especially, served as a retreat for all the Romans, whom the Asiatics drove, in great numbers, out of their countries. The king of Pontus, therefore, resolved to turn all his forces by sea and land against that island, and the inhabitants chose rather to sustain a siege than renounce their alliance with Rome. They put their ports in a state of defence, and covered their ramparts with all sorts of military machines. The Romans who fled thither composed the best part of the Rhodian army; and the inhabitants, relying upon the Roman valour, and their own skill in maritime affairs, were not dismayed at the vast fleets and land forces which Mithridates was bringing against them. In several engagements the Rhodians had the advantage. Mithridates lost many ships, and narrowly escaped himself being made prisoner.

During these actions, Mithridates embarked his numerous army in transports, which being dispersed by a violent storm, the Rhodians with their fleet attacked the vessels, which the storm had put in disorder, sank some, burnt others, and took four hundred men prisoners. Provoked by this disaster, Mithridates resolved to attack the city by sea in the night; and ordered a sambuca, built on two galleys, to advance to the walls. The wall of the city was but of a moderate height, and he resolved to storm it. He embarked his troops silently, and furnished them with scaling ladders, but the attempt miscarried. Early in the morning, the Rhodians made a vigorous sally, and repulsed the enemy. The sambuca, after having done some damage, sunk with its own weight; and Mithridates, disheartened at these disappointments, raised the siege, after having lost a great number of men, and the best part of his navy. The behaviour of the Rhodians on this occasion was

highly applauded at Rome. In the war which Pompey made upon the Cilician pirates, the Rhodians assisted him with their naval force, and had a great share in all the victories which he gained.

In the civil war between Cæsar and Pompey, they assisted the latter with a numerous fleet, under the command of Euphranor, who distinguished himself above all the commanders of Pompey's navy, and gained very considerable advantages over Cæsar's fleets. After the death of Pompey, they sided with Cæsar; a change which drew upon them the resentment of C. Cassius, who advanced to the island of Rhodes with a powerful fleet, after having reduced the greatest part of the continent. The Rhodians, alarmed at his approach, offered to come to an accommodation, promising to remain neuter. Cassius insisted upon their delivering up their fleet to him, and putting him in possession, both of their harbour and city. This demand the Rhodians would not comply with, and began to put themselves in a condition to stand a siege. Having created one Alexander, a bold and enterprising man, their prætor, or prytanis, they equipped a fleet of thirty-three sail, and sent it out, under the command of Manaseus, an experienced sea officer, to offer Cassius battle. Both fleets fought with incredible bravery, and the victory was long doubtful; but the Rhodians, being at length overpowered by numbers, were forced to retreat to Rhodes, two of their ships being sunk, and the rest very much damaged, by the heavy ships of the Romans. This was the first time that the Rhodians were fairly overcome in a sea fight.

Cassius, who beheld this fight from a neighbouring hill, having refitted his fleet, repaired to Lorymà, a fortress on the continent, belonging to the Rhodians. This castle he took by assault, and thence conveyed his land forces over into the island. His fleet consisted of eighty ships of war, and above two hundred transports. The Rhodians no sooner saw this great fleet appear than they advanced to meet the enemy. This second engagement was far more bloody than the first; many ships were sunk, and great numbers of men killed on both sides. But victory again declared for the Romans, who immediately blocked up the city of Rhodes, both by sea and

land. As the Rhodians had not had time to furnish the city with sufficient store of provisions, some of the inhabitants, fearing that if it were taken, either by assault or by famine, Cassius would put all the inhabitantts to the sword, opened the gates to him, and put him in possession of the town. He nevertheless treated it as if it had been taken by assault. He commanded fifty of the chief citizens, who were suspected to favour the adverse party, to be brought before him, and sentenced them all to die; others, to the number of twenty-five, who had commanded in the fleet or army, because they did not appear when summoned, he proscribed. Having thus punished such as had either acted or spoken against him or his party, he commanded the Rhodians to deliver up all their ships, and whatever money they had in the public treasury. He then plundered the temples, stripping them of all their valuable furniture, vessels, and statues. As to private persons, he commanded them, under severe penalties, to bring to him all the gold and silver they had, promising, by a public crier, a tenth part to such as should discover any hidden treasures. The Rhodians at first concealed some part of their wealth, imagining that Cassius intended by this proclamation only to terrify them; but when they found he put several wealthy citizens to death, for concealing only a small portion of their riches, they desired that the time ordered for bringing in their gold and silver might be prolonged. Cassius willingly granted them their request; and then they dug up the treasure they had concealed under ground, and laid it at his feet. By these means he extorted from private persons above eight thousand talents. He then fined the city in five hundred more, and leaving C. Varus, with a strong garrison, to exact the fine, without any abatement, he returned to the continent.

After the death of Cassius, Mark Antony restored the Rhodians to their ancient rights and privileges, bestowing upon them the islands of Andros, Naxos, Tenos, and the city of Myndus. But the Rhodians so oppressed and loaded these cities with taxes, that Antony, though a great friend to the Rhodian republic, was obliged to divest her of the sovereignty over those places, which he had a little before so liberally bestowed.

From this time to the reign of the emperor Claudius, we find no mention made of the Rhodians. That prince deprived them of their liberty for having crucified some Roman citizens. However, he soon restored them to their former condition. Tacitus remarks, that they had been as often deprived of as restored to their liberty, by way of punishment or reward for their different behaviour, as they had obliged the Romans with their assistance in foreign wars, or provoked them with their seditions at home. Pliny, who wrote in the beginning of Vespasian's reign, styles Rhodes "a beautiful and free town." But this liberty they did not long enjoy: the island being soon after reduced, by the same Vespasian, to a Roman province, and obliged to pay a yearly tribute to their new masters. This province was called the "province of the islands." The Roman prætor who governed it, resided at Rhodes, as the chief city under his jurisdiction; and Rome, notwithstanding the eminent services rendered her by this republic, treated the Rhodians, not as allies, but as vassals.

The Saracens conquered this island in 652; but the Greeks recovered it in the civil wars of the Saracens, about the year 900. In 1124, it was taken by the Greeks under John Ducas. The Turks conquered it in 1283; and, though it was taken from them by the knights of St. John of Jerusalem, in 1310, it was retaken by Solomon II, after a year's siege, 1523. Its present population is about 40,000. It is now a part of Turkey in Europe. In its capital, the city of Rhodes, no Christian is allowed to dwell.

Crete.

Crete, at present called Candia, is one of the largest islands in the Mediterranean, and much longer than it is broad. It is said to be about two hundred leagues in circumference. It is well watered, and produces excellent wine. The soil is

fertile, and the air salubrious. This island was covered formerly with a hundred cities, the vestiges of which still exhibit remarkable curiosities. There are still seen fragments of fluted columns of granite, eighteen feet in circumference, master-pieces of art, which it would now be difficult to imitate. The principal mountain is Ida, from which the sea may be seen on both sides.

The first inhabitants of Crete were Phenicians, or Phrygians, and known by the name of Idæi, Dactyli, and Curetes. They taught the use of fire, the method of fusing copper and iron, and of working these metals, and understood poetry, music, and sacred ceremonies. They inhabited caverns in the mountains, or resided under large trees, and these people, so skilful in things of less use, were unacquainted with the art of building houses. When they attained to this, they united men in society, instructed them how to manage flocks, to break horses, to hunt, to dance, and to form swords and helmets.

We know the names of the ancient Cretan kings, but little else of their history, except in the case of Minos. That prince was the first who equipped a fleet, and made himself formidable at sea; but he is indebted for his chief reputation to his laws, which served as a model for those of Lycurgus. We there find eating in public, respect for the aged, punishment denounced against luxury and idleness, military exercises, severe life recommended in infancy, and political conversation of old men after their public banquets: all Spartan laws.

Another establishment of Minos, admired by Plato, consisted in inspiring young people, at an early age, with a great respect for the maxims, customs, and laws of their country, and in forbidding them to question, or even doubt, the wisdom of their institutions; because they ought to consider them, not as prescribed by men, but as dictated by the gods themselves, and as laws, which, if carefully observed, would greatly contribute to public tranquillity.

The monarchical form of government first prevailed in Crete; and eighteen kings of that island are mentioned by historians. It was succeeded by the republican system, but

we neither know when, nor on what occasion. At the head of each of the republics, where that form of government was adopted, there were ten magistrates, named Cosmi, charged with the administration of government, and the command of the armies. They consulted with the senate; and laid the decrees, which they drew up in concert with that body, before the assembly of the people, which alone possessed the right of confirming them.

The Cosmi were only chosen from a particular class of citizens; and, after their year of office expired, they possessed the exclusive right of filling the vacant places in the senate. The consequence was, that a small number of families were invested with the whole authority of the state, and refused to obey the laws. By uniting, they exercised the most despotic power; or by opposing each other excited the most fatal seditions.

It appears that, after the abolition of monarchy, there never was a federative union among the Cretans. Their great dexterity in the use of the bow and the sling is ascribed to the perpetual wars in which they were involved with each other. There were few belligerent powers that did not endeavour to engage in their service Cretan archers and slingers. A proof that they had no union among themselves as a nation, is, that we do not find they ever had a national war with the other islanders in the neighbourhood; and that, when they went beyond the limits of their own isle, either to defend themselves, or to attack others, it was only with single ships, and not a fleet, as becomes a people connected by one common interest.

The Cretans preferred piratical wars to all others. They infested the Mediterranean, and interrupted the navigation even on the coasts of Italy. This conduct supplied the Romans with a specious pretext for attacking Crete, which had always been perfectly independent. But the true reason of the senate was, that the situation of the island was exceedingly convenient for the Romans in time of war, whether they carried it on in Europe, Asia, or Africa. They changed its government, subjected it to tribute, and, in 68, B. C., converted it into a Roman province. The Saracens conquer-

ed it in 812, but the Greeks recovered it in 954. When Constantinople was taken by the Latins, in 1204, this island fell to the Venetians; but in 1645, the Turks took it from them, except the capital, which surrendered in 1669. The Turks have ever since had possession.

Cyprus.

Cyprus produced formerly, and still produces, excellent wine, honey, oil, and a sufficient quantity of corn. The copper of Cyprus was highly esteemed. It was fused accidentally, when the inhabitants set fire to the forests, in order to render the land fit for cultivation. It is supposed to have been first discovered by the Phœnicians, who established in it a colony, by whom it was peopled.

The government of Cyprus was always monarchical, but the island was divided into several kingdoms, so that almost every city had its own king. Sometimes, but very seldom, these kingdoms were united, and formed one monarchy. This was afterwards dismembered. It was easy for the neighbouring nations to subdue each part separately. The Persians profited most by this division. They ruled there without interruption, till a king of Salamis, named Onesilus, formed a confederation of all the kings of the island, who before had been, as it were, vassals to the Persians, and at the head of those united forces made himself formidable to the oppressors.

Being betrayed and deserted by two of the kings, his colleagues, he was killed in a battle. His successors bore with patience the Persian yoke, but revolted under the protection of the Greeks, who abandoned them altogether at the peace of Antalcidas.

At that time there were nine kings in the island. Evagorus II, tired of being tributary to the Persians, and supported by the great riches he had amassed, raised a strong army,

and equipped a fleet; but, though powerfully assisted by the Athenians, could not obtain peace till he returned to his former dependence. Under the successors of Alexander, Cyprus passed from Antigonus to the kings of Egypt. Nicocles, one of the petty kings of Cyprus, having become suspected by the Egyptian monarch, the latter sent assassins to Cyprus, who surrounded Nicocles in such a manner, that, seeing no means of escaping, he dispatched himself. Axiothea, his wife, when informed of her husband's fate, killed her daughters with her own hands, and afterwards stabbed herself with a poniard. When the account of this massacre was spread abroad, the brothers of Nicocles were so much affected with grief, that each of them set fire to his palace, and perished in the flames with his family.

It might be expected that the increasing Roman republic would, at length, include the island of Cyprus; it was not, however, by conquest that it obtained possession. It judged proper to employ rather the right of succession, whether well or ill founded. A certain Alexander, driven from the throne of Egypt, which he had usurped, retired to the island of Cyprus, as it formed a part of the Egyptian dominions, but was expelled from it by the Ptolemys, two brothers, one of whom assumed the sceptre of Cyprus, and the other that of Egypt. Alexander, thus stripped of his territories, in order that he might be revenged, made the Romans his heirs when he died. According to every appearance, the moment was not then favourable for using the right given to them by this testamentary disposition, for they suffered the Ptolemys to live in peace, and even made an alliance with them; but the Cyprian Ptolemy having been so imprudent as to refuse money to the tribune Clodius on an urgent occasion, the Roman magistrate thought proper to revive the testamentary right, which was then almost forgotten. When he presented it to the people, he took care to make known, that the riches to be shared would amount to a very large sum. This was a powerful consideration with the citizens of Rome, who lived on the spoils of other nations. It appeared to them extremely just that Cyprus, an island so opulent, should belong to the republic. Thus, though Ptolemy, then on the throne, was

acknowledged a friend and ally of Rome, though he had done nothing that could incur the hatred of the imperious republic, the kingdom of that prince was declared, by a decree of the senate, to belong to the Roman people.

Clodius gained three advantages by this decree: first, to avenge himself: secondly, to please the people, whose support he found necessary; and, in the third place, to get Cato removed to a distance, as his presence was injurious to his ambitious designs. Unknown to Cato, the prætor got him appointed to this department; and went himself to announce to him the decision of the senate. Cato, perceiving the snare laid for him, declined the appointment. "Since you refuse the solicitations of your friends," returned Clodius, "we must employ force." He immediately caused the senate to be assembled, and Cato received orders to depart without delay, and proceed to Cyprus to dethrone the king.

Without an army, and without guards, Cato went on board the first vessel he could find, and having landed at Rhodes, wrote a letter to the weak king, exhorting him to retire in peace, and offering him as an indemnification for the loss of his crown, the high priesthood of the temple of Venus at Paphos, the revenues of which were considerable. The monarch, frightened at the very idea of a war with the Romans, embarked with all his riches, and set sail intending to sink the vessel, and perish with his wealth. He repented, however, of his design, returned on shore, and, having put his darling riches in his treasury, swallowed poison. Cato took possession of the island in the name of the republic, and seized for its account the king's treasures, which amounted to above a million sterling.

Samos.

Samos is about thirty leagues in circumference. The soil is fertile, and the air salubrious. This island contains ruins, which attest the beauty of some of its cities, and particularly of Samos, the capital. Near it stood a superb temple dedicated to Juno, the tutelary deity of the island, an aqueduct which crossed a mountain and conveyed water to the city, and a mole of a hundred feet in height, which extended two furlongs into the sea. So extraordinary a work, constructed at so remote a period, proves that the Samians had a knowledge of navigation. It is said that they built the first ships proper for transporting cavalry.

The earliest inhabitants of Samos were Carians, and people from the neighbouring islands. The government was first monarchical, afterwards republican. The most remarkable civil war was occasioned by the nobles, called geomori, who deprived the people of their lands, which they divided among themselves. In a war which took place afterwards, they entrusted the command of the troops to nine generals. These commanders, finding themselves at the head of the troops, put the geomori to the sword, and re-established democracy. This form of government gave place to tyranny, which one Syloson found means to establish, by enticing the people from the city, under the pretence of a procession, and not suffering them to return till he disarmed them, and rendered them obedient. The people, however, resumed their authority, but were again brought under the yoke by Polycrates, the famous tyrant of Samos.

He attained to the sovereign authority by a plot, formed in concert with his brothers, to whom he promised a share in the government. It is said they began their enterprize when only ten in number, and that, having taken possession of the citadel, they withstood the first efforts of the Samians. Polycrates mounted the throne, but he refused to admit any partners, and got rid of his brothers, either by death or banishment. Thus he was master in his own country, and soon

became so in others. He became a conqueror formidable to his enemies, and his alliance was courted. Too much confidence, however, hurried him on to destruction. Being accustomed to success in all his enterprizes, he fell into a snare laid for him by a Persian governor, who was hurt to see himself eclipsed by the sovereign of a petty island like Samos. He enticed him into his government, and caused him to be crucified. Polycrates was a great prince, a good general, and an able politician. Samos was never so flourishing as under his reign. Anacreon lived in his time: a court which encouraged this poet, and where he was fond of residing, could not be destitute of the knowledge of pleasure.

Polycrates was succeeded by Mæandrus, his secretary and minister. He intended to have restored the Samians to liberty; but, when he made the proposal in an assembly of the people, Telesearchus, one of the principal inhabitants, rose up and said, that he had much better begin by giving an account of the money, with the management of which he had been intrusted. Mæandrus replied: "If I am addressed in such language while I have authority in my hand, what will be the case when I shall have abdicated?" He therefore retained the crown, but it did not remain long in his possession. It was wrested from him by one of the brothers of Polycrates, who had been banished. Various successors held the reins of government, some under the protection of the Persians, and in alliance sometimes with the Athenians, and sometimes with the Lacedæmonians. This degenerate state was followed by one still worse under the kings of Macedonia, Syria, and Pergamus. The Samians were involved in great revolutions almost without being observed by other nations. Thus they fell into the hands of the Romans, as a part of the states bequeathed by Eumenes to the republic. Augustus restored them to liberty, and the use of their laws, which they had enjoyed for a short time during their alliance with the Athenians; but Vespasian included Samos among the Greek islands which he formed into a Roman province. After it had undergone the usual changes of the Greek islands, it became, and continues to be, a part of the Turkish empire.

Greek Islands.

The Greek Islands consist of two general divisions: the Cyclades, thus called from the Greek word which signifies a circle, are those arranged in that form around Delos, the island of Apollo. The Sporades take their name from another Greek word, which signifies to sow, because they are scattered in a confused manner throughout the sea, at a distance from Samos. The following islands, being sometimes mentioned in the Grecian history, are selected as worthy of some notice.

Tenedos, opposite to the ancient Troy, is about nine leagues in circumference. The Greeks concealed themselves behind it when they pretended to raise the siege of Troy. It belonged to the Athenians, the Lacedæmonians, and the Romans, and afterwards fell into the hands of the Turks.

Lesbos is about a hundred and twenty leagues in circumference. It produced Arion, the inventor of the lyre; Theophrastus, the chief of the peripatetic philosophy, next to Aristotle; Pittacus, one of the seven sages of Greece; Alcæus, a lyric poet; Sappho; Terpander, who added a seventh string to the lyre; Hellanicus, a celebrated historian; Diophanes, a celebrated rhetorician; and many others. There was a certain period during which the Romans, who wished to improve themselves in the belles lettres, repaired to Rhodes, Athens, or Mitylene, the capital of Lesbos.

Like the other islands, it was peopled by colonies, the chiefs or conductors of which became kings. Of these we find only four mentioned in history. Afterwards democracy was established, and each of the cities then affected a superiority over its neighbours, which gave rise to civil wars, that brought back royalty, or, as it was called by the Greeks, tyranny.

The Lesbians were engaged in all the wars of the Persians, the Lacedæmonians, of Mithridates, and the Romans. The reputation of the men in regard to morals was indifferent, and

that of the women still worse. A Lesbian life was an expression generally used to signify a debauched life. This island is called at present Mitylene.

Chios, or Scio, is said to be the birth place of Homer. A kind of amphitheatre, called the school of Homer, and situated in the middle of the best vineyard, is still shewn.

Were we to describe the government of Chios, we should only repeat what has been said of other Grecian cities: monarchy, republicanism, tyranny, and dependence upon the neighbouring islands, or great empires, succeeded each other, without any striking event for history to commemorate. Chios lies in the centre of eight or ten small islands.

Æsculapius, the god of medicine, had a beautiful temple at Cos, and was honoured there with a particular kind of worship. This island gave birth to Hippocrates, the restorer of that art: it was honoured by Homer with the epithet of the "well-peopled;" and boasts of having given birth to Apelles, who executed there his magnificent painting of Venus emerging from the sea. Monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy, prevailed in Cos, and it was afterwards subject to the Romans.

Paros is celebrated for its marble, which must have invited thither eminent workmen: there are few places where so many fragments of columns, statues, architraves, and pedestals, are to be seen. It was called formerly, the opulent, the powerful, the happy. It was proud of its riches, which, at present, are confined to the produce of a very limited trade. It is the country of Archilochus, the most severe of the satiric poets.

Three temples were erected in the island of Delos, the first consecrated to Latona, the second to Diana, her daughter, and the third to Apollo. The last was one of the most superb edifices in the world. Here this deity formerly gave oracular answers. A great part of the island belonged to this temple. The island itself was an asylum, not only for individuals, but also for nations. Hostile armies have been seen to meet here, without committing the least outrage against each other, through respect for the place. All the Greeks contributed towards the construction of the temple, and of

its magnificent galleries, the ruins of which still exhibit the names of several kings who encouraged the work. Some of them sent gifts, which were borne by solemn deputations. This island is visited at present by travellers, for the purpose of searching for the traces of ancient monuments. The earth is so covered with ruins and shrubs that it has become unfit for cultivation. It has not a single inhabitant.—Such is the contrast between ancient and modern Delos.

The island of Eubœa went anciently by the names of Chalcis, Abantis, &c. It is three hundred and sixty-five miles in compass, and has several remarkable promontories stretching a great way into the sea.

In Eubœa are several high mountains, covered, for a great part of the year, with snow. This island had, in former times, many cities of great note mentioned by Strabo, the principal of which are Chalcis and Eretria. The most ancient inhabitants of Eubœa were the Abantes, from Abas, a city of Thrace. It is observable that Homer, who often styles the island Eubœa, never calls the inhabitants Eubœans, but constantly Abantes.

The first form of government was monarchical. We are told that the Eubœans, immediately after the Trojan war, formed themselves into a republic, or rather into several small states, most of their cities being governed by their own laws, and quite independent of each other. In the reign of Darius Hystaspes, the cities of Chalcis, Eretria, Carystus, and Oreos, were so many distinct republics governed by the nobles.

But this form of government was seldom undisturbed: either the multitude introduced a democracy, or domestic tyrants seized all power to themselves, and ruled in their several cities uncontrouled. Five persons are named by historians as tyrants of Chalcis, and three of Eretria. Besides the tyrants of particular cities, Tynnondas is mentioned by Plutarch as lord of the whole island. He was cotemporary with Solon the legislator, and displayed great equity and moderation in his tyranny. The Eubœans had wars with the Athenians, Persians, and Spartans. They submitted first to Philip, and then to his son Alexander, after whose death

they shook off the Macedonian yoke, but Antigonus brought them again under subjection. When the Romans first passed into Greece, the kings of Macedon ruled the island of Eubœa, but soon after it was declared free by a decree of the Roman senate. Antiochus the Great, and Mithridates, king of Pontus, were in their turns masters of Eubœa; but the Romans, prevailing in the east, restored the Eubœans to their former state of liberty. Mark Antony subjected them to Athens; but Augustus, incensed against the Athenians for assisting his rival, first gave freedom to the city of Eretria, and soon after to the whole island, which remained in a flourishing condition, under the enjoyment of its own laws, till the reign of Vespasian, when it underwent the same fate as the other states of Greece.

These, and the other Greek islands, have experienced dreadful ravages from fire and sword, and the subversion of flourishing cities. The inhabitants, oppressors and oppressed, in turns wrested from each other the palm of liberty, which they moistened with the blood of their neighbours, or of their fellow-citizens. Degraded at present by slavery, and under the power of the Turkish government, they still lead a peaceful and happy life, provided they pay the taxes. Travellers, who have had an opportunity of examining their character, have found among the men, that delicacy and urbanity which distinguished the Greeks; among the women, the attractive graces of their ancestors; and, in their festivals, decency and mirth. As far as we are able to judge from history, they are more content in their present state of dependence, than they were formerly under the egis of liberty, always agitated, and always covered with blood.

ALEXANDER'S SUCCESSORS.

When Alexander died, he was the lord of many fair provinces, the sovereign of many large and powerful kingdoms, and held an empire more extensive than the world had till that time seen. Macedon was his hereditary kingdom; he had subdued great part of Thrace and Illyria; and all Greece was under his protection. His Asiatic conquests reached from the Hellespont to the Indian Ocean. He held Egypt and Lybia, and all the Greek islands owned his authority.

A day or two after the death of Alexander, his friends assembled in the council-room, and summoned thither all the principal commanders of the army. Perdiccas, as soon as silence could be obtained, ordered the chair of Alexander to be produced, placed the robes and regalia upon it, and laid upon them the royal ring, declaring that he most willingly resigned any authority that might be intended for him by the king, when he received this ring from his hands. However he proposed it as a thing, not only expedient, but necessary, that the empire should have a head. He then declared that Roxana was with child, and that if she brought forth a son, he ought to be acknowledged as his father's successor. Nearchus applauded the design of preserving the regal dignity in the family of Alexander, but said, it would be too long to wait for Roxana's delivery, especially, as the result might be attended with uncertainty. He therefore mentioned Hercules, the son of Alexander by Barcine. The soldiers signified their dislike of this proposal, by the usual signal, the clangour of their arms. Ptolemy then proposed that the state should be governed by a council of officers. This project being also disapproved, a motion was made in favour of Perdiccas, but he, from modesty, refused the honour. At last somebody mentioned Aridæus, the brother of Alexander. The Macedonian phalanx closed immediately with this proposition, and called for Aridæus. Perdiccas, Ptolemy, and

most of the cavalry officers, were extremely averse to this measure. However, Meleager, at the head of the phalanx, supported vigorously the first resolution, and threatened to shed the blood of those who affected to rule over their equals, and to assume a kingdom to which they had no title. Aridæus was arrayed in royal robes; they buckled on him the armour of Alexander; and saluted him by the name of Philip, that he might be rendered more popular.

While things remained in this situation, Meleager managed affairs for the new-created king, and Perdiccas transacted all things for the other party. Both pretended great concern for the public, yet intended nothing so much as their own private advantage; each having formed a scheme of engrossing the administration for his own benefit.

The generals divided the provinces amongst themselves, as governors, under the inspection of Perdiccas, who presided over the partition, as protector. Perdiccas, full of ambition, confined Aridæus, while he appeared to defend him. This prince, weak both in body and mind, had been advised to solicit the support of Meleager, who commanded the Macedonian phalanx. Perdiccas, jealous of every authority which he could not controul, caused Meleager to be assassinated at the foot of the altar, where he had taken shelter. This was the first crime he committed. The second was the murder of Statira and Drypetis, the two last wives of Alexander, whom he caused to be dispatched at the solicitation of Roxana, who was afraid they might be pregnant. The third was the massacre of a body of Greek mercenaries, consisting of twenty thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry, who, believing themselves freed from service by the death of Alexander, were returning peaceably to their country. The fourth the assassination of Cynane, the sister of Alexander, who had come to propose the marriage of her daughter Ada, or Eurydice, with Aridæus. Notwithstanding the death of the mother, the marriage took place. None of those esteemed by Alexander, except Eumenes, his secretary, a man of great merit, remained with Perdiccas, and he attached himself to the protector, only because he believed him to be sincerely devoted to the royal family. To secure completely the friend-

ship of Eumenes, Perdiccas put him in possession of Cappadocia, which he gave him under the name of a government, after having put to death Ariarthes the king.

Perdiccas issued all his orders, and distributed kingdoms, under the name of Aridæus and the young Alexander, of whom Roxana had been delivered; but this was only a feint, in order that he might attain with more certainty to the empire. As his plans did not remain a secret, they caused all those who dreaded his ambition to unite against him. On the other hand, Perdiccas resolved, in order to prevent being himself surprized, to strike the first blow, which he directed against Ptolemy, the most powerful of his rivals. Ptolemy had been appointed governor of Egypt by Alexander himself; and Perdiccas was persuaded, that if he pulled him down, the rest would fall of themselves. This prince, by his wisdom, clemency, and justice, maintained Egypt in a state of profound peace. He had so fortified himself in that country, that Perdiccas, when he came to attack him, found him in a formidable state of defence. There was this difference between the two generals: Ptolemy was beloved by his soldiers, while Perdiccas had alienated the affection of his troops by unbecoming haughtiness. A bloody battle took place in Egypt, on the banks of the Nile, in which the Macedonian phalanx experienced great loss. As the soldiers ascribed their misfortune to Perdiccas, they hurried to his tent and dispatched him.

Perdiccas was succeeded by two tutors, or protectors, but they were thwarted in their views by Eurydice, the wife of Aridæus. She wished to free her husband from the shackles of guardianship, and as she began to gain influence among the troops, the tutors opposed to him Antipater, who assumed alone the authority of protector. Antipater made a new partition of the provinces. Ptolemy was continued in the possession of Egypt; Seleucus had the government of Babylon; Antipater of Susiana; Cassander of Caria; and Antigonus of Phrygia, with the command of the king's household troops. These are the principal generals who established thrones on the ruins of Alexander's empire.

Antigonus collected around him, by his liberality, the best of Alexander's soldiers, who composed an army entirely devoted to his service. Polyperchon having succeeded Antipater, who was now dead, in the office of protector, formed a kind of association of all the governors and commanders, for the purpose of defending the royal family against Antigonus; and he placed at the head of his army, Eumenes, whose attachment to that family was well known.

Two campaigns, in which these generals displayed their talents, and every resource of the military art, were terminated by a decisive battle. Antigonus could depend upon his army, but that of Eumenes had no great attachment to his cause. All did justice to the merit and talents of Eumenes, and for that reason they thought him necessary in the moment of battle; but as he excited their jealousy they resolved to get rid of him, in order that they might at their pleasure put an end to the war, of which they considered him to be the instigator and principal support. As Eumenes was aware of this plot, he might have saved himself by retiring into Cappadocia; but he reflected, that to renounce the command would be to abandon the family of Alexander, and on that account he determined to perish with glory.

When he had formed this resolution, he went forth from his tent, and exhorted the soldiers to perform their duty. The greater part of them, being unacquainted with the treachery of their chiefs, replied by the loudest acclamations of joy. Eumenes seemed affected by these testimonies of attachment, but said to his friends around him, that he lived among ferocious animals, by whom he would one day be devoured. The battle was not decisive, but it gave rise to an event which was more fatal to Eumenes than a defeat. During the combat, Antigonus detached a part of his cavalry, by a circuitous way, which surprised the enemy's camp, and carried off the women and children, with a considerable booty. The chief part of the loss fell upon the Argyraspides, some of Alexander's soldiers, who were distinguished by this name, because he had given them helmets of silver. When these soldiers found themselves deprived of what they most esteemed, and of all the fruits of their valour, they were thrown into a violent

rage, and attempted to massacre their generals. Teutamenes, their commander, suspended their fury, by representing to them, that, in consequence of the ancient connection which subsisted between him and Antigonus, he hoped he should be able to induce him to restore the booty. A deputation was accordingly sent to him, and he replied, that he would readily restore it, provided they would deliver up Eumenes.

Eumenes, being a good speaker, harangued the soldiers, and having represented to them the injustice of their conduct, the fatal consequences it would occasion, and the infamy they were about to bring upon themselves, added: "Put me to death, rather than deliver me into the hands of Antigonus, my old enemy, as well as yours." This speech had just begun to produce some effect on their minds, when the Argyraspides cried out: "Let us have done with these fine speeches, unless we are willing to lose our wives and children;" and they immediately conducted him to the camp of the enemy. Those to whom he was delivered, having asked in what manner he wished to be treated, he replied: "As an elephant or a lion." Two opinions prevailed in the council of Antigonus, respecting the fate of this illustrious captive. Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, supported by the young men of the army, wished that his life might be saved, provided he would promise not to act any longer for the royal family. On the other hand, his father's friends, and the politicians, were strongly inclined to think that they ought to get rid of a man, who was the only person, perhaps, capable of crossing the designs of Antigonus. While the matter was under discussion, the latter caused his prisoner to be treated with every possible mark of respect. Eumenes, however, became uneasy on account of the uncertainty in which he was left respecting his fate. "I am astonished," said he, "that Antigonus should suffer me to remain so long in confinement, and that he has not the courage either to put me to death as his enemy, or force me to become his friend by restoring me to liberty." He was soon freed from this uncertainty. That resolution which was the least generous being adopted, he was executed in prison.

Antigonus was a gloomy politician, who coolly calculated in his closet the advantages which were likely to arise from a murder committed at a favourable moment. Cunning, dissimulation, and insincerity, cost him nothing, provided he could circumvent those whom he wished to get rid of; and he deferred the execution of his plans till the most favourable opportunity. In one of his armies, stationed at a distance on the frontiers, was a man, named Pithon, whom he suspected of a design to render himself independent. A great many more entertained the same opinion, and openly spoke of it at court. Antigonus, however, seemed to take up his cause with warmth, and forbade any one to speak ill of a man whom he esteemed; adding, that instead of giving credit to these calumnies, he had destined for him the command in Upper Asia, the most beautiful of his governments. When Pithon was informed of this disposition, he readily obeyed the king's order recalling him to court; but he had scarcely arrived, when Antigonus caused him to be accused of high treason. In one day, he was tried, condemned, and executed. The following is another instance of his cruelty. Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander, having determined to bestow her hand on Ptolemy, had set out to meet him; but, Antigonus fearing that this marriage would convey some rights to the governor of Egypt, caused her to be arrested at Sardis, and gave orders for her being put to death. The crime was committed by the ladies who attended on this princess. Antigonus afterwards declared, that it was perpetrated without his knowledge; caused the women, who had been the instruments of his barbarity, to be beheaded; and celebrated the funeral of Cleopatra with the utmost magnificence.

There was a very striking contrast between Antigonus and his son Demetrius. The latter, humane and merciful, was of a candid and open disposition, and so well known to be incapable of perfidy or treachery, that his father, notwithstanding his gloomy temper, lived with him in the most intimate confidence, and prided himself on so doing. Demetrius had free access to his father at all times, and even with his arms, which at that period was rarely suffered. Anti-

gonus made some ambassadors, to whom he was giving audience, take notice of this circumstance, and said: "You will be careful to tell your masters in what manner I and my son live." These ambassadors were those of Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus, with whom Antigonus shared almost the whole of the empire of Alexander. He had reserved to himself Asia; Ptolemy retained Egypt; Macedonia was assigned to Cassander; and Thrace to Lysimachus; and the Grecian cities were allowed to preserve their liberty. This arrangement, according to the strict spirit of their treaty, was only provisional, as these generals acknowledged themselves to be merely depositories of the power assigned to each, until the family of Alexander should be in a state to maintain their rights: but this shadow of deference soon vanished, and each assumed the title of king in the districts which had been committed to his care.

Antigonus, after he had declared himself king, treated the people much better than he had done before; and the reason he assigned for his conduct was, that he wished to preserve with good will, what he had acquired by force. But in regard to taxes, he was far from being so moderate as Alexander. To some remonstrances which were made on this subject he replied: "Alexander collected the harvest of Asia; as for me, I only glean."

The new kings, established either in the hereditary states of Alexander or the conquered countries, were soon involved in war with each other. The uncertainty of their rights and limits afforded sufficient motives for hostilities.

Lysimachus and Seleucus on the one side, and Antigonus with his son Demetrius on the other, each at the head of a powerful army, met, near Ipsus, in the plains of Phrygia. The fate of Asia depended on the battle which was about to take place. It was exceeding bloody. Victory, however, declared for Seleucus, and Antigonus, wounded in several places, died in the field of battle at the age of eighty-four. Demetrius fled with a few attendants, and escaped to Greece. Seleucus, by one blow, was thus rendered master of all Asia.

The deplorable disasters which arose from the conquest of Alexander in Asia, prepare us for scenes still more bloody in Macedonia. That prince had left the government of it to Antipater. The government entrusted to him by Alexander was more embarrassing than that of any other portion of his empire, owing to the difficulty of living with Olympias in such a manner as to prevent her from assuming too much authority, and without giving the son cause to blame the restraint imposed on his mother. The part he had to act was delicate; but it appears that Antipater discharged his duty, for a long time, to the satisfaction of Alexander.

The account of Alexander's death occasioned great embarrassment to Antipater. As a part of the Grecian cities had expelled the Macedonian garrisons, it was necessary to negociate with some of them, and to treat others with rigour. The Athenians, in particular, gave him great uneasiness. They obliged him to sue for peace, but they refused to listen to any proposals, unless he would first surrender at discretion. Antipater, victorious in his turn, insisted on the same conditions as those which the Athenians had wished to impose on him. They were forced to submit, but he did not abuse his victory, and contented himself with obliging them to banish those dangerous orators, who misled the people, always volatile and changeable.

Antipater, excited by a desire of being useful to the family of Alexander, proceeded to Asia, where he received the title of protector, which he brought back to Macedonia, and died there at the age of eighty. His delicacy did not allow him to give his government to his son Cassander. He assigned it to Polyperchon, the oldest of Alexander's generals whom he had around him. This man, who succeeded Antipater in the quality of governor-general of Macedonia, and tutor of the young princes, possessed only moderate talents. His son Alexander was equally destitute of ability. In direct opposition to the advice left them by Antipater, they invited Olympias to Macedonia, from which Antipater had found means to get her removed. This artful woman rendered herself mistress of the mind of Polyperchon, and advised him to introduce into the government of different cities

changes which excited discontent. He issued his orders with great haughtiness, in the name of Aridæus, the brother of Alexander, who had been acknowledged king in conjunction with young Alexander, the son of Roxana.

Aridæus had married his own niece Eurydice, the granddaughter of Philip, and whether it was, that the right of this princess to the crown excited the hatred of Olympias, or that rivalship in authority, or that jealousy, which is not uncommon among women, prevailed between them, they not only shewed a mutual coolness, but even hatred, and a desire of injuring each other. Olympias was supported by Polyperchon, while Eurydice sought support in Cassander, the son of Antipater. Armies were raised on both sides, and a civil war commenced in Macedonia. The two heroines, each at the head of an army, shewed themselves determined to hazard the event of a battle. Eurydice's soldiers had voluntarily entered into her service, and with every mark of zeal and affection; but Olympias, having presented herself before them at the moment when the action began, her majestic air, and the idea that they were going to combat against the widow of Philip, the mother of Alexander, made them drop their arms. They abandoned the unfortunate Eurydice and her husband. Olympias, being mistress of their fate, caused them to be shut up in a place so confined that they were scarce able to move, and ordered them to be fed with the coarsest nourishment. Along with this wretched couple, a great many of Cassander's partizans, among whom was his brother Nicanor, having fallen into her hands, she caused them all to be put to death, and a hundred of his friends to be massacred.

As those cruelties began to excite some compassion in favour of Aridæus and his wife, Olympias, fearing the consequences, resolved to get rid of her prisoners. By her orders, some Thracians, armed with poniards, entered the prison where the king was confined, and dispatched him with repeated blows. A moment after, she sent a messenger to offer Eurydice a dagger, a rope, or a cup of poison. "May the gods," said the unfortunate princess, "give one day to Olympias a present of the like kind." She then tore her

handkerchief, wiped the wounds of her husband, who had just breathed his last sigh; covered up his body; and, without displaying the least weakness, or suffering a single complaint to escape from her lips, presented her neck to the fatal cord, and was strangled.

Cassander arrived too late to prevent these cruelties, but soon enough to punish them. When he entered Macedonia, Olympias was going from city to city, escorted by a magnificent court. She had taken with her Roxana, and the little Alexander, under a firm persuasion, that a sight of the widow, the son, and the mother of that conqueror, whose victories did so much honour to the Macedonian name, would induce the best soldiers to range themselves under her standard; but her army did not increase. Being still pursued by Cassander, she was at last compelled to shut herself up in Pydna, which Cassander besieged both by sea and by land. The garrison were reduced to such a dreadful state of famine that the soldiers were obliged to feed on the dead bodies of their companions. After several fruitless attempts to escape, Olympias surrendered at discretion, and, being accused before the assembly of Macedonia, by the relations of those whom she had put to death in so cruel a manner, was condemned herself to capital punishment, without being allowed to speak in her own defence. Cassander then offered her a vessel to transport her to Athens, but she refused this offer. She expressed a desire of justifying herself in a new assembly, but Cassander thought it would be dangerous to grant her that permission. Two hundred men, indeed, whom he sent to dispatch her, were so disconcerted by her majestic air, that they returned without executing their order. The same cause, therefore, must have produced a much greater effect on a multitude, among which there are always some individuals inclined to mercy. No other means could be devised for getting rid of her, than to deliver her up to the relations of those whom she had caused to be put to death. Such was the end of the mother of Alexander. It would be useless to trace out her character: it is sufficiently displayed in her actions. Cassander sent Roxana and her son to Amphipolis; but he removed from them those by

whom they had been usually attended, and ordered that the young prince should be educated as a common individual. From Amphipolis they were transferred to a solitary castle, and when he thought the Macedonians had forgotten them, he caused them to be put to death.

Hercules, the son of Alexander by Barcine, the only remaining branch of the royal family, was murdered by Polyperchon, at the instigation of Cassander, about two years after. Eight years had not elapsed since the death of Alexander, and not a single branch of his house remained to enjoy a portion of that empire, which Philip, and his son, had acquired at the expense of so much blood, danger, and treachery. Such, to the royal family, were the effects of that ambition, which had lighted the torch of war over Europe, Asia, and Africa. Meanwhile Cassander laid aside the name of protector, which he had hitherto retained, and assumed the title of king.

If military talents, added to a wise and moderate government, can justify usurpation, Cassander deserved the throne. He brought back to Macedonia, peace and abundance; rebuilt the cities which had been destroyed; united to his crown that of Epirus; maintained, with honour and advantage, the war against Antigonus; imposed laws on the Ætolians and the Illyrians; subdued Peloponnesus; and died in the midst of his triumphs. He left three sons, Philip, Antipater, and Alexander, the first of whom succeeded him, but died soon after. Antipater then caused himself to be proclaimed king, but Alexander opposed his installation; being supported by a powerful party, and the consent of the queen his mother. Antipater, fearing the preponderance of such influence, entered his mother's house with assassins, on purpose to destroy her. In vain did she beg for mercy, and conjure her son by the breasts which suckled him: he remained inflexible, and commanded her to be massacred before his eyes.

After a war of several years, which was attended with fatal consequences to the kingdom, it was partitioned between two brothers. Alexander, the eldest, was supplanted by Demetrius; but his subjects, at length becoming tired of his op-

pressive government, expelled him from the country, and gave the crown to Pyrrhus, king of Epirus. Thus Macedonia, to which Epirus had been annexed, under Cassander, was itself annexed to Epirus, under Pyrrhus. The latter quitted it in order to make conquests in Italy, but, before he departed, he divided it with Lysimachus, the sovereign of Thrace, who, during his absence, made himself master of the whole.

By female intrigues, the court of this prince was filled with fatal dissensions. Arsinoe, whom he espoused in his old age, inspired him with the most odious suspicions of Agathocles, his eldest son, a prince universally beloved and esteemed. He was confined in prison, without being heard, and afterwards poisoned. Lysandra, his widow, the daughter of Ptolemy, escaped with her children and her brother Ceraunus, to the court of Seleucus. This prince took up arms in favour of the unfortunate family, and fought a battle at Lysimachia, in which the king of Macedonia perished, with thirteen of his sons. The conqueror, when about to place Ceraunus on the throne, was assassinated by him, and the latter, notwithstanding the atrocity of his crime, had the address to get himself proclaimed king by the Macedonians. He then began to think of being revenged on Arsinoe, the murderer of his brother-in-law Agathocles. As the princess had retired to Cassandria, a place of great strength, Ceraunus deceived her by offers of espousing her, and adopting her children. She opened the gates of Cassandria, and, on the day appointed for the marriage, Ceraunus caused her two sons to be murdered in her presence, and banished the mother to Samothrace, with only two women to attend her. Having, however, escaped to Egypt, she gained the affection of Ptolemy Philadelphus, the brother of Ptolemy Ceraunus, who married her; and she thus became the sister-in-law of him, whose brother-in-law she had put to death, and who had assassinated her children.

Under Ptolemy Ceraunus, the Gauls, a nation hitherto unknown in these countries, made an irruption into Macedonia. Nothing but the hope of plunder could have induced these barbarous hordes to quit their forests. They began by pil-

laging, and afterwards settled, if the place suited their convenience. In either case, the invaded country was in an unfortunate situation. Ceraunus, at the head of a powerful army, waited for them on the frontiers, but he was defeated and killed. They then dispersed themselves throughout the whole kingdom, and exercised their robbery with the more ease, as the Macedonians were without a chief. During the first moments of surprise, they had elected Meleager, the brother of Ceraunus; but, as he appeared to be destitute of ability, they deposed him two months after. Antipater, the grandson of Cassander, who was next chosen, reigned only forty-five days. Sosthenes, a Macedonian lord, collected his scattered countrymen, formed them to discipline, and, at their head, defeated the barbarians in several engagements. He was offered the crown, but declined it, and contented himself with the title of general, which he retained with glory for two years. A new swarm of Gauls having arrived to reinforce the former, Sosthenes and his small army were overpowered by numbers. These two invasions completed the ruin of Macedonia, which the Gauls abandoned, in order to exercise their fury in Greece.

This kingdom, notwithstanding the miserable state to which it was then reduced, excited the ambitious views of three competitors: Antigonus Gonarus, the son of Demetrius, Antiochus Soter, the son of Seleucus, and Pyrrhus, who had returned from his expedition to Italy. The fathers of the two first had borne the crown of Macedonia. Assisted by their own troops, as well as by mercenaries, they disputed for the remains of the desolated kingdom. Pyrrhus was soon after killed at Argos by the hand of a woman, who struck him on the head with a tile. Antigonus, finding himself sole master of Macedonia, gradually got rid of the remainder of the Gauls, by whom it was still infested, and began a reign, which, on account of its mildness and justice, ought to have given satisfaction to the Macedonians; but they suffered themselves to be dazzled by the brilliant valour of Alexander, the son of Pyrrhus, who came to claim the rights of his father. The Macedonians, almost to a man, having espoused his cause, Antigonus abandoned this un-

grateful people, and retired to his estates in Greece. His son Demetrius, however, maintained his ground in a corner of the kingdom, and, as his exploits attracted the notice of the Macedonians, they embraced his party. With this support he vanquished his opponents.

Demetrius II, son and successor of Antigonus, was so fortunate as to be in a situation which enabled him to imitate the mild virtues of his father, rather than his military talents. His reign was tranquil, but exceedingly short. His death excited much regret, which would have been still greater, but for the eminent qualities of Antigonus Doson, his brother, who succeeded him, first as tutor to a very young son named Philip, whom his brother had left, and afterwards as king on his marrying the widow. The care which he bestowed on the education of his nephew, and the affection he always shewed towards him, prove that, if he assumed the crown, it was not to deprive him of it, but to render it more brilliant for him when he came of age. Macedonia prospered under his government. He was an excellent warrior, and an able politician. He died of a spitting of blood, occasioned by an effort he made when encouraging his soldiers in a battle. Before he breathed his last, he begged the army to preserve constant fidelity to Philip, his nephew and ward, who was about to ascend the throne at a very early age.

Philip, like his predecessor, was brave, eloquent, and well versed in every branch of knowledge necessary for a king; but he was of a gloomy and cruel temper. Before he attained to the age of maturity, he attempted a discovery the most difficult perhaps of all, and especially for a king, to distinguish his real from his false friends. Incensed at not being able to satisfy himself on this point, he removed the difficulty by putting to death, without discrimination, such of his courtiers as he had lived with in a state of familiar intimacy. We know also that he was guilty of the death of Aratus, a respectable chief of the Acheans, whom he caused to be poisoned. Such was the father of Demetrius and Perses, both celebrated; the former for his attachment, and the latter for his antipathy to the Romans.

These republicans had already carried their arms into Greece, where they put in practice that insidious policy which rendered them at last masters of the world. It consisted in giving assistance to the weak against the strong. One of their political arts was to demand, as hostages, the children of great men and sovereigns, that they might educate them in their own principles. This kind of address was practised against Philip. The Romans demanded his son Demetrius as a hostage, and sent him back filled with sentiments of esteem and of affection for them.

Demetrius had an elder brother, named Perses, who, though the son of a concubine, aspired to the throne. Demetrius on every occasion endeavoured to soften the resentment of his father against the Romans. He tried, above all, to move him through considerations of interest, by representing to him that the power of the republicans was far superior to his own. Philip was sensible of the justness of this reasoning; but he did not hear it without pain, and this pain often induced him to believe that his son employed these arguments, more through his attachment to the Romans, than with a view to his advantage. Perses lost no opportunity of strengthening these suspicions.

Meanwhile Philip incurred the displeasure of the Romans. On a request made by the inhabitants of Maronea, a maritime city of Thrace, the Roman senate had ordered him to withdraw the Macedonian garrison. After much evasion, Philip obeyed, but he pursued his measures in such a manner, that, at the very time when the garrison quitted Maronea, it was entered by Thracians, posted for that purpose, who sacked and plundered it, and exercised against the inhabitants the most horrid cruelties. As this atrocious affair was soon known at Rome, Philip received orders to justify his conduct before the senate, and to send to Rome the commander of the garrison, that the truth might be fully ascertained. Philip ordered him to set out, and caused him to be poisoned on the road. As he was unable to resist the forces preparing to attack him, he commissioned Demetrius to endeavour to avert the storm. When the young prince arrived at Rome, he was astonished and much disconcerted,

at finding that accumulated proofs had been produced against his father. He did every thing in his power to justify his conduct, and the senate were inclined to admit his vindication, but in the letter which the senate wrote to his father, they expressly declared, that his reasons had been considered as valid, only through respect for the son.

This restriction displeased Philip. He imagined that his son had entered into some private treaty with the Romans, to support him in opposition to his father, and, perhaps, to deprive him of the throne. Perses strengthened these suspicions, by forged letters which he caused to be sent from Rome, and in which the pretended plans of Demetrius were unfolded with so much plausibility, that the king was deceived, and issued orders for arresting his son. The person entrusted with this business was one Didas, a secret partisan of Perses, who executed his commission with apparent regret, and behaved with so much respect to the young prince, that he began to place confidence in him. He confessed to him, that if he could obtain his liberty, he intended to escape to Rome, to avoid the effects of his brother's hatred. Didas related this to the king, who ordered him to dispatch his prisoner by poison, but with as much caution as possible, lest the Macedonians and the Romans, by whom he was equally beloved and esteemed, should suspect his design. Didas mixed some poison with the prince's food; but, finding that its effect was too slow, and that the violent pain, by which Demetrius was agitated, began to raise doubts, he caused him to be suffocated.

As soon as Demetrius had breathed his last, Perses changed his conduct. He no longer behaved to his father with the same respect as formerly, and shewed evident signs of joy at the death of his rival. This conduct gave Philip great uneasiness, and he began to suspect that he had been deceived. He endeavoured to satisfy himself on this point, and for that purpose applied to one of his relations, named Antigonus, a man of approved probity. Antigonus told the king, that he believed Demetrius to have been innocent, and pointed out to him the means by which he might still farther ascertain the truth. The person who had forged the letters ac-

knowledged his crime, and his confession, supported by other proofs, threw the king into a state of the utmost despair. Such of the guilty as could be seized were condemned to death; but Perses made his escape, and fixed his residence on the frontiers, where he entertained hopes of seeing the moment soon arrive which would render him master of the crown. He was not kept long in expectation; Philip, tormented with remorse, terminated, amid the horror of painful repentance, a life, which his gloomy disposition had rendered unfortunate to himself, as well as to others.

During his last illness, he revealed the infamous conduct of Perses in regard to his brother, and recommended to his subjects to acknowledge as king, Antigonus, the son of Demetrius. Perses, however, who had taken proper measures to secure the kingdom to himself, having received early information of his father's death, arrived at the head of a body of troops; took possession of the throne; and caused Antigonus to be dispatched. His whole reign perfectly corresponded with this commencement. It would be difficult to find in history a man who committed murder with more indifference, or more spontaneously. The reader no doubt expects to find Perses, as soon as he was seated on the throne, engaged in hostilities with the Romans. It is certain that those republicans treated him with the most disdainful haughtiness. Philip, in consequence of a treaty with them, had engaged not to make war without their permission. They extended this clause so far, as to maintain that Perses had no right to arm against his rebellious subjects without their approbation. In general, they behaved to him as to a man whom they wished to insult. All his actions excited suspicion: if he had any disputes with his neighbours, they accused him of being of a restless character, and an enemy to peace; if he lived with them on good terms, they reproached him with attempting to augment his power, by secret alliances, in order that he might put himself in a state for carrying on war.

The last charge was not void of foundation. Had the advice of Perses been followed, the Greeks, oppressed by the Roman power, would have expelled the armies of that ambi-

tious republic, which reckoned those only its friends who entirely submitted to its will. Perses, by means of remonstrances, excited some of the Grecian states against the Romans; formed alliances with the neighbouring kings; made a peace with the Thracians, in consequence of which they were to furnish him with troops; amassed a prodigious sum of money; purchased provisions sufficient for several years; and raised a powerful army. Eumenes, king of Pergamus, jealous of the credit which these preparations gave to Perses among the Greeeks, denounced him to the senate. The king of Macedonia endeavoured to dispatch Eumenes, by means of assassins, who lay in wait for him in a hollow road, and almost buried him under a shower of stones. They imagined that they had killed him; but he escaped, and obtained sufficient proofs that Perses had been the author of this plot against his life. The researches of Eumenes produced also another discovery:—that Perses had engaged a man to go to Rome, and poison the senators who had shown themselves most hostile to his views.

A war was the consequence of the provocations given by both parties. The Romans were defeated in the first battle; but, as Perses had not sufficient talents to take advantage of his victory, the war was prolonged amid events which produced nothing decisive. On one of these occasions, being afraid that a large sum of money, which he destined for building a fleet, in the harbour of Thessalonica, might be captured by the Romans, he sent orders to two of his generals, Andronicus and Nicias, who commanded there, to burn the arsenal, together with the naval stores, and to throw the money into the sea. The latter obeyed; but Andronicus thought it his duty to defer executing the king's command, and it appeared that he was right. The Roman general did not advance. When Perses got the better of his terror, he sent for divers to recover the treasure. To reward Andronicus for his wisdom, Nicias for his obedience, and the divers for their labour, he caused them all to be put to death.

It may be readily seen, that the Romans were engaged with an enemy fertile in resources, who required all their attention. They therefore sent against him the ablest of their

generals, the celebrated Paulus Æmilius, under whose command a well planned campaign decided the fate of Perses and of Macedonia. This prince covered his kingdom by a strong army, entrenched behind Mount Olympus, so that the Romans were not able to attack him, but by fortifying themselves on that mountain. Some of the Roman generals believed that it would be impossible to continue there for want of water; but Paulus Æmilius thought, that as the place abounded in grass, and was ornamented with beautiful trees, it must contain springs. He accordingly led thither his army, and dug wells, which afforded an abundant supply of water. At the same time he dispatched, by a circuitous route, a body of troops, who surprised the Macedonians, and obliged them to abandon their entrenchments. Paulus Æmilius afterwards descended into the plain, and preparations were made, on both sides, for a general engagement.

The Macedonian army astonished the Romans by its order and disposition. The Thracian mercenaries and the auxiliaries formed so many select corps, but the phalanx was the most remarkable. The fine appearance of the men of which it was composed, the richness of their dress, which was of scarlet, and the splendour and brilliancy of their arms, presented a most striking spectacle. Nothing was wanting to this army but an able general. It is not known by whom it was commanded; but it is generally agreed that Perses was among the foremost who fled, and that he placed his purple robe on the bow of his saddle, and laid aside his diadem, that he might not be known. He proceeded without stopping to Pella, his capital, which he entered about midnight, with only a few attendants, because the greater part of the nobility of his court chose rather to fall into the hands of the Romans than to follow him. They, indeed, had reason to applaud themselves for their prudence, when they learned that two of his faithful servants, having presumed to give him advice, he fell into such a violent rage, that he struck off their heads with his own hands. He was abandoned by all his followers, except one body of Cretans, who remained with him, not so much through attachment to his person, as through the hope of participating in the treasures which this wretched monarch

carried about with him, and from which he scarcely ever averted his eyes.

Perses, flying from town to town, retired to the island of Samothrace, where there was a highly respected temple, dedicated to Castor and Pollux. He was attended thither by Evander, one of those whom he had employed, in the beginning of his reign, to stone Eumenes king of Pergamus. Both he and his master were under the greatest apprehension that the Romans would not respect their asylum. The inhabitants of Halicarnassus, seeing themselves surrounded by the Roman fleets and armies, were no less uneasy respecting the preservation of their privileges. While they were deliberating on this subject in the market-place, a young Roman mixing with the crowd, asked them, with an air of simplicity, whether it was true that Samothrace was considered as a sacred island. "Without doubt," cried the whole assembly. "But do you believe," added the young man, "that it would be polluted if it served as an asylum to an infamous assassin?" They all agreed that it would. "Well then," added he, "Evander," whose history he related, "is just now in your temple, along with Perses." When they heard this account, they were struck with horror, and it was immediately determined that Evander should quit the asylum, or come out and vindicate his conduct. Perses was thrown into great embarrassment by this resolution, for, to permit Evander to enter into a vindication of his conduct, would be to accuse himself. The king advised him, in an amicable manner, rather to put himself to death. Evander did not relish this proposal, but pretending to agree to it, he said that he would prefer swallowing poison to death by the sword. Perses, who suspected that he chose poison merely that he might gain time, pursued the most expeditious means, and caused him to be dispatched by his servants.

This atrocity made all those who could have been of any use to him, keep at a distance, and he was no longer surrounded but by wretches, who were only fit to betray him. By their advice he concluded a bargain with a Cretan, the captain of a vessel, who agreed to transport him to Crete with his family and treasures. Perses sent on board the

vessel in the evening his most valuable effects, and, about midnight, repaired himself to the sea shore, according to appointment; but the Cretan had set sail. The wretched monarch, thus deserted, concealed himself in a small wood, and dispatched a messenger to Paulus Æmilius, to inform him that he surrendered himself into his hands.

The consul, surrounded by lictors, and all the insignia of Roman grandeur, received him under an open tent. The prince appeared in a morning habit, as if ready to sink under his misfortune. After reproaching him for his conduct towards the republic, Æmilius said: "The Roman people are as much celebrated for their clemency as their valour. You may hope then, prince, and be even assured, that they will be no less generous towards you, than they have been towards various other princes subjected to their authority." These consoling words he addressed to Perses in the Greek language, and then turning towards the Romans, spoke to them as follows, in his native tongue: "Young Romans! you here see how uncertain are all human things. Take advantage of the lesson given you by this striking example: learn that prosperity can never be insured by pride or violence; and remember, that as our fate is liable at all times to change, we ought never to place confidence in the happiness of the moment. True courage is never elated in prosperity, and does not suffer itself to be depressed by adversity."

The consequences were not agreeable to the hopes which the consul had inspired. As Perses well knew that he was destined to add splendour to the triumph of the conqueror, he sent to beg that he might be saved from the shame of being exposed as a spectacle to the Romans. "The favour which he requests," said Æmilius coolly, "is in his own power, it depends on himself to obtain it." That is to say, he was at liberty to put himself to death. He was led in triumph with his two sons, Alexander and Philip, and an infant daughter, accompanied by the officers of their household. They all had their eyes bathed in tears, and while they saluted the people in a suppliant manner, they taught the young princes to stretch out also their innocent hands. The king of Macedonia, covered with a mourning habit, walked behind them,

alone, followed by a great number of Macedonians, all exhibiting in their looks every sign of grief and despair. Besides the treasures of Perses, and the rich spoils of the soldiers, there were exhibited on this occasion those almost of the whole world; since the kings of Asia, by often plundering Greece, had transported to their own kingdoms the most beautiful works of industry, and the most esteemed monuments of the arts. These had been sent to Macedonia by Alexander; Paulus Æmilius, in his turn, carried away from all the cities, whatever he found in them most valuable, in order to enrich Rome. The sum of money which he sent to the treasury was so considerable, that it prevented the necessity of imposing any tax on the Romans for a number of years.

After the triumph, Perses was thrown into an infectious dungeon, with common criminals. As he was left several days without receiving any nourishment, he begged of his companions in misery to share with him their scanty portion. They offered him a rope, or a dagger, but he refused to make use of them. He died soon after, but whether from disease or violence is uncertain. His two sons and his daughter, led with him in triumph, were still children. Philip and the young princess died, but Alexander was put apprentice to a carpenter. He applied afterwards to writing, and became a clerk or secretary in the senate.

In regard to Macedonia itself, Paulus Æmilius declared that he rendered it free, but its freedom was only nominal. He divided the kingdom into four governments; forbade the inhabitants of one govetnment, under the severest penalties, to have the least intercourse with the inhabitants of another; gave them new laws; took away their most valuable effects; obliged all the nobility above the age of fifteen to leave the country; and forbade the richest mines to be worked. Of the two hundred talents, which the Macedonians paid to their kings, the Roman consuls required a hundred for the republic. Such was the liberty granted to them by the conqueror!

When Paulus Æmilius returned, the senate sent commissioners, who were charged to give some form to this republic, now composed of incoherent parts; for each city govern-

ed itself, without any general connection, as was the case also in regard to the four governments. The garrisons which the Romans had left, though they apparently assumed no right over the civil government, still had an influence in the election of the magistrates, and other civil officers. Those most distinguished by their probity and talents were not the persons chosen, but such as shewed the greatest devotion to the Romans. The bulk of the nation were really in a state of slavery, while they possessed only a shadow of liberty. Tormented by the remembrance of their ancient grandeur, they longed for the moment when they should find themselves in a state of independence.

While in this disposition, they with pleasure saw appear a pretender to the throne, who called himself the son of Perses. He gave out that he had been born to the prince by a concubine, and that his father had caused him to be privately educated, in order that a branch of the royal family might remain, in case he should miscarry in his war against the Romans. This pretended prince was called Andriscus; but when he appeared he assumed the name of Philip, under both which appellations he is equally known. As his first attempt was not successful, he retired to Syria to Demetrius Soter, who had married a sister of Perses. But Demetrius delivered him up to the Romans, to avoid incurring their resentment. The latter, either through contempt or indifference, being negligent in guarding him, he escaped to Thrace, and having collected some troops, entered Macedonia, where his army increased, and he re-conquered the kingdom in as little time as had been employed by Paulus Æmilius to subdue it. The chief feature in his character was bravery carried to intrepidity. In other respects he had all the vices of Perses, cruelty, avarice, pride in prosperity, and meanness in misfortune.

Like him, after gaining advantages, he had the imprudence to expose his crown to the hazard of a general battle. Being defeated, he was taken prisoner, and served to ornament the triumph of his conqueror. The most common opinion respecting this pseudo Philip, as he was called by the Romans, is that he was an impostor. He was followed

by two other pretenders, the last of whom also assumed the name of Philip. Like the first, he found in the hatred of the Thracians to the Romans, and the discontent of the Macedonians, resources which supported him for some time; but at length he perished in a battle. He was the last person who excited the Macedonians against their conquerors.

Macedonia became a Roman province, and in that state was happier than when it had been an ally. Such was the conduct of the Romans, that, though adorers of their own liberty, they were not fond of seeing it among others, and even persecuted those who seemed to enjoy it. But as they were well acquainted with the influence which the word liberty had over the human mind, they proclaimed it with pomp in their conquests, but imposed on it conditions and restrictions which rendered it burdensome, and even dangerous. This gave rise to quarrels between individuals and neigbouring towns, and sometimes to civil wars, in which the protecting garrisons interposed their mediation and force. In a word, their conduct gave rise to acts of defence or resistance, which were treated as revolts. The Roman armies were put in motion, the country was subdued, and the allies became subjects. After this they were treated with the greatest mildness. Those whom they entrusted with the government were strictly charged to endeavour to reconcile their new subjects to the yoke. Proconsuls who displayed incapacity were recalled, and the guilty were punished.

The vicissitudes of the kingdom of Macedonia are remarkable. It began by a colony of Argives, who formed a petty empire, in a small central spot, surrounded by barbarians, who gradually joined them, and lasted about seven hundred years. The policy of the first kings, in not declaring against Persia, made them enjoy peace, while all Greece was involved in the flames of war. Thus the treasures of the cities which were attacked flowed into Macedonia, as into an asylum; and the Persian monarchs augmented the kingdom, that they might attach it more firmly to their interest. The peace of the Macedonians was often disturbed by the jealousy of the Greek republics; but Philip attacked these republics in his turn, and got into his hands the supreme au-

thority of Greece. He made use of it to pave the way to his son for the conquest of Asia. After the death of Alexander, Macedonia was reduced to its former boundaries. It was gradually contracted by unfortunate foreign and civil wars, until, being converted into a Roman province, it returned to that diminutive extent possessed by the Argives, its founders, and it at length lost even its name, under the dominion of the Turks.

END OF VOL. IV.